



Integrating Realist Alliance Theories The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957)

Al-Ankari, Fahad

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author

For additional information about this publication click this link.

<http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/8389>

Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk

Integrating Realist Alliance Theories
The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957)

Fahad Al-Ankari

PhD

ABSTRACT

The three theories may seem to be at odds with each other, but each brings to the discussions very relevant and useful notions of alliance motivation rooted in the notions of power, threat, and interest/opportunity. It is not the aim of this chapter to arrive at a new theory that explains the entirety of Saudi-U.S. relations to the exclusion of other perspectives. The goal is to broaden the path, which enriches understanding of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment by applying not just one but all three major elements found in realist alliance theory: power, threat, and interest. This thesis examines and applies realist theories of alliance to Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment from 1941-1957, which are best understood within a structure of power, threat, and interest/opportunity for gain. Realist alliance theories applied to economic, military, and political circumstances and events in the Saudi-U.S. case result in a more complete understanding of the formation, dynamics, and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance.

In addition to the grand scenario of Cold War power-seeking and self-interests, the Palestine-Israel problem, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis made Saudi-U.S. relations, and the formation of alignment, a complicated process marked by extraordinary challenges to the interests of both states.

Gregory Gause (2007) emphasised that except for Walt's study, literature on the formation and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance is virtually non-existent. The literature review pointed to a shortage in deploying major realist alliance theories into the Saudi-U.S. alliance, especially theories advanced by Stephen Walt (1985, 1987) and Randall Schweller (1994, 1997). The literature shows that the application of realist alliance theory tends to emphasise a single dimension more than an attempt to integrate arguments from the three major theories.

The paper argues that the integration of multiple realist alliance theories in the study of the Saudi-U.S. case is more useful than studies that focus on single concepts only, such as

balance of power. The application of core elements of neorealist and neoclassical realist alliance theories creates an explanatory structure that brings a sharper focus and a more sober understanding of the basic drivers of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. By viewing the Saudi-U.S. alliance through the lens of the three major realist alliance theories, the research paper adds to the body of knowledge about the dynamics of a long-standing and critical alliance in the international economic, political, and military arena.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 General Introduction	1
<i>Background</i>	1
<i>The influence of realism in the Saudi-U.S. case</i>	2
<i>The use of realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case</i>	3
<i>Gap between academic theory and the Saudi-U.S. case</i>	3
<i>Literature review on realism and alliance theory in Saudi-U.S. relations</i>	4
Aim and purpose of the project	8
Research, methodology, and limitations	9
Project chapters	11
Chapter 2 Realist Alliance Theories	14
Introduction	14
Dueling realisms	15
Defining an alliance	18
Kenneth Waltz: Balance of power	21
Stephen Walt: Balance of threat	23
Randall Schweller: Balance of interest/opportunity	28
A framework for analysis and testing	33
Conclusion	34
Chapter 3 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1943)	35
Introduction	35
1933-1939: Prelude to relations	37
1941: Saudi Arabia was not a priority for the U.S. Government	40
1942: Saudi Arabia becomes a U.S. strategic military priority	50
1943: Positive shifts in U.S. attitudes towards Saudi Arabia	54
Conclusion	63
Chapter 4 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1944-1946)	65
Introduction	65
1944: Clearer motives for stronger relations and alignment	66
1945: Ambivalence in Saudi-U.S. relations	75
1946: Threats to the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia	89
Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1941-1946	91
Conclusion	94
Chapter 5 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1947-1948)	95
Introduction	95
1947: Saudi-U.S. relations become more complex	98
Palestine: diametrically opposite U.S. and Saudi positions	112
Realist alliance elements in the Palestine problem	130
1948: Proposals for formal alliances	133
Conclusion	140

Chapter 6 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1949-1952)	142
Introduction	142
1949: Ibn Saud's quest for Saudi military power and security	143
1950: Intensity of Saudi threat perceptions and military security	153
1951: Hurdles to U.S.-Saudi negotiations	165
1952: U.S grant aid to strengthen the alignment	169
Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1947-1952	171
Conclusion	175
Chapter 7 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1953-1955)	176
Introduction	176
1953: U.S. seeks to revitalise relations	180
Crown Prince Saud becomes the new Saudi King	185
1954: Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment in jeopardy	187
1955: Further deterioration in Saudi-U.S. relations	191
The Buraimi dispute	198
Realist alliance elements in the Buraimi dispute	214
Conclusion	218
Chapter 8 Deploying Realist Alliance Theories: The Saudi-U.S. Case (1956-1957)	219
Introduction	219
1956: Regaining Saud's trust and confidence	221
The Suez Crisis	225
Realist alliance elements in the Suez Canal crisis	233
Eisenhower searches for a strong Arab leader	235
1957: The U.S. regains Saud's trust and confidence	238
Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1953-1957	246
Conclusion	248
Chapter 9 Conclusion	249
General observations	249
Project results	250
Bibliography	254

Integrating Realist Alliance Theories **The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957)**

Chapter 1 **General Introduction to the Project**

Background

This project traces the birth and early stages of what became an enduring alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. After 9/11, Saudi-U.S. relations and the alliance came under very critical scrutiny; however, those who carried out the critique of Saudi-U.S. relations did not examine the realist basis of its origins and evolution. This thesis examines and applies realist theories of alliance to Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment from 1941-1957, which are best understood within a structure of power, threat, and interest/opportunity for gain.

After 9/11, U.S. and Western explanations resorted to convenient labels and characterisations that do not explain the realist roots and foundation of relations and the alignment between the two states. Lee Teslik (2008: par.1) described it as a “complicated alliance where oil dominates”. Matt Palmquist (2008: par. 1) characterised it as an “inconvenient alliance bound by oil polluted by profit and political quid pro quos”. David Ottaway and Robert Kaiser (2002: pars.6 &15) labelled it a “marriage of convenience”, in which America’s dependence on Saudi oil is “the best single assurance that American governments will try to preserve the alliance”. Josh Pollack (2002: 7 & 2003: 30) also labelled it as a “marriage of convenience, an ongoing transaction of economic and security relations”. Thomas Lippman (2004: 1, 5) described it as the “ultimate marriage of convenience, a bargain in which Americans gained access to Saudi oil, and the Saudis purchased American planes, weapons, construction projects and know-how that brought them modernization, education, and security”. Ellen Laipson and Emile Hokayem (2005: par. 3)

called it a “cozy security alliance”. Doug Bandow (2002: 9) viewed it as a “dubious alliance because it is not clear that America's presence increases Saudi stability”.

The influence of realism in the Saudi-U.S. case

For historical and academic reasons, the realist paradigm is highly applicable to the study of the Saudi-U.S. case. Realism dominated international politics in the years studied. Incessant competition for power and influence characterised much of the twentieth century, reflected primarily by the struggle and competition between the United States and Soviet Russia in their global ‘Cold War’. The realist core ideas of survival and insecurity, conflict, struggle and competition, fears of domination, power, and force were unmistakable features of the international conflicts that happened during the middle to almost the end of the twentieth century. Kurth (1998:29) described it as “among the most, if not the most, grand and dramatic centuries in the history of international relations”. He pointed out that in the military sphere, there were two World Wars and the Cold War; in the economic sphere, there was the Great Depression of the 1930s, the long boom of the 1950s-60s, and the oil shocks and world inflation of the 1970s (*Ibid*).

In addition to the grand scenario of Cold War power-seeking and self-interests, the Palestine-Israel problem, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis made Saudi-U.S. relations, and the formation of alignment, a complicated process marked by extraordinary challenges to the interests of both states. Given these scenarios and state interactions within the anarchic international structure, realist considerations surely dominated the deliberations of Saudi and American leaders and their foreign relations advisers.

Realism dominated liberalism and other international relations theories in academe during 1941-1957 when much of the development of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment occurred. Perhaps, realism dominated academe due to the persistent struggles and conflicts reflected in many of the events on the international political stage during those years.

Clearly, idealism/liberalism with its notions of peace and harmony of interests is difficult to fit as an explanatory tool for much of a conflicted world during that period.

The use of realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case

The frontlines of realism are its notions of power, conflict, national interest, the human condition, and force. Realist alliance theories applied to economic, military, and political circumstances and events in the Saudi-U.S. case result in a more complete understanding of the formation, dynamics, and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance. They provide more meaningful and substantial explanations that avoid reducing Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment to ‘marriage of convenience’ and ‘oil for security’ labels.

The main views of realist alliances are balance of power in the international structure (Waltz 1979), balance of threat (Walt 1987), and balance of interests (Schweller 1994, 1997). Stephen Walt’s study of Middle East alliances gave less attention to the dynamics of the Saudi-U.S. alliance and greater focus on Saudi regional alliances with neighbouring states, such as the Kings’ Alliance among Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Walt also focused on the Arab Cold War rivalries that undermined Pan-Arabism as an ideology. Kenneth Waltz and Randall Schweller have not widely deployed their theories to the Saudi-U.S. case.

Gap between academic theory and the Saudi-U.S. case

Rachel Bronson (2006b: 3) accepted the notion of oil for defense as “compelling shorthand for describing the relationship”, but one that “ignores overlapping strategic interests that drove successive Saudi kings and American administrations together”. Bronson pointed out that “so little serious work exists on the official bilateral relationship between the two states”, and that “recent books seem more intent on feeding public outrage than on seriously probing the relationship; politics and history seem all but absent from the debate over the U.S.-Saudi relationship” (*Ibid*, 5).

Bronson's contention points to a wide gap between the academic side of politics, which includes IR theory, and its application to the study of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment. Overall there seems to be a shortage of literature that specifically argues for the use and the deployment of realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case. With few exceptions, the literature does not emphasise, or utilise to any meaningful extent, realist alliance theories to explain the underlying reasons for alignment between the two states.

Literature review on realism and alliance theory in Saudi-U.S. Relations

There are works that reflect realist alliance theory in the literature about Saudi-U.S. relations. However, the literature shows that the application of realist alliance theory tends to emphasise a single dimension more than an attempt to integrate arguments from the three major theories. It also shows that authors, who use realist alliance theory to discuss the Saudi-U.S. case, tend to restrict it to a single historical event or circumstance.

Gregory Gause (2007) emphasised that except for Walt's study, literature on the formation and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alliance is virtually non-existent. Although the analysis of Saudi-U.S. relations during 1931-2002 by Josh Pollack (2002) touched on many aspects and reasons for the alliance, he did not anchor its arguments on realist alliance theories. Zachary Landau (2007) included various aspects of alliance formation in his study, but restricted his analysis to the concept of 'omnibalancing' during the 1967 Six-Day War. John Ciorciari (2005) focused on the effects of the 1967 Six-Day War on the Saudi-U.S. alliance. Realist themes often dominate the work of contemporary analysts such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (2001), Anthony Cordesman (2003, 2006, and 2007), Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman (2005), Bradley Bowman (2005), and Rachel Bronson (2006); however, there is no structured or heavy deployment of realist alliance theories into their work.

The literature cuts across a variety of approaches to discussing the Saudi-U.S. case, but rarely focused on deploying realist alliance theories. Mordechai Abir (1988) argued that the

best way of understanding Saudi motivations for the Saudi-U.S. alliance is in the frame of both internal domestic threats and external threats to Saudi security and stability. Marwan Buheiry (1989: 190) focused on the U.S. foreign policy establishment: ‘Cold Warriors’ such as Hans Morgenthau, Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles recommended decisions based on global ‘balance of power’; ‘Regionalists’ such as Dean Rusk reached decisions based on the argument that, “local problems have their own substance to be dealt with in their own terms if the U.S. is to hope for positive relationships with the local societies and their governments”; and ‘Arabists’ in the U.S. State Department who believed that it is in the U.S. national interest to improve relations with the Arab world by developing “even-handed” policies and correcting the persistent U.S. pro-Israel bias (*Ibid*, 194-195).

Michael Hudson (1996: 329) framed the U.S. role in the Middle East along the same lines as Buheiry. Hudson argued the realist position clearly. He provided brief but articulate explanations of U.S. motives in seeking Middle East alliances: “the projection of U.S. military power secured the ‘holy trinity’ of American interests: Israel, oil and anti-communism”. Hudson emphasised the dilemma of the U.S. being allied openly with Israel in the context of shared ideology while continuing to seek alliances with Arab states especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in order to protect continued U.S. and Western access to Arab oil and containing the threat of Soviet influence. Wesley Bagby (1999: 207) focused his arguments on the same U.S. motives in the Middle East: preserving secure access to Middle East oil, keeping strategic trade routes open, and deterring or excluding Soviet power. Bagby argued that these goals required strengthening Arab capabilities to resist Soviet expansion. However, U.S. support of Israel complicated U.S. efforts to gain Middle East allies.

Similar to Buheiry and Bagby, Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (2001: 7-8) argued that, “starting with Truman, U.S. administrations compromised the ability to contain communism in the Middle East because of built in dilemmas and tensions in U.S. policies that tried to

balance realism and idealism, isolationism and internationalism, unilateralism and multilateralism”. In an effort to explain such dilemmas and tensions in U.S. policies, Dobson and Marsh pointed out that “no American realist has conducted foreign affairs without celebrating the rights, liberties, and economic system of the U.S. and allowing such values to influence policy. No idealist has sustained in pristine form their principles and moral values when confronted to save the state they value (*Ibid*).

Daniel Byman and John Wise (2002: 2-8) presented limited but more focused arguments about the notion of interests and threats in the Saudi-U.S case: ensuring the free flow of oil to world markets and protecting a friendly regime against threats to its security. Similar to Abir, Byman, and Wise argued that internal domestic problems and instability in Saudi Arabia also posed a threat to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

John Miglietta (2002: 198) anchored the alliance, less on strategic military reasons, more on the economic relationship resulting from U.S. and Western oil needs and the U.S. need for Saudi political influence in gaining Arab support for the U.S. Saudi oil became vital to the goal of strengthening Western Europe against the influence of the U.S.S.R. Just as important as Saudi oil, the U.S. recognised and needed Ibn Saud’s political influence in the Arab and Muslim world. Miglietta emphasised the important role of ARAMCO, a non-state actor, in encouraging the Saudi-U.S. alignment and finding ways to help Saudi Arabia financially, regardless of U.S. legislative barriers and U.S. government bureaucracies (*Ibid*, 198-199). Miglietta also focused on ARAMCO’s role in helping Saudi Arabia during the Buraimi dispute with Britain and its allies.

M. A. Muqtedar Khan (2004: 167-174) attempted to integrate a constructivist notion with overall realist arguments. The constructive idea is that Islamic legitimacy is a symbolic value in Saudi identity as well as a strategic and security issue for the Saudis. Other than this

notion, Khan's work focused mainly on the oil and security argument, and minimally on any application or analysis of realist alliance theories to the Saudi-U.S. case.

Peter Hahn (2005: 47-49) studied the U.S. in the "crisis and crossfires of the Middle East" since 1945. Similar to the other authors, he framed his work on the notions of the geographic, strategic, and economic importance of the region in the context of oil, the proximity of the Middle East to Europe and the Soviet Union, and U.S. involvement arising from its efforts to deter Soviet influence and to promote regional and global stability. By failing to link his contentions to any alliance theory, Hahn did not fully develop his arguments regarding U.S. motives for seeking alliances in the region or Saudi motives for aligning with the U.S.

F. Gregory Gause III (2007: 119) identified two categories of threat in the Gulf region: the military strength of neighbors and foreign-inspired domestic unrest. Gause contended that the second source of threat is equally important as the first and must be part of any analysis of alliances (*Ibid*, 122).

Rachel Bronson (2006) and J.A. Lazazzero (2008) argued for the same thesis. The alliance formed due to a mutual dependency on oil; the strategic location of Saudi Arabia relative to potential conflicts and wars in the region and elsewhere; and shared ideology about the threat of godless communism during the Cold War. However, Lazazzero and Bronson still did not directly link these elements to any of the realist alliance theories.

Robert Vitalis (2007) attempted to reconstruct the Saudi-U.S. relationship as one built on U.S. capitalism and U.S. racism, and justified in the name of national interest. Vitalis' book accused the U.S. Government, ARAMCO, and the Saudi Arabian monarchy of greed, selfishness, and brute force. These are features of extreme realism, a single dimension explanation that does not fully explain relations and the alignment.

In Randall Turner's thesis (2008: 32), Saudi Arabia's uses its ideological power, religious leadership and influence, and economic power through oil to play external and internal power politics. Saudi Arabia is "a state that behaves rationally in order to ensure its very survival, and that the Al-Saud family omnibalances its internal and external conflicts by deft vacillation between religious state and political power player". Turner made brief references to Walt's work, specifically the notions of ideology and proximate power. However, he does not develop any substantial application of Walt's theory to the Saudi-U.S alliance, preferring instead to stay within the bounds of a general discussion of realism. In Edward Sylvester's thesis (2008), the U.S.–Saudi relationship is a projection of U.S. power and the alliance is a response to a complex balancing of power among Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the Southern Gulf states. Similar to Turner's thesis, Sylvester restricted his explanations to general aspects of 'power' and 'balance of power' and did not deploy any alliance theories to defend his contentions.

Aim and purpose of the project

The literature review pointed to a shortage in deploying major realist alliance theories into the Saudi-U.S. alliance, especially theories advanced by Stephen Walt (1985, 1987) and Randall Schweller (1994, 1997). This shortage or gap provides an opportunity for the student to do this qualitative research project. According to Glenn Snyder (1992 in Rothstein 1992: 84), George Liska recognised the great difficulties that analysts encounter in identifying and describing the peculiarities of alliance theory within the framework of general analysis. These often lead to a "retreat into something more manageable, such as a study of a particular alliance" (*Ibid*) and not attempt a general theory of international relations. This is what this project does. It studies a particular alliance: the Saudi-U.S. alignment. It is not an attempt at a general theory of international relations. It does not offer a new realist alliance theory.

Its aim is to arrive at a clearer and more objective explanation of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment.

The paper argues that the integration of multiple realist alliance theories in the study of the Saudi-U.S. case is more useful than studies that focus on single concepts only, such as balance of power. The application of core elements of neorealist and neoclassical realist alliance theories creates an explanatory structure that brings a sharper focus and a more sober understanding of the basic drivers of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. By viewing the Saudi-U.S. alliance through the lens of the three major realist alliance theories, the research paper adds to the body of knowledge about the dynamics of a long-standing and critical alliance in the international economic, political, and military arena.

Theoretical components of the three major realist alliance theories are evident in the formation of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. They are also evident in Saudi and U.S. behaviour and management of their relations and alignment during the Palestine problem, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez crisis. Deploying and testing the efficacy of the three theories in the Saudi-U.S. case may show which of the three emerges as a more dominant explanation for the dynamics and endurance of the alignment. The deployment may also indicate situations and issues that the balancing theses cannot explain, thus opening opportunities for future research into other realist and non-realist explanations of the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

Research, methodology, and limitations

The U.S. State Department Office of the Historian produces a credible historical record of U.S. foreign relations and policies. The paper extracted primary research data from the U.S. State Department archives on the Foreign Relations of the U.S. (FRUS). FRUS contain declassified records from the White House, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. Government sources. The student accessed de-classified documents

for 1941-1957 that the Office of the Historian categorised as documents related directly to Saudi-U.S. relations.

Official documents and communications between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are voluminous and intricate. The de-classified data include official U.S. State Department telegrams, memoranda of conversations and meetings, exchanges of diplomatic letters, and records of official and unofficial state visits. These are factual evidence and recorded details of negotiations and decisions between the U.S. State Department and the Saudi Foreign Ministry, responses of Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, and reactions of Ibn Saud and Saud to issues that impacted almost two decades of Saudi-U.S relations. The FRUS documents reviewed were not in strict chronological sequence or in exclusive thematic grouping, which made it extremely difficult to read, sort, and organise the supporting references used in this paper. For contextual purposes and ease of presentation, the paper tries as much as possible to present the data chronologically.

The paper also incorporates some material from U.S. Presidential libraries and authoritative secondary sources to support the realist themes further; and to help fill in some of the gaps in the historical narratives. Discussions in books, journals, and academic theses also provided material to compare with the primary sources and the findings of this paper.

The project draws official Saudi Arabian Government perspectives only from the FRUS documents, which is a drawback in the overall analysis.¹ Comparable official Saudi Foreign Ministry documents are extremely secret and highly classified. They are not readily accessible and require top security clearance, which the student does not have.

Through historical narratives, the paper identifies important or major themes that affected or influenced Saudi-U.S relations and alignment. The paper gives particular attention to

¹ “Sources remain hard to come by, particularly with regard to the Saudi side of things” (Jones 2006: par. 3).

motives and circumstances that surrounded the British-American rivalry for Saudi Arabia, the partition of Palestine, the Buraimi dispute, and the Suez Canal Crisis.

Project chapters

This introductory chapter presented the background, aim, and purpose of the project. Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case improves upon studies that focus only on a single alliance concept such as power or threat. An integrated approach results in a much better understanding of the underlying drivers of relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., and their motives for their alignment during the period 1941-1957.

Chapter 2 builds a framework for the analysis and test of the Saudi-U.S. case based on propositions from the realist alliance theories. The chapter discusses the common elements and the differences in alliance theory propounded by neorealism and post classical or neoclassical realism. The theories may seem to be at odds with each other, but each brings to the discussions very relevant and useful notions of alliance motivation rooted in the notions of Waltz' balance of power, Walt's balance of threat, and Schweller's balance of interest/opportunity. The paper identifies elements of realist alliance formation and alliance behaviour to be tested in the Saudi-U.S. case.

Chapters 3 and 4 begin the deployment into the qualitative research data. The discussions analyse important circumstances and events contained in declassified U.S. Department of State FRUS records during the period: 1941-1957.² The chapters explain that although an alignment had not yet clearly formed between the two states, the realist alliance notions of balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interest are already evident in their relations during 1941-1946, which are the focus years in these chapters. The chapters discuss

² Miglietta (2002: 196, 199, 200) organised his narrative of Saudi-U.S. relations into three themes and periods: oil development in early relations; political and strategic ties from 1945 to 1960; and the military relationship in the 1950s. Cordesman (2003: 105-107) organised his narrative of Saudi-U.S. relations into two themes and periods: formation of political and economic relations from 1943-1952; and focus on military relations and security from 1953-1959.

several themes that dominated relations and negotiations, which included: the subtle rivalry between the U.S. and Britain for power, position, and influence in Saudi Arabia; the U.S. quest to gain access and control of Saudi Arabia's strategic military location starting with Dhahran; a critical need for U.S. financial and economic aid to Saudi Arabia; opportunities for economic and political gains by both states from the development of Saudi oil resources; and on-going perceptions by the Saudis of external threats from their neighbouring states and internal domestic threats to the Kingdom and Saudi rule.

Chapters 5 and 6 argue that power, threat, and interest continued to interact in shaping relations and alignment, which became more complex and fragile. The informal alignment faced tests of its durability in 1947-1952, which are the focus years in these chapters. Relations and the alignment nearly collapsed because of diametrically opposite interests in the Palestine problem. It shows how the U.S. and Saudi Governments managed their relations and alignment in the context of their opposite interests in the Palestine issue. Although Palestine severely strained relations and the alignment, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia did not want to jeopardise their broader mutual economic and military interests; balancing their interests averted the collapse of relations and the alignment. The chapters discuss the durability of the alignment attributable to mutual financial-economic interests, especially in oil development. Ibn Saud continued to seek financial-economic security and stability to counteract internal threats. Mutual military interests also contributed to the durability of the alignment: the U.S. still needed the strategic military advantage of Saudi Arabia's geographical location, especially Dhahran. Ibn Saud desired to rebuild Saudi military capabilities with U.S. equipment, arms, and training; and sought to gain American assurances of protection against external threats to the Kingdom, including the early threats of Russian influence seeping into the region and changing the balance of power.

Chapters 7 and 8 analyse how mutual concerns about power, threat, and interest continued to dominate relations, negotiations, and alignment between both states during 1953-1957, which are the focus years of these chapters. Discussions focus on the Buraimi dispute, the Suez crisis, and the post-Suez environment. Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment were discordant on Buraimi and more harmonious on Suez. As British and French power and influence waned after the Suez crisis, U.S. and Saudi fears of Soviet presence and influence in the region grew. The U.S. sought to strengthen its alliance with Saudi Arabia to counteract the potential shift of the regional and global balance of power, to eliminate perceived threats posed by Egypt and the Soviets, and to protect U.S. and Western interests in Saudi and Middle East oil resources. A big challenge to the strength of the alignment arose from Nasser's push for Arab nationalism and his own hegemonic ambitions. The U.S. rushed to fill the region's power gap and decided it needed King Saud to help thwart Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism and contain the Soviets. Saudi Arabia persisted in its concerns about external and internal threats to its sovereignty and security. It stayed aligned with the U.S. because the Saudi Government perceived that the best path for the continued security and survival of the Saudi state and the Al-Saud monarchy depended on gaining even greater U.S. economic and military assistance and protection.

Chapter 9 offers the research project's conclusion. The dynamics of power shifts, threat perceptions, and interest or opportunities for gain interacted continuously in Saudi-U.S. relations and in shaping the alignment. The integrated use of realist alliance notions of power, threat, and interest brings a clearer perspective on relations and alignment motives in the Saudi-U.S. case.

Chapter 2

A Judicious Mix of Realist Alliance Theories

Introduction

Although there is no grand or comprehensive theory of alliances, the concept of alliance and its theories must be at the forefront of any analysis of relations between states.³ The three realist alliance theories discussed at length in this chapter are Kenneth Waltz' balance of power (1979, 1997), Stephen Walt's balance of threat (1985, 1987) and Randall Schweller's balance of interest/opportunity (1994, 1997, and 2002).

The three theories may seem to be at odds with each other, but each brings to the discussions very relevant and useful notions of alliance motivation rooted in the notions of power, threat, and interest/opportunity. It is not the aim of this chapter to arrive at a new theory that explains the entirety of Saudi-U.S. relations to the exclusion of other perspectives.⁴ The goal is to broaden the path, which enriches understanding of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment by applying not just one but all three major elements found in realist alliance theory: power, threat, and interest.

The chapter first establishes the reasons for employing realist alliance theories despite some apparent incompatibility among them. This is followed by a discussion of definitions of alliance before unpacking the concepts of alliance proposed by each of the three theories. The chapter reveals common elements and differences in alliance theory propounded by neorealism and post classical or neoclassical realism. The discussions identify state motives

³ George Liska spoke of international relations and the notion of alliance as so intertwined that the "two often merge in all but name" (Liska 1962:3). Glenn Snyder (1992 in Rothstein 1992: 83-84) bemoaned the "paucity of landmark studies" on alliances. He specifically mentioned only the landmark work on alliances by Liska (1962), the focus on alliance behaviour by Ole Holsti, P.T. Hopmann, and John Sullivan (1973), and the limited empirical study of alliances by Walt (1987). Snyder pointed out that alliance theory is one of the most underdeveloped and is often "ancillary to broader topics such as system structure and balance of power and lags well behind the study of crises, wars, and other manifestations of conflict between adversaries" (Snyder *op.cit.*, 83-84).

⁴ Mohammed Ayoob (2002) argued that theories "successfully explain important aspects", but "restrict radically their explanatory power because they fail to reflect fully the totality of the phenomena they purport to explain" (Ayoob 2002: 29).

for realist alliance formation and behaviour within alliances. The chapter's discussions of the history and development of realist alliance theories yield questions and parameters that guide in the deployment and testing of elements of alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case. The deliberate and careful integration of elements of the three theories into the analysis of the Saudi-U.S case in 1941-1957 will give a clearer and more objective structure to the understanding of the formation and the endurance of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment of the two states.

Dueling realisms

The three realist alliance theories are not necessarily in conflict with one another. Waltz was the starting point. Waltz did not want the use of balance of power to predict specific state actions. He proposed that because security is the ultimate concern in the international system or structure, state actors will act against real or perceived shifts in the balance of power (i.e., military capabilities) caused by other state actors.

Walt and Schweller broadened the realist perspective on alliance formation and behaviour. Walt carefully examined the balance of power argument.⁵ He was not satisfied with it as the sole explanation for states to form alliances; however, he did not abandon the realist concept of power. Walt added the balance of threat perspective to the realist alliance equation; he shifted the focus to the actions of state actors against external threat. Walt moved away from the notion of power as the only motivation for alliance and emphasised that states act more against real or perceived threat; not necessarily from only a rise in the military capabilities of another state, but from the proximity and aggressive intentions of the other state.

⁵ See Walt, S.M., 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security*, 9: 4, 3-43.

Schweller stated clearly that his perspective was one of “refining, not refuting Waltz’ balancing proposition”.⁶ Similar to Walt, he broadened the perspectives of realist alliance formation. Schweller added the notion of balance of interests, specifically the ideas that non-military gains, such as economic gain and economic security, are state interests that compel a state to balance against its concerns about military capabilities. Furthermore, instead of restricting state response only to only external threats, Schweller proposed that internal domestic threat is another valid variable to include in explaining alliance formation.

Thus, while there are differences in the emphasis of each perspective, it does not mean that concepts drawn from them are incompatible or contradictory. This project does not see serious incompatibility among the three perspectives because they share strong basic assumptions. Stephen Brooks (Brooks 1997: 446) identified these shared assumptions. They have systemic focus and are state-centric;⁷ they view international politics as inherently competitive; they emphasise material factors, rather than non-material factors such as ideas and institutions; they agree that military security is the state's prime responsibility and that relative military capacity ultimately depends on a state's productive base; and they agree that states are egoistic actors that pursue self-help.

Brooks’ discourse argued that assumptions differ between these “dueling realisms”⁸ when they explain state behaviour. He narrowed it to the possibility vs. probability difference between neorealism and post classical realism. According to Brooks, neorealism assumes that states condition their decisions in foreign relations and policy based on the mere

⁶ Schweller, R.L., 1997. “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition”. *American Political Science Review*, 91:4; 927-929. Oest noted that Schweller included complex domestic processes, which ‘act as transmission belts in response to external forces, primarily changes in relative power’ (Schweller 2004 cited Oest 2008: 5).

⁷ Waltz viewed systemic structures as “constraints that confine all states” (Waltz 1979 cited Oest 2008: 5).

⁸ Brooks, S., 1997. “Dueling Realisms: Realism in International Relations”. *International Organization*, MIT Press Summer 51:3, pp.445-477.

possibility of conflict (*Ibid*) and relentless competition for security that characterises the international system (*Ibid*, 472). Neorealism holds that rational states focus on the possibility of conflict because of the extreme potential costs of war if the state is not vigilant in defence (*Ibid*, 448). Defensive precautions are the only true assurance against aggression. Military security is the overriding priority. Thus, states always prioritise decisions to balance against the military capabilities of potential aggressors (*Ibid*). By always adopting a worst-case perspective, and heavily discounting the future, states favor short-term military preparedness over longer-term goals such as economic capacity. Neorealism expects states to always behave in this highly cautious and conservative manner. Thus, in neorealism state behaviour is rigid and unbending.

Neoclassical or post classical realism suggests that state actors condition their decisions based on the probability of conflict (*Ibid*, 446). Postclassical realism reflects some uncertainty regarding the relentless competition for security. It holds that the strength of security pressures fluctuates according to a variety of material factors besides the distribution of military capabilities, namely technology, geography, and international economic pressures (*Ibid*, 472). Postclassical realism does not assume states employ worst-case reasoning; rather states are understood as making decisions based on assessments of probabilities regarding security threats. Although states ultimately pursue power, a concept that contains an inherent tension between military security and economic capacity, neither goal is necessarily subordinate to the other (*Ibid*). Postclassical realism does not regard long-term objectives as always subordinate to short-term security requirements. Thus states trade off a degree of military preparedness if the potential net gains in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses (*Ibid*, 461). This does not suggest that in post classical realism states will never behave in a highly cautious and conservative manner, i.e. take

extensive and costly measures to ensure their military security. Thus, in post classical realism state behaviour is more flexible than that suggested by neorealism.

Other studies such as those by Kajsa Noe Oest (2008: 4) and Larry L. Watts (1998) argued that major realist alliance theories do not necessarily fit the perspectives of small states. However, both studies found that the same concepts in great power alliance formation were also operable in small state alliance formation. Oest concluded that small states act based on the importance of increased security, relative power vis-à-vis other states, non-military (typically, economic gains), and lessons learned from past security challenges.⁹ Watts questioned the relevance of realist alliance theory to small states. However, he failed to prove that factors from realist alliance formation were not operable in the small state perspective; these include state orientation towards power in the international system (i.e., states are either revisionist or status quo); state perceptions of threat; and security strategy to pursue national goals or interests.

Defining an alliance

There is no single definition that sufficiently encompasses the elements of power, threat, and interest. Realist notions of survival and security, power, threat, and interests cut across various definitions.¹⁰ The notion of alliance in this paper necessarily includes war or threats

⁹ Dan Reiter wanted to test if minor powers or small states sought alliances because of threats. As an alternative to the “changes in external threat” reason for alliance formation advanced by Walt, Reiter offered learning theory: “learning theory proposes that states make alliance policy in accordance with lessons learned from formidable historical experiences” (Reiter 1994:490). From his study, Reiter concluded that small states or minor powers in the twentieth century seek and form alliances, not because of changes in the level of threats, but because of lessons that learned from historical experience. The flaw in Reiter’s thesis is that historical experience is not a trigger but the result of factors within the international system such as shifts in the distribution of power, real or perceived external and internal threats, and interests/opportunities for gain. Perhaps, it is a better argument to say that the basic arguments posed by realist alliance theories are the triggers for a state to include the lessons of historical experience.

¹⁰ According to Liska, an alliance formalises an alignment or association among states against the threat of another more powerful state. External threat is the main cause for an alliance and Liska argued that “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something” (Liska 1962:12-13). Alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973). Dan Reiter viewed alliances as the “primary foreign policy means through which states increase their security” (Reiter 1994:490). Realism’s “focus on power and security” also places “great emphasis on alliances” as a way of acquiring power and gaining security (*Ibid*). Alliance is “an explicit agreement among

of war. However, alliance cannot be restricted to war settings.¹¹ The resulting definition is not sufficient for the Saudi-U.S. case.

The definitions most relevant to the Saudi-U.S. case are those offered by Wight, Oest, Snyder, and Walt. According to Martin Wight (1978:122), the function of an alliance is to “reinforce the security of the allies or to promote their interests in the external world”. Oest (2007: 11) defined alliance as “formal or informal explicit security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” with security as a “state’s position vis-à-vis others” based on a state’s relative capabilities” (Hansen 2000 cited Oest, *Ibid*). Oest employed Waltz’ explanation of capabilities: “territorial size, population size, military strength, economic capability, resource endowment, political stability, and competence” (Waltz 1979 cited Oest, *Ibid*).

The most representative and commonly used narrow definition of alliance is that of Glenn Snyder (1992 in Rothstein et al, 1992: 84). He initially defined alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended either for the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified”. The narrow definition emphasised that “commitments are formal, the character of the alliance is military force, and the alliance explicitly directs its cooperative action against another state or alliance” (Oest 2007: 14). Later, Snyder (1997

states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency, the arising of which is uncertain” (Bergsmann 1995:29). A military alliance can “save costs and multiply benefits through the division of responsibilities, the sharing of common assets, or the protection provided by having a stronger country as an ally” (Tertrais 2004:136).

¹¹ In discussing wartime alliance or coalition, Louis-Blaise Dumais-Lévesque defined alliance as a “formal agreement agreed upon in anticipation of a threat or benefit” (Dumais-Lévesque 2009:1). He also noted that “predatory states use alliances to increase their own power to aggress, but also to exploit the weaknesses or false sense of security that an adversary’s alliance can provide” (*Ibid*). Because he restricted his discussion of alliance to war scenarios, Dumais- Lévesque had little choice but to restrict the elements of alliance to the narrowest realist explanation: concern about security and predatory behaviour reflected in a desire to increase power for aggression against an adversary and exploitation of weaknesses in the adversary (*Ibid*, 6-10).

cited Oest 2007: 13-14) defined alliances as “formal associations of states for the use or non-use of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership”. Snyder (1997: 78) defined alliance formation as “the product of systemic anarchy, strength inequalities and conflicts and common interests among the states, and a bargaining process”.

Schweller anchored his concept of alliance on Snyder (1997 cited Schweller 2001: 238) because the definition, “does not require any institutionalization or physical commitment in the form of troops or bases”, and it “distinguishes alliance from other types of international coalitions and international organizations” (*Ibid*, 239). Snyder emphasised that alliance is the more “formal subset of the broader and more basic phenomenon, that of alignment” (1992: 85). Snyder explained alignment as “a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with other states. Such expectations arise chiefly from perceived common interests” (*Ibid*). Thus, alignment is more descriptive of the Saudi-U.S. partnership.

The most representative and commonly used wide definition of alliance is that of Stephen Walt (1987 cited Oest 2007:15). He defined alliances and alignment as “formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” and “uses the terms alignment and alliances interchangeably” (*Ibid*). Oest explained that Walt’s wide definition emphasises that commitments can be formal or informal and security defines the character of the alliance; however, the alliance does not always define against whom it explicitly directs its cooperative action (*Ibid*). In 1993, Walt redefined it is a cooperative security relationship between two or more states, usually taking the form of a written military commitment.

The chapter now looks into the main arguments of each of the three main realist alliance theories.

Kenneth Waltz: Balance of power

Waltz' balance of power is the first leg of realist alliance perspectives. Waltz believed that shifts in the balance of power in the anarchic international structure were the main impetus for alliance formation. He characterised "alliances forged and destroyed" as one of the phenomena in the international system (Waltz 1979: 67). In the context of the Middle East as a regional structure composed of constantly competing states and unpredictable shifts in power, the balance of power perspective is a very attractive tool for understanding the dynamics of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. Thus, it is vital to understand the underlying propositions of Waltz' balance of power perspective.

Balancing or Bandwagoning: Aggregation of Power

Waltz tied the notions of survival, security, and power or material capabilities to the balancing/bandwagoning approaches to alliance formation, more specifically to an aggregation of power model.¹² Waltz carefully differentiated his view of power from that of Morgenthau: "Morgenthau took power to be an end in itself; in contrast, I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and that power is one of the means to that end" (Waltz 1997: 913).¹³

The aggregation of power model holds that the weak state aggregates its material capabilities with another state or other states in order to increase individual and collective security. The weak state seeks to restore balance by leveraging its power or material capabilities, measured by its population, economic, industrial, and military resources, in an alliance with another state that likewise seeks to restore or maintain the status quo. Thus,

¹² This model traces its roots to the dominance of the power concept in Morgenthau's principles (1948, 1954, and 1985) and the defensive orientation of the balancing and bandwagoning alliance choices posed by Waltz (1979).

¹³ Adam R.C. Humphreys (2006) pointed out that Waltz's theory "does not generate inferences about whether states seek to maximize power or security, or whether they weigh the risks of cooperation and competition; only that Waltz assumes states seek to survive and infers that they will balance" (Humphreys 2006: 246).

from the balance of power perspective, a weak state such as Saudi Arabia seeks alliance or alignment because on its own it cannot check, negate, or balance against the strength or greater power of a competing or enemy state.

Aggregation of power is done through either balancing or bandwagoning. Waltz also differentiated his notion of balancing against that of Morgenthau: “for Morgenthau, balances are intended and must be sought by statesmen who produce them; for me, balances are produced whether or not intended” (Waltz 1997: 914). Waltz proposed that a state’s concern in the anarchic structure is the equal or perceived equal distribution or balance of power: “faced by unbalanced power, states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance” (*Ibid*, 915). Waltz defined balancing alliances as the forging of alliances to prevent or deter territorial occupation or military and political domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition (Waltz 1979:124-127 cited Tomashevskiy 2008:1). Waltz carefully explained that “bandwagoning and balancing are opposite responses of security-seeking states to their situations; states concerned for their security value relative gains” brought about by balancing “over absolute ones” that result from bandwagoning (*op. cit.*, 915).¹⁴

The second leg of realist alliance perspectives is Walt’s balance of threat. The next section discusses Walt’s contributions to the neorealist perspective on alliances. These include his contentions about balancing/bandwagoning; the role of power and security in determining potential levels of threat; and other alliance motives such as foreign aid, shared ideology, and transnational penetration.

¹⁴ Jack Donnelly (2005 in Burchill et al. 2005: 37-38, 42) identified three main propositions by Waltz. A state seeks its own preservation or survival and its first concern is to maintain its position in the system or a status quo distribution of power. Relative strength rather than absolute advantage is the concern of the state. The distribution or relativity of power or material capabilities in the anarchical structure pushes states to balance or seek relative gains rather than bandwagon or seek absolute gains.

Stephen Walt: Balance of threat

Stephen Walt (1985, 1987) challenged the balance of power perspectives advanced by Morgenthau and Waltz. Walt doubted that balance of power explained the formation of alliances convincingly; he saw some anomalies in the argument. Walt pointed out that some alliances grow larger and stronger; they cannot be explained by Waltz' belief that the systemic or structural pressure cause states to form balance of power alliances. Walt also observed that while the balance of power argument can explain the behaviour of great powers, it did not necessarily explain the alliance considerations of lesser states such as Saudi Arabia. Thus, this project uses this argument to propose that there are factors other than balance of power that entered the decisions of Saudi Arabia to align with the U.S. One of the factors that persisted in the Saudi-U.S. case was the strong Saudi perception of and belief in external threat and possible encirclement by neighbouring states. In the context of the Middle East regional structure, it is reasonable to posit that both balance of power and balance of threat are operable perspectives to use in explaining alliance considerations and decisions by both Saudi and U.S. Governments.

The balance of threat argument applied to the Saudi-U.S. case offers a powerful explanatory tool because the military and political history of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East region is fraught with real and perceived threat scenarios. The Saudi-U.S. alignment formed and endures because of real and perceived external threats to the survival and security of the monarchy; and similar threats to Western access to Saudi oil resources.

External Threat, Balancing and Bandwagoning

Waltz and Walt emphasised balancing and bandwagoning responses. Walt used them in the context of potential level of external threats. Walt anchored his arguments on the notion of balancing against external threat and not on shifts in the structural balance of power, which Waltz proposed. Walt contended that, rather than balancing against structural shifts in the

balance of power, states form or enter alliances to balance against threatening states. He also argued that in the threat scenario, states do not balance only against states that are more powerful. Regardless of power capabilities, if a state is perceived as a threat, other states will form alliances to counter the perceived threat.¹⁵

Walt distilled the balance of power argument for alliance formation into an “anticipatory avoidance of domination by a stronger power” (Walt 1985: 5). He saw two motives for states to balance against a stronger power. If they fail to curb the potential hegemon before it gets too strong, their survival is at risk. Weaker states have a greater need for help, so a state that joins the balancing alliance can help the other weaker states and increase its own influence among them in the alliance.

In the threat perspective, instead of power shifts, states form or join an alliance to protect against states or coalitions “whose superior resources could pose a threat” (*Ibid*, 8). States respond to threat by balancing, allying against the prevailing threat (Walt 1987:17), or bandwagoning, aligning with the source of threat or danger (*Ibid*). Theoretically, in a balancing response, states are more secure because of their aggregate power and united opposition to the threat. The alliance is more stable because there is little competition within the alliance and low expectation of allies becoming a threat to each other. Walt argued that balancing preserves most of a state’s freedom to act, while bandwagoning subordinates a state to a potential hegemon. It is also safer to balance than bandwagon because perceptions of the intentions and benevolence of a dominant state can be unreliable in bandwagoning. The state may change its intentions and its benevolence may not last for long.

Walt commented that although history tends to support the balancing theory of alliance formation, it is often suggested by many that bandwagoning is more likely. Walt explained

¹⁵ Walt tested the balance of threat theory by studying the formation and dynamics of Middle East alliances covering the period from 1955 to 1979. From that study, he concluded that balancing against a threatening state occurred more often than bandwagoning with the threatening state.

that in bandwagoning, states are attracted to strength. More power means more allies; however, if a dominant or powerful state loses power or position other states may defect to another side or become neutral. Walt contended that very weak states tend to bandwagon because they are more vulnerable to pressure from stronger and threatening states. Motives for a state to bandwagon are appeasement of the stronger power, thus avoiding an attack on the weaker state; and hopes of sharing in spoils of victory, such as gaining territory.

However, whatever capabilities a very weak state possesses are not enough to add to any alliance and can do little to affect outcomes. Another reason for bandwagoning may be the absence of states to balance with or the absence of any possible external assistance (*Ibid*, 32). Walt saw more insecurity in a bandwagoning world: much more competition and instability. Resources available to the threatening power increase, thus rewarding strong and potentially dangerous states.

Power and Security

Nevertheless, the realist notions of power and security remained at the forefront of Walt's propositions.¹⁶ Although he emphasised threat, power remained a very important underlying notion in his contention about the potential level of threat (Walt 1985:9-13). According to Walt, compared to balance of power alliance theory, identifying the sources of the potential level of threat provide a more complete picture of what statesmen consider in making alliance choices; and that all sources are likely to play a role. In the Saudi-U.S. case, the possibility of conflict with its neighbour states weighed heavily in Saudi perceptions. Walt's four measures of the potential level of threat are very evident in Saudi assessments of threat and their decisions on alignment with the U.S.

¹⁶ Wolfgang Piccoli agreed with Walt that, "in the face of external threat, states seek alliances for the primary purpose of enhancing their effective military capabilities through combination with others; military power, security interests and external threats rather than domestic factors determine states' alliance behavior" (Piccoli 1999:6). Schweller argued that domestic factors must also be considered.

Walt characterised the sources as aggregate power; proximate power; offensive power; and offensive intentions. First, the greater a state's aggregate power (its total resources reflected by its population size, industrial and military capability, technological prowess, etc.), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others. Second, because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that have proximate power pose a greater threat than those that are far away. Third, states with offensive power or large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable only of defence. Fourth, offensive intentions: states with offensive intentions or appear aggressive are likely to provoke other states to balance against them.

Shared Ideology, Foreign Aid, and Transnational Penetration

Walt did not limit his thesis on the origins of alliance to balancing against external threats. He also proposed that shared ideology, foreign aid, and transnational penetration as other possible reasons for alliance formation. However, Walt concluded that ideological compatibility, foreign economic and military aid, and foreign penetration into the domestic politics of a state were not compelling reasons for alliance formation. Shared ideology has limited relevance to the Saudi-U.S. case. However, the foreign aid and transnational penetration arguments are very relevant to the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

Shared ideology¹⁷ meant that alliances can result between states that share political, cultural, or other traits. According to Walt, scholars argue that, "the belief that ideological

¹⁷ In discussing the formation of alliances based on shared ideology, Piccoli (1991) noted Michael Barnett's constructivist twist to the notion in the context of Pan-Arabism. According to Barnett, "Arabism imprinted its mark or identity on inter-Arab security dynamics and alliance politics; and that identity explains or influences alliance dynamics in two different ways. It provides theoretical leverage over the construction of the threat, meaning a shared identity is likely to generate a shared definition of the threat; and it provides a handle on who is considered to be a desirable alliance partner, meaning identity makes some partners more attractive than others" (Barnett 1996:446 cited Piccoli 1999: 20-21). Piccoli noted that Barnett did not deploy his constructivist argument effectively in the examples he used: the Baghdad Pact and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); it resulted in supporting Walt's conclusion that shared ideology produces divisiveness and is not a strong reason for the formation of an alliance.

alliances are crucial often appears in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side or opposition to another” (Walt 1985:19). The rhetorical factor applies to times when Saudi and U.S. leaders publicly invoked shared beliefs in unity, justice, and world peace to defend the alliance. Other than this, ideological compatibility has little applicability to the evidence in the Saudi-U.S. case.

The foreign aid reason argued that the provision of economic or military assistance will create effective allies, either by demonstrating one’s own favorable intentions, by evoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor (Walt 1985:27). Foreign aid can result in an alliance if the recipient state is asymmetrically dependent on the donor state (*Ibid*, 41); or the donor state has a monopoly on the type of military or economic aid and has few domestic constraints on managing the aid (*Ibid*, 44). Walt concluded that foreign aid may be more the result of an alignment or alliance and less of a cause of its formation. The evidence in the Saudi-U.S. case strongly challenges Walt’s conclusion. Walt also contended that foreign aid could eventually result in disadvantages for the donor. As the recipient increases its capabilities, it can become less dependent on the donor. Thus, the donor loses leverage. The Saudi-U.S. case tends to support that contention. When the U.S. Government imposed arms supply and purchase restrictions on Saudi Arabia, the Saudis easily turned to other countries for purchases of military weapons and equipment from them.

Transnational penetration is the “manipulation of one state’s domestic political system by another state” (*Ibid*, 46) by using public officials with divided loyalties, lobbying, and propaganda. The Saudi lobby in the U.S. is less formidable than the Israel lobby. The U.S. ambassador, U.S. military officials, and other pro-Saudi personalities in the U.S. State Department seemed to do much of the lobbying on behalf of the Saudis. Lobbying by Saudi leaders and elites tended to be done during official state visits to the U.S.

Randall Schweller provided the third leg of the realist perspective on alliance. Schweller questioned Walt's focus on only external threats; Schweller proposed the addition of domestic factors as variables in alliance formation. The balance of interest/opportunity argument clearly has relevance to understanding the Saudi U.S. case. The alignment formed and endures despite situations where shifts in power or perceptions of external threat were not evident. Thus, the balance of interest perspective adds other elements that help to explain Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment.

Randall Schweller: Balance of interest/opportunity

Schweller's perspective on alliances returned the tougher and more calculating aspect of realist thought: "alliances are not friendships but relationships of utility based on strict calculations of self-interest; they are cooperative endeavors meaning that members concert" or aggregate "their resources in the pursuit of some common goal" (Schweller 2001: 236). In this context, the duty of government is "safeguarding their territorial frontiers, furthering the interests of their people, and, in international politics, making decisions for self-preservation and not for the survival of an ally or friend" (*Ibid*). Thus, any alliance turns on the basic concept of the other as being either a friend or an enemy. Alliances can be classified based on "purpose, size, architecture, economic, military, political, or cultural in nature, permanent or temporary, made during wartime or peacetime" (*Ibid*, 237). Schweller included other state interests such as "prestige, status, political influence, leadership, and political leverage" (Schweller 1997: 927). Schweller departed from the usual realist framework. He argued that states balance both security and non-security interests. However, when security concerns are less intense, bandwagoning for material gains is rational.

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning is a very important concept in the balance of interest/opportunity perspective on alliance. Schweller argued that his perspective on bandwagoning was

different and broader than that of Walt. Walt argued that by bandwagoning, “the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role” (Walt 1985:282).¹⁸ Schweller concluded that states bandwagon more than they balance.

Schweller pointed out that his definition of bandwagoning is similar to that of Waltz.

Bandwagoning is “siding or being allied with the stronger state or coalition; bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing, i.e., bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition; balancing means allying with the weaker side” (Schweller 1997:927). According to Schweller (1994), balancing aims at self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed or being a status quo state. Bandwagoning aims at obtaining values coveted or being a revisionist state.

Schweller argued that Walt “redefined bandwagoning as ‘alignment with the source of danger’ in order to retain the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy and to make it fit Walt’s balance-of-threat framework” (*Ibid*). Schweller argued against combining bandwagoning and capitulation and against assuming that balancing and bandwagoning have the same goal of promoting security. Schweller argued that Walt’s view of bandwagoning, which is capitulation to a threatening or more powerful state, is too narrow. Schweller criticised Walt for “confusing bandwagoning with strategic surrender and viewing bandwagoning solely as a response to threat” and pointed out that Walt “ignores the primary motivation for bandwagoning, namely, the expectation of profit and easy gains” (*Ibid*). In Schweller’s view, a bandwagon alliance is not necessarily only a response to threat; it can be a response to an opportunity to change things. In the absence of threat, Schweller believes that a bandwagoning strategy envisions an opportunity to gain values or interests not yet possessed.

¹⁸ Similar to Walt, John Mearsheimer (2001) believed that bandwagoning is usually a bad idea because it is capitulation to the stronger or first state by the third party.

Thus, Schweller's thesis is not a realist zero-sum game since one state's gain is another state's loss.

Another argument advanced by Schweller is that alliance literature is incorrect in treating balancing and bandwagoning as mutually exclusive. Borrowing Waltz' notion of balancing through internal and external means, Schweller argued that, a threatened state can bandwagon with the "stronger or more dangerous side in order to redirect the threat elsewhere and gain time, space, and resources" (Schweller 2001: 250). This is the notion of internal balancing. Threatened states can attempt, on their own, to mobilise their national resources by internal balancing to match their challengers or form alliances against the threatening state or alliance by external balancing or do both.

Although Schweller tried hard to differentiate his approach from that of classic realism and neorealism, he still relied on both when he gave his six assumptions about effective balancing between states. The primary goal of states is survival; states are keenly aware of changes in the distribution of capabilities or balance of power. States respond quickly and decisively to changes in the balance of power. States have the capacity to project defensive and offensive military power. States see war as a tool of statecraft, but a tool of last resort; and there are no handicaps such as ideology, religious affiliation, or territorial disputes (*Ibid*).

Revisionist vs. Status Quo States

The notion of revisionist and status quo states is also important in understanding Schweller's perspective on alliance. Alliance goals in Schweller's thesis depend on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of states with their relative capabilities. Dissatisfied or revisionist states seek gains and enter alliances as "a response to perceived opportunity for profit and aggrandizement and where benefits outweigh costs" while satisfied or status quo states seek to prevent or minimise losses and join an alliance as "a response to threat" and an undertaking "in expectation of costs" (Schweller 2001: 239).

Seen in this context, Schweller did not disconnect from the notions of power or threat. He argued that motivations that push all states into alliances are to gain “greater brute force”; coercive power”; and a “voice” in effecting or preventing some international change (*Ibid*). In brute force, status quo states defend against and defeat aggressors; revisionists take territory from others. In coercive power, status quo states strengthen their capabilities to deter and contain aggression; revisionists bully other states into making territorial and institutional adjustments. In voice opportunity, both status quo and revisionist states have the opportunity in their respective alliances to modify the behaviour of their allies, manage rivalries, manage the rise of a dissatisfied power, and gain leverage in bargaining, especially with stronger states (*Ibid*, 240).

Defensive Alliance

Schweller identified three motivations for a defensive alliance. First, alliance by a state with other states results in an aggregation of capabilities or power and, based on the sheer strength of the alliance, the state seeks to deter or defend against an external threat. Second, a state joins an alliance to enhance the state’s internal security or domestic political stability, i.e., membership in the alliance empowers the state to discourage dissidents, legitimise the existing regime, or suppress internal disorder (Schweller 2001: 240-241). Third, a state sees an opportunity of managing threat by restraining, controlling, or binding a rival’s actions.¹⁹

By including internal threats in his alliance thesis, Schweller differed substantially from Walt who anchored his perspective on external threats. Schweller argued that internal threat was as vital a component that of external threat. Schweller said little about offensive

¹⁹ Schroeder argued that “all alliances in some measure function as pacts of restraint (*pacta de contrahendo*), restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliances themselves” and that, “alliances were frequently employed in order to group and conciliate an opponent in the interest of managing the system and avoiding overt conflict” (Schroeder in Knorr 1976: 231). In contrast to Schroeder, Schweller added the argument that a state forms or joins an alliance for self-protection, meaning survival, and to avoid loss of values or interests already possessed, meaning security.

alliances, commenting only that motivations are “conquest and maximization of one’s share of the spoils of victory” (Schweller 2001:243).

A crucial aspect in the Saudi-U.S. case is that Saudi concerns about external security could not be easily separated from their concerns about internal security.²⁰ Thus, the notion of threat from the Saudi perspective was almost always a combination of both external and internal threat. This created disturbances in the Saudi-U.S. alignment. U.S. officials tended to ignore or minimise external threats. Even when the U.S. Government weighed the Saudi perceptions of external threats, the U.S. tended to disconnect them from the persistent internal threats that the Saudi Government and leaders feared.

In the context of whether the Saudi-U.S. alignment helped or hurt the monarchy, consideration of internal threats is extremely relevant to the Saudi-U.S. case. Ibn Saud, Saud, and Feisal faced dilemmas between Saudi Arabia’s need for U.S. economic and military assistance vis-à-vis Saudi sovereignty and independence and the security and stability of the Al-Saud rule. The Saudi kings faced internal threats of instability arising from dissatisfaction with Saudi Arabia’s dependence on the U.S., which strongly supports Israel. ***Entrapment and Abandonment***

In the Saudi –U.S. case, fears of entrapment and abandonment are very relevant to the Buraimi dispute. Using Glenn Snyder’s argument, Schweller explained entrapment as a state being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that a state does not share or shares only partially. Abandonment is when an ally re-aligns, de-aligns, or simply fails to live up to its treaty commitments when called upon to do so (*Ibid*, 248). Both fears create dilemma in an alliance. On one hand, a state that does not share an ally’s interest in a conflict can give a firm commitment to join or support the ally in the conflict; however, this can increase the fear

²⁰ Ayooob argued that most neorealists do not recognise and fail to explain that both interstate threats and internal domestic threats are significant determinants of state behaviour in international relations (Ayooob 2002: 35-36). He offered the notion of “subaltern realism”, a notion he believed is better suited for understanding international relations of Third World and dependent states (also see Ayooob 1991: 257-283).

of entrapment and further increase the enemy's hostility. On the other hand, to avoid entrapment by a weak commitment increases the fear of abandonment and can strengthen the resolve of an enemy.

From the chapter's discussions of the major propositions advanced by Waltz, Walt, and Schweller, the project constructs a framework for analysis and testing of the Saudi-U.S. case in chapters 3 to 8.

A framework for analysis and testing

Guiding propositions of realist alliance theories:

Waltz: Faced by unbalanced power in the structure, states try to increase their own strength or ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. Bandwagoning and balancing are opposite alliance responses of security-seeking states to their situations; states concerned for their security value relative gains from balancing over absolute ones from bandwagoning.

Walt: States form alliances to counteract external threat. States respond to external threat by balancing: allying against the prevailing threat; or bandwagoning: aligning with the source of threat or danger. States balance more often than they bandwagon. A shift in the balance of power is only one source of threat. The levels of threat come from one or all of the following: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive power, and offensive intentions. Regardless of power capabilities, if a state is perceived as a threat, other states will form alliances to counter the perceived threat. Alliances can arise from shared ideology, foreign military and/or economic aid, and a goal of penetration of the state's domestic political system.

Schweller: Alliances are not friendships but relationships of utility based on strict calculations of self-interest; they are 'cooperative endeavors' in that their members concert or aggregate their resources in the pursuit of some common goal. Governments make decisions

for self-preservation and not the survival of a friend or ally. The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed or being a status quo state.

However, states bandwagon more than they balance. Bandwagoning aims at obtaining values coveted or being a revisionist state. The expectation of profit and easy gains provide an incentive for states to bandwagon. State motives can also include interests in prestige, status, political influence, leadership, and political advantage.

Guiding Questions for analysis of the Saudi-U.S. case:

Balance of Power: Was there a perceived, anticipated, or real shift in the balance of power? Did the states balance, bandwagon, or stay neutral? Was the result beneficial or detrimental to the states?

Balance of Threat: Was there a perceived, anticipated, or real threat? Did the states balance, bandwagon, or stay neutral? Was the level of threat caused by concerns about aggregate power, proximate power, offensive power, perceived aggressive intentions, or all of them? Did alliances form because of ideological similarity, bribery through foreign aid, or a desire for penetration in the other state's domestic system?

Balance of Interest/Opportunity: Did internal domestic threats cause the formation of the alliance? Did the state balance internally or externally or do both? If there was no shift in balance of power and no threat of war, what other interest and/or opportunity for profit or gain did the state perceive? Did the state get what it wanted?

Conclusion

It was not the purpose of this chapter to unfold or argue the theoretical advantages and shortcomings of each theory. The purpose was to identify common, as well as unique, elements that will be useful in analysing the Saudi-U.S. alignment. All three alliance theories agree that survival and security are the goals of alliance, alliances yield benefits, and that states have the choice to balance, bandwagon, or stay neutral.

A state's decisions to form or join an alliance or align with another state, and the behaviour of a state within the alliance or alignment, can move along or within the entire realist spectrum of power, threat, or other interests/opportunities. These three concepts are not mutually exclusive. Thus, alliance motivations can spring from all three. They produce balancing alliances, bandwagoning alliances, or no alliance meaning staying neutral. Only by integrating all three elements of power, threat, and interests/opportunities, can a state's alliance decisions be analysed and explained more satisfactorily. Within that spectrum, one can analyse if a state's alliance decision is based on elements such as defensive or offensive responses to shifts in power within a system or structure; defence or offence against threats; alliances based on brute force and coercive force; alliance because of interests or perceived opportunities for gain or profit.

Clearly, the study of the Saudi-U.S. alliance formation and the behaviour of both states within the alliance need to take into consideration aspects from all three theories: balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interests/opportunities. Stated another way, the study of realist alliance formation and behaviour in the Saudi-U.S. case is far more credible if it is multi-dimensional and incorporates state motives arising from power, external and internal threats, and interests/opportunities in the military, political, and economic sphere.

Chapter 3

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1943)

Introduction

This chapter begins the deployment of the three realist alliance theories into the official FRUS data. The deployment of key elements from the theories contributes to understanding the formation and endurance of the Saudi-U.S. alignment more systematically and more clearly. The empirical data disclose that realist considerations by U.S. and Saudi leaders and

officials dominated these early formative years. Diplomatic exchanges between the two states and discussions among the U.S. Department of State and its officials in Washington, Egypt and Saudi Arabia reflect realism more so than idealism/liberalism or other IR theories. Thus, the deployment of the realist paradigm in general and realist alliance theories in particular yields clearer perspectives on alliance or alignment considerations and decisions by American and Saudi leaders and government officials.

The years 1941-1946, which are the focus years of chapters 3 and 4, are the early formative years when relations and an alignment began to take shape. The chapters explain that although an alignment had not yet clearly formed between the two states, realist alliance notions of balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interest are already evident in their relations and early thoughts about alignment. They included the subtle rivalry between the U.S. and Britain for power, position, and influence in Saudi Arabia. Both states understood the importance of Saudi Arabia's military strategic location and the growing importance of Saudi oil resources. The U.S. wanted to gain access to and control of Saudi Arabia's strategic military location represented by the Dhahran Airfield. For the U.S., access to and control of Saudi oil and Saudi Arabia's strategic location for war and post-war needs were its overriding motives for seeking alignment with Ibn Saud. U.S. control of Saudi oil was an opportunity to gain more economic and political power, and access to Saudi territory enhanced its strategic military and commercial advantage over Britain and Russia.

The financial and economic stability of his Kingdom was the compelling need for Ibn Saud to move towards alignment with the U.S. Acquiring increased sums of U.S. foreign financial and economic aid, in order to build up its financial and economic capabilities, was the most important motivation for Saudi Arabia to move towards alignment with the U.S. Technological advances in the development of Saudi oil resources presented opportunities for substantial financial, economic, and political gains by both states. Militarily, Ibn Saud saw

the U.S. as a potential partner that could help to protect and to secure the Kingdom against external threats from neighbouring states and against internal domestic threats to the Kingdom and Saudi rule.

The first section briefly explains two important predicates to the evolution of Saudi-U.S. relations in 1941-1946. First, U.S. Government isolationist policies, in the years before World War II, limited U.S. Government involvement in Saudi Arabia and the Near East. Second, U.S. Government interests in financial, economic, and political matters in Saudi Arabia relied largely on 'oil diplomacy' through which American oil companies were the frontline of relations with Ibn Saud. Thus, Ibn Saud's relations during this period were with American business primarily and not with the U.S. Government.²¹ These positions began to change with the onset of World War II.

1933-1939: Prelude to relations

U.S. Isolationism

Roosevelt became U.S. President in 1933. Global economies were in shambles because of the Great Depression.²² Two opposing views of American national interests and foreign policies faced Roosevelt: isolationism and expansionism²³ (Cole 1995: 3). Keeping the nation out of the escalating tensions in Europe and Asia became a key U.S. foreign policy goal. However, Roosevelt's foreign policies became increasingly internationalist and

²¹ In U.S. policy prior to World War II, "a good case could be made in favor of a high degree of political passivity, not out of genuine strategic disinterest for Saudi Arabia, but to leave the stage to diplomatically less conspicuous private actors as long as possible" (Pustelnik & Lusic 2009: 11). They argued that "the evolution of America's relationship with Saudi Arabia is a classic example of strategic entry to gain control of a vital resource by phasing into a market with private activity preceding political intervention" (*Ibid*).

²² The Great Depression began with the U.S. stock market crash in October 1929; it ended in December 1941 when the U.S. entered World War II hostilities. Massive U.S. industrial production of materials for war jump-started the U.S. economy.

²³ Isolationists believed in non-intervention overseas and rejected foreign entanglements. Expansionists believed in looking internationally for the development of business and growth of capitalism. The isolationist movement of the 1930s argued that the U.S. should remain neutral, avoid financial dealings with countries at war, and thus avoid engagement in future wars. The U.S. Congress legislated neutrality acts to try to prevent U.S. engagements in international conflict.

interventionist (*Ibid*) as pressure escalated for Roosevelt to help the U.S. ally Great Britain²⁴ in the war raging in Europe. Roosevelt remained under pressure to stay out of active engagement in World War II; and to focus on defending the U.S. within the confines of U.S. territory. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. naval and air bases at Hawaii's Pearl Harbor. At that moment, realist concerns about survival and security, military power, territory and spheres of influence gripped Roosevelt and the U.S. Roosevelt had no choice but to lead America into World War II.²⁵ America's isolationism ended.

American interests in Saudi oil

The U.S. Government entered the Saudi Arabian stage to protect private American business interests in the development of Saudi oil. Realist motives found in the theories of Schweller and the theories of Walt are applicable this early in the discussions. There were opportunities for massive economic gains for both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia if the Americans controlled Saudi oil exploration and development. The U.S. stood to lose those opportunities if Saudi Arabia came under the control of the Axis Powers, or Britain, a great power and U.S. ally. The denial of U.S. access to the material capabilities provided by Saudi oil and territory would seriously damage any U.S. aspirations for power, influence, and prestige in the Kingdom and the region.

Despite bids by Germany, Japan, and Britain, Ibn Saud granted Standard Oil Company (SOCAL) a sixty-year oil concession.²⁶ SOCAL and its affiliate in Saudi Arabia, California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), the forerunner of Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO), led the efforts to convince the U.S. Government to take a more active role in

²⁴ Rosmaita explained why Roosevelt decided to aid Britain. Roosevelt fervently maintained that the threat of fascism was not limited to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of European nations; it also threatened the elaborate extra-territorial empires of the major European powers. Roosevelt concluded that the U.S. had an inherent obligation to actively aid Britain (Rosmaita 1994: pars.4-5).

²⁵ World War II gave the U.S. "economic and political weapons to start rearranging remnants of old European empires into American-style world order" (Gardner 2009: 17).

²⁶ Ibn Saud granted the concession in exchange for sixteen percent of SOCAL's revenues because of his desperate needs for capital (Hahn 2005: 1925).

the protecting their business interests in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Government agreed to extend official government protection and established official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1933.

In 1939, Bert Fish²⁷ recommended to Secretary of State Cordell Hull²⁸ that the U.S. Government open a legation office in Jidda to handle diplomatic matters with Saudi Arabia. A U.S. diplomatic office in Saudi Arabia could communicate faster on issues affecting U.S. interests in the Kingdom. Fish perceived dangers to U.S. business interests and American citizens in Saudi Arabia if the Axis Powers Germany, Italy, and Japan gained a foothold in the Kingdom;²⁹ or if Britain increased its power and influence there. Fish told Hull that, “the King believes the Japanese, Italians and Germans, have in mind additional territory as well as oil concessions; and the King feels that to grant the [British] Petroleum Development, Ltd. another concession would give the British a further grip on his country” (U.S. Department of State, 1939. FRUS diplomatic papers, the Far East; the Near East and Africa, Volume IV, Saudi Arabia: 124.90F/11 June 21 Fish telegram to Hull: 827).

Britain was the great power and influence in the Middle East. Relative to British power and influence in the Near East, the U.S. was a rising power in competition with Britain for influence with Ibn Saud; and later for power and influence in the region. In contrast to the U.S. Government’s hands off approach, the British Government continued to wield its

²⁷ Bert Fish, a political appointee of Roosevelt served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Egypt from September 6, 1933 and concurrently as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia from August 7, 1939. His official duties in both states ended on February 28, 1941 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

²⁸ Cordell Hull served as U.S. Secretary of State from March 4, 1933 to November 20, 1944. A firm believer in former U.S. President Wilson’s vision of liberal internationalism, Hull believed that free trade promoted international peace and prosperity. Hull was the longest-serving U.S. Secretary of State; however, Franklin D. Roosevelt limited Hull’s role in foreign policy greatly (*Ibid*).

²⁹ A German advance through the Middle East would capture or at least deny to the Western allies the Suez Canal and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf region (Hahn, *op.cit*).

colonial approaches directly on all fronts.³⁰ The British had both material and political capabilities to deal with threats in the region.

1941: Saudi Arabia was not a priority for the U.S. Government

In 1941, Saudi Arabia was not yet a military or political priority for the U.S. Government.³¹ The U.S. Government did not seem to have deep concerns about its power, position, or opportunities in Saudi Arabia or the region. There were no significant threats to the U.S. there. Despite agreements to cooperate with each other in Saudi Arabia, a rivalry developed between Britain and the U.S. when the U.S. Government wanted access to and control of Saudi Arabia's strategic location in the region and Saudi Arabia's oil resources.³² Ibn Saud shrewdly recognised how he could manipulate this growing rivalry to gain vital financial, economic, and perhaps even military aid from the U.S. Foreign aid for Ibn Saud was needed immediately as the Saudi state faced a severe financial crisis. Ibn Saud faced a sudden precipitous drop in the Kingdom's income. World War II interrupted oil development; the revenue from religious pilgrimages to Mecca shrunk substantially; and a drought exacerbated the Kingdom's problems (Philby 1955; Safran 1988: 60; Al-Nafjan 2009: chapter 7).

³⁰ The British were in the "habit of thinking in terms of imperial and global responsibilities" (Peterson 1986: 77). Britain acquired strongholds in the region because of British emphasis on the security of routes to India and the fulfillment of British obligations to its colonies (*Ibid*).

³¹ See Chapter 7 in Al-Nafjan, F., 2009. *The Origins of Saudi-American Relations: from Recognition to Diplomatic Representation (1931-1943)*. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, Inc. S.A.L.

³² John Peterson (1986) characterised America's entry into the Middle East as an "intrusion that revolved around oil and penetration of the Gulf fields", followed by a "bare-faced attempt to create a political and strategic presence in Saudi Arabia" (Peterson 1986: 112). The formation of Saudi-U.S. relations arose from "the special role played by ARAMCO in Saudi development, the erstwhile American military presence at Dhahran, and the burgeoning U.S. arms sales and training teams" (*Ibid*, 117). One can restate Peterson's argument: the Saudi-U.S. alignment was brought about by a struggle for power between the U.S. and Britain; the U.S. used ARAMCO, a non-state actor, to bring further opportunities for economic gain to both the Saudi and American states; and the U.S. Government used Dhahran and U.S. military aid, a form of foreign aid, to strengthen Saudi military capabilities and gain favour with Ibn Saud.

Financial crisis for Ibn Saud

These deep financial difficulties triggered Ibn Saud to ask CASOC for help. He maintained close relations with American oil companies. In order to relieve financial pressures on the Saudi state and his rule, Ibn Saud asked CASOC to advance and to increase oil royalties, which in turn placed great financial pressures on American oil companies. They feared for their own stability and survival. The American oil companies turned to the U.S. Government for help. U.S. Government financial help for Ibn Saud meant relieving financial pressures on the American oil company in Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud chose political and military neutrality in World War II. If, as a condition of extending financial assistance to Ibn Saud, the U.S. Government wanted Saudi Arabia as an ally for the war efforts, Ibn Saud did not have any significant material capabilities to add to such an alliance. The next section explains why Ibn Saud did not have significant material capabilities to offer or to aggregate into any alliance for war efforts during these years.

Ibn Saud had no material capabilities for war

Without significant material capabilities, internal threat to Saudi unity troubled Ibn Saud persistently. Without unity, his state apparatus would crumble rapidly. According to Nadav Safran, Ibn Saud's basic security problem was having only "limited means to keep the Kingdom unified in the face of many armed tribes" (Safran 1988: 59). Ibn Saud became "a focal point, a centre of mediation, decision, and policy-making, and a source for handouts, gifts, and largesse (Al-Rasheed 2002: 218). In terms of human resources, the Saudi population was sparse and nomadic. Because of the arid nature of the Arabian Peninsula, the inhabitants of the area were pastoral nomads or Beduins that formed into scores of clans and tribes³³ that engaged in pastoral nomadism and oasis agriculture. He faced problems in water

³³ These tribes and their clans grew to dominate the area culturally and politically (Maisel and Shoup 2009: xxv-xxvi); the hereditary leaders of important Beduin tribes wielded political influence. Among the major tribes

supply, agriculture, health, education, transportation, and communication systems. Ibn Saud believed that modernisation would result in national unity and allegiance to his central government. Fahad Al-Nafjan (2009) explained that, eventually, Ibn Saud had no choice but to look outside the Kingdom for resources “to improve living conditions and modernise but not disturb social and religious patterns of Saudi life” (Al-Nafjan 2009: chapter 7).

Ibn Saud did not have military power because he destroyed his once powerful military forces. According to H. St. John Philby (1955), the Ikhwan movement “ensured the easy and rapid mobilisation of a powerful force inspired by a fanatical ideal” and the Ikhwan forces had helped Ibn Saud to become the “acknowledged master of Central Arabia” (Philby 1955: 265). However, with the help of the British, he crushed his forces in the 1927-1930 Ikhwan Rebellion.³⁴ British control of Transjordan and Iraq prevented Ibn Saud from gaining additional northern territory (Miglietta 2002: 195). The Ikhwan wanted to pursue *jihad* into those British protectorates. This challenged Ibn Saud’s authority and created problems for him with Britain. The British did not tolerate violations of the borders they set up after World War I (Cooper and Yue 2008: 272). Safran explained that “the British did not trust Ibn Saud’s ability to prevent Ikhwan raids; Ikhwan plotters succeeded in provoking conflict with Iraq and the British by depicting Ibn Saud as a frightened and weak leader in the face of infidels” (Safran 1988:51), which aroused the anger of the Najdi of Saudi Arabia. Metz pointed out that the Ikhwan rebellion reflected Ibn Saud’s lack of hesitation in using an ‘iron fist’ to quell any internal problems: “When the Wahhabi forces continued to ignore his

were the Anayzah (the Al Saud clan belongs primarily to this tribe), Bani Khalid, Harb, Al Murrah, Mutayr, Qahtan, Shammar, and Utaiba (Metz 1992b: pars.1-2). Madawi Al-Rasheed attributed the revival of Saudi rule in the early twentieth century and the evolution of the Saudi emirate into a full-fledged state to the fact that it “did not have a clear or obvious association with a tribal confederation” (Al-Rasheed 2002: 38) and the emirate was politically centralised (*Ibid*). Nation-building in Saudi Arabia happened in the 1910s and 1920s through a series of conquests and alliances that brought disparate tribes under one, increasingly national umbrella. Construction of the Saudi state happened after Ibn Saud unified the nation in the early 1930s. The state apparatus could not be built until there was national unity (Kamrava 2011: 68).

³⁴ Also see Leatherdale, C., 1983. *Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: the Imperial Oasis*, pp.93 ff., in which he discussed the Ikhwan rebellion in the context of problems caused by artificial frontiers.

authority, he waged a pitched battle and defeated them” (Metz 1992: par. 4). Ibn Saud annihilated the Ikhwan military forces because the soldiers “had become homicidal religious militants who refused to accept life in the modern world and peaceful relations with the West” (Weston 2008:142). Manea characterised Ibn Saud’s conflict with the Ikhwan as the catalyst for Ibn Saud’s realism and his reliance on foreign powers for survival and security.³⁵

The only meaningful resource Ibn Saud could offer foreign powers was Saudi oil. However, his oil resources were not yet well developed and CASOC, an American oil company, already held the Saudi oil concession. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud believed that he could use the importance of the Saudi oil business to CASOC in order to leverage his need for direct financial assistance from the U.S. Government.

Ibn Saud used his friendship with American oil executives

Ibn Saud asked his friend, CASOC President Fred Davies, to open the dialogue with the U.S. Government about direct financial assistance.³⁶ Davies asked Bahrein Petroleum Chairman James Moffett, a personal friend of Roosevelt, to present Ibn Saud’s situation to Roosevelt. Moffett described Ibn Saud’s desperate financial situation and need for direct financial help to keep his kingdom afloat, stable, and independent and to preserve his prestige and influence in the Arab world (United States Department of State FRUS 1941, 890F ~1/481 April 16 Moffett memorandum to President Roosevelt: 624-625). It was in this context that U.S. financial aid to Saudi Arabia became a catalyst for Saudi-U.S. relations. The following discussions trace the reasons for this, why there were lengthy and tedious deliberations and negotiations about it, and the impact on relations and the eventual formation of the alignment.

³⁵ Accepting the Ikhwan’s demand would have meant a confrontation with Britain and a possible loss of the land already captured by the Saudi army. When the Ikhwan leaders rebelled, he turned to the British for military help to defeat his own army. His victory marked the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s realist approach in its external relations. It was also the beginning of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign powers to guarantee its national security (Manea 2005b: par.8).

³⁶ Oil company officials were a significant influence on the U.S. Government to extend aid and support for Ibn Saud (Miglietta 2002: 22)

U.S. reticence on direct foreign aid to Saudi Arabia

The U.S. deferred to Britain for action in helping Ibn Saud directly.³⁷ The U.S. believed that Britain still wielded more power and influence in Saudi Arabia and other states in the region.³⁸ Thus, instead of direct assistance, the U.S. Government opted to use a U.S. lend-lease³⁹ program for British war needs and “channel \$10 million to Ibn Saud as part of a \$425 million U.S. wartime loan to Britain” (Vitalis 2003:4-5).

Several military considerations also influenced the U.S. decision. Ibn Saud was neutral in the war; he was not under threat of invasion by the Axis Powers; and he was not actively engaged in any of the hostilities. Saudi geography and territory were not yet critical for U.S. military purposes in the war. There were other intertwined political concerns on sending U.S. financial aid to the Saudi state: Ibn Saud’s standing in the Arab world; his friendly relations with Britain, recognised as the great power in the area; and the possibility, albeit remote, of Ibn Saud shifting to the Axis Powers.⁴⁰

Realist considerations of British power, external threats of the Axis Powers gaining a foothold in Saudi Arabia, and Ibn Saud’s political standing and influence among Arabs were integral to U.S. Government deliberations and consultations with Standard Oil Company

³⁷ To combat pro-Axis tendencies of Moslem states, Britain reintroduced its subsidy programs in 1940. Saudi Arabia received £100,000 in 1940, £1,000,000 in 1941, and £3,000,000 in 1942 (Leatherdale 1983: 338).

³⁸ Through 1939, Washington regarded the Middle East as a European sphere of influence where U.S. interests were served better by private investment in the region’s oil than by public involvement in regional affairs (Hogan 1996: 464). Despite the strong position of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt considered the Kingdom within the British sphere of interest (Palmer 1999: 25).

³⁹ The lend-lease program became the “material and ideological bridge to the Middle East and U.S. dominance there (Gardner 2009: 29).

⁴⁰ There were more than casual contacts between Saudi Arabia and Germany. In 1937, both had direct contacts about the Palestine issue and the Saudis wanted the Germans to have diplomatic representatives in Jidda (Schreiber, et al 1995: 169). In 1938, the Saudis offered to buy modern weapons from the Germans (*Ibid*; also see Wagner 2008: 65); and in 1939, “Ibn Saud wanted moral support against British pressure, material assistance in the form of arms supplies, and a friendship and trade agreement” (*Ibid*, 170). Ibn Saud’s special envoy to Germany, Khalid A- Hud, told the Germans that S.A. had a natural hostility to Britain because “she was constricting Arab living space” (*Ibid*, 172). Hitler agreed to provide active assistance in the form of military arms and materiale. Germany recognised and understood Saudi Arabia’s importance as a strategic base from which to spread German propaganda against the British; and an enormous opportunity for German and Saudi economic and commercial development because of Saudi petroleum resources (Al-Nafjan 2009: chapter 2). Hitler declared himself “the friend of the Arabs” (Murawiec 2005: 176) because Saudi Arabia and Germany had “a shared hatred of the Jews, which initiated the friendship between Hitler and Ibn Saud” (*Ibid*).

representatives about proposals for direct financial assistance to Ibn Saud. Wallace Murray, Chief of the U.S. Department of State Near East Division (NEA), suggested to Hull that a “good case can be made out in favor of granting him financial support” because of Ibn Saud’s political influence in the Arab world, his support of Allied efforts in World War II, and the intimate and friendly relations of Ibn Saud with the British (United States Department of State FRUS 1941, 89OF.51/48~ April 21 Murray memorandum to the Secretary of State:627-628). Max Thornburg, vice-president of Bahrein Petroleum, pointed out to the NEA that Ibn Saud’s loyalty to the British would “continue so as long as he felt that his interests lay in that direction”; however, Ibn Saud put his “own interests first”, and that “if he saw it was to his advantage to play along with the Axis powers he would undoubtedly do so” (*Ibid*, 890F.6363 April 29 Ailing memorandum on conversation with Standard Oil Co: 630).

Alexander Kirk⁴¹ emphasised to Hull that direct U.S. financial assistance to Saudi Arabia meant the Saudi state would align with the U.S. politically and militarily; and that other Arab states might soon follow. That would remove the threat of Saudi Arabia aligning with the Axis Powers or allowing the British to gain more advantage and influence in Saudi Arabia and other states in the region (*Ibid*, 890F.51/23 June 26 Kirk telegram to Hull: 639; *Ibid*, 890F.51/29 July 23 Kirk telegram to Hull: 640).

Part of Moffett’s proposal was for the U.S. Government to loan funds to Ibn Saud and the use future Saudi oil or Saudi ‘oil in the ground’ as collateral for the loan (*Ibid*, 890F51/31 May 10 Murray memorandum to Hull: 633). Roosevelt remained unconvinced of making the loan despite the offer of oil as collateral. The U.S. believed that Saudi oil was not useful for military purposes. William Knox, the U.S. Navy Secretary argued that Saudi oil was of lower grade and unusable by the U.S. Navy (*op.cit*, 890F.51/31 May 20 Knox memorandum

⁴¹ Alexander Kirk was the U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia from February 21, 1941 to July 18, 1943 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

to Roosevelt: 635-636). The lend-lease act that passed in March 1941 gave Roosevelt authority to extend aid to any country vital to U.S. defence and national security; however, the U.S. Congress authorised lend lease assistance for 'democratic allies' only. Thus, Roosevelt could not use lend-lease because Saudi Arabia at that time was not vital to U.S. defence and national security; and was not a democratic ally of the U.S. (U.S. Senate Report 1975: chapter 1).

Sensing that technical and commercial issues stalled American deliberations, the British seized the opportunity to exert political pressure on the U.S., play one-upmanship, and gain influence with Ibn Saud. The British announced an increase in subsidies to Ibn Saud from £800,000 to £1,000,000 (*Ibid*, 890F.51/21 May 29 Murray memorandum to Hull and Eerie: 637); and that the ten million riyals minted in India for Ibn Saud would be given to him without charge; the bullion value of the coins was \$1,500,000 to \$2,000,000 (*Ibid*, 890F.51/34 July 2 Ailing memorandum of conversation with Butler: 639). Roosevelt wrote Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones to "tell the British I hope they can take care of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield for us" (*Ibid*, 890F.51/37 August 6 Jones memorandum to Hull: 643). Despite an intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and British Governments for influence and advantage in Saudi Arabia, for the moment, the U.S. Government decided not to help Ibn Saud directly with his financial needs. American oil company executives continued their efforts for the U.S. Government to help Ibn Saud.

Standard Oil's Lloyd Hamilton repeated that a direct loan by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia is "very important from a political standpoint; Ibn Saud does not fear our intervention in his affairs" (*Ibid*, 890F.51/38 August 7 Jernegan memorandum of conversation: 643). Hamilton claimed that Britain wanted the U.S. to join them in aiding Ibn Saud because the British did not want Ibn Saud to "feel himself too much in their debt, a feeling which might someday influence him to throw in his lot with Britain's opponents" (*op.cit*, 643). This example

supports Walt's contention that foreign aid can eventually result in disadvantages for the donor (Walt 1985: 27). As Saudi Arabia, the recipient state, increases its capabilities, it can become less dependent on Britain, the donor. Britain loses leverage. According to Hamilton, the British also wanted to "avoid compromising Ibn Saud's standing as an independent leader of the Arabs" (*op.cit*, 644). This supports Schweller's inclusion of balancing other state interests such as "prestige, status, political influence, leadership, and political leverage" (Schweller 1997: 927).

The role of foreign aid in Walt's alliance theory

In alliance formation, Walt proposed that the provision of foreign economic or military aid created effective allies, either by demonstrating one's own favorable intentions, by evoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor (Walt 1985:27). However, in his study of Middle East alliances, Walt concluded that foreign aid was a result, not a cause of alliance formation. Thus, in the Saudi-U.S case, Walt would argue that U.S. foreign aid would result from, not cause, the alignment between the two states.

The Saudi-U.S. case during this period does not support Walt's conclusion. The evidence shows that foreign aid played a very significant role in Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. It is clearly embedded in U.S. State Department concerns about the effect of financial and economic aid to Saudi Arabia on Saudi-U.S. relations and any efforts for the two states to align with each other. Ibn Saud needed U.S. aid to stabilise and to develop his Kingdom financially and economically.

The U.S. declined to send direct lend-lease aid

Despite the analysis and recommendations of Kirk and oil company executives, Roosevelt and Hull did not consider the Saudi state a priority; and did not attach immediate importance to helping Ibn Saud directly. Murray admitted that Saudi Arabia was in an area where

“British interests are much greater than ours and that the British are more directly concerned; the British have a long background in the field of political loans, are used to advancing money without any great expectation of getting it back, whereas the U.S. does not have any tradition of that sort, a purely political loan in an area where we are not directly concerned to any great extent” (*op.cit*, 644). Roosevelt and Hull were not yet convinced that the U.S. had any great interests to protect in Saudi Arabia, vis-à-vis British interests, power, and influence in the region. The prevailing U.S. Government view was that Saudi Arabia was not very important to the U.S. Government strategically, economically, or politically. In the context of World War II, Saudi Arabia was not a priority for U.S. national defence in terms of Saudi geography or Saudi oil (*op.cit*, 890F.51/29 August 22 Hull telegram to Kirk: 646). Thus, in the absence of any compelling U.S. security or political interests in Saudi Arabia, the specific interests of Ibn Saud were not enough for the U.S. Government to act on them positively or with great urgency.⁴²

Kirk appealed that Ibn Saud would interpret the U.S. decision as surrender of political, economic, and military influence to the British in Saudi Arabia and the region. Kirk also pointed out that any U.S. views of Saudi Arabia playing an inactive role in the war effort and the geographical non-importance of the Kingdom would offend Ibn Saud. Kirk reemphasised that Saudi Arabia was a stabilising influence in the region, Ibn Saud was a highly respected Muslim leader, and that Saudi Arabia was geographically and strategically important for the future (*Ibid*, 890F.51/30 August 30 Kirk telegram to Hull: 647).

The U.S. did not yet believe that helping Ibn Saud directly would improve the overall security and power position of the U.S. in its war efforts or supplant British power and

⁴² Glenn Snyder’s theory of differences in the nature of interest causing conflict between allies is used in the discussion of the Buraimi dispute in Chapter 7 of this paper.

influence in Saudi Arabia. There was no shift in the balance of power; there were no threats to the survival or security of the U.S.; there were no opportunities for profit or easy gains. The U.S. Government did not have overwhelming interests to protect in the Saudi state. Hull responded that “the considered view of the President was that financial assistance to Saudi Arabia would take us too far afield and that the British have more reason than ourselves to look after its financial needs” (*Ibid*, 890F.51/30 September 10 Hull telegram to Kirk: 648), thus emphasising that any U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia were not as important as those of the British.

In order to minimise any adverse effect of the decision on Saudi-U.S. relations, the U.S. Department of State recommended sending an agricultural mission, without pre-conditions, to help Ibn Saud “settle his nomads on the land and to discover and develop the water and agricultural resources of Saudi Arabia” (*Ibid*, 89OF.515/1~ September 27 Ailing memorandum to Welles: 650). Saudi Arabia did not have the money or technical know-how to develop material capabilities in water and agricultural resources. Their development was important to help stabilise and secure the unity of the Kingdom’s tribes and Ibn Saud’s rule.

It is evident this early in the discussions that one can already apply some of the important elements found in realist alliance theories. The forging of relations between the Saudi and American Governments happened in the context of financial and economic urgencies in the Kingdom, not any imminent threats of external military invasion or hostile actions to the Saudi state arising from the war. Ibn Saud wanted the relationship to be that of a donor state, the U.S. Government helping Saudi Arabia, a friendly state in need of help. Ibn Saud saw relations and possible alignment with the U.S. Government as an opportunity to receive U.S. Government financial and economic aid, which were additional resources to stabilise the financial and economic condition of the Saudi state; and assure the monarchy’s security and

survival against possible internal threats from tribal discontent. Notions of internal domestic threat and opportunity for gain are key arguments in Schweller's theory of alliance.

Although U.S. diplomats and the U.S. Department of State argued otherwise, the U.S. Government did not perceive any significant opportunities for political or military gain or substantial external threats to any of its interests the Kingdom. Saudi oil was not that important for the U.S. Government. Business and economic interests in Saudi oil were in the hands of private American oil concessionaires, which the U.S. Government assisted through the usual diplomatic offices and procedures. Waltz and Walt might argue that, from the U.S. perspective, there was no meaningful shift in the regional structure or balance of power. The U.S. position was status quo; the British retained its influence on Saudi Arabian and regional issues.

The next section discusses the reasons that Saudi Arabia suddenly became a priority for the U.S. Government in 1942 and how both states responded to the shift. In a matter of a few months after the U.S. Government declined to help Ibn Saud directly with his financial problems, the U.S. Government began to pursue military strategic interests in Saudi Arabia actively.

1942: Saudi Arabia becomes a U.S. strategic military priority

Britain and the U.S. wanted Middle East allies with whom to aggregate military resources and capabilities against Germany and Italy, the Axis Powers in the region. This meant that the U.S. now needed Ibn Saud aligned with it for military purposes in World War II, a major shift in the U.S. view. However, with Ibn Saud's neutrality in the war, and the recent decision of the U.S. not to help him directly with his financial woes, the U.S. sought ways to gain Ibn Saud's approval of U.S. War Department needs in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. War Department wanted access to and use of Saudi Arabia air routes and territory for military

strategic purposes in the war. Ibn Saud's approval meant getting a valuable informal military ally for the U.S.

U.S. strategic military needs: air routes and airfields

The U.S. War Department needed Saudi Arabia's strategic geographical location and to gain whatever military capabilities Ibn Saud could add to the U.S. war efforts. These could increase U.S. military power and control of the war in the region and the Far East. The U.S. Department of State mulled using direct foreign aid to Ibn Saud as a *quid pro quo* for the King's acceptance and approval of what the U.S. wanted in the Kingdom: "the Army Air Corps is considering the desirability of establishing one or more airfields in Saudi Arabia on the basis of a suitable *quid pro quo* but has not yet made a decision of principle" (United States Department of State FRUS 1942, 890F.61A/2: February 6 Hull telegram to Kirk: 562). Hull anticipated difficulties but emphasised the need for a *quid pro quo*, money and security for Ibn Saud in exchange for the King's approval (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/11a: July 7 Hull telegram to Kirk: 571). One of the avenues for direct aid was the agricultural mission proposed in the prior year.

The Twitchell agricultural mission⁴³ to the King demonstrated U.S goodwill towards the Kingdom. Aside from goodwill, however, Hull saw it as an opportunity to "make a survey and prepare definite recommendations" about the "U.S. War Department desires to establish airfields in Saudi Arabia" (*Ibid*, 890F.61A/9: February 26 Welles telegram to Kirk: 564). Prior to leaving Cairo for a meeting with Ibn Saud, Kirk spoke with Saudi Finance Minister

⁴³ U.S. geologist and mining engineer Karl Twitchell first suggested the idea of such a mission to Saudi Arabia in May 1941. Ibn Saud trusted Twitchell highly; he was a consultant for Ibn Saud and represented him informally in the U.S. on various matters. Roosevelt appointed Twitchell to head the mission that, from May to December 1942, surveyed Saudi natural resources, especially the water and agricultural potential. Toby Jones pointed out that there was also a result from the survey that reinforced the internal political need for Ibn Saud to "strengthen the territorial reach and control of the central government to maximise the productivity and proficiency of the land" (Jones 2010: 47)

Abdullah Suleiman.⁴⁴ Although the British talked to the Saudis about securing air routes and airfields in Saudi Arabia before the U.S. did, Suleiman “volunteered that there was no objection to flight of U.S. planes over Saudi Arabia or even to establishment of airports on the coast provided certain zones were respected” (*Ibid*). Thus, it seemed that even without direct U.S. foreign aid, the Saudis already wanted to cooperate with the U.S.; perhaps, even align with it.

The U.S. still perceived that British power and influence in the area remained stronger than those of the U.S. Thus, the U.S. could not be aggressive in pursuing its desire for air routes and landing field rights, what Schweller called values coveted in alliance formation. The U.S. hesitated in negotiating directly with the Saudis because of an earlier British proposal to have a British military establishment in the Kingdom. Britain was responsible militarily for Saudi Arabia during the war (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/3a: April 15 Welles telegram to Kirk: 569). However, mutual Saudi-U.S. concerns about the security of the Dhahran oil fields and facilities opened the door for both states to discuss and negotiate military matters more directly.

Security at Dhahran

In February 1942, Saudi Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Hamid Sulaiman assented to the U.S. Legation in Jidda with James Moose⁴⁵ as Consul resident in Jidda and Kirk accredited as Minister to Saudi Arabia but resident in Cairo (*Ibid*, 24.90F/22a: March 3 Welles telegram to Kirk: 559). Having a Legation in Jidda made it faster and easier for the U.S. and Saudi Governments to discuss and to coordinate on the security of the Dhahran oil fields and facilities.

⁴⁴ Abdullah Suleiman was Ibn Saud’s most powerful adviser. As Minister of Finance, he made sure Ibn Saud had plenty of gold and weapons; he made sure Riyadh received pilgrim revenues, customs duties, and *zakat* (obligatory alms for charity) (Weston 2008: 143).

⁴⁵ James Moose was the Minister Resident/Foreign Service officer in Saudi Arabia from June 4, 1943 to August 18, 1944 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

Dhahran's security needs provided an opportunity for the U.S. and Saudi Governments to align and cooperate on military matters. Saudi Arabia did not have the military resources or capabilities to protect the oil port, oil operations at Ras Tanura, and Americans living in the Najmah residential compound against air attacks. Mutual concerns about a potential disruption of oil supplies, military security, and the sensitive issue of foreign forces in Saudi Arabia moved to the forefront of discussions between the U.S. and Saudi Governments.

The U.S. Government knew that the King faced a dilemma. On one hand, he needed U.S. military help, including U.S. troops and military personnel at Dhahran and other Saudi locations; on the other hand, Ibn Saud came under political and religious ideological pressures from conservative Wahhabis about the presence of foreign military forces in Saudi territory. Deciding in the context of mutual security concerns, Ibn Saud agreed to the installation of anti-aircraft defences and the presence of American military advisers and trainers in Dhahran. Ibn Saud formulated his response to criticisms of having foreign troops in the Kingdom: "he was using American military aid and resources to defend Saudi territory; and might stipulate that American troops leave after they properly trained the Saudi military (*Ibid*, 90F.6363/44: September 14 Moose telegram to Hull: 585). In subsequent years, this Saudi dilemma was a hurdle in discussions and negotiations about the U.S. lease at Dhahran.

U.S. Government motives to strengthen relations with Ibn Saud and to seek an alignment began to shift from what was initially a geographic strategic military purpose to a complex and delicate mix of military, economic, and political interests anchored on Saudi oil. The U.S. Government and military establishment focused their attention on being able to access and control Saudi oil resources, for war and post-war purposes.

Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia recognised and understood the shifting regional and global balances of power. U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia grew while that of the British

started to decline.⁴⁶ However, on petroleum matters the U.S. still contended with the British who controlled much of Middle East oil, except for the oil in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. British companies controlled Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Abu Dhabi, and Abu Dhabi Marine Areas. The Saudis and Americans grasped the importance of protecting their mutual interests in Saudi oil resources.

The following sections explain U.S. motives in Saudi Arabia in 1943 and why the U.S. Government decided to compete against Britain on a more equitable basis. The discussions then explain Ibn Saud's motives for closer relations with the U.S. These included a desire for military arms and equipment to rebuild his military capabilities vis-à-vis his concern about external threats to the Kingdom and internal threats to domestic stability.

1943: Positive shifts in U.S. attitudes towards Saudi Arabia

Direct U.S. lend-lease aid

Direct U.S. foreign aid to Saudi Arabia was the main inducement that the U.S. Government believed was necessary to bring Ibn Saud into an alignment with the U.S. The U.S. Government wanted to help Ibn Saud for military and political reasons.

The Army may at any time wish to obtain extensive air facilities in Saudi Arabia. The Department believes that it will be difficult to obtain additional privileges from Saudi Arabia unless we furnish certain direct assistance; his prestige and influence in the Arab and Moslem world are great. Lend-Lease assistance would constitute recognition of his loyal and courageous attitude and would facilitate the prosecution of the war (U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1943 890F.24/20 January 9 Acheson to Stettinius: 854-855).

The Americans wanted more political power or advantage against the British in Saudi Arabia. Kirk weighed America's political image in Saudi Arabia against that of the British:

American assistance to Saudi Arabia channelized through British resulted in the loss of considerable U.S. prestige in the eyes of Saudi Arabians who increasingly feel that the British were their only friends in need; the best all-

⁴⁶ 1943 was the turning point of "American expansionism and British imperial retreat in the Middle East", and Saudi Arabia the stage upon which "the power of American capital shattered so abruptly and thoroughly British illusions of limiting the U.S. advance" (Vitalis 2002:130).

around solution would seem to be one of understanding cooperation with British on basis of equality (*Ibid*, 890F.515/2: January 18 Kirk telegram to Hull: 857).

The first step taken by the U.S. Government was to use a legally and politically acceptable way of giving direct financial assistance to Ibn Saud. The Lend Lease Administrator, Edward Stettinius Jr., recommended that Roosevelt “make an appropriate finding that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States so as to render Saudi Arabia eligible for assistance under the Lend-Lease Act” (*Ibid*, 890P.24/30: January 12 Stettinius to Acheson: 855). In a very important and critical policy shift towards Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt quickly declared that the “defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the U.S.” (*Ibid*, 890F.24/32: February 18 Roosevelt to Stettinius: 859), thus clearing the way for direct U.S. lend-lease aid to the Kingdom.⁴⁷

Stabilising and strengthening the Saudi economy became a priority for the U.S. Wallace Murray, Adviser on political relations for Roosevelt, emphasised the economic, political, and strategic motives of the U.S. in granting direct foreign aid to Saudi Arabia: “support the existing Saudi Arabian regime by bolstering the Saudi Arabian economy through the extension of financial aid”; and “the great political and strategic importance of the oil resources in Saudi Arabia” needed the maintenance of “a sound economic system inside Saud Arabia” (*Ibid*, 811.5151/282: July 15 Parker memorandum of conversation: 875).

Hull believed the U.S. held the upper hand and wanted *quid pro quos* from Ibn Saud (*Ibid*, 890F.51/53: August 3 Hull telegram to Moose: 887). Clearly, the U.S. Government grew more confident and ready to meet challenges to its declared national interests in Saudi

⁴⁷ Roosevelt’s 1943 decision to grant direct lend-lease aid to Ibn Saud marked “the demise of British influence and power in the Saudi Kingdom” because of the “superior economic power of the Americans”, which the British could “neither match nor resist” (Cohen and Kolinsky 1998: xv)

Arabia: strategic military advantage, access to Saudi oil resources, and Ibn Saud's political influence in the area.

At this point, the deployment of elements in realist alliance theories is useful in explaining where Saudi-U.S. relations stood. First, contrary to Walt's conclusion about foreign aid, the U.S. used direct U.S. lend-lease aid as its main enticement for Ibn Saud to have closer relations and a wartime alliance or alignment with the U.S. Second, applying Waltz' argument, an alignment would prevent or deter territorial occupation or military and political domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition. A Saudi-U.S. alignment would deter Germany and Italy from invading and occupying Saudi Arabia; and would prevent Britain from military and political domination of the Kingdom in which the U.S. had strategic military and economic interests. Third, using Schweller's argument, the U.S. perceived that Ibn Saud's prestige and political leverage in the Arab world could help the U.S. gain alignments with other Arab states. More importantly, the U.S. coveted values not yet possessed: Saudi's strategic military location and Saudi oil.

Coveting a value not yet possessed: Saudi oil

The U.S. carefully weighed its military, economic, and political interests in Saudi oil. Recall that in 1941 the U.S. Navy deemed Saudi oil unfit for U.S. naval use and that Roosevelt did not value Saudi 'oil in the ground' as collateral for direct financial loans to Ibn Saud. Now Saudi oil became as urgent and important as Saudi Arabia's strategic military location. Diminishing U.S. oil resources pushed the U.S. military to look for supplementary oil resources, which Saudi Arabia possessed in massive quantities. The Americans perceived Saudi oil as a reliable supply for the short and long-term demands of the U.S. military, the U.S. nation, and its allies.

Hull considered Saudi oil as important as that of Saudi Arabia's strategic location for the U.S. War Department's purposes and Ibn Saud's influence on Arab countries. He explained to Roosevelt that,

In view of the rapid decline of the oil resources of the U.S., the War and Navy Departments are interested in obtaining military and naval reserves in the ground in Saudi Arabia. One of the largest oil reserves in the world is located [there]. Close attention is being given to means whereby an arrangement can be made to secure such reserves (United States Department of State FRUS 1943: 124.90F/31a March 30 Hull to Roosevelt: 830).

Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to Roosevelt that the urgency of controlling Saudi oil reserves was a matter of U.S. national security: "In the interest of national security, it is urged that steps be taken immediately to assure continued control of sufficient oil reserves to meet our country's needs. This would include the immediate acquisition of a controlling interest by the U.S. Government in Saudi Arabian oil concessions" (*Ibid*, 890F.6363/78: June 8 Leahy memorandum to Roosevelt: 921).

However, Hull did not want the U.S. Government to have ownership interests in private American oil companies. Hull did not want the U.S. Government to project a colonialist or imperialist image in its policies toward Saudi Arabia and the region, and in the totality of U.S. foreign relations.

In this present critical stage of our international relations, and the extreme importance of petroleum questions in the whole of our foreign relations, the Secretary of State is unwilling to get into controversy with other branches of Government as to the course to pursue in regard to the Saudi Arabian situation. The simplest and most advisable way to proceed in Saudi Arabia is along the lines of immediate arrangements with the American companies to develop their production and their refinery; and agreements setting aside such reserves as the Army and Navy deem necessary for their requirements (*Ibid*, 923).

U.S. fear of projecting an imperialist image

Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Acting Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes recommended to Roosevelt the formation of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) “for the general purpose of acquiring foreign oil reserves and to initiate immediate steps to acquire an interest in the highly important Saudi oil fields” (*Ibid*, 800.6363/1223 June 26 letter to Roosevelt: 925). Kirk reacted that control of Saudi oil concessions by the U.S. Government, through the PRC, might create a colonial or imperialist image of the U.S., which would have a negative impact relations with Ibn Saud. The U.S. had to move delicately and cautiously. Ibn Saud was leery of the British and the French because of their colonial practices.

A primary consideration in awarding concessions to CASOC was reliance on the absence of ulterior American political motives in respect of Saudi Arabia specifically and Near East generally, as opposed to the suspected policy of certain other governments. Overt American Government intervention in oil operation in Saudi Arabia would tend to tar us with the same brush. The larger sphere of American economic expansion in the foreign field after the armistice requires a system free from direct foreign government control which rightly or wrongly is ever open to the accusation of economic penetration for political purposes ⁴⁸ (*Ibid*, 890F.6363/58: July 27 Kirk telegram to Hull: 935-937).

The Saudis reacted positively to increased American participation in the Saudi oil industry. Clearly, the mutual financial and economic interests of both Governments tended to trump any negative political fallout (*Ibid*, 890F.6363/89: October 26 Murray memorandum to Stettinius: 940). During Amir Faisal’s visit to Washington on November 1, Adolf Berle of the NEA furnished to Amir Faisal a U.S. Government written statement for Ibn Saud regarding petroleum development in Saudi Arabia by the U.S. Government in the context of “the prosecution of the war; ways and means of assisting CASOC to construct a refinery in the vicinity of Dhahran, including a financial arrangement with CASOC” (*Ibid*,

⁴⁸ For a previous explanation of this point, see footnote 20.

890F.0011/99: November 1 Ailing memorandum of conversation: 850). Moose reported that the “King expressed pleasure at prospective development, seemed to consider U.S. Government participation as perfectly natural and expressed belief that project would be beneficial both to Saudi and U.S. Governments” (*Ibid*, 890P.6363/82: November 3 Moose telegram to Hull: 941).

U.S. fear of losing Saudi oil to the British

The confidentiality and secrecy surrounding U.S. deliberations and plans to control Saudi oil broke open when the *Wall Street Journal* carried a front page story about it in late October 1943. Hull reminded Ickes, who was also the President of the PRC, to exercise caution and care in petroleum issues (*Ibid*, 800.6363/1367a: November 13 Hull to Ickes: 941). Saudi Arabian oil was the grand prize in the British-American rivalry over Saudi Arabia: “the oil of Saudi Arabia constitutes one of the world's greatest prizes and that it is extremely short-sighted to take any step which would tend to discredit the American interest therein” (*Ibid*, 942). Hull emphasised that any U.S. action that discredited or undermined American interests in the development of Saudi oil resources served to weaken and undermine Ibn Saud’s confidence in the U.S. Government and CASOC. Hull feared that would give Britain the opportunity to acquire interests in Saudi oil, expand, and strengthen Britain’s control of oil in the region, and place the U.S. in a position of dependence on British oil (*Ibid*, 942-943).

Hull’s letter to Ickes demonstrated severe U.S. concern about a perceived threat posed by Britain to the long-term interests of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia and the region if Britain acquired access to and control of Saudi oil. Likewise, Murray’s memorandum to Hull and Stettinius showed deep concern about British political power and the British gaining more power and influence at the expense of U.S. interests (*Ibid*, 800.6363/1387: November 24

Murray memorandum to Hull and Stettinius: 945). In Hull's view, only cooperative effort⁴⁹ between the British and American governments assured the development, security and stability of Middle East oil, and the opportunities for economic gains (*Ibid*, 800.6363/1423: December 8 Hull memorandum to Roosevelt: 949).

Although Hull emphasised cooperation with the British, the U.S. Government's position was the complete protection of American interests in Middle East oil. The U.S. did not want Britain to dominate Middle East oil resources; and, certainly, not Saudi oil.

To the fullest possible extent consistent with military requirements, determination as to any future new refinery facilities or expansion of such facilities in the Middle Eastern area should be based on whether such facilities would be controlled by American interests, would utilize American-held oil and thus assist the full development of that oil, and would result in operation in direct benefit to the country in which the oil is produced (*Ibid*, 800.6363/1404: December 15 Hull to Leahy: 950).

Schweller's opportunity for gain argument can explain why Saudi oil resources became the most coveted value for both the U.S. and Britain. The two states competed for Ibn Saud's alliance in order to gain the economic, political, and military values from oil. Both governments understood that massive Saudi oil resources were catalysts for power in the region and globally. Saudi oil in the hands of either Britain or the U.S. would alter the balance of economic, political, and military power in the region and elsewhere.

From Ibn Saud's perspective, there were other aspects in Saudi-U.S. relations: Saudi military needs and external and internal threats to the Saudi state. He intertwined these with any U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. The following discussions introduce these factors, which become fully developed and relevant in the subsequent chapters, where they become a recurring theme especially from the Saudi perspective on the alignment.

⁴⁹ The cooperative nature of Anglo-American relations created dilemmas for the U.S. in the Buraimi dispute (see Chapter 7) and the Suez Crisis (see Chapter 8).

Military arms and equipment for Ibn Saud

Ibn Saud's requests for military supplies and equipment began in April 1943, although not as intense as his efforts would be in the late 1940s and 1950s. Hull asked the Saudis for a list of their military needs to submit to the Anglo-American Munitions Board in Britain and the United States. John Winant⁵⁰, U.S. Ambassador to Britain, explained his understanding of British arms policy in the Arabian Peninsula. The British feared a resurgence of Ibn Saud's military capabilities; his ability to wage war on his neighbours; arms being smuggled into Palestine; and political uncertainty in Saudi Arabia when Ibn Saud died.⁵¹ As much as possible, Britain wanted to limit arms transfers to Ibn Saud (*Ibid*, 00.24/1160: August 3 Winant aerogram to Hull: 886).

The U.S. War Department needed more details about existing Saudi military equipment; it recommended sending a U.S. Military Mission to survey Ibn Saud's needs, to which Ibn Saud agreed. The U.S. Government saw this as an opportunity for political gain by using the military mission to enhance "American standing particularly in focusing attention on American aid to Saudi Arabia hitherto largely obscured by the greater extent of British help" (*Ibid*, 890F.24/63: October 16 Moose telegram to Hull: 906). However, U.S. policy on military supplies to Saudi Arabia substantially restated the British position.

Such supplies should be provided only in such quantities necessary for the preservation of law and order within the country, and should be held to the minimum requirements needed. These military supplies are to be provided in substantially equal measure by the U.S. Government and by the British Government (*Ibid*, 890F.24/67: November 25 Berle to Wright: 913).

⁵⁰ John Winant was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United Kingdom from February 11, 1941 to April 10, 1946 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

⁵¹ These were the same reasons that the U.S. used in the 1950s to delay military aid for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi domestic unrest

Internal domestic threat was an important consideration for Ibn Saud. Thus, this project includes it and draws upon Schweller's argument. Unlike Waltz and Walt, Schweller includes internal domestic threat as an important motive for alliance.

Because of the rapidly changing nature of U.S. interests in the Kingdom, the U.S. Government wanted the Saudis to visit the U.S. sooner than Amir Saud's desire to visit after World War II. In July, Roosevelt extended an invitation to Ibn Saud "or a member of the Saudi Royal Family representing the King to visit the United States" (*Ibid*, 890F.0011/97: October 25 Moose to Hull: 841). Moose disclosed that Amirs Faisal and Khalid would visit because there was an urgent internal matter that prevented Amir Saud and King Saud from leaving Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud explained to Moose that "urgent matters required the presence of the Crown Prince in Arabia" and that "with the ever-present problem of maintaining order in Saudi Arabia, neither the King nor his successor should leave the country; Amir Saud is accustomed to deal with the tribes on behalf of his Royal father" (*Ibid*, 842).

Fearing that internal tribal disorder might lead to greater threats and aggressiveness from neighbouring states, Ibn Saud wanted Faisal and Khalid to ascertain U.S. intentions in Saudi Arabia and the region. This reflected Ibn Saud's uncertainty about U.S. intentions in the region generally, and the Kingdom specifically. Ibn Saud did not want the U.S. or any foreign government to intervene in Saudi internal matters; and was unsure if the U.S., unlike the British, would not intervene. Amirs Faisal and Khalid met with the U.S. Department of State in Washington on November 1943. The Saudis focused on wanting clarification of U.S. policy in the Near East, "particularly with respect to the independence of Arabic countries" (*Ibid*, 890F.0011/102: November 1 Alling memorandum of conversation: 845).

External threats to Saudi Arabia

Walt's theory focused on external threat in alliance formation. For Ibn Saud, minimising or eliminating external threat was a persistent motive in seeking relations and alignment with the U.S. At the November meeting in Washington, Faisal disclosed that the Hashemite family was "trying to add to the territory under its control by working toward a union of Palestine, Iraq and Syria"⁵² and that, "the Hashemite House was trying to surround Saudi Arabia and to strangle it" (*Ibid*, 846). In response, Berle of the Near East Affairs Division explained the U.S. Government position.

The U.S. had no interest in making dynastic alliances against Ibn Saud or anyone else. The U.S. had no interest in furthering aggressive designs. The U.S. would have no part in any movement intended to encircle Saudi Arabia. The U.S. was building up a "good neighbor" policy, between the U.S. and other countries and among countries themselves. It was contrary to U.S. policy to form a block against any Near East country or elsewhere. (*Ibid*, 846-847).

Conclusion

There was no alignment between the two states in 1941-1943. The chapter showed that the U.S. Government view of relations and alignment with Saudi Arabia moved from one of disinterest in 1941, to a strategic military interest in 1942, and to a military-economic-political priority in 1943. Balance of power played a role. The U.S. Government kept in its sight potential shifts in the balance of power should the Axis Powers Germany, Italy or Japan gain allies in the Middle East. However, more so than threats from the Axis Powers, what emerged clearly was a shifting regional power structure centred on a growing rivalry between Britain and the U.S. for influence with Ibn Saud and power over the development of Saudi oil resources. The King had the choice of restoring and strengthening his alliance with the British; or seeking alignment with the U.S. The next chapter shows that as Ibn Saud's doubts

⁵² Ibn Saud feared irredentist claims by Transjordan on Saudi territory (Miglietta 2002: 200). In addition to the possibility of Transjordan's Abdullah reconquering the Hussein family patrimony in the Hijaz, Ibn Saud perceived Abdullah's desire to expand his power by ruling Syria and unifying his kingdom with Iraq; Abdullah also had dealings with Jewish settlers in Palestine, which alarmed Ibn Saud even more (Wilson 1990: 4).

about British intentions grew, the King played a balancing act between the two Great Powers. Ibn Saud moved closer to an alignment with the U.S. that would exclude Britain; however, the King retained friendly relations with Britain. Ibn Saud saw that he could gain much-needed resources from both states.

Balance of threat did not play much of a role in 1941-1943. However, the subsequent chapters show that as relations and alignment developed, complexities increased with Ibn Saud focused persistently on threats to the Kingdom and his rule. Ibn Saud feared encirclement by neighbouring states, internal domestic unrest, and the lack of any Saudi military capabilities against threats. Ibn Saud's unwavering stand on these three issues would directly impact the behaviour of both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in their management of relations and alignment.

Balance of interest also played a role. The chapter identified the important interests for the Saudi and American states: Saudi Arabia needed U.S. foreign aid in the hope of gaining some measure of financial and economic stability. The U.S. needed and sought access to Saudi Arabia's strategic military location for World War II efforts and future military and commercial purposes. Both states saw opportunities for economic and political gain in the control and development of Saudi oil resources. The subsequent chapters will show that balancing these interests played a consistent role in the progress of relations and formation of alignment.

Chapter 4

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1944-1946)

Introduction

The further deployment of neorealism's and neoclassical realism's notions of power and threat, and neoclassical realism's notion of interest/opportunity in this chapter continues to produce a clearer and richer understanding of the motives and efforts of Ibn Saud and the U.S. Government to forge an alignment and grant virtual exclusivity to the U.S. in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia responded to a shift in the regional balance of power, in which Britain's domination continued to weaken gradually. However, the U.S. Government did not believe that it was necessary to bind America into a formal alliance with Saudi Arabia because America continued to avoid entangling alliances.

The balance of interest/opportunity aspect is more evident in this chapter as Ibn Saud continued to capitalise on the British-American rivalry in order for Saudi Arabia to gain as much financial, economic, and military aid as it could from the rivalry. As Ibn Saud's doubts about British intentions in Saudi Arabia and the region deepened, he continued to move closer to the Americans and farther away from the British. Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. Government to increase U.S. financial and economic assistance to the Kingdom in order to stabilise and develop the Kingdom. Ibn Saud also began a more deliberate quest to gain U.S. military assistance to rebuild Saudi military capabilities. The King emphasised that he needed deterrent and defensive military power against encirclement by the British-supported Hashemite states and the smaller Shaikhdoms. Although his closeness to the U.S. grew, Ibn Saud also harboured doubts about the reliability of the U.S. for the long term.

The U.S. Government's interests in gaining access to Saudi Arabia's strategic geographic location and Saudi oil reserves became clearer in 1944-1946. The U.S. wanted to gain strategic military advantage by securing base rights in Saudi Arabia and economic advantage

by having American oil companies in control of Saudi oil resources and oil prices. Clearly, the U.S. wanted to prevail over Britain in the economic and political rivalry for influence in the Kingdom.

By 1944, the Saudi-U.S. relationship can be described as an informal alliance with increasing closeness and cooperation. Both states clearly perceived the interests each could gain from the other. Ibn Saud needed substantial financial-economic help. He also weighed his military security needs and the outside assistance he needed to rebuild Saudi military capabilities. The U.S. Government wanted to secure American oil interests and to gain greater access to Saudi Arabia's strategic territory for military and commercial purposes.

1944: Clearer motives for stronger relations and alignment

U.S. national interests in Saudi Arabia

Secretary of War Henry Stimson⁵³ identified the most important U.S. military interests in Saudi Arabia as: oil; the right to construct airfields especially at Dhahran; the use of air space; and the right to make aerial surveys (U.S. Department of State, *The Near East* 1944 FRUS, 890F.51/10-2744: October 27 Stimson to Hull: 748). Stimson emphasised that “any help to the King would serve to enhance our position” (*Ibid*, 749). Stimson also pointed out that Ibn Saud would gain benefits or values from U.S. aid such as military supplies and equipment, including aircraft; training missions; engineering construction; and technical services. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal⁵⁴ focused on Saudi oil as the U.S. Navy's specific and strategic interest in Saudi Arabia: “supplementing Western Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply; and the expansion, or at least the preservation of the

⁵³ Henry Stimson served as U.S. Secretary of War from July 10, 1940 to September 21, 1945.

⁵⁴ James Forrestal's government service began in June 1940 as a special assistant to President Roosevelt. In August 1940, Roosevelt nominated him as Under Secretary of the Navy; On May 19, 1944 he became Secretary of the Navy.

continuity of ownership by U.S. nationals of oil reserves outside of the continental U.S.”
(*Ibid*, 890F.6363/12-1144: December 11 Forrestal to Stettinius: 755-756).

The U.S. Government formulated its national interests in Saudi Arabia and its desire for alignment with the Saudi state on considerations of potential regional and global power shifts, threats to its interests in the Kingdom, protecting U.S. values already possessed in Saudi Arabia, and taking advantage of opportunities for further gains. These are major elements found in the three realist alliance theories used in this project. U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius’ analysis reflected well-developed realist views on national interest, economic power, and military power. He argued for long-range financial assistance to the Saudis in the context of protecting the strategic nature of U.S. national interests in the Saudi state and the power inherent to those interests. U.S. financial aid to Saudi Arabia would assure U.S. primacy in Saudi Arabia and prevent other states from gaining influence and dominance in the Saudi state (*Ibid*, 890F.51/12-2044: December 22 Stettinius to Roosevelt: 757).

The previous chapter argued that U.S. foreign aid to Saudi Arabia was vital to relations and prospects of alignment. This became clearer in 1944. The U.S. expanded U.S. Government foreign aid to Saudi Arabia in order to have closer financial and economic relations with Ibn Saud and to entice him into an alignment.

More U.S. foreign aid and American advisers for Ibn Saud

The strongest motive for the U.S. Government in 1944 to strengthen relations with Ibn Saud and to have him aligned with the U.S. was to protect U.S. national interest in Saudi oil. Hull recommended using “additional financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia in order to safeguard the American national interest in the great petroleum resources of that country” (*Ibid*, 890F.24/4-1044: April 3 Hull memorandum to Roosevelt: 679).

Hull did not want proposed British moves to undermine the American position. First, was a proposed British subsidy of \$12,000,000 for Saudi purchases of consumer goods, which

was an amount “six times greater than the value of lend-lease aid” that the U.S. Government contemplated for 1944 (*Ibid*). Despite British efforts to undermine the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. did not want to disturb the Anglo-American alliance during World War II. The U.S. Government continued to cooperate with Britain on Saudi issues; however, the U.S. wanted the provision of aid to Saudi Arabia to be on a more equal or balanced basis. John Winant⁵⁵ confirmed that “agreement has been reached that supplies are to be provided in substantially equal measure by the U.S. Government and His Majesty’s Government” (*Ibid*, 800.24/1512: February 7 Winant aerogram to Hull: 674).

The second British move and Hull’s recommendation are significant to this project’s argument that elements of realist alliance theories are useful in studying and explaining the Saudi-U.S. case. This example shows that the U.S. wanted to use ‘transnational political penetration’, a notion found in Walt’s theory, in order to secure U.S. interests. Hull feared that “if Saudi Arabia is permitted to lean too heavily upon the British, there is always the danger that the British will request a *quid pro quo* in oil” (*op cit.*, 679). There were “reports that the British Minister in Jidda persuaded Ibn Saud to remove key Saudi officials who were friendly with the U.S. and also to appoint a British economic adviser and petroleum adviser” (*Ibid*). To strengthen the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia, Hull suggested that Ibn Saud “avail himself, at the expense of this Government, of the services of Colonel Eddy or Colonel Hoskins as financial, economic, and military adviser” (*Ibid*, 890F.51A/3a: April 18 Hull telegram to Moose: 687). Eddy became a close confidant of Ibn Saud and the King’s inner circle; he exercised great influence on the Saudi leadership.

⁵⁵ Winant, a political appointee of Roosevelt, served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Britain from February 11, 1941 to April 10, 1946 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

Missions: another form of U.S. aid

Another way for the U.S. Government to gain advantage over Britain was through U.S. military and economic missions to Saudi Arabia. Missions were very attractive and beneficial to Ibn Saud. Using Schweller's perspective, missions provided the Saudi state with further opportunities for military and economic gain. They represented opportunities for Saudi Arabia to gain the best military, technological, and commercial know how. They provided tangible resources that Ibn Saud needed for the development and strengthening of Saudi material capabilities. Thus, U.S. military and economic missions were powerful incentives for Ibn Saud to move closer to an alignment with the U.S.

Missions were part of the Anglo-American rivalry. Winant reported that the British proposed a joint military mission headed by an Anglo-Saxon British officer because primary military responsibility in the area belonged to the British. There was already a U.S. military mission in Saudi Arabia; Moose expressed his fears of a "grave weakening of American standing and influence with Ibn Saud if U.S. mission now withdrawn and British-led mission replaces it; if Department intends effectively to defend oil reserves here, such considerations cannot be ignored" (*Ibid*, 890F.20 Missions/l: May 3 Moose telegram to Hull: 698). Based on the recommendation by William Eddy⁵⁶ to extend the existing U.S. Military Mission to January 1945, Hull emphasised the political and operational advantages of missions.

⁵⁶ William Eddy was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia from August 12, 1944 to May 28, 1946 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian). Of all the chiefs of mission to Saudi Arabia, Eddy played the most critical role in communicating and explaining Saudi views and positions to the U.S. Department of State and U.S. thoughts and policies to the Saudi king. Eddy felt strongly that financial and economic collapse in Saudi Arabia would drive it back to the British sphere of influence, which probably meant that the U.S. would be excluded from Saudi oil concessions. He actively participated in negotiating U.S. financial and economic help for Saudi Arabia, in which U.S. loans to the kingdom were repaid with Saudi oil (Lippman 2008b, response to question 6, par.3). Eddy arranged the 1945 meeting at Great Bitter Lake between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud. Eddy resigned in 1947 because of Truman's decision to support the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel. The realist in Eddy warned that an Israel-U.S. alliance in Palestine would inflame the Muslim world. He was right.

The mission is instrumental in overcoming suspicions of infringement upon sovereignty or of military encroachments. The British Mission is comparatively ineffective and the U.S. Government ought to maintain the lead that it has. The U.S. Military Mission could also include the proposed Air Mission to provide training for Saudi Arabian mechanics and pilots. (*Ibid*, 90F.20 Missions/9-2944: October 5 Hull to Stimson: 745).

In Chapter 3, this paper cited Thornburg of Bahrein Petroleum who warned that Ibn Saud put his own interests first; and that Ibn Saud's loyalty to a benefactor continued so as long as he felt that his interests lay in that direction. This is a very important point because it explains Ibn Saud's vacillations in his relations with both Britain and the U.S.

Balancing Ibn Saud's doubts and apprehensions

There are two significant observations about Ibn Saud during this period. First, he rarely shifted away from his three-pronged position about threats to the Kingdom and his rule. He integrated the need for foreign aid, an important concept in Walt's theory, with his perception of external threat, the major concept in Walt's theory; and internal threat, an important concept in Schweller's theory. Second, it is not surprising that Ibn Saud doubted the U.S. as he did the British. The Saudi-U.S. alignment was in its infancy. There was no formal Saudi-U.S. alliance or treaty. With the British and American rivalry gaining intensity, Ibn Saud believed he could manipulate both sides in order to gain the financial, economic, and military aid he wanted.

Ibn Saud remained friendly towards the British because they continued to provide him with financial subsidies; however, he used his doubts about British intentions to gain more U.S. assistance for Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud did this in the context of his concerns about the British role in the Hijaz, Iraq and Transjordan and his fears of the British "loosing their restraints on his enemies" (*Ibid*, 696); and the weakening of his authority if he was unable to continue supporting his subjects financially. Ibn Saud said that the "British did not seem able to help to extent of Saudi Arabia's needs" so he "would welcome additional aid from USA;

one day it might be necessary for Saudi Arabia to look to U.S.A. for all its requirements”

(*Ibid*, 890F.24/164: April 29 Moose telegram to Hull 695-696).

British delays in implementing the joint Anglo-American assistance program, and seeming U.S. acquiescence to the delays, troubled Ibn Saud greatly. Somerville Tuck⁵⁷, the U.S. Minister in Egypt explained the increased financial pressures on the Kingdom caused by the delays.

American help is not materializing rapidly enough and not to extent he considers necessary. Pressure on Saudi Arabia is being increased according to British plan although with American acquiescence. This is being achieved, intentionally or not, by British delay in plans for a joint program of assistance, while any plans for independent action by U.S. seem to be in abeyance so long as conversations continue (*Ibid*, 890F.515/116: June 18 Tuck telegram to Hull: 707-708).

Ibn Saud sent confusing signals. There was an ARAMCO report in which Ibn Saud admitted consulting the British on American proposals because “he lacks any assurance of U.S. support” (*Ibid*, 890P.24/10-3044: October 30, Eddy telegram to Hull: 751).

Furthermore, the ARAMCO report “emphasizes displeasure and possible disgust of King at lack of American policy assurances to him and implies greater confidence in British material help over many years” (*Ibid*). More significantly, Ibn Saud expressed for the first time his concern about the long-term political reliability of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia and the Near East region.

America may lose interest in his distant land, after the war, as she has retired to domestic preoccupations after other wars. Even more to be dreaded is that America might permit her policy to be dictated by influential pressure groups, which have already spoken through the party platforms to foreshadow a possible political crisis for Palestine, wherein America's generous intentions may be compressed and diverted into a policy beneficial to someone no doubt, but not to the Arabs (*Ibid*, 890P.50/9-744: September 7 Eddy to Hull: 734).

⁵⁷ Somerville Tuck was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Egypt from May 4, 1944; he was promoted to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Egypt on September 19, 1946 and served until May 30, 1948 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

Despite his concerns about the long-term reliability of the U.S., the evolving economic-military-political mix of U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, and Ibn Saud's concerns about the British, paved the way for closer Saudi-U.S. relations; and a closer and clearer alignment between the two states. Ibn Saud perceived the U.S. as the ascendant economic and military power that would replace the British in providing for Saudi Arabia's postwar financial, economic, and military needs.

Ibn Saud's initial moves toward a Saudi-U.S. alignment

Shaikh Yusuf Yasin⁵⁸ gave Ibn Saud's perspectives on the "mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and America in the years to come" (*Ibid*, 890P.50/9-744: September 7 Eddy to Hull: 734). First, Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. Government to know that he had not discounted Britain completely. Ibn Saud used this as leverage in dealing with the U.S. Government. According to Yasin, the King was disappointed in the joint U.S.-British assistance programme because despite the equal participation of the U.S., Saudi Arabia received less benefit; and the U.S. seemed content "to have its economic activity reduced and defined by Britain" (*Ibid*, 735). Yasin justified Ibn Saud's continued friendship with the British: "Saudi Arabia may be excused if it yields to the same constraint from the same source, not merely to please an ally, but to survive. Without arms or resources, Saudi Arabia must not reject the hand that measures its food and drink (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud understood the rivalry between the British and Americans clearly. He wanted to manipulate it to his advantage. Although he doubted the British Government and seemed to keep the British at arm's length, he did not want to abandon his relationship with Britain completely while he manoeuvred towards an alignment with the U.S. Government.

However, he felt strongly that Britain's on-going role in Saudi Arabia confined both the U.S.

⁵⁸ Shaikh Yusuf Yasin was a Syrian who arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1923. Yasin was one of the outstanding men of Ibn Saud's régime. He accompanied Ibn Saud in the 1924 Hijaz campaign and quickly gained Ibn Saud's confidence. He was named editor of the official Mecca weekly, Umm al Qura, appointed Ibn Saud's Political Secretary and later as Minister of State, (Philby 1955:296; Weston 2008: 143).

and Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud sought an “an exit for our two nations from this confinement” without “a break of confidence or of cooperation with the British” (*Ibid*). Ibn Saud wanted the Saudi and U.S. Governments to find a basis for exclusive alignment: “some large area in which Saudi Arabia and America can collaborate alone, on a basis that leads far beyond the end of the war; only thus can our combined effort assure continuity, stability, and mutual benefit” (*Ibid*).

Yasin hinted at “possible American interest in military and commercial aviation” (*Ibid*, 736) as the probable area of collaboration. Both World Wars proved the critical importance of military air power. Economic power from achieving dominance in commercial air transport routes was undeniable. Yasin pointed out that “the patrolling and protecting of our oil concession, refineries, and possible pipelines should justify investment by the American Government” (*Ibid*). Eddy felt that Ibn Saud “would be hospitable to a treaty for American aviation rights if thereby he could secure financial resources” (*Ibid*). Eddy suggested Saudi projects when the war ended.⁵⁹ They included a Saudi Government concession to the U.S. to construct airdromes and operate commercial and military airways. *Quid pro quo*, the U.S. would assure Saudi Arabia some internal air transport and an “adequate native air force for border patrols by equipping and training Saudi pilots and mechanics” (*Ibid*, 890F.24/9-2544: September 25 Eddy telegram to Hull: 744). The immediate interest shown by Eddy in a treaty granting U.S. long-term aviation rights reflected an anxiety on the part of the U.S. Government about controlling the strategic location of Saudi Arabia for military and commercial purposes; and safeguarding long-term U.S. interests in Saudi oil.

⁵⁹ During the final year of the war, the U.S. laboured diligently to insure American commercial and political influence in Saudi Arabia (Palmer 1999: 27).

Ibn Saud's view of relations and alignment presented thus far can be stated in the context of shifts in balance of power, perceptions of external threats⁶⁰ and internal threats⁶¹, and interest/opportunity for gain. Ibn Saud perceived a shift in the regional balance of power from Britain to the U.S.; he had serious concerns about the long-term survival and security of the Kingdom against external and internal threats;⁶² and he perceived opportunities of gaining greater financial, economic, and military advantages by aligning with the U.S.

Ibn Saud was on the British bandwagon because the King perceived an external threat to the Kingdom from the aggregated power of the Hashemite states and Britain; he believed that neighbouring states that were his dynastic rivals, and under British sponsorship, posed offensive threats to the Saudi state. In bandwagoning with the British, Ibn Saud capitulated to a greater power, a concept proposed by Walt. Ibn Saud wanted to jump off the British bandwagon and jump on the American bandwagon. In bandwagoning with the U.S., Ibn Saud again capitulated to a greater power despite the absence of external threat to the Kingdom from the U.S. Bandwagoning was not a safe choice for Ibn Saud because perceptions of the intentions and benevolence of the U.S. as the dominant state could be

⁶⁰ At the start of World War I, Ibn Saud was surrounded by potential enemies, which he countered through the December 1915 Treaty of Darin with Britain. The treaty made the lands of the Al-Saud a British protectorate and was an attempt to define the boundaries of the Saudi state (Wilkinson 1993:133–39). By 1924, Britain controlled the frontiers north of Arabia, the entire eastern and southern shoreline s of Arabia, and three of the four corners of the Arabian Peninsula (Leatherdale 1983: 29). When Ibn Saud drove Sharif Hussein out of the Hijaz in 1924-1925, it completed the conquest of Arabia Deserta by Ibn Saud (Kheirallah 1952: 169). However, it worsened the territorial and dynastic rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemite Kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq, which were ruled by the sons of Sharif Hussein. The May 1927, Treaty of Jeddah between Britain and Ibn Saud recognised the sovereignty of the Kingdoms of the Hijaz and Najd under the rule of Ibn Saud (Caldarola 1982: 65). In exchange, Ibn Saud recognised Abdullah as ruler of Transjordan and Faysal as ruler of Iraq and accepted the British-protected Shaikhdoms in the Gulf Coast (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR) 2002: 944).

⁶¹ Ibn Saud's internal concern was potential revolt because of tribal restlessness; he lacked financial resources to take care of them (Safran 1988: 57).

⁶² Ayoob (2002: 37-38) emphasised that much of the external and internal threats and conflicts in the region result from the arbitrary nature of colonially-crafted boundaries of post-colonial states. They cut through groups considered to have primordial ties to each other. The nature of their regimes and nation-building tend to be exclusionary rather than inclusionary.

unreliable in bandwagoning, another concept found in Walt. The U.S. could change its intentions and its benevolence might not last for long.

The primary motivation for the Saudi state jumping on the American bandwagon was the expectation of profit and easy gains, a major concept in Schweller. His contention that internal threat plays a role in alliance formation also applies to Ibn Saud's unchanging perception of internal threat to the Saudi state and his rule. The King believed that U.S. Government financial, economic, and military aid would help greatly in achieving internal domestic stability and security in his Kingdom, which motivated him to move towards closer relations and an alignment with the U.S.

However, in 1945 both states exhibited great uncertainty in their relations with each other. Regardless of Britain's diminished power in the region, the U.S. was not fully confident of its standing and influence in Saudi Arabia. The British resisted increases in U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia. In order to maintain British power and standing in the region, the British Government often expressed disagreement with the U.S. and vetoed U.S. plans for Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, there were frequent and lengthy delays inherent to the U.S. decision-making process, which caused Ibn Saud to continue doubting the reliability of U.S. help on matters that the Saudis considered critical to their survival and security. Ibn Saud grew increasingly uncertain about the strength of U.S. commitment to its interests in Saudi Arabia and the overall reliability of the U.S. as a long-term partner. A new U.S. President and the worsening Palestine problem added to Ibn Saud's anxieties.

1945: Ambivalence in relations

Harry Truman becomes U.S. President

Roosevelt and Ibn Saud met for the first and only time at Great Bitter Lake on February 14, 1945. Aside from immediate financial, economic, and military issues, long-term Saudi-

U.S. relations and the Palestine⁶³ issue were the main topics that the two leaders discussed in their meeting (Bronson 2006b: 5, 39). Roosevelt wrote Ibn Saud on April 5 in response to Ibn Saud's March 10 enquiry on Palestine.

I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews⁶⁴. During our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people (Yale Law School, Department of State Bulletin 21 October 1945: 623).

Ibn Saud and the Arab world believed that the U.S. Government would not betray Roosevelt's written promise.

One week after his letter, Roosevelt died. Suddenly, Ibn Saud had to deal with Harry Truman, the new U.S. President. Similar to Roosevelt, Truman's concerns were dangers and threats to the survival, security, and stability of the West and its allies from totalitarian regimes. Truman also used the decline of British power and influence to reorient U.S. foreign policy towards more involvement overseas vis-à-vis U.S. national security and U.S. interests. The U.S. Department of State⁶⁵ emphasised that Truman reoriented U.S. foreign policy "away from its usual position of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in faraway conflicts by providing political, military and economic assistance to democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces" (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,

⁶³ Roosevelt was under political pressure in the U.S. from pro-Zionist groups; he told Ibn Saud about this at the meeting and added that the U.S. had a "spiritual interest in the Palestine situation" (Gardner 2009: 21). He hoped to win the support of moderate Arabs. However, Ibn Saud wanted a firm commitment from Roosevelt "not to support Zionist goals (*Ibid*). Spiegel contended that this misleading promise stemmed from Roosevelt's "confidence that he could gain Saudi Arabia's support in a peace-making effort" (Spiegel 1986: 13). Spiegel does not provide any evidence to support that contention; or his other argument that in exchange for U.S. lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt "expected the Saudis to listen to American views on Palestine" (*Ibid*). Also see Eddy, W.A., 1954. *FDR Meets Ibn Saud*. New York: American Friends of the Middle East; Miller, A.D., 1980. *Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.

⁶⁴ The promise to consult was a standard delaying tactic often used by the U.S. (Gardner *op.cit*, 23).

⁶⁵ "In the early Cold War, President Truman's inexperience of foreign affairs resulted in his heavy reliance on Secretaries of State George Marshall (1947-49) and Dean Acheson (1949-53)" (Dobson and Marsh 2001:10).

Milestones: 1945-1952, The Truman Doctrine: par.1). However, in the Middle East, despite strong opposition from his advisers⁶⁶ and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Truman supported the partition of Palestine⁶⁷ and the new state of Israel. That decision inflamed the Arab-Israel conflict and strained Saudi-U.S. relations severely.⁶⁸ The next chapter explains the Palestine issue and its effect on relations in greater detail.

Despite the Palestine issue, issues from prior years continued to be extremely important and often dominated Saudi-U.S. discussions and negotiations on relations and alignment. The following discussions focus on the effect of delays in U.S. direct financial aid to Saudi Arabia; the political implications of the Dhahran airfield; Ibn Saud's dilemma in the American-British rivalry; and British resistance to growing U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia.

Delays in direct financial aid

The nature and speed of U.S. financial aid to Saudi Arabia became even more important to Ibn Saud as he sought a long-range U.S. direct assistance plan. The lend-lease aid program that started in 1940 was due to expire in August 1945. Stettinius pushed for Congressional approval of direct aid based on U.S. national interests and fears that Saudi Arabia would seek help elsewhere, which would result in the loss of U.S. power and influence in the Kingdom (United States Department of State 1945, 890F.51/1-845 Stettinius memorandum to Roosevelt: 847). However, the U.S. Congress moved slowly on the issue of direct financial

⁶⁶ Every major U.S. foreign affairs or defense institution: the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and all of the top foreign affairs advisers including Secretary of State Marshall, opposed Truman's pro-Israel policies. Their opposition was not against Israel *per se* but rather what they recognized as the realities in the region. They predicted, and history since has proven, that the realities led to massive bloodshed, decades of turmoil and a skewing of U.S. interests after Truman's pro-Israel policies prevailed (Neff 1995: par.10).

⁶⁷ On August 31, 1945, Truman publicly supported large scale Jewish immigration to Palestine because he "was sensitive to the rights of victims of Nazism and the voting strength of pro-Zionists in the U.S." (Hahn 2004: 22).

⁶⁸ Palestine was not only a stumbling block to Saudi-U.S. relations; after World War II, it became the "single most dangerous question in securing the U.S. presence in the Middle East" (Gardner 2009: 21-22).

aid. Congress sought to tie U.S. financial aid for Saudi Arabia with gaining long-term U.S. military interests in Saudi Arabia, especially the construction of the Dhahran military base, the formation and dispatch of a U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia, and a two hundred ninety mile road construction project connecting Riyadh and Dhahran.

Ibn Saud was “indignant and convinced that U.S. delay” in providing his normal supply and budgetary needs “is unnecessary”, and that he is “entitled now to statement of our intentions” (*Ibid*, 890F.24/4-2045: April 20 Eddy telegram to Grew: 878). The U.S. Department of State emphasised to U.S. Congressional leaders the threat to vital U.S. national interests in Saudi Arabia. Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson⁶⁹ conferred with Congressional and U.S. military leaders to indicate the “possible danger to oil concessions held by American companies and the interests of the U.S. Navy in preserving the concessions, should the Saudi Government deficit not be met” (United States Department of State 1945, 890F.00/3-845 March 8 Acheson memorandum of conversation: 861). Acheson also conferred with U.S. Senate leaders and convinced them that, “the U.S. has a vital interest in Saudi Arabia, both to prevent internal disturbance and foreign intervention and to protect American national interests in the oil reserves of that country” (*Ibid*, 90F.51/5-1745: May 17 Acheson memorandum of conversation: 895). Acting U.S. Secretary of State Joseph Grew⁷⁰ notified Truman that key members of Congress agreed that “because of Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in relation to the Pacific War, and more importantly, because of its vast oil resources under concession to American nationals, the U.S. has a vital interest in the stability

⁶⁹ After World War II, Dean Acheson served Under Secretary of State to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes; Acheson later served as Secretary of State from January 21, 1949 to January 20, 1953. Although Acheson supported the containment of communism and the tenets of the Truman Doctrine, he was also a realist who recognized that the Soviet Union was not only an ideological opponent, but also a viable global power that had to be viewed as a serious geopolitical challenge to U.S. interests. This belief shaped Acheson’s approach to the many foreign policy challenges that faced the United States during his tenure (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

⁷⁰ Joseph Grew was Under Secretary of State from December 20, 1944 to August 15, 1945 and Secretary of State *ad interim* from June 28, 1945 to July 3, 1945 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

of Saudi Arabia”; they noted that in January [1945] “Roosevelt approved fifteen U.S. Department of State proposals, concurred in by the Secretaries of War and Navy, for the extension of aid to Saudi Arabia”, which aimed at helping to stabilise the Saudi state (*Ibid*, 890F.51/5-2945: May 23 Grew memorandum to Roosevelt: 900-901).

However, Grew explained to Eddy that there was no U.S. precedent to the type of long-range assistance program that Ibn Saud wanted. The lack of a precedent slowed down U.S. Government decision-making process further (*Ibid*: 890F.51/6-1845: June 18 Grew telegram to Eddy: 908). Eddy characterised U.S. delays as a “hard blow to Saudi hopes and plans” (*Ibid*: 890F.51/6-2145: June 21 Eddy to Stettinius: 911). Eddy elaborated on Saudi uneasiness about relations and alignment with the U.S. Ibn Saud did not express that Saudi military security in exchange for Saudi oil for the U.S. was the main issue. According to Eddy, the main issues were financial and economic aid to stabilise the Saudi state: fiscal stability, economic development, and technological know-how. These meant opportunities for Saudi Arabia to gain benefits for Saudi economic development. Ibn Saud also wanted to be able to use that argument to deflect internal Saudi criticism about foreign infiltration into the Saudi state. Thus, Ibn Saud’s primary interest was economic security, cooperation with the U.S., and an escape from British imperialism (*Ibid*: 911-914).

Realist alliance theories can explain Ibn Saud’s perspective. His desire to escape from British imperialism can be interpreted through Waltz’s contention that a motive for alliance is to prevent or deter political domination of the state by a foreign power, which in this context is Britain. Using Walt’s threat perspective, Ibn Saud perceived that the threats to the Kingdom and his rule were the British and the power Britain held over British-controlled states surrounding Saudi Arabia. Schweller’s bandwagon rationale is applicable in explaining that the expectation of material gains from superior U.S. technical goods and services was Ibn Saud’s primary motive in seeking an alliance or alignment with the U.S.

Schweller's perspective is useful in arguing that a Saudi alliance or alignment with the U.S. represented an opportunity for Ibn Saud to change the direction of the Kingdom; Ibn Saud saw alignment with the U.S. as one that would provide an opportunity for him to put the Saudi state on a path to economic stability and development, thus lessening the prospects of internal domestic strife.

What Dhahran meant to both states politically, militarily and economically was another crucial aspect in the formation of the Saudi-U.S. alignment. Dhahran represented military and commercial values and benefits that both states coveted greatly, a major concept in Schweller's theory.

Dhahran Airfield

Ibn Saud granted "permission for construction of airfield at Dhahran provided field and fixed installations pass to Saudi Government immediately war ends; use of field by U.S. Forces for period of 3 years after end of war, and most-favored-nation terms for U.S. commercial airlines when field is opened to civil aviation (*Ibid*, 890F.248/5-1345: May 13 Eddy telegram to Grew: 894). Eddy proposed that after the war, Dhahran be used by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for commercial and military purposes (*Ibid*, 890F.248/5-2445: May 24 Department of State memorandum to British Embassy: 922-923).

In June 1945 the U.S. War Department believed that "there was a diminishing military necessity for the construction of the airfield at Dhahran" (*Ibid*, 90F.248/6-2545: June 25 Grew telegram to Eddy: 915). However, the U.S. Department of State did not want to abandon U.S. plans for an airfield at Dhahran because of commercial, economic, and political reasons. Grew shifted focus away from the strategic military aspect. He emphasised that Dhahran was a catalyst for the commercial development of Saudi oil, the stability of the Saudi economy, the external political integrity of the Saudi state, and the development of close Saudi-U.S relations (*Ibid*, 915-917). He argued further that if the U.S. decided not to

build the airfield, “Ibn Saud would gain the impression that our policies with regard to Saudi Arabia are of a wavering character. This would contribute to his existing uncertainty [of] the extent to which he may rely upon the U.S. (*Ibid*). It was in the interest of both states to construct the Dhahran airfield and related facilities. Truman approved the construction of a U.S. military airfield at Dhahran (*Ibid*, 890F.248/6-2845: June 28 Grew telegram to Eddy: 918).

Ibn Saud had “reservations and objections”, which “were almost exclusively concerned with preserving the appearance, as well as the reality, of his sovereignty and jurisdiction” so that, “untamed tribesmen near those inaccessible posts will respect a station which belongs to the King, and will not consider the presence of isolated United States Army personnel as an invasion” (*Ibid*, 90F.248/8-845: August 8 Eddy to Grew: 943-944). This is an important point to remember in the Dhahran issue. Maintaining prestige and reputation were significant interests for Ibn Saud,⁷¹ alliance motives included in Schweller’s alliance theory.

Dhahran became a political issue. Over the years, Ibn Saud and his successors encountered persistent Arab criticism that Dhahran represented Saudi surrender of its sovereignty to the U.S. and a violation of the sanctity of Muslim Holy Land. The presence of foreign troops in the Kingdom that might give the impression of loss of Ibn Saud’s prestige, and surrender of Saudi territorial sovereignty, were issues that were always sensitive in negotiations about Dhahran. In times of unrest arising from Arab Nationalist ideology and political use of Islam, Dhahran was a heavy burden on the Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. In times of threat to Saudi national interests and security, Dhahran symbolised cooperation between the two states. The Saudi leadership vacillated between these two

⁷¹ Prestige and reputation are important notions in Schweller’s theory. They are not relevant in the theories of Waltz or Walt.

arguments depending on which position they believed protected the monarchy in specific situations.

The American and British rivalry: British pressure on Ibn Saud

Britain tried to blunt the growth of U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia. Eddy and Colonel Voris H. Connor of the United States Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) went to Riyadh on May 9, 1945 to negotiate the construction of the Dhahran airfield, offer a U.S. military mission, and propose road construction projects. This was the ‘Connor Mission’ (Nardulli 2002: 83). However, Ibn Saud declined the services of a U.S. Military Mission for non-military projects and stated his preference to have “foreign cooperation in developing his country achieved through civilian agencies; this applies to the projects proposed by Connor Mission including road building, but does not affect Saudi agreement to permit construction of air field at Dhahran” (*Ibid*, 890F.20 Mission/7-445: July 4 Sands telegram to Byrnes: 920). Ibn Saud supposedly objected to foreign military assistance in domestic economic matters for three reasons: “criticism by fanatical reactionary subjects; abuse from Hashemite enemies who proclaim him a puppet under foreign military; and objection by the British to a military mission from the U.S. in which the British do not share at least equally with the U.S.” (*Ibid*). Eddy interpreted Ibn Saud’s decision as “a courteous but unqualified decision to apply to any foreign military mission, whether American or not” (*Ibid*: 890F.20 Missions/7-845: July 8 Eddy to Grew: 923).

Grew did not believe that adverse Saudi domestic reaction was the reason Ibn Saud declined U.S. Military Mission services for non-military projects in Saudi Arabia such as road building since Ibn Saud pressed the U.S. Government for those forms of aid. Grew believed that Ibn Saud’s “reversal of policy can be explained only in terms of British pressure” (*Ibid*, 89, 0.248/7-845: July 13 Grew telegram to Eddy: 928). Eddy confirmed that,

indeed, the King's rejection was “decisively influenced by British pressure, which the King admitted” (*Ibid*: 890F.248/7-1545: July 15 Eddy telegram to Grew: 929).

Eddy knew and understood the intense struggle for power and influence in Saudi Arabia between the U.S. and Britain. The British did not want the U.S. to have strong political or military relations with Ibn Saud. The British wanted that role. The British did not want a strong Saudi-U.S. alignment and, clearly, sought to prevent a formal Saudi-U.S. alliance. The British did not want to be excluded from Saudi Arabia: “The British do not want U.S. to build Saudi army or air force. British oppose and will oppose any U.S. activity in Saudi Arabia which gives even appearance of political or military precedence. British permit us to relieve them of burden of supply but will not part with decisive vote and veto power. I hope we never join in joint subsidy or supply again but instead attach our independent economic aid to our own strings instead of to British apron strings” (*Ibid*: 929-930).

Ibn Saud was in a dilemma. He kept the British in the game because he had deep concerns and uncertainties about U.S. intentions. The U.S. had greater economic power than the British but the Americans hesitated using it for Saudi Arabia's benefit, thus creating false expectations. In his view, since the British still had political and military power in the region, and were not ready to leave the power game, he would use them to hedge his bet on the Americans.⁷²

Ibn Saud believes that, [despite] how powerful and friendly the U.S. may be, Britain continues to dominate the Middle East [and] to act where others [merely] concur. The U.S. statement that great care and more time must be taken to assure Congressional support for long range economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia weighted the scales again in favor of Britain as the political and military power which can be counted on to act and not just to create expectations. Ibn Saud seems convinced that the Britain which acts directly on his frontiers, which controls the approaches to his Kingdom and the sources of his subsistence, must be conciliated even though Ibn Saud sacrifices

⁷² Ibn Saud's financial and economic problems began during the global recession of 1929; his financial problems worsened in World War II. Ibn Saud gradually shifted from rapprochement with the British to conciliation with the Americans. Politically, he believed that U.S. assistance would be “less encumbering” than British assistance (Al-Nafjan 2009: Introduction: 2-3).

benefits of a military mission from the more remote and benevolent U.S. from which he has received no assurances for the future, military or economic. [Britain] guarantees [Ibn Saud's] political and national security from aggression. Only when [the U.S.] finds a way to match Britain, as an effective guarantor of the Saudi Arabian economy, can [the U.S.] hope to eliminate British veto on U.S. proposals in Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, for all our investments in the land, Britain will enjoy a political advantage over the U.S. (*Ibid*: 923-927).

Ibn Saud was not yet ready to jump off the British bandwagon. He wanted to be absolutely certain about U.S. intentions. He wanted the U.S. Government to act faster and to be more resolute than the British Government. If the U.S. wanted alignment, the U.S. needed to understand his motivations. Ibn Saud's alignment motivations were unmistakably realist: shifts in balances of power, especially in the Near East between Britain and the U.S.; expectations of economic gains to help secure and stabilise his Kingdom against possible internal difficulties from disgruntled tribes; expectations of political and military gains to assure the Kingdom's security against possible external threats arising from his acrimonious dynastic rivalry with the Hashemites and frontier disputes with neighbouring states to the south and east.⁷³ Ibn Saud's perspectives thus spoke of factors the Saudi leadership considered important in balancing Saudi state interests against shifts in the regional and global power structure and its perception of persistent external and internal threats to the Kingdom.

The Saudi leadership wanted to understand U.S. Government intentions in Saudi Arabia clearly and to make the Saudi positions similarly clear to the Americans. These were the

⁷³ Sharif's dream of a grand Arab empire did not fit British colonial plans for the Middle East after World War I; in this context Ibn Saud directed himself toward the Hijaz (AbuKhalil: 78); however, Britain did not want Ibn Saud to encroach on the new Hashemite zones in Transjordan and Iraq (*Ibid*, 79). Abdullah of Transjordan dreamt of a unified Arab nation to be called Greater Syria composed of Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Transjordan and Syria (Wynbrandt & Gerges 2010: 204). Ibn Saud perceived this as a major threat because "unlike him, the Hashemites claimed a genealogical link to the Prophet Muhammad and, thus, leadership of the Islamic nation" (*Ibid*). Details of the acrimonious rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites are discussed by Clive Leatherdale (198); W.R. Louis (1984); Frank Brenchley (1989); M.C. Wilson (1990); and Cohen & Kolinsky (1998).

purposes of Amir Faisal's meeting with Grew in Washington D.C. on July 31, 1945 (*op.cit*: 890F.0011/7-3145: July 31 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 1000).

Amir Faisal meeting at the U.S. Department of State

Amir Faisal again spoke of internal and external threats to Saudi Arabia, the conservative nature of the Saudi people, the status of Saudi-British relations, and Saudi confidence in relations with the U.S. (*Ibid*: 1000-1005). Grew explained that the U.S. wanted to help strengthen Saudi Arabia by providing economic and advisory assistance; that the U.S. would not interfere in Saudi internal political affairs so that the Kingdom could strengthen itself; and that America's involvement and heavy financial commitments in World War II and the structure and bureaucracy of the U.S. Government caused unintended and unwanted delays in providing U.S. assistance for Saudi Arabia.

At the next meeting on August 1, 1945 Faisal brought up the Palestine issue: "other Arab peoples, bound by close historical and blood ties to the people of Saudi Arabia also needed American help in order to realize their full independence" (*Ibid*: 1006). Saudi Arabia hoped that the "U.S. would not support any policy which would tend to deprive the Arabs in Palestine of their property and rights and place them under the dominance of a Jewish Government" (*Ibid*: 1007). Grew explained that U.S. policy regarding Palestine took into account "the interests of both Arabs and Jews in any decision; Roosevelt set the policy and it had not changed under Truman" (*Ibid*). U.S. policy on Palestine was about to change, driving a wedge in Saudi-U.S. relations.⁷⁴

After the meetings, Saudi-U.S. relations seemed to improve because of "generous U.S. budgetary aid for 1945, more than twice the aid being given by Britain" and "receipt by the King of enthusiastic reports from Faisal regarding his conferences in Washington" (*Ibid*, 890F.248/8-845: August 8 Eddy to Grew: 945). Truman formally notified Ibn Saud that the

⁷⁴ Chapter 5 discusses the Palestine issue and its effects on relations and the alignment.

U.S. Congress approved the amount of supplies and currency assigned to Saudi Arabia for the second half of 1945 and that the U.S., through the Export-Import Bank, extended a five million dollar development loan to Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*: 890F.24/9-1345: September 13 Truman letter to Ibn Saud: 954). Truman's real motive may have been to gain political capital from Ibn Saud by showing him that he fulfilled his personal commitment to help Ibn Saud and to lessen any negative reactions by Ibn Saud to Truman's stance on Palestine.

Eddy suggests a formal Saudi-U.S. treaty

Eddy strongly believed in the critical importance of U.S. financial aid to Saudi Arabia. However, as a condition for continued U.S. aid to the Kingdom, he recommended entering into a formal U.S. treaty with Saudi Arabia. He saw it as a way for the U.S. to compete effectively with Britain and to eliminate Ibn Saud's ability to manipulate the British-U.S. rivalry in order to get the aid he wanted from both sides. In Eddy's view, a formal treaty strengthened the negotiating position of the U.S. Government. Eddy gave his perspectives on Saudi-U.S. relations vis-à-vis the U.S. rivalry with Britain.

Ibn Saud will attempt to sit out the 'rivalry' between the U.S. and British in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has limited experience in foreign relations, and watches carefully what takes place in neighbouring countries. It will be of great assistance to U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia if the mortmain of British economic strangulation can be relaxed from the throats of neighboring governments; and if the notorious political and diplomatic precedence of the British can be abolished in Egypt and Iraq. Any move by the U.S. Government that could be interpreted as support for any British action detrimental to the Arabs would injure U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, not only because it would be resented on its own account, but because it would confirm the reiterated British propaganda to the effect that Britain acts while others concur (*Ibid*, 711.90F/9-1345: September 13 Eddy to Grew: 955).

The U.S. needed to act tough and decisively on its own terms in order to establish a stronger position in Saudi Arabia and ultimately prevail over Britain: "It is time we got tough to match or replace Britain as stabilizer of Saudi Arabian economy" (*Ibid*, 956). Eddy explained that,

American economic assistance to Saudi Arabia [must] be contingent upon treatment of the U.S. on a completely non-discriminatory basis in all political and economic matters; a treaty might be requested before notification of any future aid. It has been impossible to use our economic aid in bargaining for privileges [because of] the divorce between U.S. assistance and U.S. rights in Saudi Arabia. U.S. assistance and rights in Saudi Arabia have not functioned together because of delays in U.S. aid. It is better to reach agreements for a period of years to enable the U.S. to make assistance dependent upon prior assurance by the Saudi Government that it will maintain an open door for the U.S. against all efforts by the British to close it (*Ibid*).

The U.S. strategy in the rivalry with Britain was now very clear. In order to bring Ibn Saud to an alignment with the U.S. and win Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Government had to break the British Government's stranglehold on Ibn Saud and the Saudi economy.⁷⁵ Through the Dhahran agreement and related road construction projects, the U.S. gained control of Saudi air and land transportation systems. By breaking the British monopoly on communications, the U.S. moved closer to a checkmate on the British. The formation of a Saudi-U.S. alignment was almost complete. These U.S. moves freed Ibn Saud and the Saudi state from economic and political domination by British power, a concept emphasised in Waltz' theory. The U.S. acquired values it coveted and the Saudis perceived opportunities for Saudi material gains and enhancement of its prestige in the Arab world, concepts that Schweller's theory emphasised.

The discussions now shift to Ibn Saud's perceptions of threat. The next two sections discuss threats from the Saudi perspective. The brief discussions merely lay the basis of Ibn Saud's persistent concern about threats. In seeking alliance or alignment with the U.S., the notion of threats was more relevant and critically important to Ibn Saud. The subsequent chapters will discuss how Ibn Saud's perceptions of threat greatly impacted Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment.

⁷⁵ Eddy pushed for the U.S. Government to "grant material substance to long-range economic plans to fight British imperialism" (Gardner 2009: 25). The U.S. did not want to station military troops in the Middle East; the only path was "total American participation in the economic and political development of the Middle Eastern countries" (*Ibid*, 18).

Ibn Saud's perceptions of threat

In the 1930s and 1940s, Ibn Saud's biggest fear was the internal threat of state disintegration because he "lacked the financial resources to appease or deter the restless tribes and sections of his realm" (*Ibid*). As early as 1933, Ibn Saud started running out of money because of the Great Depression. World War II created more financial pressures. Thus, Ibn Saud's financial crises and the internal threat of state collapse were his most urgent security concerns.⁷⁶ This drove him to grant oil concessions to U.S. companies and to seek financial aid from the British and the Americans. More than political or military issues, receiving foreign aid in order to have financial resources to use against internal threats was the strongest motive for Ibn Saud to cultivate and maintain friendly relations with the British and the Americans; and eventually, an alignment with the latter.

Safran (1988) explained the external threat to Ibn Saud as "the hostility of the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan, whose family he dispossessed of the Hijaz", and the internal threat as a Saudi empire composed of "disparate sections and anarchic tribes" (Safran 1988: 57). The Treaty of Jeddah with the British in 1927⁷⁷ temporarily minimised the threat⁷⁸ posed by the Hashemites. There was a credible potential danger from Iraq and Transjordan (*Ibid*, 59). The Hashemite threat again became a Saudi security problem for two reasons: British control over Iraq weakened; and, if rumours of British collusion⁷⁹ with the Hashemites were true, then they would gain enough capabilities to defeat Ibn Saud in a war,

⁷⁶ Ibn Saud's impending bankruptcy risked tribal revolt and possible attacks by his dynastic enemies along his frontiers (Leatherdale 1983: 322).

⁷⁷ Ibn Saud never attempted to wage war with Transjordan or Iraq over territory; he accepted borders and frontiers imposed by Britain and others. The 1927 treaty did not alter Ibn Saud's dependence on the British (Vitalis 2007: 5).

⁷⁸ Britain restrained stronger powers that threatened Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi Arabia exercising self-restraint against weaker powers (Safran 1988: 3).

⁷⁹ Ibn Saud's anxiety about British collusion with the Hashemites stemmed from their traditional alliance with Britain (Miglietta 2002: 200). Mary Wilson pointed out that from 1921-1926, Emir Abdullah Hussein of Transjordan fought Beduin tribal guerillas who Ibn Saud financed; British forces assisted Abdullah. It was "natural for Ibn Saud to oppose any enhancement of the power of his life-long adversary" (Wilson 1990: 123)

destabilise Saudi Arabia, and break it apart (*Ibid*, 57). Ibn Saud also faced encirclement. Water and territories under British control,⁸⁰ except for the southwestern corner of Saudi Arabia, surrounded all sides of Ibn Saud's kingdom (*op.cit*). Ibn Saud had a three-pronged response: balance against the threats by striving for a military alliance with the U.S.; contain the Hashemites and frustrate their plans through Saudi political friendships and alliances in the Arab arena; and build up Saudi military capabilities for deterrence purposes (*Ibid*, 58). Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. to be a counterweight to Britain and a substitute buttress for Saudi security against his Hashemite enemies (*Ibid*, 63).

1946: Threats to the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia

Deep Saudi concerns about external threats to the Saudi state and its need for U.S. military protection surfaced in late December 1945. As a weak state, there were two areas in which Saudi Arabia depended on foreign powers: financial and economic stability and military security.⁸¹

Ibn Saud informed Eddy of Saudi fears of aggression from the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan (U.S. Department of State FRUS 1946, S89OF.00/12-3145: telegram 451 Eddy to Byrnes: 738). Ibn Saud wanted to counter the threats, first through U.S. political influence with Britain; second through U.S. military aid or military intervention by U.N. military forces. Ibn Saud asked that the U.S. inform Britain that the integrity, security, and defence of Saudi Arabia were of great concern to the U.S. and would not acquiesce in

⁸⁰ Clive Leatherdale (1983: 321-322) explained that Britain considered Wahhabism and the dynastic ambitions of the Al-Saud as explicit threats to the Gulf and to the British-held mandates. The British intervened only in order to limit Saudi expansionism. Britain would not use hard military options because Saudi Arabia was the spiritual home of Islam and Ibn Saud would not survive against British military forces. Britain favoured negotiation, appeasement, and limited force.

⁸¹ Toby Jones characterised Saudi-U.S relations since World War II as a geopolitical relationship in which American behaviour placed high priority on maintaining the security and stability of the Saudi regime" (Jones 2010: 33). Oil was too vital for the U.S. economy and U.S. national security; the U.S. could not "leave the fate of Saudi oil subject to Saudi Arabia's allegedly predatory neighbours or to Cold War rivals" (*Ibid*). What resulted was a "pursuit of profit and patronage" in which a "stable authoritarian Saudi government was beholden to American oil companies and U.S. security assurances" (*Ibid*).

aggression against his realm; he also asked that the U.S. request Britain to prevent hostile acts on his frontiers (*Ibid*). Ibn Saud also asked the U.S. Government whether in an emergency, after British diplomatic efforts failed, the U.S. would either send military aid, such as airplanes, to reinforce Ibn Saud's own insufficient defences or take the lead in securing prompt and effective intervention by military forces of the U.N. Ibn Saud said he would be more at ease if he could have the assurance of U.S. intervention,⁸² because the U.N. might be too slow in acting (*Ibid*, Eddy undated telegram #21 to U.S. Department of State: 738).

Grew explained that the "preservation of the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia is one of basic objectives of the U.S. in the Near East" and if the Saudi state is a "victim of aggression or is seriously threatened with aggression, the U.S. will live up meticulously to its U.N. obligations to suppress acts of aggression" against a member (United States Department of State FRUS 1946: 711.90F/1-1946: January 19 Grew to Tuck: 738). Acheson wanted Ibn Saud to know that U.S. intelligence did not find any evidence that "any aggression is being planned at this time against Saudi Arabia and that the U.S. "believes that Great Britain, similar to the U.S., would be very much averse to the outbreak of armed conflict in the Arab world at the present time and that Great Britain, again similar to the U.S, would make every proper and appropriate effort to prevent such an outbreak" (*Ibid*, 711.90F/1-446: January 3 U.S. Department of State telegram #3 to Eddy: 739). Acheson reassured Ibn Saud that "no economic rivalries that might exist between the U.S. and U.K. in the Near East are of a nature that would cause either country to engage in armed conflict; that would be contrary to the basic principles contained in U.N. Charter (*Ibid*). Ibn Saud expressed genuine satisfaction at

⁸² It is not surprising that Ibn Saud and Saud used this reasoning in the Buraimi dispute.

learning of the U.S. interest in Saudi security and territorial integrity⁸³ (*Ibid*, 890F.00/3-2146 March 21 Eddy telegram #77 to U.S. Department of State: 739).

Integrating realist alliance theories: 1941-1946

Alignment as a balance of power response

Using Waltz' argument, the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. to align with each other is a balance of power response. Both states recognised an imbalance of power in the region and sought to balance it. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. wanted to aggregate their power against Britain and its allies in the region. In the context of Saudi perceptions that neighbouring states were more powerful because they were British allies, Saudi Arabia was a revisionist state that wanted more power to defend against inimical surrounding states. The Saudi state wanted to gain power through an increase in its financial, economic, and military capabilities. As an ascendant power in the region, the U.S. was likewise a revisionist state that wanted more power and influence for its long-term military, economic, and political goals in the region and globally. Thus, faced by unbalanced regional power, an alliance or alignment between the American and Saudi Arabian states would increase their military and other capabilities and aggregate their power in order to bring the regional distribution of power into balance.

Traditional balance of power theory holds that the safer strategy is to balance against a stronger power by aligning or allying with those who cannot dominate each other easily and readily in such an arrangement. Ibn Saud saw the U.S. as a non-colonial power in the Middle East. Ibn Saud believed that the U.S. would not treat him in the colonial manner that British, the French, and the Dutch dealt with their colonial states.

⁸³ "No matter how many times the Americans assured Saudi Arabia that the U.S. would protect the oil fields and ensure Saudi independence and territorial integrity, the Saudis have never been totally satisfied with U.S. pledges or comfortable with dependence on the U.S." (Lippman 2004: 274).

From the U.S. perspective, aligning with a more vulnerable state such as Saudi Arabia increased the power and influence of the U.S. in the Saudi state because Saudi Arabia needed U.S. financial, economic, and military assistance. On the other hand, Ibn Saud may have viewed alignment with the U.S. as an alignment with a more vulnerable state, given the critical need of the U.S. for Saudi oil during and after World War II.

Alignment as a balance of threat response

Using Walt's argument, Saudi efforts to align with the U.S. is a balance of threat response. After the erosion of its alliance with the British, Ibn Saud needed another alliance to protect Saudi Arabia from the threat of superior aggregated capabilities of the British state and the states it controlled (Iraq, Jordan, Iran, and the southern Gulf States). In the context of Britain's hegemony in the region, with its control and influence in states that surrounded Saudi territory, Ibn Saud perceived⁸⁴ the presence of all four sources of the level of external threat from the British and its regional colonies: aggregated power, proximate power, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. Saudi Arabia did not have any neighbouring states with which to balance because of long-term rivalries and conflicts with them. Even if there were neighbouring states with which to ally, Saudi Arabia was a very weak state and did not have significant military or economic power to contribute to a balancing alignment.

Clearly, the Saudi-U.S. case challenges Walt's contention that foreign aid may be more the result of alignment or alliance and less a cause of its formation. From 1941 to 1946, U.S. foreign aid for Saudi Arabia was the strongest motive for Ibn Saud to align with the United States. U.S. financial, economic, and military assistance was a major factor early in relations and occupied much of the diplomatic negotiations⁸⁵ between both sides. The evidence also

⁸⁴ The notion of threat is more often a behavioural and perceptual variable rather than just a material one (Carlsnaes, et al 2002: 371).

⁸⁵ Parker Hart characterised Saudi-U.S. negotiations as "diplomatic groping for reciprocal commitments to security measures" (Hart 1999: 66).

shows that the issue of foreign aid drove much of the British and American rivalry for primacy in Saudi Arabia and the formation of an alignment with Ibn Saud.

Alignment as a balance of interest/opportunity response

Using Schweller's argument, the Saudi-U.S. willingness to align with each other is a balance of interest/opportunity response; and involves both balancing and bandwagoning positions. Both states saw a "relationship of utility based on strict calculations of self-interest". The U.S. had two interests: gaining access to and use of Saudi Arabia's strategic geographic location; and uninterrupted access to and control of Saudi oil. The U.S. wanted Saudi Arabia jump on its bandwagon because the U.S. would gain the two values it coveted in Saudi Arabia. One value was an airfield and base in Dhahran from which it could pursue its World War II efforts and post-War ambitions in the region and beyond. The other more significant value was access to and control of massive Saudi oil reserves.

Schweller's combined balancing and bandwagoning position explains Saudi Arabia's alignment with the U.S. more fully than the balance of power or balance of threat paradigm. Saudi balancing with the U.S. would be a defensive alignment or alliance motivated by Saudi security and survival concerns about both external and internal threats. The Saudis balanced with a rising, but not yet dominant, U.S. military power that was not a threat to the Saudi state, but could serve as a deterrent against potential regional threats from surrounding states. On the other side of the same alignment coin, the Saudis bandwagoned with the U.S., an economic power because of Saudi expectations of economic and technological gain or profit from direct financial aid provided by the U.S.; increased royalties from U.S. oil concessions; and perhaps some expectation of sharing in the spoils of a U.S. victory in World War II.

The most pressing problem for Ibn Saud was domestic internal threat, a major concept that only Schweller's alliance theory included. The Kingdom was in dire financial straits because of the Great Depression that started in 1929 and World War II that impeded the development

of Saudi oil resources. Gaining U.S. financial assistance would bring in revenues he sorely needed to develop the Saudi economy, stabilise the state, and acquire resources to deal with any internal revolts and prevent other states from military adventures into the Saudi state.

Ibn Saud wanted access to U.S. knowledge, technology, entrepreneurship, goods, and services in order to develop the Saudi state. Gaining U.S. financial and economic assistance helped to assure the stability and security of the Saudi state.

Conclusion

The project contends that the three realist alliance theories may seem to be at odds with each other, but each brings to the discussions very relevant and useful notions of alliance motivation rooted in the notions of power, threat, and interests/opportunities. The project also emphasises that its goal is to enrich the understanding of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment through the deployment of elements from three major realist alliance theories: power, threat, and interest/opportunity. To restrict analysis and explanation only to power or threat or interest/opportunity produces a narrow understanding of the Saudi-U.S. case. The basis of relations and alignment between the two states is wider and more complex. As an example, the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 showed that Saudi military security in exchange for Saudi oil for the U.S. was not the main issue during this period. Thus, the application of concepts and elements from all three theories yields a much more thorough and more complete perspective of the Saudi-U.S. case.

1944-1946 marked the period in which the American and Saudi states began to explore an alignment seriously and to weigh their benefits and costs carefully. The data continued to support the applicability of elements of realist alliance factors: mutual perceptions of shifts in regional power and influence; perceived opportunities for gain or advantage on the part of both the American and Saudi Arabian states; and Ibn Saud's perceptions of threats to the security and survival of his rule.

As World War II ended, signs of declining British economic, political and military hegemony in the Middle East opened the door wider for the U.S. assume a greater and more active role as an ascendant “Great Power” in the region. In the midst of dramatic and rapid shifts in the regional and global power structure in the coming years, significant challenges to the strength and durability of the informal and fragile Saudi-U.S. alignment lay ahead.

Chapter 5

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1947-1948)

Introduction

Chapters 5 and 6 continue the project’s focus on multiple drivers of Saudi-U.S. relations and maintenance of their alignment: perceived shifts in regional balance of power; external and internal threats from Ibn Saud’s perspective; opportunities for financial and economic gain by both states, especially from Saudi oil development by the U.S.; the role and impact of U.S. financial and economic aid to Saudi Arabia; U.S. strategic interest in the Dhahran base, Saudi requests for U.S. military arms and assistance. The chapters explore the reasons the two states maintained or continued their alignment in 1947-1952, despite the Palestine problem and other challenges to the fragile and informal alignment.

This chapter argues two points about the endurance of the alignment. First, mutual financial and economic interests of both states, especially in oil development, are the foundation of the alignment. The financial-economic alignment strengthened during this period. U.S. foreign aid to the Kingdom remained a critical aspect for the U.S. in relations with Ibn Saud. U.S. foreign aid continued to be a vital part of Ibn Saud’s plans for the Kingdom’s financial and economic stability and development. He wanted to build up the Kingdom’s material capabilities for modernisation of the Kingdom, which he considered essential in muting or quelling any domestic internal dissatisfaction and threats to his rule.

Second, mutual military interests contributed to the endurance of the alignment. The U.S. still needed the strategic military advantage of Saudi Arabia's geographical location, especially at Dhahran. *Quid pro quo*, Ibn Saud desired to rebuild the Saudi armed forces and their military capabilities for defence against his enemies with U.S. equipment, arms, and training. Thus, in on-going negotiations with the U.S. on Dhahran, the King wanted substantial U.S. military aid in addition to his need for overall U.S. financial and economic assistance.

Ibn Saud believed that alignment with the U.S. could bring more security for the Kingdom against the external threat he perceived from the Hashemites, especially if a rumoured British-sponsored Greater Syria alliance formed. He wanted to gain American assurance of protection against external threats, which now included the threat of Russian influence seeping into the region and disturbing the region's balance of power. Ibn Saud proposed formal alliances in 1948 in order to strengthen his economic, military, and political position in the region. However, none of the proposed formal alliances materialised; the chapter discusses the reasons for this.

This chapter explains the deep-seated importance of oil to the alignment. Ibn Saud wanted to continue his friendly relations with Britain but did not want the Kingdom to fall under British influence or control. Unlike his neighbour states, his Kingdom never became a colony of the British or any other foreign power.⁸⁶ Because of his close relations with ARAMCO, and his belief that the U.S. Government did not have colonial intentions in the Kingdom, Ibn Saud favoured the Americans to have exclusivity in Saudi oil exploration and development. The British-American-Russian Grand Alliance in World War II crumbled in

⁸⁶ The King's reputation as a tough opponent on the military and political battlefields, his alliance with the Wahhabis, and focus by the European powers on other areas of the region helped Ibn Saud to avoid becoming a colony. See Philby, H.S.J., 1955. *Saudi Arabia*. London: Ernest Benn.; Leatherdale, C., 1983. *Britain, Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: the Imperial Oasis*. New York: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.; Weston, M., 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.; and Wynbrandt, J. and Gerges, F.A., 2010. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York: Facts on File.

the face of competition for oil resources and “their deepening great power rivalry in the Persian Gulf” (Little 2008: 52).⁸⁷ Rivalry for oil development projects intensified among the oil companies; and among the Governments that protected them. Ibn Saud did not want the British to gain entry into the Saudi oil industry. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. closed ranks and strengthened their alignment in the context of protecting their mutual interests in Saudi oil.

The chapter then probes the Palestine problem and its effect on Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. Amidst already complex motivations in their relations and alignment, Palestine became an unexpected and critical disruption. Relations and the alignment nearly collapsed. The discussions unfold how the U.S. and Saudi Governments dealt with each other in the context of diametrically opposite ideological and political interests in Palestine. The U.S. supported and the Saudis opposed the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel in the area. A series of U.S. Government decisions jolted the Saudis and placed a wedge in relations between the two governments. Relying on oral and written assurances by Roosevelt and other American officials, the Saudis felt betrayed by U.S. decisions to support massive Jewish immigration in 1946, to support the partition of Palestine in 1947, and to recognise the state of Israel in 1948. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were in a quagmire. However, their relations and alignment survived. Neither state allowed the problem to overwhelm their stronger desire to preserve and to protect their mutual financial-economic and military interests in Saudi Arabia, thus averting the collapse of relations and the alignment. Neither government wanted to jeopardise or lose any of the financial-economic and military gains that they had worked hard to gain.

⁸⁷ Truman and the American oil companies sought to expand American access to Middle East oil reserves “for national security and corporate profitability” (Little 2008: 52). To blunt rising American economic and political power, Britain was “reluctant to open the door any wider for U.S. oil firms wanting to enter the Middle East” (*Ibid*, 51). There was “mounting evidence that the Soviet Union, which had exercised enormous influence in Tehran during the Second World War, might soon attempt to wrest control of Iranian oil from Britain (*Ibid*). Peter Hahn explained that after British and American troops pulled out of Iran, Soviet troops remained in Azerbaijan to lead a secessionist communist movement; the Soviets were “seeking oil concessions on par with those gained by the Western powers” (Hahn 2005: 1927).

1947: Saudi-U.S. relations become more complex

In this section, after a brief reemphasis of the importance the Saudis placed on U.S. financial-economic aid to Saudi Arabia in its alignment with the U.S., the discussions focus on applying the interest/opportunity for gain element from Schweller's theory and the external threat element from Walt's theory. The examples used are the rivalry for oil development in the region among the British, Dutch, French, and American private oil companies and their respective governments; Saudi perceptions of increased threats from the Hashemites; and Saudi requests for military arms for defence against threats.

U.S. financial and economic aid for Saudi Arabia

U.S. foreign financial and economic aid to the Saudi state remained a priority for Ibn Saud. On January 17, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes, Under Secretary Acheson, Crown Prince Saud, Saudi Ambassador Shaikh Fuad Hamza, and Saudi Arabian Minister to the U.S. Shaikh Asad al-Faqih met in Washington. The first topic was the Saudi desire to turn to the U.S. exclusively for financial loans and technical assistance in economic development⁸⁸ (United States Department of State FRUS 1947, 711.90F/1-747: January 17 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 1329). According to Crown Prince Saud, the King did not want assistance from international institutions because "he did not wish Saudi Arabia to be 'internationalised'; he did not wish to be indebted to countries other than the U.S.; he trusted the U.S. and preferred to do business with that country rather than with other foreign countries or with an international entity" (*Ibid*: 1330). Clearly, Ibn Saud used the meeting to gain more U.S. financial-economic aid.

⁸⁸ Tim Niblock pointed out that despite the influx of higher oil revenues in the late 1940s, there were no extensive economic development expenditures in Saudi Arabia; "development expenditures were less than 20% of total public expenditures" and there would be no transformation of the Saudi economy until the 1970s (Niblock, 1982: 16-18). Thus, despite U.S. financial and economic aid, Saudi Arabia remained a weak and dependent state.

*Western rivalry for oil*⁸⁹

Schweller's alliance theory emphasised the importance of interest/opportunity for gain as compelling motives for alliance formation. Financial-economic interest and opportunity for gain from Saudi oil were significant incentives for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to align and maintain it. The rivalry for Middle East oil was a web of entangled relationships among oil companies and Western and Middle Eastern governments. Although governments and oil companies under their protection often spoke of cooperation, their deliberations and decisions sought to advance their self-interests in oil. The Saudis and Americans were no exception.

Both states wanted the financial-economic and political power represented by oil; and thus, the need to strengthen their alignment within that context. If other states gained access to and control of major oil resources, such as those in the Saudi state, there would be a significant threat to the national interests and security of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a strong alignment on oil matters between the two states would give both states unique opportunities to gain enormous monetary profits. The financial-economic values to be gained by both states from the alignment were indisputable. Almost three decades later, in 1974-1985,⁹⁰ massive oil revenues during those years helped to fuel the rapid economic growth and development of the Kingdom. Oil revenues eventually enabled the Saudis to buy state-of-the-art military arms⁹¹ and related technology from America. Petrodollars deluged the U.S.,⁹² and helped its economic expansion.

⁸⁹ One of the most thorough explanations of the background and history of Western rivalry for oil is material from the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations report titled "Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy" to the Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate 1975: Chapters 1-3).

⁹⁰ Massive Saudi oil revenues in the 1970s to early 1980s created large financial surpluses in the Saudi economy. The Saudis invested the vast majority of these assets in international financial institutions and in Western government securities (Metz 1992c: par.9). The Saudi oil booms are discussed in Auty, R., 2002. *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Champion, D., 2003. *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform*. London: C. Hurst & Co., Ltd.; and Ramady, M.A., 2010. *The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges*, 2nd edition. London: Springer.

⁹¹ As an example, between World War II and 1975, the United States provided a total of \$328.4 million in economic and military aid, and \$93.8 billion from 1950 through 1997. Arms agreements with Saudi Arabia

The U.S. and Saudi Arabian Governments aligned strongly on oil development issues such as increased American ownership in the Saudi oil concession and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAP).⁹³ In 1927, after the discovery of one of the largest oil fields in Iraq, just north of Kirkuk, Calouste Gulbenkian⁹⁴ “drew a red line over what he thought was the former Ottoman Empire, which included all of the Middle East except Kuwait and Iran” (Nersesian 2010: 152). The 1928 Red Line Agreement “required the partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) to only produce or purchase oil within the Red Line area through the IPC” (Keohane 1984: 156). The agreement also stipulated that “no oil field within the red line could be developed unless there was equal participation by the companies owning the IPC” (Nersesian *op.cit*).

In 1945, the French Government wanted compensation for the oil that *Companie Francaises des Petroles* (CFP) did not get from the IPC from January 1940 to February 1945. The French wanted extra oil allotments from the IPC⁹⁵ as wartime compensation, to which the British and Americans objected. To complicate matters further, the British and Americans wanted to abolish the restrictive provisions of the Red Line Agreement. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum wanted to buy capital shares in ARAMCO. The French objected because the Americans excluded them from participating in the proposal.

from 1991 through 1998 totaled \$22.8 billion. (Prados 2002 cited Dris-Ait-Hamadouche, L. and Zoubir 2007: 109).

⁹² For a history and study of the beneficial effects of petrodollars on the U.S. economy and U.S. global hegemony, see Spiro, D., 1999. *The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets*. New York: Cornell University Press.

⁹³ The 500,000 bpd Trans- Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) was constructed in 1950 to transport crude oil for export from Lebanon (Cordesman 1997: 85).

⁹⁴ The opening up the Middle East is synonymous with Calouste Gulbenkian (Nersesian 2010: 150). Nersesian provides a compact biography of Gulbenkian (*Ibid*, 151-152).

⁹⁵ The IPC was an agreement in 1925 between Iraq and the Turkish Petroleum Company that would give oil production royalties to the Iraq Government (*Ibid*). By 1946, the IPC companies were Anglo-Iranian (23.75%); Shell (23.75%); *Companie Francaises des Petroles* (23.75%); Socony (11.875%); Gulbenkian (5%) (Keohane 1984: 156). A more recent book on the ‘Red Line Agreement’ is Black, E., 2011. *British Petroleum and the Redline Agreement: the West's Secret Pact to Get Mideast Oil*. Washington, D.C.: Dialog Press.

The French believed that their oil interests were threatened and sued in court.⁹⁶ If the self-denying provisions of the 'Red Line Agreement' were validated, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum would be denied the right as individual companies to purchase part of the capital stock of the Arabian American Oil Company (United States Department of State, 1947 FRUS, The Near East and Africa Volume V: 891.6363/1-947: January 9 Loftus memorandum of conversation: 630). This would thwart U.S. desires to expand its oil interests in Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud feared that if the Red Line Agreement was still "in force or be honored", it would be an "open door through which British, French and other oil interests [gain a] foothold in the development of Arabian oil; the development of Arabian oil resources must remain exclusively in American hands" (*Ibid*, 890F.6363/1-1647: January 16 Henderson to Acheson: 634-635). There was also a contentious issue about the geographical location and construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAP).⁹⁷ Robert Eakens⁹⁸ proposed an American registry for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline for two reasons: U.S. prestige⁹⁹ in the region and security (*Ibid*, 891.6363 AIOC/2-347: February 3 Eakens memorandum of conversation: 640).

⁹⁶ In June 1947, the French, British, and Americans arrived at a negotiated agreement that gave the French more oil from the IPC and allowed Standard Oil and Socony-Vacuum to buy into ARAMCO. Historical details of the dispute are found in Melby, Eric D.K., 1981. *Oil and the international system: the case of France, 1918-1969*. New York: Arno Press Inc.

⁹⁷ TAP was one of the first major pipelines in the region. Completed in 1950, it was a 1,100 mile (1,760 kilometer) line connecting the eastern province of Saudi Arabia to a terminal on the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon (Hobbs: 2006: 230; Brenchley 1989: 218). TAP by-passed the oil choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal; it did not anticipate that it would cross "two of the worst conflict areas of the region" in the future: the Golan Heights of Syria in 1967 and Southern Lebanon in the 1970s to the 1990s (Hobbs 2006: 230).

⁹⁸ Robert Eakens was an economist and adviser at the Petroleum Board Office 1942-45; Assistant Chief, Petroleum Division, U.S. Department of State 1945-48; and Chief of the Fuels Division, U.S. Department of State, January 15, 1955–April 8, 1956 (Truman Library Papers 1974; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

⁹⁹ In Schweller's theory, prestige is a value that states want to gain and an incentive for alignment.

Ibn Saud had deep security concerns about the pipeline going through Hashemite territory. He asked the U.S. Government to supply him with arms and equipment to defend the pipeline but the U.S. Government refused. There is a separate section in this chapter that discusses the importance Ibn Saud gave to his request for military arms. His arms requests were a direct result of his perceptions of external threat. These were major elements in his considerations and deliberations about the efficacy of Saudi relations and alignment with the U.S. In Ibn Saud's view, the external threat to Saudi Arabia worsened with rumours of a British-supported Greater Syria alliance under a Hashemite King ruling over Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Palestine, or a part of Palestine, and Lebanon.

Rumours of a Greater Syria

Chapter 4 included a section that briefly explained Ibn Saud's overall perception of threats to the Kingdom. This section explains why external threat, the major concept of Walt's alliance theory, was a primary incentive for Ibn Saud to align with the U.S. and to maintain it.¹⁰⁰ The external threat posed by the Hashemites of Transjordan and Iraq was a persistent factor in Ibn Saud's thoughts about alignment with the U.S. Ibn Saud never strayed from his belief that his Hashemite rivals plotted to seize power from him in the Hijaz and break apart his Kingdom.¹⁰¹

Thus, in Ibn Saud's view the aggregated human and military capabilities or aggregate power of a Greater Syria¹⁰² alliance and its proximate power to Saudi Arabia created a larger

¹⁰⁰ Walt distilled the balance of power argument for alliance formation into an "anticipatory avoidance of domination by a stronger power" (Walt1985: 5).

¹⁰¹ Madawi al-Rasheed pointed out that her investigation of Saudi Arabian historiographies written by Saudi Arabian historiographers supports the argument that Ibn Saud resisted any attempt to group the emerging newly independent Arab countries in any form of union. He leaned towards the formation of the Arab League; the idea behind it is believed to be orchestrated by Britain immediately after the outbreak of World War II. In effect he aimed at maintaining a balance of power and avoiding aggression by one Arab state against another (Al-Rasheed 2007: pars.38, 39).

¹⁰² Karsh, E. and Kumaraswamy P.R., eds., 2003. *Israel, the Hashemites, and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle* (London: Frank Cass) explain the roots of the Greater Syria idea. "Sharif Hussein's sons Faisal and Abdullah placed the idea of Greater Syria on the Arab political agenda as far back as the 1920s and 1930s. After the French expelled him from Damascus in July 1920, Faisal toiled ceaselessly to bring about the

potential external threat to the militarily-weak Saudi state. Ibn Saud also believed that the British encouraged and supported the Hashemite idea of a Greater Syria because Saudi-U.S. relations were becoming stronger than Saudi-British relations. Ibn Saud perceived an increase in the offensive power and aggressiveness or offensive intentions of the British-supported Hashemites.

Shaikh Fuad Hamza¹⁰³ explained the threat perceptions and asked for the U.S. position on the Greater Syria issue vis-à-vis Saudi perceptions of British support.

Such a state would be powerful and would be a definite menace to Saudi Arabia. The Hashemites could not carry out any kind of a plan for the establishment of a Greater Syria without British support. As [Saudi] economic relations with the U.S. became closer, there [was] a certain cooling off in the British attitude toward Saudi Arabia; that the British might be preparing to give support to certain Arab circles which were definitely hostile to the Saud dynasty. Could Saudi Arabia depend upon the full support of the U.S. should Saudi Arabia find itself threatened by the formation of an anti-Saudi coalition to the north? (U.S. Department of State FRUS 1947, 711.90F/1-1747 January 17 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 738-739).

Byrnes, Acheson, and Henderson¹⁰⁴ explained U.S. basic policies in Saudi Arabia and the Near East to Hamza: the U.S. supported the integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia through the U.N.; the U.S. did not want to become entangled in internal Arab struggles; and the U.S. did not believe that the British Government supported the notion of a Greater Syria (*Ibid*, 740-741).

unification of the Fertile Crescent under his rule. Nuri Said, Faisal's comrade-in-arms and a perpetual prime minister continued that policy as did Abdullah, Faisal's brother. Abdullah had his own vision of Greater Syria, which he believed was his prospective kingdom: Transjordan as a springboard for an empire embracing Syria, Palestine, and possibly Iraq and Saudi Arabia" (Karsh & Kumaraswamy 2003:2). In the 1930s, Ibn Saud negotiated treaties of nonaggression with Transjordan and Iraq; however he remained suspicious of their Hashemite leaders. He was particularly concerned about the possibility that Britain might encourage Hashemite ambitions at the expense of Saudi territory (Miller 1980: 222). Also see Louis, W.R., 1984. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Miller, A.D., 1980. *Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

¹⁰³ Fuad Hamza was a Palestinian refugee who became Ibn Saud's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰⁴ Loy Henderson was Director of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs from April 7, 1945 to July 14, 1948 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

There was deep concern in the U.S. Department of State about the Greater Syria issue because it represented potential shifts in the regional balance of power; potential threats to the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the region; and increased British influence in Arab affairs at the expense of U.S. interests. Marshall,¹⁰⁵ the new U.S. Secretary of State wanted further investigation based on reports that “Principal reasons given are Brit desire to create disunity among Arab states in order to prevent common front against Brit policy in Palestine and in revision Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and that Brit wish to enlarge and strengthen political and military position in general area” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/2-1447: February 14 Marshall circular telegram to certain diplomatic and consular officers: 741).

Waldemar J. Gallman, the U.S. Chargé d' affaires in London reported that the British Government denied any involvement; and that it was neutral on the issue (*Ibid*, 890D.00/2-1847: February 18 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 742-743). The British believed that “Abdullah is so anxious to hint that British are for Greater Syria” and that the wild rumours probably stemmed from the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, which publicised that “Abdullah planned to march into Syria and lodge himself on Syrian throne” (*Ibid*). Despite the British position, Marshall continued to express deep concerns.

The U.S. had numerous reports from Near East of rumors of Brit support for establishment of Greater Syria under Hashemite ruler; rumors allege plans afoot to overthrow or menace by force governments of Near East; despite Britain's official neutrality Brit agents secretly encouraging Hashemite groups. Continuing and growing circulation of rumors is having disruptive effect in Arab world that is not to advantage of Britain or us. King Abdullah's intrigues are troubling and a discordant influence on Arab League¹⁰⁶ cooperation in the

¹⁰⁵ George C. Marshall served as U.S. Secretary of State on January 8, 1947 until January 20, 1949. In 1947 and 1948, Marshall led the effort to formulate and secure congressional support for the massive aid package to Western Europe that would become known as the Marshall Plan. The United States also negotiated the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under Secretary Marshall. Marshall strongly disagreed with Truman on the recognition of the State of Israel. He later served as U.S. Secretary of Defense in 1950-1951 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

¹⁰⁶ On October 7, 1944, representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed on a basic proposal that an Arab League be formed by the independent Arab states to consolidate inter-Arab ties, coordinate political plans, protect the sovereignty of member states against aggression, and supervise the affairs of the Arab countries. The league was formally established on May 10, 1945. The dominant theme throughout the negotiations and committee meetings leading to the formation of the Arab League had been to

political and economic field (*Ibid*, 890D.00/-1847: March 3 Marshall telegram to Gallman: 744).

Ibn Saud warned the U.S. that activity for a Greater Syria was still afoot. There was a report that King Abdullah issued a White Paper, in which he “proposed the establishment of a Greater Syria consisting of Transjordan, Syria and Palestine, within the framework of the Arab League” (*Ibid*, FRUS editorial note 890D.00/5-947 May 9 telegram 2674 from London: 746). In this context, Ibn Saud renewed his concerns about British sponsorship of his adversaries. He believed that the “treaties between Iraq and Transjordan and between Iraq and Turkey were not directed against anyone but him and were meant to checkmate him” (*Ibid*, 711.90/6-2047: June 20 Childs telegram to Marshall: 750). In his April 24, 1945 letter to the British Government, Ibn Saud was unequivocal and unbending in his perception of the threat posed by the “military and political union of Transjordan and Iraq” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/6-1147: June 11 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 747). He wanted to pin down the British about its support for the Greater Syria alliance.¹⁰⁷ He told the British that the alliance, “which could only be directed against the Saudi Arabian Government and Syria has materially altered situation; it is not sufficient for British Government to say that Greater Syria question is one for Arabs alone. Ibn Saud asks British Government to make it known to Arab world that British Government will never agree to any change in Middle East” (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud was right about the Greater Syria movement. On August 11, 1945, King Abdullah of Transjordan announced his intentions to call a general conference to elaborate a

avoid any radical change in the existing political-territorial status quo. It was a loose regional confederation for cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural fields; it was not a step towards Arab unity (Taylor 1982: 22-23).

¹⁰⁷ The British opposed dynastic unity projects because made the territorial status quo less secure; they threatened to divide the region into rival power blocks. A split in the Arab world would have compelled Britain to choose which side to support, thereby instantly losing a significant area of influence. Such ventures ensured the vigorous opposition of Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Cohen & Kolinsky 1998: 43). According to Clive Leatherdale (1983), Britain considered that Ibn Saud’s own dynastic ambitions were explicit threats to British-held mandates in the Gulf region; however, the British would not use the military option in Saudi Arabia because it was the spiritual home of Islam. Britain favoured negotiation, appeasement, and the use of limited force similar to its 1925 intervention that constrained Saudi expansionism (Leatherdale 1983: 321).

plan for the unity or union¹⁰⁸ of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan in order to put an end to the Zionist danger threatening Palestine.¹⁰⁹ The general conference called for the establishment of Greater Syria as a federal state, which would include Iraq and Syria (*Ibid*, FRUS editorial note re 890D.00/8-1947 August 19 Childs telegram and 890D.00/8-2147 August 21 Cairo Embassy dispatch: 754). Ibn Saud hoped that the U.S. would “would give this trend prompt consideration and that it might stop the movement, thereby preventing inimical results to Saudi Arabian interests” (*Ibid*).

Absent a formal military alliance with the U.S., Saudi Arabia wanted to know if it could count on the U.S. for military assistance in the event of an attack. This led Shaikh Yasin to ask if the U.S. Government would give military support for Saudi Arabia and Syria since Saudi Arabia intended to assist Syria against Transjordan. The U.S. answered that any dispute be resolved through the U.N. (*Ibid*, 890D.00/8-2547: September 5 Lovett telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 756). Ibn Saud pressed the U.S. for an unequivocal answer to his question: “What immediate military action would U.S. take if Abdullah's army attacked Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Near, Middle East country?” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/9-1347: September 13 Bailey telegram to Marshall: 758). Marshall answered that “military action by Abdullah appears remote; primary resort should be the U.N.; and that Syria has not expressed alarm to the U.S. Government and [U.S.] feels that Arab States through their own

¹⁰⁸ Malik Mufti argued that “pan-Arab unionism is primarily a response to regime instability” (Mufti 1980: 12); and that “unionism had more to do with internal [domestic] struggles [for power] and transnational penetration than with imbalances of power or threat in the international environment (*Ibid*: 5). Also see Berger, M., 1962. *The Arab World Today*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday; Steiner, M.J., 1947. *Inside Pan-Arabia*. Chicago: Packard; and Simon, R.S., 1974. “The Hashemite ‘Conspiracy’: Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958”. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (5): 314-327.

¹⁰⁹ William W. Haddad and Mary M. Hardy explained that Abdullah imagined a powerful Arab kingdom united under his crown. He argued that Transjordan was only the southern part of Syria and envisioned Hashemite control over all of geographic Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine, with its capital in Damascus. He was willing to negotiate with the Zionists to make this a reality and offered the Zionists autonomy in this larger Arab kingdom. The Zionists appreciated Abdullah's willingness to cooperate with them; however they were not interested in becoming a twentieth century millet; they would settle for nothing less than the establishment of a Jewish state (Haddad, W.W. and Hardy, M.M., “Jordan's Alliance with Israel and Its Effects on Jordanian-Arab Relations” in Karsh, E. and Kumaraswamy, P.R. 2003:36).

organization are capable of handling affair” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/9-1347: September 18 Marshall telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 758). The Greater Syria controversy simmered down when the Iraqi Regent took a neutral position and Abdullah agreed to stop participating in the initiative.

The deployment of elements from realist alliance theories fits well into the Greater Syria example. The possibility of a Greater Syria worsened Ibn Saud’s perceptions of external threats to the Saudi state and shifts in the balance of power. Saud was already concerned about an imbalance in the area’s power. If Hashemite power and threat grew, the Saudi state needed to balance against the Hashemites. Saud perceived that the aggregated power represented by Britain’s sponsorship of Iraq and Jordan overwhelmed any military capabilities of the Saud state. Walt’s four notions of threat perceptions are found in the Greater Syria example: The aggregate and proximate power of a Greater Syria posed a greater potential threat to Saudi Arabia. A Greater Syria with large offensive capabilities pushed Saudi Arabia to align with more closely with the U.S. because the Saudi state was militarily weak and capable only of very limited self-defence. From Ibn Saud’s perception, an Iraq-led Greater Syria had more aggressive intentions; thus, he believed that an alliance with the U.S. would balance against the threats from a Greater Syria. The theories of Walt and Schweller agree about external threats. Where they differ is in the expectation about conflict. A neorealist such as Walt would focus on the possibility of conflict; a neoclassical realist such as Schweller would focus on the probability of conflict. Ibn Saud was more concerned about the possibility of conflict rather than its probability. The U.S. did not agree with Ibn Saud’s perceptions of threat; the U.S. wanted any inter-Arab conflicts resolved through the Arab League or the U.N. Using Schweller’s entrapment argument, the U.S. Government did not want a military alignment with the Saudis on this issue because it did not

want to be trapped in a conflict over Saudi and Arab interests that the U.S. did not share;¹¹⁰ or shared only partially.

The Greater Syria issue deepened Ibn Saud's distrust of the British. It pushed Ibn Saud to move into a closer alignment with the U.S. It increased his expectations of U.S. assistance and protection in political, economic, and military matters. A closer alignment could yield more U.S. financial and economic assistance. More importantly, it pushed Ibn Saud to increase his efforts to get U.S. military arms, which he believed the U.S. would readily provide because of the alignment; the U.S. did not.

Ibn Saud's request for U.S. military arms and military aid

Similar to U.S. financial and economic aid, U.S. military aid was a strong incentive for Ibn Saud to align with the U.S. Both states saw opportunity for gain, a major concept in Schweller's theory of alliance. Saudi Arabia would have the opportunity of gaining access to modern and state-of-the-art military arms, equipment, and technology, which he needed in rebuilding his armed forces.¹¹¹ The U.S. military-industrial complex would have the opportunity to gain substantial monetary profits from sales of U.S. arms, equipment, and technology to the Kingdom.

Ibn Saud initiated the first step to make the military security¹¹² of Saudi Arabia a linchpin of the alignment. 1947 was the first time since 1943 that Ibn Saud asked for U.S. arms and

¹¹⁰ The paper discusses the notion of entrapment more fully in chapter 7 on the Buraimi dispute.

¹¹¹ Politically, weapons sales to the Saudi state became a difficult hurdle for the Saudis and U.S. administrations. A strong Israeli political lobby in the U.S. Congress constantly pushed to block any weapons sales to the Saudi state that might give a military weapons advantage over the Israeli state. When delays and cancellations in Saudi arms purchases happened, the Saudis inevitably placed the blame on U.S. Government support for Israel. See Cordesman, A.H., 1997. *Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert King*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Seznec, J.F., 2005. "Business as Usual: The Saudi-US Relationship". *Harvard International Review* 26 (4): 56+.

¹¹² Increased security is the main benefit of alliance. Aid from an allied state and expectations of help from an ally enhance deterrence of attack and capability to defend against attack (Snyder 1997: 43).

military aid.¹¹³ Two decades after the British helped him destroy his Ikhwan army, Ibn Saud decided that he needed to rebuild his own army and enhance his military capabilities. With increased military capabilities,¹¹⁴ the Saudi state could project an image of military power against its enemies and deter attacks. With a strong army, he believed he could defend against external and internal threats to the Kingdom's security. Ibn Saud wanted to arm the Saudi state for defence against the Hashemites, especially with rumours of a Greater Syria.

Ibn Saud made his request in the usual context of his concerns about threats from Iraq and Transjordan but added Palestine and the threat of Communism to his rationale. Ibn Saud believed that by including them he strengthened his position on receiving U.S. military aid. Ibn Saud probably believed that the Truman doctrine¹¹⁵ applied to his concern about the emerging threat of communism in the area. The Truman doctrine opened the door to possible U.S. intervention in conflicts by "providing political, military, and economic assistance to democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces" (U.S.

¹¹³ In 1943, the Anglo-American Munitions Board approved only very limited military arms and supplies for Saudi Arabia. The British feared a resurgence of Ibn Saud's military capabilities that would give him the ability to wage war on his neighbours and smuggle arms into Palestine (see p.68)

¹¹⁴ Kenneth Pollack pointed out that only the Royal Guard Regiment received "weaponry and training to give them any real military capability, while the small Saudi Army was neglected" (Pollack 2004: 426). Pollack contended that Ibn Saud "vacillated between fearing the army as a potential threat to the monarchy and relying on it to defend the kingdom against foreign foes" (*Ibid*). The Royal Family's main military concern was internal threat posed by "potential revolts by rival Arabian tribes" that would destroy "unity and obedience" to the Saudi monarchy (*Ibid*). Pollack also pointed out that other than the Hashemites "there were few foreign threats to the Kingdom; thus there was little reason to turn the Saudi army into a modern military force (*Ibid*).

¹¹⁵ The Truman Doctrine and foreign policy grew out of Kennan's argument, which is characterised as realist, that the U.S. should follow a policy of 'containment' to stop Russian expansion of power (Milestones: Kennan and Containment, 1947: par.2). On March 12, 1947 Truman asked Congress to appropriate aid to Greece and Turkey so that these governments could continue to combat the threat of Communist aggression within their borders. Truman used the decline of British power and influence, represented by the withdrawal of British military and economic assistance to Greece, as the catalyst for reorienting U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis U.S. national security and U.S. interests. Truman argued that a Communist victory in the Greek Civil War would endanger the political stability of Turkey, which would undermine the political stability of the Middle East, a region of immense strategic importance to U.S. national security (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, The Truman Doctrine: pars.1-6). Also see: Hillman, W., 1952. *Mr. President: The First Publication from the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-Second President of the United States of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young; Levantrosser, W.F., 1986. *Harry S. Truman: The Man from Independence*. New York: Greenwood Press; Lacey, M.J., 1991. *The Truman Presidency*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge; Leffler, M.P., 1992. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press; and Ryan, H.R., 1993. *Harry S. Truman: Presidential Rhetoric*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, The Truman Doctrine: par.1). However, Saudi Arabia was not a democratic nation under internal or external threat from authoritarian forces. This may have been one reason that the U.S could not grant Ibn Saud's request for military arms and military aid.

There were other reasons. While the U.S. position emphasised its unqualified support for the territorial integrity and political independence of Saudi Arabia, Lovett¹¹⁶ implied that the U.S. did not want direct involvement with Saudi concerns about external threats to the Kingdom. Lovett emphasised the U.S. preference for resolving the problems, including any actual attacks on Saudi Arabia by any power, through the Arab League and the U.N. Lovett also emphasised the U.S. arms embargo¹¹⁷ in the region because of tensions in Palestine (*op.cit*, 890F.00/12-847: December 12 Lovett telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 1338-1340).

The Saudi leaders wanted the U.S. to know that Saudi concern about the Hashemites was not about intrinsic Hashemite power but the possible use of British power by the Hashemites (*Ibid*, 890F.00/12-1547: December 15 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1341). James Childs¹¹⁸ emphasised to Crown Prince Saud that the "decision to embargo arms shipments had been adopted in the light of general considerations involving the peace and security of the area (*Ibid*, 890F.00/12-1647: December 16 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1342). Any arms buildup that threatened regional security and stability was a serious concern for U.S. Lovett also

¹¹⁶ Robert A. Lovett served as U.S. Under Secretary of State from May 28, 1947 to January 20, 1949 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

¹¹⁷ Since November 1947, a rigorous arms embargo covering the shipment of all war matériel from the United States had been imposed (Manuel 1949: 351). In the course of the civil war which broke out in November 1947, the land frontiers of Palestine were open for reinforcement of arms and men from the neighbouring Arab countries. Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq continued to be supplied with arms under the terms of their various Treaties with Great Britain. The U.S. Government placed an embargo on all arms shipments to the Middle East (Marlow 1959: 241-242). Also see Ganin, Z., 1979. *Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

¹¹⁸ James R. Childs served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia from April 27, 1946 to July 21, 1950 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

explained that if the U.S. sent any military arms to Saudi Arabia, “such arms and munitions of war, including equipment for motorized divisions and military airplanes, are to be used solely for defensive purposes of Saudi Arabia and never to be used either against U.S. or so as to conflict with any of our interests” (*op cit.*). By interests Lovett meant U.S. support for the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel, a position diametrically opposite to the Saudi view.

Saudi disappointment

Ibn Saud expressed deep disappointment at the negative U.S. response. He reassured the U.S. that any U.S. military assistance would never be used against the U.S. or to attack others. Ibn Saud believed that the U.S. misinterpreted Saudi attitudes towards the U.S. decision to prevent U.S. military arms exports to the Middle East. He believed that U.S. military aid would enable Saudi Arabia to “assure the protection of mutual interests in the event of any emergencies” (890F.00/12-1647: December 16 Ibn Saud message to Childs: 1342). Ibn Saud considered Saudi-U.S. relations as unique, given that there was “an extremely large difference between the position of Saudi Arabia and that of other [Arab] countries, because there were vital mutual economic and strategic interests there, such as the protection of the oil fields and pipe line, which did not exist elsewhere” (*Ibid*, FRUS editorial note re: 890F.00/12-1647 December 16 Childs telegram 568: 1341-1342). He added that his real purpose was to establish a modern and mechanised defensive military force for the security of Dhahran and the pipeline. Hoping the U.S. would change its policy about arms exports to Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud affirmed his intentions to have a United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*). The U.S. stood to gain a stronger presence in the Kingdom through such a mission and to gain the opportunity of long-term use of Dhahran (*Ibid*, 890F.00/12-2247: December 22 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1342).

Despite Ibn Saud's appeals, the U.S. refused to send military arms and equipment to Saudi Arabia because of the extremely volatile situation in Palestine.

The chapter now turns its attention to the Palestine issue. The failure of Truman and Ibn Saud to discuss and carefully negotiate their diametrically opposite positions honestly and sincerely with each other pushed Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment to the brink of collapse. Palestine was a long-simmering problem since at least the 1930s; the Saudis and Americans waited too long to address their motives and differences.

Palestine: diametrically opposite U.S. and Saudi positions

The discussions focus on the basis of U.S. and Saudi positions, how they developed and unfolded, and the impact on their relations and alignment in 1946-1948. At the end of the section's discussions, the project argues that elements of realist alliance theory explain why Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment did not collapse, despite the serious negative impact of the Palestine problem on both states.

When Britain announced its decision to give up its mandate in Palestine for economic and political reasons, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were caught off guard in the rapidly developing maelstrom of Palestine and the resulting unrest in the region. It is a puzzle why both governments failed to have a common goal in Palestine before the troubles boiled over. They failed to use their relations and alignment to find a middle path that might have given them better options to solve their problems and their dilemma about Palestine. Based on the disclosures of Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke,¹¹⁹ the following discussions yield answers to Truman's motives in Palestine. The basis of his motives was very dissimilar to

¹¹⁹ Clark M. Clifford served as Special Counsel to President Truman from 1946 to 1950 and as Secretary of Defense in 1968-69 under President Johnson. Richard C. Holbrooke served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1977-81), U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1993-94), Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (1994-96), and U.S. Ambassador to the UN (1999-2001). He was the chief architect of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the war in Bosnia.

those of Ibn Saud. They were not explained clearly to the Saudis; and by the time they tried to, it was a case of too little, too late.

Truman's motives

Palestine became a very difficult problem for Truman and the U.S. Government. There were serious policy differences, bordering on overt conflict, between the White House on one side and the U.S. State Department and U.S. Defense Department¹²⁰ on the other side. Truman's idealism about Palestine and an unclear Middle East policy clashed head on with the realism of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense. This created dilemma and severe difficulty for Truman and the U.S. Government on both issues; and both sides often gave conflicting signals about policy in Palestine and the Near East.

Truman's idealism, and humanitarian concerns for the Jews, moved him to push Britain for Jewish immigration to Palestine, its subsequent partition, and the creation of a Jewish homeland. According to Holbrooke, Clifford¹²¹ explained that Truman's policy "rested on the realities of the situation in the region, on America's moral, ethical, and humanitarian values, on the costs and risks inherent in any other course, and on America's national interests" (Clifford and Holbrooke 2008: par. 84). According to Clifford, there were five factors that dominated Truman's thinking: detestation of intolerance and discrimination; sympathy for the millions of homeless of World War II, especially the Jews who had no homeland of their own to which they could return; the horrors of the Holocaust; belief that the Balfour Declaration committed Britain and the U.S. to the creation of the Jewish state in

¹²⁰ Clifford identified his opponents as "Undersecretary of State, Robert Lovett; his predecessor, Dean Acheson; the number-three man in the State Department, Charles Bohlen; the brilliant chief of the Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan; the dynamic and driven Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal; and a man with whom I would disagree again twenty years later when we served together in the Cabinet, Dean Rusk, then the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs" (Clifford and Holbrooke 2008: par.3).

¹²¹ Clifford recalled that the meeting included Truman, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, Robert Lovett. Behind Lovett, and two State Department officials, Robert McClintock and Fraser Wilkins. Clifford explained that just before the meeting Lovett decided the presence of Dean Rusk (Marshall's protégé) and Loy Henderson (a U.S. career diplomat who was strongly pro-Arab and heavily influenced by the British) in the same room with him would be too inflammatory. Also present at the meeting were David Niles and White House Appointments Secretary Matthew Connelly (*Ibid*, pars. 7, 17).

Palestine; and as a student and believer in the Bible, felt the Jews derived a legitimate historical right to Palestine (*Ibid*, par.11). Truman wrote in his memoirs that, "The question of Palestine as a Jewish homeland goes back to the solemn promise that had been made to them [the Jews] by the British in the Balfour Declaration of 1917.¹²² This promise just as all promises made by responsible [and] civilized governments should be kept" (Isseroff undated: par.3).

Clifford was especially critical of the "foreign policy establishment, especially the pro-Arab professionals at the State Department, who, deeply influenced by the huge oil reserves in the Mideast, supported the side they thought would be the likely winner in the struggle between the Arabs and the Jews. Officials in the State Department had done every-thing in their power to prevent, thwart, or delay the President's Palestine policy in 1947 and 1948" (*op. cit.*, par. 6). The disagreements within the U.S. Government hit their lowest point when the time came to decide whether to recognise the new Jewish state of Israel. The most explosive meeting happened in the Oval Office on May 12, 1948. Marshall and Lovett were critical of the Jewish Agency for Israel. They wanted trusteeship instead of partition. At the meeting, Lovett criticised the "growing assertiveness of the Jewish Agency on the basis of some recent military successes and the prospect of a 'behind the barn' deal with King Abdullah; the Jews seem confident that they can establish their sovereign state without any necessity for a truce with the Arabs of Palestine (*op cit.*, par.18). Marshall said he was "strongly opposed to the behavior of the Jewish Agency" (*Ibid*, par.19). He disclosed that on

¹²² The 1917 Balfour Declaration was a letter from British Foreign Secretary A.J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild that publicly declared support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. It was "the real starting point of Arab dispossession and misery and the development of profound mistrust" by the Arabs (Schneer 2010: 374). For a history of the Arab-Israel conflict, see: Kimche, J. and Kimche, D., 1960. *A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel*. New York: Praeger; Khouri, F.J., 1985. *The Arab-Israeli dilemma*, 3rd edition. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press; McDowall, D., 1989. *Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and Beyond*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Lesch, A.M. and Tschirgi, D., 1998. *Origins and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; and Bassiouni, M. C., and Ben-Ami, S., 2009. *A guide to documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict: 1897-2008*. Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.

May 8 he told its political representative Moshe Shertok that it was "dangerous to base long-range policy on temporary military success" and that if the Jews "came running to us for help that there was no warrant to expect help from the United States, which had warned them of the grave risk they were running" (*Ibid*). The U.S. State Department also argued that the White House position was "obviously designed to win the Jewish vote" (*Ibid*, par. 32). Some forty years later, Clifford admitted that "domestic considerations are in fact a legitimate part of any important foreign policy decision"; however he contended that he "never rested the case for recognition upon politics" (*Ibid*, par.81).

Clifford presented six arguments to refute the contentions of Marshall and Lovett and to assert the White House position.

First, there has been no truce in Palestine and there almost certainly will not be one. Second, trusteeship presupposes a single Palestine. Partition into Jewish and Arab sectors has already happened. Jews and Arabs are already fighting each other. Third, giving prompt recognition to the Jewish state immediately after the termination of the British Mandate on May 14 would have the distinct value of restoring the President's firm position in support of the partition of Palestine. Such a move should be taken quickly before the Soviet Union or any other nation recognizes the Jewish state. Recognize the Jewish state once it has complied with the provision for democratic government outlined in the UN resolution of November 29, [1947]. Fourth, Jewish people the world over have been waiting for thirty years for the promise of a homeland to be fulfilled. Trusteeship will postpone that promise indefinitely. Fifth, the United States has a great moral obligation to oppose discrimination such as that inflicted on the Jewish people; perhaps these steps would help atone for the atrocities that occurred during the Holocaust. Sixth, I fully understand and agree that vital national interests are involved. In an area as unstable as the Middle East, where there is not now and never has been any tradition of democratic government, it is important for the long-range security of our country, and indeed the world, that a nation committed to the democratic system be established there, one on which we can rely. The new Jewish state can be such a place (*Ibid*, par. 28).

Clearly, the White House had already decided to support the creation and recognition of the Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine. Truman failed to explain his rationale and position to Ibn Saud in a clear and convincing manner; and the U.S. administration became inflexible in its position. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia missed opportunities to explain their perspectives on

Palestine clearly and adequately until it was too late. They were too occupied with other mutual interests they considered more important at that time. The prospects for using their strong alignment in order to craft a middle path on Palestine eluded both states.

Before discussing the Saudi position and the issues and events as they unfolded for Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in 1946-1948, the project finds it useful to include Madawi Al-Rasheed's contention that a major part of the Saudi-U.S. problem on Palestine was that Palestine was not a priority for Ibn Saud in the 1930s and much of the 1940s.¹²³ Al-Rasheed's perspective adds to this paper's contention that Ibn Saud also waited too long to have substantial and honest discussions with the Americans before the Palestine problem boiled over.

Ibn Saud's motives

Al-Rasheed constructed her argument based on two premises. First, Ibn Saud was too busy in the 1930s and 1940s nurturing an intimate relationship with Britain. This relationship prevented Ibn Saud from taking a more active position in dealing with the Palestine problem. Al-Rasheed emphasised Ibn Saud's determination "to use all his efforts in order to maintain his friendship with Britain, even at the expense of the Palestinian cause" (*Ibid*, par.14).

In the 1930s, Ibn Saud did not want to do anything in Palestine that would agitate the British because he still viewed Britain as the most important foreign factor in the world about him (*Ibid*, par.17). This position, developed and repeated throughout Ibn Saud's correspondence with Britain in the 1930s, continued in the 1940s. While Ibn Saud expressed his sympathy with the Palestinian cause, he was not prepared to jeopardise his friendship with Britain (*Ibid*, par.21).

Al-Rasheed contended that for Ibn Saud the "Palestinian problem assumed secondary importance because his primary concern was the growing power of the Hashemite family" (*Ibid*, par.59). Al-Rasheed argued that "personal enmity rather than the concern with broad

¹²³ Al-Rasheed based her contention on flaws or omissions in 1970 historiographical narrations "by Arabs, mainly Levantine and Egyptians who were entrusted with the task of narrating Saudi Arabia to establish and enforce two important state legitimacy narratives; one reflected the need to legitimate the state internally, the other reflected the need to legitimate the state externally in the Arab and Islamic contexts" (Al-Rasheed 2007: par.3).

Arab and Muslim causes determined Saudi policy on Palestine” (*Ibid*, par. 33). Ibn Saud’s focus on his relations with Britain arose from the “enmity and mistrust between the House of Saud and the House of Hashem”, which according to Al-Rasheed, “more than any factor shaped the way the Saudi leadership dealt with the Palestinian crisis” (*Ibid*, par.12). Ibn Saud did not want the British to abandon their mandates; and did not want the partition of Palestine.

Al-Rasheed explained the basis of Ibn Saud’s objection to the partition of Palestine.

Ibn Saud’s letters on Palestine reflected his concern over the shape and structure of any Palestinian government after the end of the British mandate. Ibn Saud could not envisage a Hashemite takeover of Jerusalem after the departure of Britain. Therefore, he rejected any plans to partition Palestine. [Furthermore] Ibn Saud considered his interests to be affected very unfavourably by the prospective renunciation of British mandate over Transjordan; so long as the mandate lasted he knew that Abdullah’s intrigues would be held in check (*Ibid*, par.24).

Ibn Saud’s primary concern about the partition of Palestine was his belief that it strengthened Abdullah: “the partition of Palestine would almost certainly make the Amir Abdullah an independent sovereign with a considerable accession of territory to the West of Jordan” (*Ibid*, par.30). Thus, Ibn Saud did not want Britain to abandon its mandates: “Pledging loyalty to Britain and continuously insisting on the benefit of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem reflected his concern over his borders with both Iraq and Transjordan; he preferred the perpetuation of this mandate to the emergence of two independent Hashemite kingdoms to the north of his realm” (*Ibid*, par.26). Ibn Saud “reflected great understanding of the British position and dilemmas which he was determined to help alleviate [in order to] maintain his friendship with a power that he saw as a check on the ambitions of the two Hashemite realms and their own legitimacy in the Arab world” (*Ibid*).

Al-Rasheed also pointed out that in the 1930s and early 1940s, “Ibn Saud appeared to be isolated both ideologically and politically in the wider context of the Arab world” and needed

ways of “legitimizing the Saudi state externally among Arabs and Muslims who were suspicious of Saudi control over Mecca” (*Ibid*, par.6). It was this “quest for legitimacy among Arabs and Muslims that shaped his involvement in Palestine” (*Ibid*, par.26).

As a Moslem and an Arab his sympathy naturally lay with the Arabs of Palestine. He has suppressed these feelings out of friendship for his Majesty’s Government and he could always suppress his feelings in the interests of policy; but he stood alone, and he had to think of his position in a world where many of his co-religionists would not even admit that he was a Moslem (*Ibid*, par.27)

Al-Rasheed concluded that Ibn Saud failed to deal with the Palestine problem effectively and on a timely basis because of his obsession about the Hashemite threat to his Kingdom; and he focused more on his prestige and his personal self-interest of keeping himself firmly in power. This limited and constrained “horizon of Ibn Saud’s political vision” resulted in his failure to deal with Truman and the U.S. Government about the Palestine problem in a timely, substantial, and effective manner. Palestine became as much of a problem and a dilemma for Ibn Saud as it had become for Truman.

The Saudi position

There were two sources of Arab discontent: the injustice of sending large numbers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine that would eventually make the Arabs the minority there; and the Arabs’ contention that they did not have a voice in determining Palestine’s sovereignty issues because it was done by fiat of the U.N. (Christison 1991: 62-66).¹²⁴ The Saudis added their discontent about the absence of U.S. consultation with Saudi Arabia and the Arab states

¹²⁴ The Arabs were already infuriated in 1939 when the British Cabinet issued a formal policy statement called the White Paper, which established a set quota for Jewish immigration to Palestine (Ferrell: 1997: 65). Also see Snetsinger, J., 1974. *Truman, the Jewish vote, and the Creation of Israel*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Studies; Christison, K., 1991, *Perceptions of Palestine: their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Evensen, B.J., 1992. *Truman, Palestine, and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the Beginning of the Cold War*. New York: Greenwood Press; Kochavi, A.J. *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press; Gevin, J.L., 2007. *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Acacia, J., 2009. *Clark Clifford: the Wise Man of Washington*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

on Palestine; and lingering Saudi doubts about overall U.S. policy and intentions in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia's Amir Faisal felt personally and deeply betrayed by the U.S. when U.S. delegates to the U.N. lobbied actively for passage of the U.N. resolution¹²⁵ to partition Palestine and create the Jewish state. The Saudis could not reconcile U.S. support for Saudi Arabia with U.S. support for a Jewish state, which in Saudi perceptions was a new threat to the region. The U.S. position was not merely an irritant for Ibn Saud and Faisal; it placed Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment in serious jeopardy. The discussions in this section now turn to how and why the Palestine problems became severely contentious issues in Saudi-U.S. relations.

Saudi anger about the absence of consultation

Ibn Saud reacted very badly to the news from the British Legation that the "entry of hundred thousand Jews into Palestine was one purely of American origin against which British members struggled unsuccessfully (*Ibid*, 867N.01/5-646: May 6 Sands telegram to Byrnes: 595). The Saudis believed that Truman's October 4, 1946 statement¹²⁶ that he wanted to see 100,000 Jews admitted immediately to Palestine violated Roosevelt's 1945 promise to consult with Arabs before making any decision or taking any action to change the

¹²⁵ Throughout 1947, the U.N. examined the Palestinian question and recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. On November 29, 1947 the U.N. adopted Resolution 181 that would divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states on May 1948 when the British mandate was scheduled to end. The area of religious significance surrounding Jerusalem would remain a *corpus separatum* under international control administered by the U.N. (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, Creation of Israel, 1948: par. 3). Also see: Quigley, J.R., 1990. *Palestine and Israel: a Challenge to Justice*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Shannon, V.P., 2003. *Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing; Allain, J., 2004. *International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing; Hartley, C., Lea, D., and Rowe, A., 2004. *A survey of Arab-Israeli relations* 2nd edition. London: Europa Publications Ltd.; and Pappé, I. and Hilāl, J., 2010. *Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History*. London: I.B. Tauris.

¹²⁶ There were accusations against Truman that he made the statement for U.S. domestic political purposes: to gain Jewish votes in the upcoming elections (Benson 1997: 70). Also see Cohen, M.J., 1990. *Truman and Israel*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Lacey, M.J., 1991. *The Truman Presidency*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge; and Devine, M.J., Watson, R.P, and Wolz, R.J., eds 2008. *Israel and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press.

basic situation in Palestine. The Saudis argued that the U.S. Government did not consult them. Thus, the Saudis concluded that U.S. support of Jewish interests was done at the expense of Arab interests.

The U.S. Department of State was very sensitive about the repercussions of the lack of consultation. Gordon Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs pointed out to Acheson that the proposed immigration recommendation “fails to take into account any aspect of the complicated Palestine problem other than the European perspective”, meaning protection of U.S. military and political interests in Germany and Austria, and that “if all or part of the [Anglo-American] report were to be put into operation by us without such consultation [with both Arabs and Jews], it would be regarded as a breach of faith which could not fail to have repercussions of a very serious nature” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/5-346: May 8 Merriam memorandum to Acheson: 597, 599).

In the Saudi view, consultation with Arabs became an afterthought. Britain and the U.S. merely went through the motions of ‘consulting’ with the Arab states. From the Arab perspective, the process was a façade that did not seriously consider Arab interests and concerns in Palestine. Truman notified Attlee, the British Prime Minister, that “the first thing to be done is to initiate the consultations with Jews and Arabs to which both our Governments are committed” (867N.01/5-646: May 8 Truman telegram to Attlee: 596). The British agreed and both states set the consultation process in motion. However, from the Saudi view, it was too late and the damage was done. Amir Faisal strongly criticised the U.S. Government on the issue of consultation (*Ibid*, 567N'.01/5-2546: May 28 Eddy telegram to Byrnes: 616). Amir Faisal was correct in his assessment. The declassified U.S. Department of State data on Palestine in 1946¹²⁷ showed that the British and American Governments had

¹²⁷ United States Department of State, 1946. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa (1946) Palestine* (pp. 576-737).

their plans for ending the British mandate in Palestine, sponsoring Jewish immigration to Palestine, and forming a Jewish state in Palestine already completed in great detail and substantially agreed upon by the two powers before the 'consultation' process with the Arabs began.

The Saudis felt betrayed by the U.S. on the Palestine issue, which led Amir Faisal to seriously question overall U.S. policy in the Middle East. He spoke of using force and of distrusting U.S. policy: "I am afraid we Arabs will have to resist, by force if necessary, though that I should greatly regret because of our countries' otherwise truly friendly relations" (*Ibid*, 867N.01/5-946: May 9 Wadsworth telegram to Byrnes: 599); "so long as we are in doubt about the intentions of your Government toward us, it would be useless to discuss specific lines of cooperation so long as the atmosphere is clouded by grave distrust of the basic U.S. policy in the Middle East" (*Ibid*, 567N'.01/5-2546: May 28 Eddy telegram to Byrnes: 615). This was a clear signal to the U.S. that its national interests in Saudi Arabia and the region were under threat.

Threats to U.S. national interests

The U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State did not want the U.S. Government to support any action in Palestine for fear of jeopardising U.S. national interests in the region. The Joint Chiefs recommended that the U.S. Government not to take any actions that "orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has a vital security interest in that area", which is "control of the oil of the Middle East" (*Ibid*, 867N.O1/7-246: June 21 memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee: 633). Similar to the U.S. Joint Chiefs, Childs emphasised that the U.S. "proceed with utmost circumspection in considering all possible repercussions of Palestine question; we may raise difficulties for ourselves in this most strategic area of vital national interest

which will plague U.S. constantly in years to come” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/7-146: July 1 Childs telegram to Byrnes: 641).

There was a clear threat of war erupting in Palestine. However, despite the escalating violence and the possibility that the British needed help to control it, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to send U.S. military forces.¹²⁸ They believed that the mere presence of U.S. military forces in the area would open the door for the Soviet Union.¹²⁹ They did not want the U.S. Government taking any action that might damage or reduce U.S. power and influence in the region¹³⁰ (*Ibid*, 632).

The U.S. Government faced a dilemma about a Jewish state in Palestine. On one hand, it had a basis for U.S. Government support of such a state:¹³¹ “Since the termination of the First World War, the Government and people of the U.S. have given support to the concept of the Jewish National Home in Palestine; my Government is therefore acting only in keeping with the traditional policies of the U.S. when it advocates taking measures which tend to strengthen the realization of this concept (United States Department of State FRUS, Palestine, 1947: 5867N.01/12-1646: January 13 Byrnes telegram to the Embassy in Egypt: 1003). On the other hand, the U.S. recognised the negative effect on U.S.-Arab relations; and the threat

¹²⁸ According to Leffler (1992) the U.S. Government did not want to send troops to Palestine because it did not want to assume formal military-political responsibilities in the region. Truman did not want to dissipate U.S. military strength and did not want to antagonise Arabs in Palestine (Leffler 1992: 122). However, if the U.S. did not step in to keep the peace, the Soviets could seize the opportunity to do so (*Ibid*, 241).

¹²⁹ The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense claimed that British and American intelligence agents reported that Soviets sent Jews and communist agents into Palestine from the Black Sea area. Clifford debunked this contention at the May 12, 1948 White House meeting with Marshall and Lovett.

¹³⁰ Christison also pointed out that Truman did not want to send U.S. troops to Palestine; and that, in the first two years of his Presidency, Truman did not favour the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine because a state based on religion and race violated U.S. pluralism and secularism. However, Christison contended that Truman was “ambivalent, uncertain of the impact of Palestine on U.S. national interests, and did not know the political intricacies of Palestine” (Christison 1991: 62, 64).

¹³¹ “The relationship was spectacularly asymmetrical. Whatever the assertions of credibility, history, sentiment, or bad conscience, whatever the assertions of democratic ideology, postwar geopolitics, or Cold War opportunity, Israel was neither a natural ally nor conventional client, a buffer, satellite, colony, beachhead, market, or supplier. Israel needed the United States not only for its further survival but for its very existence. United States aid and above all American-Jewish aid were crucial if Israel was to avert starvation for want of oil, markets, and hard currency” (Schoenbaum 1993: 75).

of greater Soviet influence in the region: "Continued agitation and uncertainty regarding the Palestine question is prejudicial to American-Arab relations in the fields of education, trade, petroleum, and aviation. Weakening the Anglo-American position in the Near East permits a more rapid extension of Soviet Russian objectives" (*Ibid*, 867N.O1/ 1-1447: January 14 Wilkins memorandum: 1004).

Smith¹³² updated Marshall on the Soviet view of Palestine and the region: "to ensure unsettlement and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in the Near East" (*Ibid*, 867N.O1/11-1447: November 14 Smith telegram to Marshall: 1263). However, Smith believed that the Soviets were very pessimistic about their chances of penetrating the region successfully: "indigenous Communist movements, Jews and other minority groups provide Kremlin's only immediately useful tool to "soften up" area for eventual straight Communist cultivation (*Ibid*, 1264).

If the assessment was correct, the overall Soviet threat to the region at that time was minimal. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia viewed Palestine as a gate for the Soviets to enter the Middle East; however, the basis of threat for each was different. It seemed that for the U.S. it was more a fear of losing access to oil and power and influence in the region. For Ibn Saud, it seemed to be to thwart the spread of communist ideology in the region. As the Cold War unfolded in the 1950s, these threats would bring the two states into a very close alignment.

Contentious exchanges between Ibn Saud and Truman

The telegram exchanges between Ibn Saud and Truman showed the highly dissimilar interests they had in Palestine and the great pressures those created for both leaders. The Saudis focused on threat and security, which were significant realist concerns shared by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense. In an earlier meeting in July

¹³² Walter B. Smith was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia from March 22, 1946 to December 25, 1948. Before he served as U.S. Under Secretary of State on February 9, 1953 to October 1, 1954, Smith was Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Truman from 1950 to 1953 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

1946, Amir Faisal told Childs that the “Palestine question was matter of life and death to Arabs who viewed Zionist aspirations Palestine as having ultimate end of swallowing up Arab world” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/7-146: July 1 Childs telegram to Byrnes¹³³: 641). The Saudis perceived a Jewish state in the region as a threat to the existence of the Kingdom and the Arab world. Ibn Saud told Truman that “the Jews are aggressors openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence; the designs of the Jews are not limited to Palestine only, but include the neighboring Arab countries within their scope, not even excluding our holy cities (*Ibid*, 867N.01/10-1 546: October 1 Ibn Saud letter to Truman¹³⁴: 708).

Truman responded to Ibn Saud that “I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. I furthermore do not feel that my statements in any way represent a failure on the part of this Government to live up to its assurance that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. During the current year there have been a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews. (*Ibid*, 867N.01/10-1546: October 25 Truman telegram¹³⁵ to Ibn Saud: 716-717).

In his final appeal to Truman, Ibn Saud emphasised that “relations between the U.S. and the Arabs are clouded with doubt and suspicion; it is my duty as a close friend whose country is united to the people of the U.S. by several strong mutual political and economic ties to revise as quickly as is possible this dangerous situation, which has resulted from the support

¹³³ James Byrnes served as Secretary of State from July 3, 1945 to January 21, 1947. Byrnes led the U.S. Department of State during the transition from World War II to the Cold War. Byrnes spent much of his time outside of Washington meeting with foreign leaders. President Truman was uncertain of his own aptitude in matters of foreign policy and thus placed a great deal of confidence in Secretary Byrnes. Byrnes increasingly wielded less control over U.S. foreign policy as disagreements arose with President Truman over how forceful the country should be against the increasingly uncooperative Soviet Union (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

¹³⁴ The letter from King Ibn Saud is published in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin (vol. 15, p. 848).

¹³⁵ Truman’s letter is available on line. See Peters, G. and Wooley, J.T., undated. “Harry S. Truman October 28, 1946 : Message to the King of Saudi Arabia Concerning Palestine”

your Government has lent to Zionism against the interests of the Arab peoples” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/10-3047: October 26 Ibn Saud letter to Truman: 1212). Ibn Saud argued that,

To support claims of the Zionist in Palestine is an unfriendly act directed against the Arabs and is inconsistent with the assurances given us by Roosevelt. This decision will lead to a deathblow to American interests in the Arab countries and will disillusion the Arab's confidence in the friendship, justice, and fairness of the U.S. Such a policy of the U.S. disagrees with its long-held reputation as a defender of friendly nations against fearfulness and aggression. The Arabs have definitely decided to oppose establishment of a Jewish state in any part of the Arab world. The dispute between the Arab and Jew will be violent and long-lasting and without doubt will lead to more shedding of blood (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud believed that the U.S. should not intervene in Palestine; the U.S. had “nothing to do with the Palestine question, a matter which should be settled by the British, who had enticed American involvement in order to prejudice Saudi Arabian friendship with the United States” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/10-2846: October 28 Childs telegram to Byrnes: 714). Ibn Saud concluded that “if the U.S. desired to preserve its relations with the Arabs, it should give up its interest in the Palestine question” (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud responded to Truman’s contention about massive Jewish immigration, characterising it as one that changed the basic situation in Palestine; the King repeated that “Zionist Jews have used this humanitarian appeal as an excuse for attaining their own ends of aggression against Palestine, these aims being to conquer Palestine and by achieving a majority to make it Jewish, to establish a Jewish state in it, to expel its original inhabitants, to use Palestine as a base for aggression against the neighboring Arab states, and to fulfill (other aspects of) their aggressive programs (*Ibid*, 867N.01/11-246: November 2 Ibn Saud letter to Truman: 718).

Truman did not answer Ibn Saud again until January 1947; and essentially repeated his arguments about the U.S. position. He emphasised that the U.S. opposed any solution that violated the political, economic, and religious rights and freedoms of Arabs and Jews.

However, Truman did not explain to the Saudis why his idealism and humanitarian concerns about the Jews were equally important to Ibn Saud's realism and concern for the right of Arabs in Palestine. After all, the basis and nature of U.S. ideals of freedom and democratic government were alien concepts to the Saudis and the wider Muslim world. Truman also expressed his belief that Jewish terrorists were "not indicative of the temper of Jews in general throughout the world or symbolic of Jewish aspirations respecting Palestine" and acknowledged that "uncertainties and unsettled conditions will continue to exert a disturbing influence in Palestine and adjacent areas" (*Ibid*, 867N.01/1-1747: January 24 Truman to Ibn Saud: 1011-1014).

The exchanges showed that Truman and Ibn Saud did not fully disclose to each other their true personal motivations and dilemma on Palestine. Since the basis of their interests in Palestine was incongruent, both should have been more deliberate, open, and honest with each other. Ibn Saud felt trapped and abandoned by the British and the Americans. His worst fears came true. The British gave up its mandate in Palestine; Palestine was partitioned; and the reality of a Jewish state was unavoidable.

U.S. Government support for the partition of Palestine

Unofficially, the U.S. favored a British proposal to partition Palestine and have it approved in the U.N.¹³⁶ Acheson based this on "American domestic considerations and that

¹³⁶ "Although the United States backed Resolution 181, the U.S. Department of State recommended the creation of a U.N. trusteeship with limits on Jewish immigration and division of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab provinces but not states. The State Department advised against U.S. intervention on behalf of the Jews because of its concern about the possibility of an increasing Soviet role in the Arab world and the potential for restriction of oil supplies to the U.S." (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, Creation of Israel, 1948: par.4). Leffler (1992: 239) pointed out that U.S. Department of State officials such as Kennan, Rusk, and Henderson tried to get Truman to reverse his decision. Partition was unacceptable to the Arabs and

opposition to such a solution would be more vocal than physical” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/1-2147: January 21 Acheson memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador: 1010). According to Acheson, “the American Government, for domestic and other reasons, would find it easier to support in the U.N. and elsewhere the solution of the Palestine problem calling for partition and the setting up of a viable Jewish state than any other solution at present under consideration” (*Ibid*, 867N.01/2-1247: January 27 Acheson oral statement to Lord Inverchapel: 1014). Britain and the U.S. failed to bring the Jewish Agency, the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, and the Arab League representatives into agreement about Palestine, which left the U.N. as the remaining venue to resolve the Palestine problem. In the U.N. the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel were *fait accompli*. The U.S. was the most aggressive endorser of partition. On November 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 181 (II), which effectively terminated the British Mandate for Palestine and partitioned Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, and placed the Jerusalem-Bethlehem under special international protection administered by the U.N. The partition of Palestine and U.S. support for it deepened the rift in Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment. The Saudis felt betrayed and threatened.

Saudi bitterness, disillusionment, and pragmatism

The partition of Palestine disillusioned and embittered the Saudis, especially Amir Faisal. He reported that the U.S. delegates to the U.N. acted as spokesmen of Zionists and pressured other foreign delegations to vote for partition. He felt betrayed after repeated assurances from the U.S. Department of State that no such pressure would be exerted. Faisal wanted to

unworkable. There would be a greater potential for violence; pressure for the U.S. to help Israel would grow. The U.S. could be trapped in assuming major military and economic responsibilities indefinitely.

break off relations with the U.S. if he had the power to do so (1948 FRUS footnote referring to a December 4, 1947 telegram from Childs that remains classified).

Ibn Saud viewed the Jewish state as a blatant threat to the Saudi state and the Arab world. Ibn Saud expressed his disgust: “the decision with respect to Palestine was most distasteful for the Arab world and the Arabs would take such measures as they deemed necessary for the defence of their interests” (U.S. Department of State FRUS, 1947: 890F.00/12-447:

December 4 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1335). However, Ibn Saud was more pragmatic than Faisal. Ibn Saud raised other concerns: an increase of Russian communist propaganda in the surrounding states; continued perception of threats from Iraq and Transjordan; and British political influence in the region. Ibn Saud added that “although we [the U.S. and Saudi Arabia] differ enormously on the question of Palestine, still we have our own mutual interests and friendship to safeguard” (*Ibid*). Nevertheless, Childs believed that U.S. support of the Palestine partition accentuated Ibn Saud’s doubt that the U.S. could be a stable political partner to substitute for the British (U.S. Department of State FRUS, 1947: 890F.00/12-447: December 4 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1336). His defeat on Palestine sharpened Ibn Saud’s apprehensions about long-term U.S. reliability.

Ibn Saud’s apprehensions about the U.S. Government

Fearful of communist ideology creeping into the region, and more fearful of British power and control in Iraq and Transjordan, Ibn Saud wanted to know if he could rely on receiving U.S. military aid in the form of arms and materiale for Saudi troops to defend against possible troubles caused on that border “through Communist propaganda or through the instigation of the Shereefian family and proclamations and speeches made by prominent Iraqi leaders” (*Ibid*); and U.S. help to protect vital Saudi interests in the area, specifically the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. Ibn Saud reiterated that “the crucial question for him was whether and to what extent he might count on U.S. aid in resisting incursions from Iraq and Transjordan” (*Ibid*,

1338). Prince Saud disclosed that the Arab League Ministers from Iraq and Transjordan requested Saudi Arabia to break relations with the U.S. and cancel the oil concession because of the Palestine partition.¹³⁷ The Saudi representative at the Arab League meeting emphasised, to the Iraq and Transjordan Arab league ministers, that Saudis unified ideologically with Arab states opposing the establishment of Israel but saw no reason to sever relations with the U.S., adding that if Iraq and Transjordan insisted that Saudi Arabia break relations, it would not be with the U.S. but with the states of Iraq and Transjordan (*Ibid*, 1340-1341).

Because of the partition of Palestine, the Saudi leaders perceived new and greater threats to Saudi Arabia and the region. Ibn Saud feared that Palestinian and Arab-Israeli disputes would lead to armed conflict in the region. For Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, the creation and proclamation of the State of Israel,¹³⁸ which resulted in loss of Arab territory, was a cause for war. The first Arab-Israeli War¹³⁹ loomed over the horizon where forces

¹³⁷ According to William Haddad and Mary Hardy, "One of the interesting leitmotifs surrounding the formation of Israel was the secret political alliance between the Yishuv and King Abdullah of Transjordan. This alliance undercuts the common assumption that the Arab nations provided a united front against the establishment of the Jewish state and explains how the mutual interests shared by Transjordan's Hashemite leadership and the Zionists came to dictate the destiny of the Palestinians. The clandestine dealings between the two seemingly unlikely partners resulted in the abandonment of a Palestinian state and the subsequent division of the British mandate between Israel and Transjordan. The annexation of the West Bank by King Abdullah and the continuing friendly relations between the Hashemite dynasty and the Zionists enraged other Arab leaders who vehemently condemned the King's actions and launched a campaign to subvert any effort to create a 'Greater Syria' under his crown. Despite their tactics, the Arab world was unable to collaborate and proved incapable of halting the perceived traitorous activities of the Hashemites" (Haddad & Murphy 2003: 31).

¹³⁸ On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel. U.S. President Harry S. Truman recognized Israel on the same day (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, Creation of Israel, 1948: par. 1). Armies from neighboring Arab states, which rejected the UN partition plan, immediately engaged in war with Israel (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Israel 2010 par. 3).

¹³⁹ The United Nations resolution already sparked conflict between Jewish and Arab groups within Palestine. The goal of the Arabs was to block the Partition Resolution and to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state. The Jews, on the other hand, hoped to gain control over the territory allotted to them under the Partition Plan. On May 14, 1948, Arab armies from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt joined the Palestinian Arabs in attacking territory in the former Palestinian mandate. Saudi Arabia sent a small contingent that fought under the Egyptian command. British trained forces from Transjordan eventually intervened in the conflict, but only in areas that had been designated as part of the Arab state (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, The Arab-Israeli War 1948: pars. 3-4). Also see: Karsh, E., 2002. *Essential Histories, The Arab-Israeli conflict: the Palestine War 1948*. Colchester, Essex: Osprey Publishing; Morris, B., 2008. *1948: a*

from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria prepared for battle against Israel.¹⁴⁰ The Saudis did not have military capabilities to join the battle; it “did not have a regular army and their irregular troops had no ammunition” (Pappé 2001: 108). Al-Rasheed pointed out that regardless of Saudi historiographical narrations, the “underdeveloped Saudi military capabilities in 1947-1948 must be considered in any evaluation of Saudi involvement in the first Arab-Israel war” (Al-Rasheed 2007: par.12); and that “Ibn Saud realised that his cautious and indecisive policy of the 1930s and early 1940s would no longer be sufficient (*Ibid*, par. 46).

The discussions now apply elements from realist alliance theories to explain the aberrations in Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment; and why the two states remained aligned despite those aberrations.

Realist alliance elements in the Palestine problem

Clearly there were aberrations in Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment caused by the Palestine problem. There was an imbalance of Saudi and U.S. interests in Palestine. Both states failed to understand and appreciate their differences. Applying Schweller’s theory, the Saudi and American states did not have a common goal there. In the context of Palestine, their relationship was one of utility based on strict calculations of self-interests that were diametrically opposite. Saudi Arabia had reputational interests at stake in Jerusalem because of its religious leadership role in the Islamic world. The U.S. also had reputational interests because of its commitment to end the misery and suffering of Jews in Europe and restore the Jewish nation. However, considerations of U.S. values already possessed such as oil for the

History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; and Rogan, E.L. and Shlaim, A., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁰ Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian armies inflicted heavy casualties on Israeli forces before the US and the Soviet Union sponsored a four-week UN truce. This respite gave Israel time to buy large quantities of weapons from communist Czechoslovakia and when hostilities resumed it drove the Arab armies back deep into their own territories. By the time the US sponsored another peace deal, Israel had expanded its borders far beyond those envisaged by the original UN partition of Palestine (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 95).

U.S., foreign aid for the Kingdom, and prestige for both states outweighed thoughts of de-alignment. Saudi Arabia stayed on the American bandwagon because no other allies were available. The British were retrenching economically and militarily; the Arab states were far from being united; and Russia's atheistic communism was a total contradiction to Islam.

Applying Schweller's elements further, one can characterise the Saudi position on Palestine as status quo and the U.S. as revisionist. The Saudis wanted the Arab status quo maintained. The Americans were revisionist in pushing for more Jewish immigration to Palestine, partition of the territory, and creation of a Jewish homeland there. Both states sought absolute gains on the Palestine issue instead of relative gains. Saudi Arabia did not want Jewish immigration into Palestine, rejected any moves to partition Palestine, and could not accept a Jewish state in the area. The U.S. pushed for Jewish immigration; it supported partition and the eventual creation of a Jewish state. The extreme positions taken by Truman and Ibn Saud can be attributed to domestic pressures, another aspect found in Schweller's theory. Truman needed the American Jewish vote to get re-elected. Ibn Saud claimed that he faced persistent domestic criticism from anti-Western factions about Saudi alignment with the U.S. vis-à-vis. the partition of Palestine and the creation of the Jewish state.

Using Waltz' theory, the balance of power continued to shift as result of the Palestine partition. The status quo changed. Giving up the British mandate in Palestine disturbed whatever stability and security existed in the area. The U.S supported the Jewish state despite the possibility of U.S. power and influence stalling because of Arab rage about the partition of Palestine. The U.S. aligned with Israel and became a counterbalance to Arab solidarity against the Jewish state. Furthermore, if the Soviets successfully used the Palestine issue to gain an alignment with the Arabs, it potentially represented a major power shift regionally and globally. The U.S. was the only great power that could replace Britain in the region and prevent Soviet entry.

Using Walt's theory, from the Saudi view the territorial and political disruptions caused by the partition of Palestine and the presence of the Jewish state in Arab territory created further instability in the area and added to Saudi concerns about external threats to its territory. More than the ideological threat of Communism seeping into the area, there were threats of increasing violence against the Arab and the Jewish population in Palestine. The Arab refugee problem in Jordan was a potential flashpoint for regional violence and war, which created more insecurity and instability for neighbouring Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. A militarily superior Israeli state was a real and direct threat to a Saudi state that did not have any viable military capability. The threat of Soviet entry, and any resulting Arab alignment with the Soviets, represented a direct threat to U.S. and Western oil interests in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia. Disruptions or terminations of U.S. and Western access to oil threatened the economic stability and security of the West.

The Palestine problem drove a wedge in Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. However, it remained intact because Ibn Saud was pragmatic enough to accept what happened in Palestine in the context of the totality of his concerns and interests about Saudi Arabia. Palestine was a major issue but not the only issue. The same factors that motivated both states to align in the previous years did not lose their meaning or importance for either state. Both states understood that they had more to lose if they broke off relations and abandoned their alignment: U.S. foreign aid to Saudi Arabia; U.S. access to and use of the Dhahran base; and Saudi oil development for the financial-economic benefit of both states. They shared mutual concerns about potential shifts in the balance of power caused by British withdrawal from Palestine. The possibility of Soviet entry added to the motivation of both states to stay aligned.

Despite the difficulties on Palestine that both states grappled with, and the resulting strains on relations, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. seriously explored the possibility of entering

into a formal security alliance. The next section explains what the formal alliance proposals were, why Ibn Saud proposed them, and why the formal alliances did not materialise.

1948: Proposals for formal alliances

Ibn Saud's setback in Palestine did not deter him from seeking to cement relations and alignment with the U.S. or Britain, or both. Much of the communications and negotiations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in 1948 continued to focus on U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia¹⁴¹ and the Middle East.¹⁴² Ibn Saud's pursuit of formal security alliances in 1948 must be viewed within the context of his on-going need for financial, economic, and military aid to build up the Kingdom's material capabilities; the threat to the stability and security in the region because of the Palestine partition and creation of the state of Israel; perceived new threats from the possible entry of the Soviets into the region; persistent perceptions of threat from his Hashemite rivals; and his keen understanding of the British-American rivalry for power and influence in Saudi Arabia and how to manipulate both sides to his advantage. Freed from the burdens of its mandate in Palestine, the British Government seemed to be revitalised in efforts to regain power and influence in Saudi Arabia. The British offered a formal British-Saudi treaty.

Britain offers a formal British-Saudi treaty

¹⁴¹ Pereboom (2006) emphasised that the primary factor that shaped U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia was the desire of the U.S. to expand its economic power, more so than military power: "since the early days of the U.S. republic, America sought access to world markets" and that the U.S. forged relations where trade expanded (Pereboom 2006: 37). However, Pereboom believed that U.S. national interests in Saudi Arabia laid in two equally important issues: first, expanded military advantage by gaining a strategic base in Saudi territory; and, second, opportunities for substantial economic profits provided by Saudi oil. Pereboom contended that with the support of a formidable U.S. military-industrial complex, the U.S. sought simultaneously "to preserve the [capitalist] global economic system and to create a worldwide U.S. military presence" (*Ibid*: 40).

¹⁴² Gettleman and Schaar (2003) identified major themes in U.S. relations in the Middle East. These included the replacement of European imperial power, especially British power, by U.S. power and influence; U.S. efforts to form alliances with states that shared U.S. goals of containing communism and curtailing radical nationalism; and, most important of all, protection of American and Western access to Middle East oil and natural gas resources (Gettleman and Schaar 2003: 244).

Childs believed that the British were “taking advantage of a favorable atmosphere created for them in Arab world by their refusal to be drawn into imposed Palestine settlement, and extremely unfavorable position in which we have been placed in our all-out support [of] partition, to move into positions of advantage in Arab states generally, including Saudi Arabia” (United States Department of State, 1948. FRUS The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1, Saudi Arabia, 867N.01/1-1348: January 13 Childs telegram to Marshall: 209).

Amir Faisal intimated to Childs that “the King may be influenced to abandon hopes of close political relations with the U.S. and return to relying more upon his political relations with Britain” because the King doubted “whether he could find in U.S. a stable political partner in substitution for his old ally, the British” (*Ibid*, 711.90F/1-1348: January 13 Childs telegram to Marshall: 209-210). Childs added that “U.S. negative attitudes towards other Saudi Arabian Government proposals for closer political relations” (*Ibid*) moved Ibn Saud to re-examine his alliance preferences.

U.S. analysis of the proposed British-Saudi treaty

Britain proposed a treaty with Saudi Arabia that was similar in form and substance to the British-Iraqi treaty (*Ibid*, 741.90F/1-2048: January 20 Childs telegram to Marshall: 212). Childs added that “Prince Feisal had in mind that Britain should conclude treaties with other Arab states by which they would all be treated alike, and Hashemite states should not be favored. Proposed British-SAG treaty went beyond this idea” (*Ibid*). The U.S. Department of State analysed a rough draft of the proposed British-Saudi treaty and concluded that it did not contain exclusive features. The treaty showed that the British “hoped for Saudi facilities in time of war or threat of war and certain communications and other facilities during peace” (*Ibid*, 741.90F/1-2048: January 20 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 214). The proposed treaty promised the Saudis “British assistance if attacked from any quarter” (*Ibid*). The U.S.

Department of State analysed a revised draft that contained provisions for several British strategic military installations during times of war and peace, and British responsibility for costs of construction, maintenance and operations, including technical staff and equipment (*Ibid*, 741.90F/1-2648: January 26 Henderson memorandum to Marshall: 217).

Clearly, the British wanted the Americans out of Saudi Arabia. That would mean a significant shift in regional power to the British and a grave threat to U.S. national interests in the Kingdom and U.S. national security. Ibn Saud believed that the purpose of the proposed treaty was to move Saudi Arabia away from the U.S.” and place the Saudi state in a position of reliance on Britain so that, “the British would easily gain what they desire” (*Ibid*): access to Saudi territory for military bases and control of Saudi oil, values coveted by the British and at the centre of British-American rivalry. The U.S. Department of State did not seem alarmed by the proposed British-Saudi treaty.

The U.S. Department of State reaction

Faisal recognised that “Saudi refusal to conclude a treaty with the British might result in their use of the Hashemites to create a disturbed situation; it was to guard against such an eventuality that the King desired to strengthen his realm” (*Ibid*). Beyond U.S. verbal assurances of protecting Saudi territorial integrity and political independence, Faisal “sought practical assurances by the U.S. to supply the military requirements essential to defending Saudi sovereignty and maintaining internal stability” (*Ibid*, telegram 47). However, because of the unstable situation in Palestine, the U.S. embargo against U.S. arms transfers to the region continued.

Ibn Saud believed that formal alliance with the U.S. would prompt the U.S. to give the military arms and materiale that the Saudi state wanted. He argued that absent a formal alliance, it was “unreasonable for the U.S. to provide a military mission without furnishing arms and other essentials for training Saudi Arabian forces” (*Ibid*, 890F.20 Missions/2-348:

February 3 Childs telegram 46 to Marshall: 216). Marshall explained that “supply and financial considerations and arms embargo to Middle East make it difficult to meet Saudi Arabian Government request” (*Ibid*, 741.60F/2-648: February 6 Marshall telegram to Childs: 219).

Marshall instructed Childs to tell Ibn Saud that the U.S. would not object to the proposed British-Saudi treaty provided that the “Saudi Government considers such arrangements to be in Saudi interest; that the arrangements are not inconsistent with U.S.-Saudi agreement on Dhahran Airbase; that arrangements would not preclude free development of political military and economic relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S.; and arrangements would be in harmony with U.N. charter” (*Ibid*). Marshall also wanted Childs to find out the Saudi Arabian Government’s attitude towards a five-year extension of U.S. airfield operations at Dhahran so that the U.S. could continue training Saudi nationals; without an extension, the U.S. “do not see how plans for improving field and for continuing training of Saudi nationals can be formulated or carried out” (*Ibid*, 220). Although Marshall felt that an Anglo-Saudi treaty “might abate King's apprehension of Hashemites and their friends”, the U.S. really did not want to support any treaty between the Saudis and the British (*Ibid*, 741.90F/2-1248: Marshall telegram to Childs: 222). Thus, Marshall put the onus back on the Saudis regarding the proposed British-Saudi treaty and kept U.S. options flexible.

Realising that the Americans had called his bluff, Ibn Saud declined the proposed Anglo-Saudi treaty. Ibn Saud “adhered strongly to his friendship for Britain [but] they could not always be trusted, and thought [the British] might attempt to ‘egg on’ the Hashemites to adventures in Western Saudi Arabia” (*Ibid*, 741.90F/2-2148: February 21 Childs telegram #76 to Marshall: 223).

Saudi pursuit of alliances

Ibn Saud preferred a multilateral treaty among Britain, the U.S., and Arab League states; however the U.S. and Britain did not support that approach. The British felt it would be ineffective and the U.S. was not prepared to commit to a wide defence of the Middle East. Ibn Saud next proposed a tripartite alliance composed of Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the U.S. Ibn Saud wanted that form of alliance with Britain and the U.S. because of their military and economic capabilities; and political power and influence. A formal alliance with both great powers would surely bring even more substantial financial-economic aid to stabilise the Kingdom; and military aid to provide greater security against threats to his rule. Furthermore, having formal alliance with Britain would dilute the confidence of the Hashemites in pursuing any aggressive intentions towards Saudi Arabia. The British favoured a tripartite agreement to regain position in Saudi Arabia, dilute U.S. influence in the Kingdom, and perhaps control the actions of both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

Tripartite alliance

Hamza gave the first indication of Ibn Saud's interest in a tripartite alliance among the U.S., Great Britain, and Arab states, possibly through Arab League, which would "attain same security objectives British had sought in their proposed bilateral treaty with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and would ease the problem of those Arab states making individual arrangements" (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/2-148: February 21 Childs telegram #77 to Marshall: 224). Ibn Saud's idea of a tripartite or multilateral defence pact gained some interest in the U.S. and the Arab League for two reasons: it would prevent criticism by extremist elements about subservience to another state; and "it would relieve Ibn Saud of his perpetual apprehensions concerning his being defenseless against Hashemite designs" (*Ibid*, 711.90B/4-648: April 6 Childs telegram #182 to Marshall: 228).

The British Foreign Office dismissed the proposal because "His Majesty's Government would like a multilateral Arab League resolution under which bilateral but interlocking pacts

could be negotiated with Arab states" (*Ibid*, 711.90B/4-848: April 8 U.S. Embassy telegram #1456 to Marshall: 229). The U.S. Department of State gave its perspectives.

The British they do not want vague alliances that commit Britain to the defence of the Arab Near East unless Britain gets facilities that enable them to carry out their defence commitment. Arab countries might enter into a treaty as a group or some kind of arrangement with Great Britain to accomplish together what domestic politics do not allow them to accomplish singly. In view of present British weakness, they fear that an alliance with Britain might well be more of a liability than an asset unless the U.S. was associated in some way. The U.S. should not give any encouragement that we would participate in an alliance arrangement with the Arab Near East. We should keep informed on the development of Arab ideas so we can throw cold water on any unrealistic plans before they become formalized, and encourage any trend that coincides with our interests and capabilities (*Ibid*, 741.90B/4-748: April 7 Merriam memorandum to Henderson: 229-230).

Ibn Saud envisioned a "network of treaties between Britain and all Arab states" and between "the U.S. and all Arab states" (*Ibid*, 5890F.00/4-1948: April 19 Childs telegram to Marshall: 234). Shaikh Yasin added that "settlement of the Palestine and Egypt questions was necessary to achieve unity between Arabs, the U.S., and Great Britain" (*Ibid*). Shaikh Yasin's rough draft of a tripartite agreement recognised the "integrity of Saudi Arabia, the vital interests of the U.S. and Britain, and the defence of Saudi Arabia in the event of attack; Saudi Arabia would provide facilities and furnish airbases and ports for U.S. and British use; the U.S. would equip and train Saudi armed forces (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/11-1448: Childs telegram to Lovett: 254).

The U.S Department of State recognised that Ibn Saud continued to use the rivalry between Britain and the U.S. to gain what he wanted. The U.S. Department of State turned down Ibn Saud's proposal of a tripartite treaty. U.S. relations with Britain are "most friendly and cooperative and that the U.S. did not feel the proposed tripartite alliance would now be practicable; the U.S. wished to continue cooperation with Saudi Arabia along present lines that have already brought substantial benefits to Saudi Arabia" (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/12-1748: Lovett telegram #471 to Legation in Saudi Arabia: 257). Lovett followed up with Childs

that, “any steps toward U.S. association for defense with nations outside Western Hemisphere constitute radical departure from past American peace-time policies¹⁴³; U.S. Government proceeding with utmost care” (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/12-1748: December 17 Lovett telegram #472 to Childs: 259).

The U.S. did not favour a tripartite agreement; it wanted a bilateral alliance with Saudi Arabia to gain position, power and influence superior to that of the British. The U.S. did not want any other power having access to and control of Saudi oil sources. From Ibn Saud’s perspective, a bilateral alliance treaty with the U.S. would bring him U.S. military aid and military arms to counter proximate external threats from the Hashemites; and perhaps even greater, U.S. economic and financial aid that would give him more resources to minimise and control internal domestic threats to his rule.

The King settled for relative, not absolute, Saudi gains from his alignment with the U.S. Ibn Saud could not get U.S. military arms because of the embargo; he could not get a formal alliance with the U.S. Because of America’s aversion to entangling alliances,¹⁴⁴ it was highly improbable that formal alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would occur. The U.S.

¹⁴³ That the U.S. mistrusts entangling peacetime commitments is one of the contentions about exceptionalism in American foreign policy. Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown pointed out that U.S. “dispositions seem to rest on the premise that war and peace are polar opposites; and may help to explain America’s oft-noted ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to foreign commitments that is consistent with oscillations between major involvement overseas and significant retrenchment. Because American values are strongly inconsistent with the methods and objectives of realpolitik, the country has a more messianic, erratic style abroad than has been typical of other great powers” (Lepgold & McKeown 1995: 369). Also see: Buzan, B., 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-first Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁴⁴ The roots of American aversion to entangling alliances go back to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. Washington encouraged commercial relations with Europe but cautioned America to stay away from political involvement in Europe. The maxim ‘entangling alliances with none’ was part of Jefferson’s inaugural address. See: DeConde, A., 1958. *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Kaplan, L.S., 1999. *Thomas Jefferson: Westward the Course of Empire*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.; Powaski, R.E., 1991. *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950 (Contributions to the Study of World History.)* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; and Lake, D.A., 1999. *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

policy would change in a just a few years. After the Suez Crisis and the perceived growth of Soviet influence in the region, the U.S. aggressively sought alliances.¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

1947-1948 also showed that the Saudi state continued to be weak financially and economically, deeply dependent on American oil companies and the U.S. Government for support. For economic and political advantage, Ibn Saud and the U.S. Government strove for exclusivity in their oil relationship vis-à-vis the intense rivalry for oil development projects among Western oil companies and among the governments that protected them.

The aberrant behaviour of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia towards the Palestine problem revealed a profound weakness in their relations and alignment. The chapter argued that both states arrived at diametrically opposite positions because their leaders failed to disclose and explain to each other their real motivations in a clear and forthright manner. They failed to use their alignment to find a solution that addressed their concerns satisfactorily. Ibn Saud's priority for almost twenty years before the Palestine crisis was not Palestine. Truman dealt with a U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense that were stubbornly wedded to inflexible realist views on Palestine and the Near East, with little room to accommodate Truman who was similarly inflexible in his idealism about a Jewish homeland. When the crisis boiled over, Ibn Saud and Truman had simply run out of time.

The same factors in realist alliance formation explain why the alignment did not crumble in the face of the Palestine crisis. The importance of those factors to Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment counterbalanced the negative impact of the Palestine on Ibn Saud. These factors

¹⁴⁵ Miglietta argued that the U.S. sought alliances to demonstrate U.S. certainty about its ability and will against the Soviets (Miglietta 2002: 295-296). However, the U.S. postwar alliance system created entangling relationships because of over-commitment, mis-commitment, and mis-management of its alliances (*Ibid*, 304). According to Miglietta, the U.S. alliance system did not have a comprehensive strategy that fit U.S. interests, which resulted in over-commitments. U.S. mis-commitments resulted from the U.S. espousing anti-Communist political ideology while supporting authoritarian regimes. Mis-management resulted from alliances with small states that could not contribute to U.S. strategy and only wanted to access the U.S. political system in order to gain heavy leverage for their self-interests (*Ibid*).

included national interests in Saudi oil development and the Dhahran base; U.S. foreign aid to Saudi Arabia; continued Saudi perceptions of threats to the Kingdom; and the potential regional and global power shift and increased threat to U.S. and Saudi interests if the Soviets gained alignments with Arab states because of their discontent with the events in Palestine.

The first Arab-Israel war on May 14, 1948 exposed the profound military weakness of the Saudi state. Other Arab states flexed their military muscle to champion the Arab cause in Palestine. Ibn Saud, warrior and conqueror, leader of the Muslim world, had no regular army, not even ammunition. Much as Ibn Saud wanted to be the power in the region, the Saudi state did not yet have the material capabilities to reach that role.

Britain sought formal alliance with Saudi Arabia to try and push the U.S. out and regain influence and power in the Kingdom and the region. Ibn Saud pursued formal alliance with the U.S. to gain iron-clad written commitments, especially on U.S. economic, financial, and military aid, and to dispel his doubts about long-term U.S. reliability. However, the U.S. decided against formal alliance because of its long-held policy against entangling peacetime alliance. Despite Saudi bitterness at the Americans about Palestine, Ibn Saud had little choice but to maintain relations with them and hold on to a tenuous alignment. In the coming years, Saudi perceptions of external and internal threats and Saudi military defence security needs became more prominent in Saudi negotiations and deliberations about its alignment with the U.S. Their effect on the endurance of the alignment is the main focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1949-1952)

Introduction

Balance of interest considerations were more dominant considerations for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in 1949-1952. For the U.S. Government, it was protection of U.S. strategic military interests at Dhahran and financial-economic interests in Saudi oil, the latter also of critical interest to the Kingdom. Balance of threat considerations grew more intensely from Ibn Saud's perspective. Ibn Saud's heightened perceptions of external threat from potential encirclement by British-sponsored states, potential armed conflict with Israel, and Soviet intrusion into the Middle East caused him to increase focus on rebuilding Saudi military capabilities. He looked to the U.S. for military arms and other military aid.

Ibn Saud wanted Saudi military capabilities built on having the latest military arms and equipment and strong, well-trained Saudi armed forces. To do this he needed alignment with a great military power. With revitalised and expansive Saudi military capabilities, he hoped to aggregate Saudi military power with those of the U.S., his already powerful ally. If Ibn Saud leaned towards alignment with the U.S. in 1941-1948 because he needed U.S. aid for the Kingdom's financial and economic stability and security, in 1949-1952 he wanted to strengthen Saudi alignment with the U.S. because he needed U.S. military arms and aid for the kingdom's military security. Thus, military power and security became another linchpin in Saudi alignment with the U.S. However, U.S. failure to meet Ibn Saud's urgent requests for military arms and aid heightened Saudi concerns about U.S. intentions and interests in Saudi Arabia and the region. The first section in this chapter discusses the intense efforts by the Saudis to get U.S. military aid.

1949: Ibn Saud's quest for Saudi military power and security

Getting military arms and rebuilding Saudi military capabilities were critical factors in Ibn Saud's assessment of benefits to gain from alignment with the U.S. The U.S. Government failed to respond or responded too slowly to his concerns, especially his requests for U.S.

military arms and foreign aid; and when the U.S. responded, Ibn Saud felt the answers were ambiguous and wary. The King felt that the U.S. Government did not give urgency to his needs, which caused him to have lingering doubts about the efficacy of stronger alignment to the U.S. However, he did not give up easily. He continued his efforts to gain the military interests he wanted from alignment with the U.S. To bolster his argument that the U.S. should provide him with military aid, Ibn Saud added renewed Saudi concerns about the threat of a Greater Syria as a basis for his concern about threats to his Kingdom.

Ibn Saud's renewed concerns about Greater Syria

The Saudi Government disclosed that “Abdullah of Transjordan and the Regent of Iraq are taking new measures to realize Greater Syria by annexing the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan, bringing about revolution or instability in Syria and later taking active measures against Saudi Arabia” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/2-349: Childs telegram #88 to Acheson: 1579). The inclusion of threat of a Greater Syria did not prompt the U.S. to give Ibn Saud military arms; it also became clear that the U.S. was not inclined to intervene militarily.

Acheson¹⁴⁶ gave little weight to Ibn Saud's argument; and did not perceive any jeopardy to U.S. interests in the Kingdom or the alignment. According to Acheson, the U.S. had “no indications of any impending move toward realization of Greater Syria” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/2-349: February 19 Acheson telegram #62 to Legation in Saudi Arabia: 1580). Acheson reiterated a U.S. ‘hands-off position’ regarding any conflict among Arab states, saying that the “preservation of peaceful cooperation among Arab States is fundamentally and primarily the responsibility of Arab statesmen themselves” (*Ibid*, 890D.00/1-1949: January 19 Childs

¹⁴⁶ At that time Acheson's focus was on Europe, especially the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See: Acheson, D., 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department*. New York: W.W. Norton, Inc.; Leffler, M.P., 1992. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press; McNay, J.T., 2001. *Acheson and Empire: the British Accent in American Foreign Policy*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press; Beisner, R.L., 2006. *Dean Acheson: a Life in the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; and McMahon, R.J., 2009. *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.

telegram to Acheson: 1578). According to Acheson, if a Greater Syria materialised and threatened the peace and security of the Middle East, the U.S. would immediately approach the British because of the “mutuality of U.S. and U.K. interests” (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud expected a positive response from the U.S. regarding his concerns about external threat and need for military arms. Ibn Saud poured out his uneasiness and frustrations about U.S. intentions in Saudi Arabia and the region.

U.S. Government ought to reconsider its attitude because its common interests with Saudi Government are not as those with any other country. Its attitude toward Saudi Arabia should differ from that toward other countries. Does the U.S. Government still believe that the Palestine problem does not permit discussion of military and other aid for the Saudi Arabian Government, including a tripartite agreement? If the U.S. Government does not favor tripartite agreement, is it more disposed to a bilateral agreement? We are ready to do everything that will help in strengthening friendship ties. We are ready to assure all U.S. Government requests based on mutual interest will be met. Saudi Government will cooperate for as long as Saudi family in power. King has requested guarantees and commitments; he is ready to give in return such guarantees and commitments. All air, sea, and land facilities required by U.S. Government will be accorded to assure sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and not subject the Saudi Government to criticism by other foreigners that Saudi Arabia is a U.S. colony (*Ibid*, 711.90F/2,-2749: February 27 Childs telegram #138 to Acheson: 1581-1582).

At this point in 1949, the U.S. knew that relations and the alignment were in deeper trouble than they were in 1947-1948. A shift in power and influence back to the British was always a concern for the Americans because that shift meant facing the threat of losing values already possessed: Saudi oil, Saudi strategic military location, and the prestige of being a great power in the region and globally.¹⁴⁷ This factor and Ibn Saud’s obvious unease with the U.S.

Government prompted Childs to meet on March 30, 1949 in Riyadh with Ibn Saud, Crown

¹⁴⁷ The U.S. aligned with Saudi Arabia for two reasons. First, Saudi Arabia was a strategic military location for war and post-war purposes; it added to U.S. military and commercial capability regionally and globally. Waltz and Schweller include the notion of increasing material capability or power as a balancing response. In the context of defense against the Soviet threat, the same notion applies in Walt. Second, the U.S. needed access to and control of the massive Saudi oil reserves for the post-war rebuilding of Europe and Japan and for U.S. economic development. Alignment with the Saudis provided the U.S. an opportunity for significant economic and political gains at home and abroad. Schweller’s theory regarding opportunity for gain is relevant here.

Prince Saud, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Mansour, and the King's adviser Fuad Bey Hamza.

Childs carefully explained U.S. overall difficulties in allocating military funds, materiele, men and other assistance because of U.S. budgetary strains from vast U.S. global commitments; legal obstacles to the dispatch of military missions to non-Western countries; and the delicate situation in Palestine that resulted in an arms embargo. Childs did not speak directly of U.S. military arms and related aid for Saudi Arabia. Childs assured the King that the U.S. wanted to strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia and to protect the kingdom from any threats to its territory. However, he gave no assurance of U.S. military action to defend Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁸

It was also clear that a formal defense alliance or a mutual defence treaty with Saudi Arabia was not on the U.S. agenda; other formal non-military treaties were. The U.S. offered to help in the development of the Saudi economy and the improvement of Saudi living standards. To show its sincerity, the U.S. offered a formal treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation (*Ibid*, March 30 Childs *aide memoire* to Ibn Saud, in 711.90F/4-249; April 2 Childs telegram #83 to Acheson: 1586-1587).

The notion of threat, the foundation of Walt's alliance theory, was foremost in Ibn Saud's thinking and in his pursuit of rebuilding his military power. Without Saudi military capabilities, Ibn Saud perceived that power would shift even more to the Hashemites, given the possibility of a Greater Syria and continued British sponsorship of the Hashemites.

¹⁴⁸ Formal alliance binds signatories to the agreement that an attack on any one of them is the equivalent of an attack on all of them. That is an onerous obligation. Bronson pointed out that repeated assurances by the U.S. to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia were "interpreted by both Saudis and Americans as an implicit security guarantee" (Bronson 2006: 46). The Saudi-U.S. relationship is an informal alliance that relied mainly on verbal assurances from the U.S. about security guarantees. As relations and cooperation developed, the Saudis believed even more that the U.S. gave security guarantees for the Kingdom and promised military assistance during crises. The relationship can also be characterised as a strategic partnership, which does not necessarily imply a security guarantee; however, it recognises common or shared security interests and usually provides for strong military cooperation.

Added to this was Israel¹⁴⁹ as a new military power and threat to the region. It is clear that in 1949, Ibn Saud's strongest motive for alignment with the U.S. was to build up Saudi military forces and military power in addition to securing the Kingdom's financial and economic stability. Military and economic strength would give the Saudi state more political power and influence in the Arab world; and strengthen the King's prestige and standing. However, without a Saudi military buildup or slowness in doing it, Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. to guarantee using its military power to defend the Kingdom. This is why Ibn Saud strongly pursued formal defence and security alliance with the U.S. The Saudi response to Childs' March meeting with the Saudi leadership was not what the U.S. Government expected. The Saudis seemed more dissatisfied.

Saudi dissatisfaction

Ibn Saud considered the U.S. response as a personal rebuff. He perceived that the U.S. did not take him seriously, and that the U.S. was too casual about his concerns about threats to his Kingdom and rule. The Saudi Foreign Ministry characterised the U.S. response to Saudi requests for military assistance as a "lack of confidence in Saudi Arabia" or that the U.S. "has not yet considered [the] great fundamental mutual interests involved" (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/4-1449: April 14 Childs telegram #272 to Acheson: 1589).

It was not lost on Ibn Saud that the spread of communist influence in the region and elsewhere weighed heavily on the Americans. Ibn Saud added communism to his perception of external threats in order to strengthen his argument that negative or slow responses by the U.S. to his requests for military arms and other aid placed the Saudi state in the position of

¹⁴⁹ P.L Hahn explained (2004a: 70) that the U.S. wanted to take full advantage of Israel's strategic potential. Israel had well-developed airfields and bases. The U.S. believed that in the event of a world war against the Soviets, Israel would contribute troops and provide access for Western troops to its territory to blunt any Soviet advance. The Arab-Israel War in 1948 demonstrated the superior military capabilities of Israel against the Arabs in terms of rapid mobilisation, flexibility, and speed (Murray and Viotti 1994: 488).

not being able to defend against threats. Ibn Saud believed that communism already had a foothold in neighbouring countries such as Egypt.

Ibn Saud also added Israel as a growing threat amidst reports of Transjordan's willingness to make concessions to Israel about Palestine if Israel supported Abdullah in regaining the Hijaz. This latter point exacerbated Ibn Saud's long-held fears about "innate Shereefian hostility" leading to the encirclement¹⁵⁰ of Saudi Arabia by Transjordan, Iraq and, perhaps even by Yemen;¹⁵¹ and British preference for these states that posed a threat to the Saudi state¹⁵² (*Ibid*, 8Q90F.00/5-1049: May 10 Childs telegram #159 to Acheson: 1595-1596). Thus, "for the last time", Ibn Saud asked for U.S. "help, adequate armaments and advice; and he did not wish U.S. to treat this present approach casually but to give it the great importance he attached to it" (*Ibid*).

U.S. negotiations with the Saudis about Dhahran provided the opening for the U.S. to solve the problem of military aid to Saudi Arabia, and to regain Ibn Saud's confidence. What Dhahran meant for their mutual interests held the alignment together in 1949.

The Dhahran lease extension negotiations

Ibn Saud understood the importance of Dhahran for "U.S. and Saudi defense needs" (United States Department of State FRUS, 1949, 890F.7962/1-2449: January 24 Childs

¹⁵⁰ The British arbitrarily drew Saudi Arabia's borders with Kuwait in 1922; and with Iraq and Transjordan in 1925. In the southeast, the British determined bordering regions (*limitrophes*) rather than precise boundaries with Trucial Sheikhdoms and Oman. Britain extended a protective umbrella over them because of earlier treaties. Saudi Arabia laid claim to traditional tribal grazing grounds in the area, citing "tribal loyalties evidenced by Saudi tax collections (*zakat*) among those tribes" (Brown 2004: 220). Territorial border disputes resulted.

¹⁵¹ In the early 1930s, Amirs Saud and Faisal led military campaigns that established Saudi predominance over the disputed Asir and Jizan provinces (Quandt 1981: 27). The 1934 Treaty of Taif returned Saudi-occupied Hodaidah and its environs to imamic rule; the treaty established the Saudi southeastern boundary with Yemen (Brown 2004: 220).

¹⁵² Walt explained that regardless of power capabilities, if a state perceives another state as a threat, the threatened state forms an alliance with another state to counter the perceived threat. This is exactly what Ibn Saud perceived regarding Transjordan and Iraq. Walt's four perceptions of power are directly relevant to what Ibn Saud perceived the Hashemites had: aggregate power with the British; proximate power since the Hashemites were neighbouring states; offensive power against a militarily weak Saudi state; and offensive intentions by moves to consolidate territory and capabilities through a Greater Syria movement and rumoured plans to retake the Hijaz.

telegram #54 to Acheson: 1577). Both states understood that Dhahran played a crucial role in the protection and security of Saudi oil against any threats; and that Dhahran was critical for the Saudis to build up their own military capabilities and to be able to defend its sovereign territory. Having uninterrupted access to and use of the Dhahran Airbase was an important incentive for the U.S. to continue giving foreign aid to the Kingdom, aid that Ibn Saud badly needed. Dhahran was the door through which the U.S. found a way to start giving Ibn Saud some measure of military aid. However, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. did not use formal bilateral alliance to reach agreements on Dhahran.

Ibn Saud offered to renew Dhahran for twelve months only because “conditions changed” and “trouble and gossip would arise in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries” (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/4-649: April 6 Childs telegram #254 to Acheson: 1594). The changed condition that the Saudis referred to was the partition of Palestine and U.S support for Israel.¹⁵³ The Saudis feared Dhahran being used by Arab states as an example of Saudi indifference to the greater Arab cause in Palestine and in the Arab-Israel dispute. Ibn Saud also did not want to project any image of foreign occupancy¹⁵⁴ by the U.S. and wanted the U.S. to settle, in the same twelve months, his requests for military arms and a treaty (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/4-249: April 2 Childs telegram #84 to Acheson: 1590).

Childs recommended a workable solution using Ibn Saud’s *quid pro quo* approach to the Dhahran lease renewal (*Ibid*: 890F.7962/5-2349: May 23, Childs telegram #137 to Acheson: 1598). It would be a starting point for the U.S. Government to help Ibn Saud build up Saudi military capabilities. Childs suggested aggregating U.S. military needs at Dhahran with Ibn Saud’s defence requirements for “maintenance by him of internal security and security

¹⁵³ Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign economic and military aid since World War II (Sharp 2009: 1). Reported aid figures range from \$27 billion in the years 1946-1983 (El-Shazy 1986: 77) to \$146 billion from 1946-2004 (Thomas 2007: 4). U.S. aid to Israel was limited to economic assistance until 1962; military grants did not begin until 1974 (Canfield 2001: 30). Also see Mark C.R., 2006. *Israel-United States Relationship*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

¹⁵⁴ This point was first discussed in this project in Chapter 3.

against his most likely enemies, modern warfare, and local exigencies” (*Ibid*, 1599). The U.S. “training of 10,000 mobile airborne Saudi troops for defense of Dhahran offers excellent opportunity to obtain U.S. long-term agreement and rights at Dhahran” (*Ibid*, 1598).

To dispel Ibn Saud’s doubts about U.S. interests and reliability, Truman accepted Ibn Saud’s offer of a twelve-month extension of the Dhahran lease. Regarding a longer-term agreement on Dhahran, Truman suggested “friendly negotiation between equals that would be for the mutual advantage of our two countries” (*Ibid*, 811.001/5-2349: May 23 Truman letter to Ibn Saud: 1599-1560). Truman’s letter to Ibn Saud "avoids any direct mention of the King's desire for a defense pact" (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/5-1049: May 10 Acheson draft to Truman: 1599). Instead, Truman emphasised the availability of the Point IV¹⁵⁵ programme for cooperation and technical assistance to countries such as Saudi Arabia, which would result in the “complete fruition of the mutual economic interests of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*). Point IV dealt with economic assistance, which Ibn Saud needed. It was not a channel for military aid. However, The U.S. National Military Establishment (NME) already planned for Saudi Arabia to receive U.S. military arms and training.

Trying to mend the alignment: U.S. military assistance to the Kingdom

Through a worldwide U.S. military assistance programme, the Kingdom could get U.S. Government assistance in procuring U.S. military equipment on a cash reimbursable basis. Upon Ibn Saud’s approval, the NME would send a military planning group to Dhahran “to study Saudi Arabian defense needs and recommend the organization and equipment of Saudi Arabian defense forces; and to study U.S. requirements at Dhahran for a long term agreement

¹⁵⁵ Truman’s inaugural address emphasised four points as the basis then of U.S. foreign policy. The fourth point was the Hardy technical assistance program, a new plan to make the benefits of U.S. “scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Hechler 1982: 118). Also see: Hillman, W., 1952. *Mr. President: The First Publication from the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-Second President of the United States of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young; Levantrosser, W.F., 1986. *Harry S. Truman: The Man from Independence*. New York: Greenwood Press; and Reichard, G.W., 2004. *Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.

and how to best link and correlate U.S. requirements with Saudi military needs” (*Ibid*, 890F.7962/6-449: June 4 Childs *aide memoire* to Ibn Saud: 1600-1601). If the U.S. and U.N. arms embargo was still in effect, “the U.S. Government would request permission from the U.N. for shipment to Saudi Arabia of equipment for training defensive forces needed for internal security” (*Ibid*).

Ibn Saud approved the proposal. Driven by his acute perceptions of external threat, Ibn Saud’s offer of cooperation with the U.S. in military intelligence matters was clearly realist. He desired that the “work of the survey group leads toward giving him military forces equal to or greater than forces Jordan and Iraq, that we draw on our intelligence sources and inform him regarding the military strength of these two countries, and that he would place at our disposal all data he has on this subject” (*Ibid*, 811.2390F/8-2549: August 25 Hill to Acheson: 1613). This was the first unequivocal statement of Ibn Saud about aggregating U.S. and Saudi military capabilities to balance against the Hashemites. The King’s declaration raises a question of his intent: rebuild his military capabilities solely for defence or pursue his ambition of conquering territories that the British denied to him previously. That possibility and the chances that Ibn Saud could also engage in war with Israel weighed in U.S. deliberations about sending arms to Ibn Saud. One must remember that Ibn Saud’s external threat concerns were not only about his traditional rivalries with the Hashemites and the threat of a Greater Syria, but also about Jordan’s Abdullah making overtures to Israel for help in retaking the Hijaz.

The first steps by the U.S. Government to provide military assistance to Ibn Saud helped to assuage his doubts about alignment with the U.S. The importance of Saudi-U.S. mutual strategic and economic interests in the area also lessened the negative impact of Palestine on the alignment: “despite great dissatisfaction with policy regarding Palestine, he had been enough of a statesman to recognise that there was too great a community of interests between

the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to be deflected from his course of friendship with us by what he regarded as a merely temporary development” (*Ibid*: 890.F.00/9-2849: September 28 Childs memorandum of conversation: 1614).

Ibn Saud never strayed from his position that Britain’s sponsorship of the Hashemites worsened the threats to Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud distrusted Britain, especially after the latter gave up its mandate on Palestine. As the U.S regained favour with Ibn Saud, the King wanted the U.S. to exert its political influence on the British about the Hashemites. He wanted the U.S. to persuade the British to “cease [British] policy encirclement [of Saudi Arabia]” (*Ibid*, 811.2390F/1.1-1749: November 17 Childs telegram #668 to Acheson: 1619). According to the King, the British began a “Cold war against him by trying to put Syria under Hashemite jurisdiction and put pressure on Ruwali and Anaza tribes [blood relations of Ibn Saud] to sever those relations” (*Ibid*, 1618).

Ibn Saud further explained that in addition to agitating Ibn Saud’s traditional tribal friends, the British were inciting Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Shaikhdoms under British control in the Persian Gulf, Yemen included, into encircling Saudi Arabia and retaking the Hijaz. Despite British denials, Ibn Saud believed that the British controlled policies in those states and principalities. Ibn Saud referred to a recent note that he received from the British; it explained to him that that if aggression were committed against Jordan or Iraq, treaty obligations called for British assistance in those countries. For Ibn Saud, it implied that if those countries attacked Saudi Arabia, the British could do nothing about it (*Ibid*).

Maintaining the status quo was important to Ibn Saud. He also wanted the U.S. to notify Britain that the “U.S. Government will never approve any alteration of the present status of the Arab states; and that every state should maintain its boundaries and integrity as is” (*Ibid*, 1619). Furthermore, because of his lack of confidence in the U.N. after the Palestine

partition, Ibn Saud did not want the U.S. to defer to the U.N. for action if military conflict threatened Saudi territory. He wanted direct U.S. intervention.

It was in these contexts that Ibn Saud sought public declaration by the U.S. regarding specific actions that the U.S. would take to protect Saudi security¹⁵⁶ and territorial integrity. The U.S. responded that the O'Keefe report¹⁵⁷ on the survey of Saudi defence needs and implementation of its findings gave strong evidence of U.S. concern for Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. desire to insure Saudi territorial integrity and sovereignty. Despite amendments to the U.S. Military Defence Assistance Program (MDAP) of 1949 that Truman signed that made Saudi Arabia eligible to receive U.S. military aid, the U.S. failed to give prompt military aid to the Kingdom in 1949. This irritated the Saudis, dampened any favourable lease extension at Dhahran, and further agitated the Saudis about its contention that the U.S. favoured supporting Israel over Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁸ In 1950, despite the intensity of Saudi threat perceptions and emphasis on its lack of military power and security, the Kingdom had yet to receive the U.S. military assistance it had long requested.

1950: Intensity of Saudi threat perceptions and military security

In 1950, the most immediate problem in Saudi-U.S. relations continued to be the failure of the U.S. Government to send U.S. military aid to the Saudi Government, which added more difficulty to Saudi-U.S. lease negotiations on Dhahran. Long-term U.S. tenancy at Dhahran

¹⁵⁶ As British control and influence waned in the 1940s and 1950s, the Saudis felt alone in facing external threats from stronger powers. This led to them to emphasise defence and military security as their primary concerns (Safran 1988: 3) along with their traditional fears of internal disunity.

¹⁵⁷ The O'Keefe report was the result of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia from September 1 to October 22, 1949. U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Richard J. O'Keefe, Commander of Dhahran Airfield, was the chief of the survey group. The group surveyed security requirements and ways in which U.S. requirements at Dhahran could be correlated with Saudi Arabian military needs (*Ibid*, T11.5638GA/4-1S50 April 1) Top Secret Field Report with Final Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy, and Air Force General: undated).

¹⁵⁸ According to P.L. Hahn (2004a: 139-140) Saud feared Israel territorial expansion at Arab expense and the import of Communism to the region. Faisal complained about U.S. economic aid to Israel and pro-Israeli statements by members of Truman's Cabinet. John Miglietta pointed out that the U.S. did not want to be involved with Israel directly on supplying military weapons and equipment. However, he also pointed out accusations that the U.S. facilitated arms sales from countries such as France and Canada; and that others contended that the U.S. provided Israel with the funds for weapons purchases (Miglietta 2002: 121).

quid pro quo immediate U.S. military assistance for Saudi Arabia remained the most burning issue for the alignment to solve in 1950. In a series of meetings in 1950 between the U.S. Department of State and the Saudi Foreign Ministry, their respective officials focused mainly on issues of security and threat, which now included mutual apprehensions about the Soviets. Conferences between Ibn Saud and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff revealed Ibn Saud's greater concern about threats from Israel than threats from the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, aside from persistent Saudi concerns about the Hashemite threat and the new threat posed by Israel and the Soviets, internal problems plagued the Saudi government.

Dhahran quid pro quo U.S. military assistance

The U.S. needed the Dhahran base for U.S. national security reasons. For Saudi national security reasons, Saudi Arabia needed military aid from the U.S. Saudi Arabia would grant the lease extension provided the U.S. granted military aid to Saudi Arabia. The two issues were now inseparable. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Hare explained the *quid pro quo* posture from which the Saudis would not budge: "The Saudi Arabian Government, particularly Ibn Saud, has consistently informed us that the U.S. was welcome to use the strategic facilities of Saudi Arabia. It was essential that military assistance be provided if we wished to enjoy such facilities on a long-range and comprehensive basis" (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/2-1350: March 8 Hare to U.S. Secretary of Defense: 1130).

Childs recommended that the U.S. Government consider Ibn Saud's request for U.S. military aid, not in the context of U.S. concerns about aiding an Arab country that was in conflict with Israel, but to decide on the military aid issue in the context of U.S. strategic interests in the Kingdom: "I feel strongly we should approach question not from point of view of aid to an Arab country but aid for a country that is helping us out and is important to the U.S. strategically. Aid should be viewed not as aid to Arabs but as aid that seconds U.S.

interests (*Ibid*, 611.86A/2-150: February 1 Childs telegram #62 to Acheson: 1123). Sensing even more U.S. delays on military aid, Childs did not want to aggravate Ibn Saud further. Childs recommended that the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defence give a “concrete expression of intent” about the Military Assistance Program for Saudi Arabia: “offer as a token of intent 20,000 M1 rifles with 1,000 rounds ammunition per rifle; this is minimum which might placate SAG” (*Ibid*, 786A.5/2-1450: February 14 Childs telegram to the Secretary of State: 1127).

It was not only external threats that the Saudis faced; domestic internal problems plagued the Saudi state. Despite rising state income,¹⁵⁹ Saudi finances remained in shambles. The Saudi state was not in a favourable fiscal condition. Its economy could not ascend.

Saudi domestic internal threats

Crown Prince Saud admitted to the “deplorable state of the administration of finances” by the Finance Ministry (*Ibid*, 886A.10/2-1350: February 13 Childs telegram #78 to Acheson: 1124). For the first time, Ibn Saud himself disclosed that Saudi security depended on his “liberality to tribes and to necessity of expenditures by him outside Saudi Arabia to maintain Saudi influence” (*Ibid*, 1125). Ibn Saud overspent to maintain the loyalty of Saudi and other tribes, which placed severe pressure on the state’s coffers.

The U.S. became even more concerned about potential instability in Saudi Arabia and urgently sought ways to help the Saudis prevent that from happening and to save the alignment from breaking apart. To prevent the Saudi state from imploding, the U.S. Government recommended that Ibn Saud institute essential financial reforms, which Fuad Bey Hamza referred to as “reforms for which so many were crying in country” (*Ibid*).

¹⁵⁹ The first published budget of the realm showed estimated revenue of £21½ million for the year 1947-48 including £14 million from oil. The budget estimates for 1951 were for £49 million, including £18 million from oil, and £16 million from income tax. The total had risen to £100 million for 1952 (Philby 1955: 333).

According to Crown Prince Saud's private secretary Abdullah Effendi, there was a "gathering discontent" in the Kingdom because of its financial problems and absence of any steps towards financial reforms" (*Ibid*, 886A.10/6-2650: June 26 Childs dispatch #375 to Acheson: 1179).

In their theories of alliance formation, both Waltz and Walt did not include state domestic issues because their theories focused on the international structure and emphasised external factors. Schweller included internal state issues and considered them as important as external factors. Thus, using Schweller one can argue that, other than power shifts and external threats, domestic internal threat was also a vital element in the formation of the Saudi-U.S. alignment; the Saudis needed U.S. financial and economic assistance to stabilise the Saudi state and secure it from internal threats. To protect its strategic and economic interests in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Government needed a Saudi state that was financially and politically stable; it had little choice but to provide financial assistance and advice on financial reforms to the Saudi Government.

The U.S. realised the critical position that the notion of threats and Saudi security occupied in Ibn Saud's assessment of relations and alignment with the U.S. This led to a series of meetings at Jidda between representatives of the Saudi Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Department of State. The Saudi Foreign Ministry, represented by Prince Faisal, Abdullah Sulaiman, Yusuf Yasin, and Mohammed Effendi met at Jidda with Childs and Assistant Near East Affairs Secretary McGhee¹⁶⁰ on March 19, 1950. Details of this meeting provide the U.S. views in 1950 about U.S. foreign aid in the context of regional and global security threats to the U.S. and external threats to Saudi Arabia.

Threats to U.S. security and global security

¹⁶⁰ George C. McGhee served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from June 24, 1949 to December 19, 1951 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

In the context of Saudi problems and requests for foreign aid, especially military aid, McGhee explained that the U.S. had limits on its material capabilities. The Saudis based their arguments for prompt military aid on the notion of regional threat and limited Saudi financial resources. Threat and financial limitations were familiar concepts to the Saudis. Thus, McGhee probably used threat, although in the wider international context, and strains on U.S. financial resources to justify U.S. delays in resolving the military aid requested by the Saudi state: “The U.S. does not have unlimited wealth to support these obligations. The U.S. hopes that Ibn Saud and Saudi Arabia recognize that there are always limitations to what the U.S. can do (*Ibid*, 611.86A/3-1950: March 19 McGhee memorandum of conversation: 1133). McGhee explained next that U.S. military aid goes where there are probable or actual threats to U.S. and global security (*Ibid*, 1133-1134).

According to McGhee, the U.S. did not perceive that there was a Russian menace to Saudi Arabia.¹⁶¹ Russia was not a proximate threat to Saudi Arabia because the two states did not have common borders; and communism was not an internal problem in the Kingdom. However, the U.S. acknowledged the possibility of Russian threats to the Saudi state: “Saudi Arabia would be a very valuable target in a shooting war”, and that “Saudi Arabia would face the problems of its own defense” (*Ibid*).

¹⁶¹ Andre Kreutz (2007) explained that Russia and Saudi Arabia engaged in friendly relations in the early 1930s. Ibn Saud wanted to show Russia as an alternative to Anglo-American companies. The King appreciated Russia giving information to him about the secret Imperial treaties, specifically the Sykes-Picot agreement on the division of zones of influence (Kreutz 2007:125) and encouraged trade between the two states. Kreutz also pointed out that the Soviets backed away from the Middle East for two decades and did not restart an active role in the Arab world until the mid-1950s (*Ibid*). The Soviets doubted the political usefulness of Soviet-Arab relations because there was no ideological or strategic content (*Ibid*). Adam Ulam (1968) emphasised that after World War II, the Soviets did not pose a serious military threat to the West because of Russia’s substantial post-war military demobilisation and cautious expansionism (Ulam 1968: 2:313). Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (1997) argued that Soviet policy in the Middle East for almost a decade was largely nonassertive. In one important regard, it paralleled American policy. The Soviet Union not only supported the creation of the state of Israel, it was amenable to the sale of Czechoslovakian arms to Israeli forces fighting their war of independence (Sayigh and Shlaim 1997: 216-217).

Chapter 2 of this project explained that neo-realist and post-classical realist alliance theories differ on the significance of possibility and probability. Neo-realism holds that the possibility of conflict leads to alliance; post-classical realism argues for the probability of conflict. The same notions are applicable to McGhee's explanation. The possibility of Russian threat to Saudi Arabia was not enough of a compelling reason for the U.S. to give aid to the Saudis. Probability, not possibility, was more important for the U.S. McGhee used the example of massive U.S. aid to Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey. The U.S. perceived that the level of threat and probability of conflict posed by the Russians in those areas were higher than those in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Schweller's theory would argue that since the probability of conflict with the Hashemites was low, there was no urgency for the U.S. to send military aid despite Ibn Saud's insistence on prompt U.S. military aid for the Kingdom.

The U.S. acknowledged the apprehension of Saudi Arabia with respect to her neighbors, the Hashemite Kingdoms (*Ibid*). However, the U.S. continued to downplay the proximate threat perceived by Ibn Saud: "There appears to be little basis for a community of interest in action on the part of the Hashemite countries. Because of special treaty arrangements [by the British with the Hashemites], the British are fully capable of restraining any aggression on the part of either of the two countries. The British have assured us that they desire to prevent aggressive action and share the U.S. interest that Saudi Arabia not be menaced and be permitted to maintain its independence and integrity (*Ibid*, 1135). Despite the absence of a Russian threat¹⁶² to the Kingdom and an unlikely threat from the Hashemites, the U.S. "fully understood that Saudi Arabia is entitled to a security force" (*Ibid*). According to McGhee, the U.S. concluded that the "only ultimate security any nation has is in its internal political

¹⁶² M.J. Steiner argued that, "As a result of Russian high military and political pressure, she gained vital oil concessions in Northern Iran and revoked her treaty with Turkey with a view of securing an outlet through the Dardanelles to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. In Syria and Palestine, too, the Soviet Union made several diplomatic moves, even renewing contact with the Greek-orthodox missions established there by Tsarist Russia. The hitherto "atheistic" regime takes pains to emphasize the fact that Russia with its thirty million Moslem citizens is a "Moslem" power (Steiner 1947: xiii).

and economic strength” (*Ibid*). However, the Saudis did not have that strength; it resulted in concerns in the U.S. Government about the stability and durability of relations and the alignment.

Financial and economic crises and their effect on Saudi internal political security drove the Kingdom to seek U.S. help in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Ibn Saud’s urgent requests for U.S. military aid came soon after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Ibn Saud believed that he could get the military aid by sharpening his use of the notion of threats to the Kingdom. He did that by combining his fears about the Hashemites, Israel, Russian communism, and internal domestic instability into a single argument in order to underscore the critical Saudi need for all forms of foreign aid,¹⁶³ especially military aid.

Amir Faisal on threats to Saudi security

Amir Faisal reiterated Saudi concerns about its security and defence: “internal stability, complete security from any aggression or menace from a neighboring country, and a menace that is menacing the whole world” (*Ibid*, 1137). He explained how Saudi internal stability and security, and the need for financial assistance, differed from other those of other states.

Saudi Arabian methods of preserving security differ from schemes used in the U.S. or Europe or in any foreign nation. The police force is not the prime factor for safety, peace, or internal stability in Saudi Arabia. It is the result of the wise system of governance by Ibn Saud. The King gives money to those who are hungry and would threaten internal stability. He spends money on tribes and areas so that they keep quiet and not menace the security of the country. Saudi Arabian Government income is not enough to feed its people, build a strong army, do government projects such as the improvement and modernization of transportation and communications (*Ibid*, 1137-1138).

¹⁶³ Opportunity for gain, especially during peacetime, is a vital argument in Schweller’s alliance theory. There were other significant opportunities for economic gain for the Saudi state through friendly relations and alignment with the U.S. The U.S. prepared to send American technicians on a direct grant basis to help in Saudi economic development projects such as ground water exploitation, improvement of agricultural methods, improvement of transportation, and technical assistance in various fields such as finance and administration. The U.S. Government also resurrected the proposal a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation that the Saudis turned down previously (*Ibid*, 611.86A/3-1950: March 19 McGhee memorandum of conversation: 1140). The ‘gain’ concept rests on benefitting from security and other values brought by alliance or alignment. The definition of gain is “a surplus of benefits over costs” (Snyder 1992 in Rothstein, et al 1992: 90). The primary benefit is security; the primary cost is reduced freedom of action (*Ibid*).

In the context of external threats from the Hashemites, Amir Faisal emphasised that Saudi Arabia could have taken care of its problems with neighbouring states; however, Saudi Arabia felt more threatened now because of British intervention. He explained that, although Britain might not intend to threaten Saudi Arabia, the threat came indirectly through British provision of armaments and military education and training for neighbouring states. The Saudis sought to balance against the threat by getting similar military assistance from the U.S. In Amir Faisal's view, Saudi Arabia should not have to wait until the last minute to defend against threats to its security. In other words, the mere possibility of threat, rather than probability, was the basis of the Saudi position (*Ibid*, 1139). Given this view, the mere possibility of threat and conflict, an important view in Walt, motivated the Saudis to form and maintain relations and alignment with the U.S. Furthermore, because of Saudi alignment with the U.S., the Saudis expected to receive prompt U.S. financial and military assistance because they relied on U.S. verbal assurances of protecting Saudi territory and sovereignty.

Faisal argued further that Saudi anxieties about a shift in the British attitude towards the Saudi state steered the Kingdom away from Britain and into closer relations with the U.S. Faisal contended that, despite friendly Saudi-British relations, the U.S. should help Saudi Arabia since there was now closer alignment of U.S. and Saudi interests. However, "maintaining friendly relations with the British does not prevent Saudi Arabia from looking out for its security and preparing its defenses" (*Ibid*).

The unresolved issue of U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia resulted in another meeting on March 23, 1950 in Riyadh among Ibn Saud, Amir Saud, Shaikh Yasin, Fuad Hamza, Childs, and McGhee.

U.S. Department of State meets Ibn Saud at Riyadh

Ibn Saud continued to press for U.S. military aid in the context of Hashemite military capabilities provided by the British:¹⁶⁴ “Hashemite military power was entirely derived from British support, without which they would represent no threat. Saudi Arabia had no such outside support. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia had every right to expect the U.S. to approach Saudi security needs and requirements with sympathy (*Ibid*, 611.86A/3-2350: March 23 Childs memorandum of conversation: 1147).

Hamza said that Ibn Saud needed a treaty of alliance with the U.S. to assure Saudi security and U.S friendship, but also assure that U.S. support would flow from its vital interests in Saudi oil (*Ibid*, 1149). Yasin specified that what Ibn Saud “really desired were [military] arms and a military alliance” (*Ibid*, 1151). At subsequent meetings with Ibn Saud and Crown Prince Saud, McGhee repeated the U.S. alternatives to a military alliance treaty, which “serve in effect the practical purposes of a treaty of alliance” (*Ibid*, 1150). The alternatives included the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation that symbolises the closeness of relations; U.S. technicians for Saudi Arabia through the Point IV program; financial loans such as the Export-Import Bank loan under discussion; and a long-term Dhahran agreement including military aid composed of military arms and a U.S. training mission to Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud seemed satisfied with these alternatives (*Ibid*, 1153).

Analysing the McGhee meetings

The meetings anchored by McGhee in Washington and Riyadh showed that in U.S. foreign relations and policy, the U.S. Government had to act in two anarchic structures: the global

¹⁶⁴ According to Ottaway (2009:1), the King’s primary concern was not the one haunting Washington at the time: communist expansion. Ibn Saud feared an imminent attack by the forces of the Hashemite royal families ruling in Jordan and Iraq. Ibn Saud wanted a formal military alliance with the U.S. to obtain arms urgently on a grant basis so he could deal with the Hashemite threat. The British had offered such an alliance, but Ibn Saud did not trust them because they were the main backers of his Hashemite enemies (*Ibid*). However, Ottaway explained only one part of the Saudi rationale. There was the additional threat posed by Israel. There was also the need to secure Saudi oil facilities.

structure and a regional structure. The Saudis acted mostly at the regional level. Specific to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. perceived that Saudi concerns were less urgent from the U.S. global, as well as the U.S. regional perspective. The McGhee meetings showed that the U.S. emphasised global shifts in power and larger regional threats. Saudi Arabia focused on local Arab threats and power shifts. Weakness in their alignment resulted from this basic difference.¹⁶⁵

It is noteworthy that McGhee did not focus his attention on U.S. interests in Saudi oil and Dhahran. These were critical components of relations and alignment. It is understandable that McGhee skirted the Palestine-Israel issue because it aroused Saudi anger; and the U.S. could not satisfactorily explain to the Saudis the closeness of Israel-U.S. relations, given that Saudi Arabia viewed Israel as an enemy. Perhaps it was deliberate on McGhee's part to avoid talking about Dhahran, oil, and Israel in order not to lose the impact of his argument about U.S. priority on global security and limitations on U.S. Government resources.

As far as formal alliance, the U.S. continued to avoid that commitment. The danger of formal alliance with the Saudis was two-fold. U.S. options would be severely limited in the event of war between Saudi Arabia and Israel or war between the Saudis and the Hashemites. Given its support for Israel and traditional Anglo-American friendship, the U.S. did not want the potential entanglement or entrapment inherent in formal alliance with the Saudis.

A series of conferences in April 1950 between the U.S. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Joseph Collins¹⁶⁶ and Ibn Saud reflected more U.S. sensitivity to and understanding of Ibn Saud's anxieties about threats to Saudi Arabia.

Collins conferences with Ibn Saud at Riyadh

¹⁶⁵ Glenn Snyder's theory would explain this as a conflict in the nature of interests between two allies. The U.S. had broader strategic interests in global shifts in power and larger regional threats. Saudi Arabia had narrower particular interests in the Arab balance of power and local threats.

¹⁶⁶ General Collins served as U.S. Army Deputy Chief and Vice Chief of Staff from 1947-1949, and as Chief of Staff from 1949-1953.

Collins believed that Ibn Saud was “more concerned about possible warfare resulting from some subsequent expansion of Israel than any threat from Russia”¹⁶⁷ (*Ibid*, 786A.5MAP/4-350: April 3 Collins telegram #194 to Haislip and 786A.5/4-1950 April 19 Collins excerpt to Gray: 1158). Collins also reported that Ibn Saud and his advisors were “cognizant of how serious such a threat would be, not only to Saudi Arabia but to the Moslem World, and that the Arabs would fight to the limit of their ability if threatened by Russia”¹⁶⁸ (*Ibid*). Collins shared U.S. Government views with Ibn Saud about probable Soviet attacks in the Middle East in the event of another World War and perspectives on Saudi Arabia’s strategic location and oil resources in that war scenario. The Cairo-Suez area was the frontline; Saudi Arabia was not. In Collins’ judgment, the U.S. Government would not depend on Saudi oil; however, both the Western powers and Russia would deny Middle East oil to each other (*Ibid*, 1165).

In the context of Saudi concerns about delays in U.S. military aid and the negotiations on Dhahran, Collins’ tactic of disclosing sensitive Cold War information probably sought to deflate the importance of Saudi oil to the U.S. and the West. In any negotiations, that might

¹⁶⁷ The Middle East is a tri-continental passageway where control of specific locations means the ability to access and control inter-regional trade routes and defend against potential military threats (Murray and Viotti 1994: 487). Russia was always interested in the Eastern Mediterranean and its Arab states for geopolitical, economic, and cultural reasons (Kreutz 2007: 11). Russia’s history of military power created a perception of threat (*Ibid*, 228-229) to the region. Towards the end of World War II, the Soviets exerted undue pressure on Iran and Turkey. In Iran, the Soviet Union represented a direct military threat and an indirect threat through subversion and exploitation of Iran’s social and political weaknesses (Amirahmadi 1993: 43; Sayigh and Shlaim 1997: 216-217).

¹⁶⁸ FRUS and secondary sources do not explain the statement by Collins. The student believes that this referred to several issues. Israel captured Arab territory in the 1948 war; the Saudis now wanted U.S. military arms and aid to balance against further Israeli threat or another war with Israel. Ibn Saud could not contribute significant military resources to the Arab side in the 1948 war. Surely, that weighed heavily on his prestige and pride since the Hashemites used their military capabilities in the war. If Ibn Saud could get the U.S. military arms and aid he asked for, it would show the strength of U.S. commitment to an Arab state vis-à-vis Israel. Then, should Russia threaten the Arab world militarily, it would be less difficult for Ibn Saud to convince the Arab states to aggregate their military and other material capabilities against the Russians.

serve to lessen the ability of the Saudis to ‘blackmail’ the U.S. about the critical importance of Saudi oil to U.S. interests and national security.¹⁶⁹

Collins also explained to the Saudis the need for a bi-lateral treaty upon finalising U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia. Collins carefully pointed out that the treaty under the MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program)¹⁷⁰ “would not be a military or political alliance but would simply stipulate the extent of the aid program and the method of financing it” (*Ibid*, 786A.5MAP/4-350: April 3 Collins telegram #194 to Haislip: 1160). However, despite the MDAP, Saudi Arabia had yet to receive U.S. military aid. Pressure on the alignment continued as the Saudis still had not received U.S. military aid.¹⁷¹

U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia remained unresolved

Hill, the Chargé d'affaires at Jidda characterised U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia as “practically the keystone of our present relations with Saudi Arabia and is vitally connected to future negotiations about a long term Dhahran Air Field agreement” (*Ibid*, 786A.00/9-350: September 3 Hill telegram #127 to Acheson: 1185). According to Hill, the King and Yasin complained that the “U.S. was only interested in protecting the Dhahran Airfield and Saudi Arabian oil wells” (*Ibid*). Furthermore, the same old explanations given by the U.S. regarding delays in U.S. aid “were considered as delaying tactics and double talk” (*Ibid*,

¹⁶⁹ There is no evidence in FRUS or secondary sources that Collins’ scenario affected the Saudis. The Saudis used its oil power during the October 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, the June 1967 Six Day War, and the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Saudi-led 1973 oil embargo and resulting oil price hikes nearly brought the U.S. and its allies to their economic knees.

¹⁷⁰ In July 1950, Truman signed into law the amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program Act of 1949, which enabled Truman to “transfer military equipment, materials, or services, at no cost to the U.S., to other countries whose defense was important to the security of the United States” (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1950 editorial note: 1182). The amended section of the act authorized transfers to a country not eligible to join with the U.S. in a collective defense and regional arrangement; but whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it was a part was considered important to the security of the U.S. (*Ibid*).

¹⁷¹ On May 25, 1950 the U.S., Britain, and France issued the Tripartite Declaration, which called for “formal assurances from Middle East nations receiving Western military equipment that it would not be used against other states in the area” (Freiberger 1992: 21). The Western powers did not consult with the Arabs or Israelis. The initiative failed to change Western arms policies in the Middle East. Britain sold weapons to the Arabs; the U.S. refused to sell to Israel. The Arabs were angered that they could not buy U.S. weaponry (*Ibid*).

1186). To worsen matters, Ibn Saud felt that ARAMCO was no longer cooperating fully with him.

Hare¹⁷², the new U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia reported the Saudis' belief that they were entitled to U.S. grant aid, not the cash-reimbursable basis of military arms and materiale. Saudi friendship and alignment with the U.S. "entitles them to treatment comparable to that we have accorded countries such as Iran, in which we have a close interest; Saudis gave us Dhahran Air Base rights without demanding compensation and a gesture of comparable liberality on our part would be in order" (*Ibid*, 786A.5/11-450: November 4 Hare telegram #270 to Acheson: 1191). Hare, suggested that the U.S. Department of State find "counterbalancing factors and present matters in such a way to make it appear that Saudi Arabia made a good bargain" on U.S. military assistance *quid pro quo* Dhahran (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/12-2450: December 24 Hare telegram #400 to Acheson: 1197).

In 1950, the future of Saudi alignment with the U.S. depended on Ibn Saud's perspective that the survival and long-term military security¹⁷³ of the Saudi state depended on receiving U.S. military arms¹⁷⁴ and aid he needed urgently. Likewise, the U.S. Government and Saudi Governments understood clearly the mutual importance of Dhahran for their relations and alignment. For the U.S., Dhahran and Saudi territory were important strategic military locations for defence and offence against any military threats from Russia or China. Although Collins discounted the use of Saudi oil in any future war, U.S. military operations at Dhahran offered security for Saudi oil fields and, at a minimum, symbolised U.S.

¹⁷² Raymond A. Hare served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia from September 20, 1950 to July 8, 1953.

¹⁷³ What counts for security is not power as such but how power translates into military capabilities (Glaser 1994 cited Carlsnaes, et al 2002: 372).

¹⁷⁴ From 1950 to 1990, the U.S. Government agreed to transfer or sell to Saudi Arabia \$8.34 billion in weapons and ammunition, \$8.541 billion in military support equipment, and \$4.578 billion in spare parts and modifications. In addition, the U.S. transferred or sold \$15.835 billion in support services and \$16.486 billion in construction (Cordesman 1993: 114).

protection of the Saudi state against any external threats from the Hashemites or any other aggressive states in the region.

In 1951, there was a new complication in the Dhahran lease negotiations. Ibn Saud shifted his attention to the sovereignty problem that was inherent in a U.S. military presence at Dhahran. The sovereignty of the Saudi state was a deep-seated concern for Ibn Saud. The King did not tolerate anything that hinted at the surrender of all or part of Saudi sovereignty. For the Saudis, Dhahran might project the image of loss of Saudi sovereignty. Ibn Saud rejected the draft agreement on Dhahran and the preliminary U.S. military aid that came with it.

1951: Hurdles to Saudi-U.S. negotiations

Saudi sovereignty at Dhahran

Ibn Saud asked the U.S. for patience because “he had to be careful about the domestic reaction by the uneducated and foreign reaction by certain Arab ill-wishers” (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1951: 711.56386A/1-351: January 3 Hare telegram #152 to Acheson: 1017). In 1948, Ibn Saud lamented that, “my enemies are saying I have given Saudi Arabia over to the Americans. My enemies in Islamic countries spread rumors I have even permitted Americans occupy holy places (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1948: 890F.7962/4-2448: April 24 Childs telegram #224 to Marshall: 236-237). Yasin explained that loss of sovereignty and the absence of formal alliance treaty were also sensitive concerns of Ibn Saud.

King did not desire to do anything adversely affect sovereignty. His people were ignorant and he did not want give them reason turn against either himself or Americans. U.S. ready give Saudi Arabia procurement military assistance does not mean Saudi Arabia prepared conclude agreement re Dhahran. There was difference between war and peacetime. American group said it was unable discuss security Saudi Arabia from external attack; therefore, Saudi Arabia unable discuss except in terms of time of peace. U.S. getting wartime rights in peacetime without treaty to cover situation. Saudi Government not impressed by arguments re necessity in order get appropriations from

Congress. Military jurisdiction also important point of contention. Guards must be Saudi. Desired avoid any U.S. military appearance at Dhahran (*op cit*, 1017).

Ibn Saud took the counsel of the majority of his ministers and advisors and used a very hard negotiating approach to Dhahran. Legitimising the Saudi state internally and externally and his rule in the Arab and Islamic contexts¹⁷⁵ remained a compelling concern for Ibn Saud. He agonised over the image of Saudi Arabia to the Arab world, especially to his enemies that the Saudi state had become an American colony. By the early 1950s, Ibn Saud already had the political power and influence in the Arab world to justify having foreign military forces in Saudi territory for reasons of Saudi security and survival. He could defuse domestic civil and religious opposition when he wanted to. Instead, he used it as a subterfuge¹⁷⁶ for extracting the military and other aid that he sought from the U.S.

Typical of the Saudi approach, Ibn Saud and his advisers added other reasons for Ibn Saud's reversal on his decision about the Dhahran lease for the U.S.

Other reasons for Ibn Saud's reversal on Dhahran

There was public political pressure, especially from Egyptian papers *Al-Ahmal* and *Al-Misr*, which were "critical of negotiations" (*Ibid*, 1020). The Saudis were leery of entanglement in agreements that created difficulties similar to what the British did in Iraq and Egypt on comparable matters. The Saudis wanted to imitate Iran's stubbornness with the Americans. The Saudis pointed out that despite "Iranian intransigence" the U.S. gave Iran

¹⁷⁵ Madawi Al-Rasheed (2007) argued this point extensively.

¹⁷⁶ Recall that In 1942, in the face of political and religious ideological pressures from conservative Wahhabis about the presence of foreign military forces in Saudi territory, Ibn Saud readily responded to his critics that he was using American military aid and resources to defend Saudi territory (90F.6363/44: September 14 Moose telegram to Hull: 585). Certainly, the political and religious pressures were real during these years. However, Ibn Saud was clever enough to use them, and the sovereignty issue, when it suited his need to gain advantage over the Americans in negotiations at Dhahran. By adding to his argument that he could not renew the Dhahran lease or offer only a short-term extension because of political and religious opposition and sovereignty issues, Ibn Saud eventually got the Americans to give in to his requests for U.S. military arms and aid.

\$25 million in additional aid: “if such tactics worked in Iran, why not Saudi Arabia” (*Ibid*, 1021).

There were internal disagreements and internal political pressure in the Kingdom. Abdullah Suleiman¹⁷⁷ criticised the “short-sightedness of those who did not understand the desirability of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia” and the “harmful advice being given King by ‘foreign boarders’ at court who are more interested promoting self-interests than those of Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/1-1251 January 12 Hare telegram to Acheson: 1021). Suleiman did not believe there would be seriously adverse domestic reaction to the agreement; he offered to help the U.S. get a more realistic approach from Ibn Saud. If Suleiman was unsuccessful, Hare suggested to Acheson that “may have to resort to stronger tactics to jolt Saudis into recognition of facts of life” (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/1-1651: January 16 Hare telegram to Acheson: 1024).

U.S. support for Israel¹⁷⁸ was another hurdle for Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud realised that the U.S. had “reasons for friendship with Israel and that he cannot hope to change that situation; however, he feels that U.S interests in Saudi Arabia¹⁷⁹ are greater than in Israel and that he expects at least equal treatment” (United States Department of State FRUS, 1951: 611.86A/2-551: February 5 Policy Statement¹⁸⁰ on Saudi Arabia: 1029).

¹⁷⁷ Except for Suleiman, most of the men who became members of Ibn Saud’s administration were not of Saudi descent. Abdullah Suleiman became Minister of Finance in 1929. He was a Najdi by birth, a trained accountant, and a close friend of Ibn Saud. He seemed to enjoy the complete confidence of the King. He was the only member of the Saudi administration who regularly acted on his own initiative and authority, convinced that his acts would meet with the King’s approval (Miller 1980: 19, 129).

¹⁷⁸ Except for 1948 and 1951, Israel received more economic aid from the U.S. Government than did all Arab states combined until 1955 when Arabs collectively received slightly more help than Israel. Not until 1959 did Arabs receive substantially more aid than Israel (Ellis 1960: 96). From 1948-1959, Israel received \$614.3 million and Arabs as a group received \$386.48 million (*Ibid*).

¹⁷⁹ P.L. Hahn pointed out that Saudi-U.S. economic and security ties healed the breach in Saudi-U.S. relations, especially when the U.S. Government cleared the way for Ibn Saud to receive U.S. military aid (Hahn: 2004a: 139-140).

¹⁸⁰ The 1951 U.S. Department of State Policy Statement on Saudi Arabia provides insights into the formation and maintenance of Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment. It expresses U.S views on Saudi-U.S. relations and declares U.S. objectives and policies towards the Kingdom (*Ibid*, 611.86A/2-551: February 5 U.S. Department of State policy statement on Saudi Arabia: 1027-1042).

The maintenance and durability of the alignment was in Ibn Saud's hands. He questioned the efficacy of the alignment. U.S. uncertainty¹⁸¹ and hesitance in granting military aid to Saudi Arabia gnawed at him. U.S. military aid was a critical need for the long-term security and survival of the Kingdom. He saw how the U.S. gave prompt and substantial U.S. aid to Iran, which added to his perception that the U.S. considered Iran more important than Saudi Arabia. If so, Iran was yet another political and military threat to the Saudi state.

Despite the hurdles, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. achieved a breakthrough in terms of the military arms and related aid that Ibn Saud wanted for rebuilding his armed forces. The Saudis and Americans finally reached an agreement on Dhahran and U.S. military aid.

MDAP treaty

It was through a June 18, 1951 treaty called the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. It established Saudi rights to obtain military arms, equipment, and training from the U.S. for self-defence purposes (United Nations Treaties, 1952: 1906). It was not a mutual defence pact.¹⁸² The agreement does not speak of the U.S. defending Saudi Arabia against aggression. It does not speak of Saudi Arabia being required to defend U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis still had only verbal assurances from the U.S. on defending Saudi Arabia militarily.

For the moment, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a renewed optimism about relations and greater confidence in the alignment. Four years after the Saudis first initiated discussions about military assistance and aid, the *quid pro quo* negotiations succeeded in bringing about expanded U.S. military and financial aid to the Kingdom and, the benefit to the U.S. of a Dhahran lease extension to 1956 that did not impinge on Saudi sovereignty. The *quid pro*

¹⁸¹ David Long argued that ambivalence placed "constraints on the degree of cooperation between the two states, which undermined their mutual political, economic, and military security needs" (Long 1983: 35).

¹⁸² Saudi Arabia has long played a critical role in supporting Western power projection, when this has been necessary to meet threats from nations like Iran and Iraq. Although Saudi Arabia does not have a formal status of forces agreement with the US, it has long maintained close military ties (Cordesman 1993: 190).

quo at Dhahran set a precedent that future Saudi Kings employed in relations with the U.S.

The linkage of U.S. rights at Dhahran and Saudi military security¹⁸³ reflected Ibn Saud's growing expectations for the U.S. to treat Saudi Arabia as a friend and an equal partner.

Despite being a weak power, Ibn Saud sought more symmetry in the alignment.

In 1952, grant aid¹⁸⁴ to Saudi Arabia became the next factor that added to the strength and durability of the alignment. Economic advantage represents a significant opportunity for gain in Schweller's alliance theory. Thus, economic grant aid is an important element in understanding Saudi and U.S. motivations for alignment.

1952: U.S grant aid to strengthen the alignment

In 1950, Eddy, who by then was a consultant to ARAMCO, explained that the Saudis knew that the U.S. gave millions of dollars in economic grant aid to other countries.

According to Eddy, as a matter of pride the Saudis did not ask for grant aid. However, they felt that they deserved grant aid because of their "vulnerability to Russian designs and extent of American investment" in Saudi Arabia (United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. The Near East: Multilateral Relations: 886A.00/10-5-50: October 5 Awalt memorandum of conversation: 101). Eddy suggested that a token grant would give the Saudis a "feeling of partnership with us and our allies, which would bolster their pride and create a feeling of goodwill far more valuable than the sum involved" (*Ibid*).

¹⁸³ Neuman (1998) emphasised that Saudi Arabia, unable to defend itself, needed the help of foreign forces but not any foreign military buildup in Saudi territory (Neuman 1998: 95). One often encounters the description of the alignment as a military security alliance that exists "over the horizon".

¹⁸⁴ Grant aid is free economic or military aid. The U.S. used primarily economic grant aid for newly independent states with non-Communist governments or states that faced grave internal political and administrative problems. It also used grant aid in financially weak and under-developed states that are exposed to Communist pressures (United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. The Near East: Multilateral Relations: 890.00 TA/G-750: June 7 McGhee memorandum to the Secretary of State: 169).

The Dhahran agreement provided Saudi Arabia with U.S. military training and cash reimbursable military assistance for arms purchases under the MDAP. The U.S. Department of State recommended U.S. military grant aid to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Security Act (MSA).¹⁸⁵ Following Eddy's rationale in October 1950, sending military grant aid to the Kingdom was for political considerations and demonstration of good faith towards Saudi Arabia (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952: 786A.5 MSP/4-1652: April 16 Acheson to Lovett: 2413). The U.S. Department of Defence noted that, "from a military point of view, grant aid to Saudi Arabia and certain other Middle East countries is not justified. However, Saudi Arabia holds a unique position among the Arab States because of the existence of a U.S. air base in Dhahran and oil resources which may be required in war" (*Ibid*, 786A.5 MSP/6-1352: June 13 Foster to Acheson: 2416). Foster also noted that "eligibility for grant military aid should not be construed as implying a requirement to commit U.S. military forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia or the Middle East" (*Ibid*). Similar to deliberations in prior years about U.S. financial-economic aid and military aid to Saudi Arabia, 1952 was no different. Grant aid became another hurdle and pressure point for the alignment.

The Saudis hoped that through "MAAG (U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group) negotiations the U.S. would offer grant aid; failure to offer it tended to cloud the negotiating atmosphere" (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/8-452: August 4 Hare telegram #83 to Acheson: 2418).

The U.S. Mutual Security Agency (MSA) did not see any reason to give grant aid to Saudi Arabia. According to the MSA, Saudi Arabia had plenty of money and there was no Middle

¹⁸⁵ Lynne Zusman and Neil Helfand explain that from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy makers, the vulnerability of war-torn nations in the European continent and the less-developed nations of Asia, Africa, and South America to the threat of communist influence and aggression posed a direct threat to U.S. national security and the rest of the free world. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was the U.S. response to this security threat. "The ideological purpose of this act was the defense of democracy in the continual struggle against communism. The means for defense was by strengthening and developing the military and economic structure of nations opposed to communism. The goal was to make them viable partners in building an effective 'collective security' against communism. Such self-sustaining countries could contribute to the common defense of the free world, including the defense of the U.S." (Zusman and Helfand 2004: pars. 1-3).

East defence program (*Ibid*, 86A.5 MSP/9-1952: September 19 Sturgill memorandum of conversation: 2422). Hare argued that in addition to “implied commitments to give grant aid to Saudi Arabia”, the “U.S. Air Force wants additional rights at Dhahran. The success of negotiations for these rights is not foreseeable without grant aid” (*Ibid*, 2423).

The year ended with no resolution to the grant aid issue. It had not yet affected MAAG negotiations. The Saudis were busy implementing the cash-reimbursable program for U.S. military assistance. Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment were calm but fragile. The only possible disturbance to the alignment and relations arose from U.S. Government concerns about Saudi discrimination against American Jews trying to enter the Kingdom for business and trade purposes. Current attitudes towards Jews were exacerbated by the Palestine issue and paralleled Saudi attitudes toward communists, “both regarded as potentially dangerous from standpoint security” (*Ibid*, 611.86A/12-1052: December 10 Hare telegram #445 to Acheson: 2430), clear threats from the Saudi perspective.

Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1947-1952

Alignment as a balance of power response

Using Waltz’ argument, regional and global power continued to shift. British power in the region waned and U.S. power gradually replaced that of the British. Ibn Saud acted on his perceptions of the unbalanced distribution of power between the Hashemites and the Saudis. Ibn Saud sought to equalize the balance of power in the regional or Arab structure or to tilt it in his favour. Ibn Saud’s focus on securing U.S. military aid represented his efforts to balance power by having material capabilities equal to those of the Hashemites or even superior to them. Other than the Soviets, there were no other Great Powers with whom to align; however, for religious and ideological reasons, Ibn Saud did not align with the Soviets. He had no other choice but to stay aligned with the U.S. The U.S. objective was regional security and stability because of the disturbances caused by the Palestine problem, the

creation of the Jewish state, and the expected attempt by the Soviets to extend its power and influence to the region.

Alignment as a balance of threat response

Using elements from Walt's balance of threat theory, the Hashemite states were proximate threats to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continued to view external threats to its security and survival not only from Hashemite military capabilities, but also from the Hashemites' aggregated power with the British. In Ibn Saud's perception, they also displayed aggressive intentions because of the Greater Syria consolidation proposed by Abdullah of Transjordan and reports of Abdullah wooing Israel's help to retake the Hijaz from Ibn Saud. The 1948 Arab-Israel War showed the threat to Arab territory posed by Israel; and there was the threat of Soviet entry into the region. Using Walt's theory broadly, the request by Iraq and Jordan for Saudi Arabia to cancel oil concessions to the U.S. and to break off the Saudi alignment with the U.S. implied an aggressive intent towards both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia did not consider being in the Arab League¹⁸⁶ with Iraq and Jordan, and being ideologically aligned with them on the Palestine-Israel issue, to be a strong enough reasons for Saudi Arabia to break relations or de-align with the U.S.

The explanatory power of Walt's theory about external threat shows clearly in the context of Ibn Saud's deep concern about threat to the Saudi state and military security as his overriding motives for alignment with the U.S. Ibn Saud's objective was protection of the Saudi state from various external threats. To do this, he wanted to get U.S. arms and military aid in order to rebuild his armed forces for defence. This effort to balance against an external threat by rebuilding his military capabilities was an internal balancing move.

¹⁸⁶ The political impotence and irrelevance of the Arab League paved the way for a "more militant, mass-based radical Pan-Arab ideology beginning in the mid-1950s" (Cohen and Kolinsky 1998: 90). However, an "intricate system of inter-Arab checks and balances" that developed from 1946 to 1956, and the "failure of Arab states to develop inter-locking economic interests heavily inhibited implementation of the Pan-Arabist revisionist vision" (*Ibid*).

In Walt's study of alliances, foreign aid did not cause alliance to form; foreign aid resulted from alliance. Walt's conclusion about foreign aid is correct if one argues that there was already alignment between the U.S. and Saudi states in 1950 and prior years. Building on Walt's conclusion about the role of foreign aid, U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia not only resulted from the alignment, it was a vital factor in maintaining the alignment. From the Saudi view, the failure of the U.S. to give prompt military aid weakened the alignment and could possibly leave it with no other option but to de-align with the U.S and to seek military arms and aid from the British, the French, or maybe even the Soviets. That would pose a significant threat to U.S. interests and its position in the Kingdom and the region. For the U.S., if the alignment ended it meant the loss of Dhahran and, perhaps, loss of access to and control of Saudi oil development.

Thus, getting U.S. foreign aid remained a strong motive for Saudi Arabia to align with the U.S. It was a compelling factor for Saudi Arabia to continue alignment with the U.S. donor state. Without U.S. aid, the Saudis believed they could not stabilise and secure the Saudi state against any external threats or protect Saudi territory, oil fields, and pipelines. Saudi Arabia always contended that it did not have the economic, military, or political strength to deal with threats on its own, thus needing the alignment and support of a great power: the U.S.

Alignment as a balance of interest/ opportunity for gain response

Using Schweller's argument, Ibn Saud wanted absolute gain for the Saudi state: from little or no military capabilities to at least equal if not superior military power vis-à-vis the Hashemites. Using Schweller's theory, the level and extent of any U.S. action to help and defend Saudi Arabia depended on the level and extent of internal and external threats to the Saudi oil fields and the Al-Saud rule.

The Saudis were status quo in the context of wanting the alignment with the U.S. to continue because U.S. foreign aid gave Saudi Arabia the financial-economic resources to help it deal with internal domestic threats. The Saudis wanted to continue receiving U.S. foreign aid, a value already possessed. Similarly, the U.S. wanted to remain aligned with Saudi Arabia to preserve values already possessed: U.S. and Western access to Saudi oil and Dhahran. However, in its rivalry with Britain for Saudi Arabia, the U.S. wanted to tip the balance of power towards the U.S. and away from Britain. In this context, the U.S. was a revisionist state.

The explanatory power of Schweller's argument about opportunity for gain and protection of values possessed shows in the context of U.S. tenacity in getting a long-term lease at Dhahran. The specific interest of the U.S. in 1949 was to gain a longer-term Dhahran lease. It wanted to have access to Dhahran for as long as it could because Dhahran was a vital tool to protect economic and strategic U.S. self-interests in Saudi Arabia: a forward military base in Saudi territory and the gateway to Saudi oil fields and resources. Dhahran was a value the U.S. possessed and needed to retain. If the U.S. lost Dhahran, it meant the loss of access to and control of Saudi oil and the use of the Kingdom's strategic military location.

Using Schweller's bandwagon argument means that Saudi alignment with the U.S. lessened Saudi concerns about external threats to its security; and provided increased opportunities for Saudi Arabia to gain or profit from the alignment. U.S. help in reorganising the fiscal programs of the Saudi Government would result in internal stability¹⁸⁷ and prepare the Saud economy for the 'takeoff' stage of its development. Vast sums of direct U.S. financial and economic assistance would translate into rapid Saudi economic development,

¹⁸⁷ Neuman argued that the Saudi state has internal stability evidenced by "the historical continuity of the Al-Saud rule; a long tradition of obedience to the ruler; abhorrence of disorder; and a dearth of political alternatives" (Neuman 1998: 95). Threats and disruptions to these conditions are precisely what the Saudis feared.

the expected gain or profit for the Saudi state. On the U.S. side, expectation of gain or profit arose from the prospect of even greater oil profits flowing back into the U.S. economy.

Conclusion

The discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 further validated the use of realist alliance theories to explain the multiple drivers of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment: threat perceptions, interests and opportunity for gain, and power shifts. By continuing to deploy these elements into the FRUS data, the alignment motivations of both states become easier to identify and explain. The pattern of their priorities becomes clearer and more consistent. In this chapter, the notions of balance of threat and balance of interest were more prominent. Balance of power played a more limited role in explaining the Saudi-U.S. case.

In 1949-1952, Ibn Saud focused on enhancing Saudi security¹⁸⁸ against external threats. His exchanges with the U.S. Government concentrated on getting military arms and other forms of U.S. military aid. Ibn Saud wanted U.S. military arms and assistance to build up his army. He wanted the military capability to defend Saudi territory, especially the oil fields and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, against aggression by any power, especially Iraq and Transjordan. Ibn Saud's focus on military security during these years did not diminish his need for financial and economic assistance. He still faced internal threats caused by the Kingdom's financial and economic instability.

Getting a long-term lease for the Dhahran Air base was the focus of the U.S. Both states understood the inextricable link between U.S. military aid for Saudi Arabia and U.S. rights at Dhahran. The chapter showed that negotiations for a longer-term lease at Dhahran became more complex and difficult because the Saudis linked it to their need for U.S. military arms and other aid. The U.S. had little choice but to find a way to use Dhahran to gain what it

¹⁸⁸ Using Snyder and Schweller's rationale, the Saudis sought to reduce the probability of being attacked (deterrence) and to increase its own strength in case of attack (defence) (Snyder 1992 in Rothstein, et al 1992: 90). The notions of internal and external balancing are inherent in this explanation of Saudi motives for alignment with the U.S.

wanted and meet Ibn Saud's requests. Dhahran negotiations also underscored how fearful Ibn Saud was of the danger of projecting the image of Saudi loss of sovereignty at Dhahran. This was a deep-seated fear of Ibn Saud in the context of internal domestic politics and regional Arab politics.

The alignment continued despite strains from the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel. The Saudis and Americans had too much to lose by breaking off their relations and alignment. As the Truman presidency ended and the Eisenhower administration came into power, more intense challenges lay ahead for Saudi-U.S. relations and the alignment. Similar to the Palestine problem, the Buraimi dispute and the Suez crisis tested the strength and durability of the alignment.

Chapter 7

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1953-1955)

Introduction

The dynamics of realist alliance notions of power, threat, interest/opportunity, which were evident in 1941-1952, are likewise evident in the events and circumstances that impacted the behaviour of both states in managing their relations and alignment in 1953-1957. These were years that tested strength and durability of the Saudi-U.S. alignment as great pressures came to bear on it. The deployment of elements in realist alliance theory continues in Chapters 7 and 8 in order to explain how both states responded to pressures and maintained their alignment. There are two cases analysed: the Buraimi dispute and the Suez crisis. A separate section in Chapter 7 discusses the Buraimi dispute; and a separate section in Chapter 8 discusses the Suez crisis. The Buraimi problem created a difficult dilemma for the U.S., which found itself gradually drawn into the middle of the conflict, raising U.S. fears of

entrapment and mutual Saudi-U.S. fears of abandonment. These concepts¹⁸⁹ based on Snyder's ideas are important elements that Schweller incorporated in his alliance theory.

The Suez crisis bared the dilemma for both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. created by U.S. support for Israel.¹⁹⁰ Despite U.S. anger at Israel, for colluding with the British and the French in fighting against the Arabs¹⁹¹ during the Suez crisis, U.S. support for the Jewish state continued. This reinforced Saudi doubts about U.S. intentions in the area; and the efficacy of the U.S. as a reliable and stable partner. However, the Suez crisis also gave the U.S. and Saudi Arabia the opportunity to mend and strengthen their alignment. After Suez, both states faced the threat of the Soviet entry into the region and close Soviet relations with Egypt's Nasser.

Nasser's rise to power, and the apparent Soviet influence on Nasser, changed the political dynamics of the region. Nasser's pursuit of Arab nationalism¹⁹² and 'positive neutrality',¹⁹³ and perceptions of Nasser's ambitions to be the Arab hegemon¹⁹⁴ unnerved Arab leaders, especially the new King Saud. Saud did not appear to be as adept as Ibn Saud in

¹⁸⁹ Schweller based his contentions on Snyder's explanations of the entrapment-abandonment security dilemma.

¹⁹⁰ Philby observed that compared to Ibn Saud, Saud was more antagonistic towards Israel. Ibn Saud was more restrained. Saud's desire for solidarity with Arab countries resulted from what Philby characterised as "realisation that Arabs could do little to change the [Israel] situation deriving from fiat of great powers on whom Arabs depended for prosperity" (Philby 1955: xvii).

¹⁹¹ For Saudi Arabia and the Arab states, Israel's participation reinforced their view of Israel as a threat to their security.

¹⁹² The 1950s brought the "renaissance of Arab nationalism and the centrality to all Arabs of the Palestine problem" (Levey and Podesh 2008: 271). The years reflected "growing Arab sensitivity to the vestiges of Western imperialism" (*Ibid*), the latter symbolised by Britain.

¹⁹³ Harry Ellis (1960) explained that Nasser required only that Egypt be left free to make her political decisions alone. Nasser insisted that Egypt must remain independent of big power blocs. This was the genesis of his "positive neutrality" (Ellis 1960: 36-37). According to Ray Takeyh (2000), Nasser perceived Arab nationalism as a facet of the Third World struggle against big power exploitation. Nasser stated that the only wise policy would be one of 'positive neutrality and non-alignment'. This entailed more than exemption from the Cold War struggle. Egyptian neutrality called for eliminating divisions based on clan, tribe, and class, and espoused unity with and loyalty toward the Arab world (Takeyh 2000: 52). Also see: Flower, R., 1977. *Napoleon to Nasser: the Story of Modern Egypt*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; and Oron, Y., ed, 1960. *Middle East Record Volume 1, 1960*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

¹⁹⁴ Nasser's ambitions to lead the Arab world are well discussed in St. John, R., 1960. *The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser*. New York: McGraw-Hill. Also see Wheelock, K., 1960. *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Beattie, K.J., 1994. *Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; and Jankowski, J., 2002. *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

maneuvering through political changes and pressures, often vacillating in his political relations with Egypt.¹⁹⁵ This caused more anxiety and uncertainty in the Saudi-U.S. alignment. Nevertheless, because of a mutual desire to blunt Soviet advances in the region, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. cemented their alignment in 1957.

1953 brought leadership changes in America and Saudi Arabia. Eisenhower became the new U.S. President on January 20, 1953. Crown Prince Saud became the new Saudi King when Ibn Saud died on November 9, 1953. Heightened Saudi perceptions of threats from the Hashemite states, persistent Saudi dependence on the U.S. for military and economic aid, the Dhahran base, and Saudi oil continued to be strong underlying motives in the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

Before discussing the impact on the alignment by the events and circumstances in Buraimi and Egypt, the chapter analyses the status and condition of the alignment in 1953. Saudi Arabia waited for U.S. military grant aid, an issue unresolved as of December 1952. For the Saudis, the delay in receiving grant aid was another sign that the U.S. undervalued Saudi contributions to the alignment. The Saudis wanted better and more equal treatment from the U.S. The Saudis believed that they made a contribution to the military capabilities¹⁹⁶ of the U.S. The Saudis felt that the U.S. did not adequately recognise Saudi Arabia's extension of U.S. rights at Dhahran as a Saudi contribution to the strength of U.S. power against any Soviet military threat. Furthermore, in matters pertaining to Dhahran the Saudis did not

¹⁹⁵ Madawi Al-Rasheed discusses Saud's dilemma regarding relations with the U.S. and his relations with the Nasser who seemed to lean more towards the Soviets. Al-Rasheed argued that Saud kept up the appearance of being friendly to Nasser as a balance against the Hashemite threat posed by Iraq and Jordan (Al-Rasheed 2002: 115-116).

¹⁹⁶ The Saudi-U.S. alignment was for defensive purposes. Schweller believes that a state joins forces with another state resulting in an aggregation of capabilities or power that strengthens the alliance to deter or defend against an external threat (Schweller 2001: 240-241). In Walt's theory, he argues that whatever capabilities a very weak state possesses are not enough to add to any alliance and can do little to affect outcomes (Walt 1987: 32). In terms of power or material capabilities, the alignment was unequal or asymmetrical. Saudi Arabia was a weak power aligned with the U.S. a great power.

believe that the U.S. understood the gravity of external and internal criticisms¹⁹⁷ of the Kingdom “falling unduly under American domination” and of Saudi Arabia “selling itself short in the Dhahran airfield agreement” (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: 786A.5 MSP/2-1453: February 14 Hare telegram #621 to the Department of State: 2434). Hare contended that Saudi sensitivities¹⁹⁸ on these issues would worsen “if another Arab country¹⁹⁹ or Israel²⁰⁰ was given grant aid before Saudi Arabia or in undue proportions” (*Ibid*). In fact, The U.S. Government believed that military grant aid would help to stop any further weakening of relations and the alignment.

1953: U.S. seeks to revitalise relations

Eisenhower approves military grant aid to Saudi Arabia

The U.S. wanted to protect its position and interests in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Department of State asked the U.S. Mutual Security Agency (MSA)²⁰¹ to recommend to Eisenhower that military grant assistance be given to Saudi Arabia immediately in order to “continue enjoying friendly relations with Saudi Arabian authorities and to maintain the U.S. preferential position in Saudi Arabia”, and because “U.S. base rights in Saudi Arabia may be adversely

¹⁹⁷ Schweller also pointed out that a state joins an alliance to enhance the state’s internal security or domestic political stability, i.e., membership in the alliance empowers the state to discourage dissidents, legitimise the existing regime, or suppress internal disorder (*Ibid*).

¹⁹⁸ This meant Saudi doubts on the efficacy of the alignment in the context of not receiving military grant aid or delays in receiving it.

¹⁹⁹ In 1952, after the Egyptian revolution of July 23, Acheson and other U.S. Department of State officials sought to stabilise Egypt and to have Egypt join a proposed Anglo-American regional security arrangement called the Middle East Command (MEC), which eventually became a proposal called the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO). To entice Egypt to cooperate with the West in this regard, Acheson proposed a large scale military assistance program (Hahn 1991: 147).

²⁰⁰ The size and rapid U.S. response to aid Israel also deeply disturbed the Saudis given the lengthy delays they experienced in getting U.S. aid. Aid to Israel involved massive proposed and actual U.S. economic help packages. In 1949, the U.S. Government assisted in getting Israel a \$100 million Export-Import Bank loan (Sharp 2009: 18). There were bills filed in the U.S. Congress to give a \$150 million grant aid package to Israel (Lesser 1984: 238). In July 1952, Truman and Acheson proposed an \$80 million package; later, the Congress allocated \$73 million for Israel in fiscal year 1953. During Israel’s financial crisis in mid-1952, the White House emergency fund awarded \$19 million plus another \$25 million; the original request from Israel was \$11.5 million (Hahn 2004a: 81).

²⁰¹ In 1951 and during the Korean War, all assistance programs, economic, technical, and military were united under the Mutual Security Agency. It resulted in the emphasis on security assistance to a few strategic allies and less emphasis on humanitarian and economic aid (Rabie 1988: 36).

affected unless grant military aid is made available” (*Ibid*, 786A.5 MSP/2-2053: February 27: Smith to Stassen: 2436). The U.S. Department of State used provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 to support its recommendation: Saudi Arabia’s strategic position is of direct importance to the defence of the Near East area; assistance to Saudi Arabia is of critical importance to the defence of free nations; and immediately increasing the ability of Saudi Arabia to defend itself is important for the preservation of the peace and security of the area and the security of the U.S. (*Ibid*). The U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, the MSA, and the White House concurred that U.S. military grant assistance to the Saudi state was necessary. Eisenhower approved the grant aid (*Ibid*, 786A.5 MSP/3-1453: March 14 Eisenhower memorandum to Stassen: 2438). Grant aid as a form of foreign aid fits well into Walt’s argument about the role and importance of foreign aid in alliance.

The previous chapters showed that in the Saudi-U.S. case not only was U.S. foreign aid a major element in the formation of the alignment, foreign military and economic aid were linchpins that held it together and contributed to its strength and durability. From the U.S. perspective, military grant aid was not a result of alignment but a necessity to hold the alignment together. In the Saudi view, military grant aid should be the result of continued alignment with the U.S. The Saudis expected the aid. This latter point validates Walt’s argument that foreign aid, in this example military grant aid for the Kingdom, was an expected result from its alignment with the U.S. It also says that the U.S. Government gave grant aid to Saudi Arabia as a demonstration of favorable U.S. intentions towards the Saudis, thus evoking a sense of gratitude from Saudi Arabia, a recipient state dependent on the U.S. donor state (Walt 1985: 27, 41).

However, solving the military grant aid issue did not improve relations immediately because of Saudi concerns about Buraimi²⁰² and other old issues. This necessitated a meeting in Washington between Faisal²⁰³ and Eisenhower on March 2, 1953.

Faisal's 1953 meetings in Washington

Eisenhower expressed the desire of the U.S. Government to “seek a restoration of the spirit of confidence and trust with Arab nations” (*Ibid*, Lot 64 D 199 #154 March 2 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation, meeting of Eisenhower and Faisal: 2519). Eisenhower’s statement reflected the serious damage to the image of the U.S. to the Arabs caused by the Palestine-Israel problem. Eisenhower recognised that because of that problem, U.S. relations and the alignment with Saudi Arabia weakened and needed revitalisation. Not wanting to get embroiled in the Palestine-Israel problem, Eisenhower instead emphasised the threat of Communism as the main concern globally and regionally. Eisenhower wanted Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to unify and align with the U.S. in the fight against Soviet communism.

Balance of power and balance of threat arguments provide explanations why the U.S. actively sought alliances during this time. Using Waltz’ balance of power argument, the U.S. perceived potential power shifts and imbalances in the regional and global balance of power caused by the Cold War. The U.S. sought defensive alliances in the region to stabilise and to maintain the balance of power against the Soviets. Using Walt’s argument, the U.S. perceived that the Soviets had aggregate power, offensive power, proximate power, and offensive intentions. Thus, the U.S. sought alliances because of balance of power and balance of threat considerations about Soviet entry into the region.

²⁰² See separate section in this chapter on the Buraimi dispute. According to Hart, Faisal’s disappointment with the U.S. position on Buraimi was mitigated somewhat by Eisenhower’s positive action on military aid to the Kingdom (Hart 1997: 63).

²⁰³ Ibn Saud was quite old and not in good health. He sent Prince Faisal who was the Saudi Foreign Minister at that time.

Eisenhower warned that Arab disunity and rivalry further threatened regional stability and that “it was in the interest of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states to take all possible steps to counter the spread of godless materialist forces of communism” (*Ibid*). The “growing power of the Soviet Union and the international spread of communism” was Eisenhower’s biggest concern;²⁰⁴ it “dominated most of the foreign policy decisions during his administration” (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1953-1960: Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy, par.1).

Prince Faisal also met with the new U.S. Secretary of State Dulles²⁰⁵ at the Department of State in Washington. Saudi concerns were unchanged except that they now included the Buraimi issue.²⁰⁶ Faisal propounded the primacy of Saudi security against unfriendly neighbouring states; Saudi expectations of prompt action, not rhetoric, on U.S. economic and military aid to the Kingdom; and the need for U.S. help in boundary disputes with Britain, specifically the Saudi border dispute in Buraimi (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: Lot 64 D 199 Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, January-April 1953, Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 2516).

²⁰⁴ Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh (2001) argued that Eisenhower embraced NSC-68 and its monolithic view of international communism and the dangers of communist subversion. He believed in the ‘domino theory’ and that “losing to communism anywhere was a triple defeat for the West: a potential ally was lost, an implacable enemy gained a new recruit, and U.S. credibility was damaged” (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 26).

²⁰⁵ John Foster Dulles served as Secretary of State from January 21, 1953 to April 15, 1959. The Department of State Historian provided the following summary of Dulles’ contributions. He left an indelible mark on U.S. foreign policy, which included close cooperation between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and a focus upon international mutual security agreements or alliances to contain communism. During his tenure, the consensus in U.S. policy was that containment of communism would maintain peace. This allowed Dulles and Eisenhower to secure international mutual security agreements while reducing the number of troops in the U.S. military and the production of conventional weapons. Dulles confronted many foreign policy challenges, including the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. One of his last directives was the formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in response to the Suez Crisis and the balance of power in the Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine used key tenets of Dulles’ foreign relations and policy views: containment and international mutual security agreements or alliances reinforced by economic aid (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Dulles pars 1-3). With Dulles, it seemed that power once again emanated from the Department of State; this was more because of Dulles than the Department itself (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 10).

²⁰⁶ See the separate section on Buraimi in this chapter.

In 1953, the first year of his Presidency, Eisenhower had not yet formed enough of a clear U.S. Middle East defence policy against the Soviet threat,²⁰⁷ other than his acceptance of NSC-68²⁰⁸ and his belief in the domino theory.²⁰⁹ In terms of aggregating U.S. military capabilities or power, with the Arab states, the U.S. Government leaned towards Egypt as the key Arab power with whom to forge a strong defence alignment. Egypt showed its military prowess and political leadership and influence in the first Arab-Israel war. Eisenhower wanted to be sure of Egypt, so he sent Dulles to a series of Near East meetings from May 9 to May 23, 1953.

The Saudis challenge Dulles at Riyadh

The U.S. Embassy in Damascus recommended that "stops at Cairo, Riyadh, Tel Aviv and Damascus would permit rapid survey key issues affecting US position in area, including: Arab-Israeli relations; Palestine refugee problem; Anglo-Egyptian question; Middle East defense; and U.S. stake in area oil" (United States Department of State, 1952-1954. FRUS: The Near and Middle East Volume IX, Part 1. The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1953: 110.11 DU/1-2353 FRUS editorial note on December 17 1952 Jernegan memorandum: 1).

²⁰⁷ It was after the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 that Eisenhower enunciated his doctrine.

²⁰⁸ National Security Council 68 (NSC-68) was a top-Secret report by the U.S. Department of State's Policy Planning Staff on April 7, 1950. It concluded that the Soviet threat would soon be greatly augmented by the addition of more weapons, including nuclear weapons, to the Soviet arsenal. It argued that the best course of action was to respond in kind with a massive build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952, NSC-68, 1950: par. 1). It called for the rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world to deter Soviet aggression (*Ibid*, par. 3). It called for a drastic expansion of the U.S. military budget to support a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear arms. It expanded the scope of 'containment' beyond the defense of major centers of industrial power to encompass the entire world (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945-1952 Kennan and Containment, 1947: par.3). Steven Freiberger characterises NSC-68 as a call for a radical shift in U.S. global defence doctrines and capabilities based on large military expenditures (Freiberger 1992: 20).

²⁰⁹ This was the imagery of nations toppling successively to communism like a row of up-ended dominoes (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 26).

The Near East meetings represented “an opportunity to dispel misunderstandings and develop close relations between the United States and friendly nations; and to gather facts rather than make specific proposals” (*Ibid*, 2). The real purpose of Dulles’ journey was to campaign for alliances in the region in order to strengthen U.S. material and political capabilities in the region, the aggregation of power model in Waltz’ realist alliance theory. The U.S. Government viewed Egypt as the most powerful and influential Arab state. The Americans wanted Egypt to be the main Arab cog in a defence alignment. The Egyptian Government was not receptive to the idea. For the Egyptians, American support for Israel was a hurdle, as was the brewing conflict between Egypt and Britain at the Suez Canal. Furthermore, the Egyptian domestic political environment was unsettled.²¹⁰

Saudi Arabia was the second and only other choice for the U.S. Iraq, Jordan, and Syria were already in the British sphere. However, the U.S. Government knew that its relations with Saudi Arabia and the alignment were in deep trouble.²¹¹ U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia were in jeopardy because of the Palestine-Israel problem and the Buraimi dispute. At the Dulles meetings in Riyadh, the Saudi leaders showed intense negative feelings regarding Buraimi and other recurring issues that had weakened Saudi relations with the U.S. Thus,

²¹⁰ Similar to Saudi Arabia, Egypt wanted substantial U.S. economic and military aid. Similar to the Saudi experience, the U.S. failed to respond immediately, which frustrated and angered the Egyptians (Jankowski 2002: 51). Also see Burns, W.J., 1985. *Economic aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; Alterman, J.B., 1998. “American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: from Hope to Hostility”. *The Middle East Journal*. 52 (1): pp. 51+; Miglietta, J.P., 2002. *American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia*. Oxford: Lexington Books; and Barrett, R.C., 2007. *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy Under Eisenhower and Kennedy (Library of International Relations)*. London: I.B. Tauris.

²¹¹ At the Foreign Ministers Meetings in New York on October-December 1952, Faisal told Acheson that the U.S. stance on Buraimi was anti-Arab; and that the desperation of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states could make them look to Russia (Lot 53 D 65: December 4 S/A (Jessup) files, Foreign Ministers Meetings-New York, October-December, 1952: Plitt memorandum of Acheson conversation with Foreign Ministers of the Near East, 7th U.N. General Assembly: 2501).

Dulles found it impossible to talk to the Saudi leaders about the U.S. desire for Saudi Arabia to be the main Arab power in Eisenhower's Middle East plans for defence alliances.²¹²

Ibn Saud died on November 9, 1953 and Crown Prince Saud succeeded to the Saudi throne. The change in leadership created new uncertainty about the strength and durability of the Saudi-U.S. alignment; and in what direction Saud would take the Saudi-U.S. relationship.

Crown Prince Saud becomes the new Saudi King

Similar to Ibn Saud, the new King Saud was a product of several military campaigns and battles.²¹³ Saud understood the internal domestic threat to the Al-Saud rule if he failed to improve the political, economic, and social situations in the country and to take care of the interests of his subjects. He also understood the importance of "keeping the friendship of foreign states of which our beloved late King Abdulaziz asserted" (Saud 1953 cited King Saud History, 'Death of King Abdulaziz and Appointment of Prince Saud as King of the Country-1953', 2008: par.3).

However, in contrast to Ibn Saud's pursuit of formal alliance with Britain and America, the new King Saud did not pursue formal alliance.²¹⁴ Saud "believed in non-alignment and strove to keep the region free of coalitions and blocs that he believed would only serve foreign interests; this conviction led him to reject the Baghdad Pact" (*Ibid*). This non-belief

²¹² S.Z. Freiburger (1992) emphasized that after the 1953 visit to the Middle East, the U.S. Government believed it was unwise to pressure the Arabs into regional alliance; the U.S. Government wanted to distance itself from Britain and France whose images remained colonialist. The U.S. Government tried to show impartiality in the Arab-Israel conflict. All these were done to improve the U.S. standing in the region and to create mutual trust between the Arab world and the U.S. (Freiburger 1992: 211).

²¹³ Battles at Jirab, al-Ihsa against the Sheikhs of the Bani Hajir, Yateb, Manahil al-Dafeenah, and Hail (King Saud History, First military assignments 1915-1933, 2007: pars.1-4). Saud's participation in defending his father against the Ikhwan was "one of the most dangerous and important roles played by Saud in reinforcing the stability and support for his father's reign" (King Saud History, Sibillah Crisis 2007: par.1). Saud played an important role by managing Najd's affairs during his father's absence in Hijaz for two years. He helped to recruit and assemble soldiers from Riyadh sent to defend Ibn Saud's base in Ihsa (*Ibid*, par.7).

²¹⁴ Miglietta (2002) explained that for the Arabs, the Baghdad Pact symbolised Western imperialism (Miglietta 2002: 202). The Saudis did not want direct involvement in superpower confrontation. The Saudis did not want agreements that limited their freedom to act or their "ability to manoeuvre diplomatically in the region" (*Ibid*). Given these preferences, the Saudis preferred informal agreements with the U.S.; but with implicit guarantees of U.S. support (*Ibid*). This meant that, despite its being a weaker power, the Saudis tended to seek absolute gains instead of relative gains. This caused difficulties in Saudi-U.S. negotiations.

in alignment may have contributed to the erratic behaviour of Saud in the informal alignment with the U.S. Saud seemed unsure of his power and influence and he vacillated between aligning closely with the U.S. and distancing himself from the U.S.

Saud assured Eisenhower initially that he would continue Ibn Saud's policies and friendship with the U.S. and that he had the full support of the Saudi people, including the new Crown Prince Faisal (United States Department of State, 1952-1954. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume IX, Part 2, Saudi Arabia: 786A.11/11-1053: November 10 Jones telegram to the Department of State: 2447).

Saud hedged his assurance. His first priority was Saudi sovereignty. Saud emphasised to Hackler, the U.S. Consul at Dhahran, that he wished to cooperate fully with the U.S. and not place any hindrances in its way; however, while he realised that the U.S. was not an imperialistic state, he was determined to maintain Saudi sovereignty and hoped the U.S. would remember that when dealing with Saudi Government officials (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/12-2053: December 20 Hackler telegram #97 to the Department of State: 2450). Thus, in Saud's view foreign interference or undue foreign political influence in Saudi affairs was unwelcome. In alliance theory terms, Saud did not want transnational penetration to be a motive for U.S. relations and alignment with the Saudi state.

By 1954, Saud no longer saw any real benefits to the Saudi state from the alignment. U.S. military grant aid was slow in coming. The expected U.S. political and military support at Buraimi did not happen. U.S. aid and support for Iraq in the Baghdad Pact increased the enemy's power. Similar to Ibn Saud, Saud questioned the outcome of Saudi alignment with the U.S. and may have considered it as a threat to his rule and the sovereignty of the Saudi state. Saud and Faisal began to drift away from the U.S. Saud used the issue of U.S. military grant aid to express his displeasure with the U.S.

1954: Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment in jeopardy

U.S. military grant aid terms threaten Saudi sovereignty

Perhaps, to show his strength and power as the new Saudi King, and to express genuine displeasure at the U.S., Saud declared that the conditions of the U.S. military grant aid threatened Saudi sovereignty. Saud explained that “new obligations Saudi Arabia would have to assume could not be put on shoulders of new regime; they would reflect badly on Saudi Arabian standing in all Arab States” (*Ibid*, 786A.5 MSP/1-1854: January 18 Hackler telegram #109 to the Department of State: 2450). According to Yasin, Saud’s Acting Foreign Minister, what Saud really meant was that the agreement would infringe on Saudi sovereignty by placing Saudi “economic and military fields under U.S. control and dictation; all country would be under control [of the] U.S.” (*Ibid*: 2451). Saud was uncertain about his power and influence in the Arab world; he knew he did not have the prestige and influence that Ibn Saud reached in the Arab world. Thus, Saud did not want to do anything that would “subject him to strong criticism from other Arab states” (*Ibid*). Saud believed that the terms of the U.S. military grant aid encroached on Saudi sovereignty, which in turn would damage his other interests. The U.S. Government moved quickly to put out the fires of Saud’s discontentment. The new U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom tried to shift the focus to concerns other than Buraimi and military grant aid.

U.S. Government tries to focus on concerns other than Buraimi

Wadsworth,²¹⁵ the new U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia met with Faisal in June 1954 to discuss U.S. concerns about growing anti-American feeling in Riyadh because of Buraimi, the Point IV agreement, and unresolved problems in Palestine.²¹⁶ Wadsworth anticipated that

²¹⁵ George Wadsworth served simultaneously as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Yemen from October 21, 1953 to January 1, 1958 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian).

²¹⁶ Bruce Nardulli argued that “sensitivities to the range of political threats to the regime were consistently viewed with more gravity than conventional external military threats” (Nardulli 2002: 490) and was a barrier to easing continued tensions in relations. Nardulli contended that “security ties unfolded under conditions in

Faisal would express Saudi displeasure about Buraimi and that the Saudis no longer felt they needed the Point IV agreement. Wadsworth also anticipated strong Saudi criticisms about U.S. positions on military aid, especially aid to Iraq, a known adversary of the Saudis.²¹⁷

Wadsworth tried to defuse Saudi criticisms by framing his explanations within the “tremendous struggle between our Western world and Communist Russia” (*Ibid*, 611.86A/6-154: June 15 Wadsworth telegram #493 to the Department of State: 2452). Faisal countered in the context of deep Saudi disappointment about the lack of U.S. help on Buraimi: “Nations, like individuals, must act in accord with the dictates of their national or self-interest. This one result [Buraimi], small though it was, in the world scene made Saudi Arabia a loser. In dismissing the Point IV aid, the kingdom decided it would no longer trouble U.S. Government with its small problems but instead would henceforth handle them to the best of its own ability” (*Ibid*, 2452-2453).

Other reasons Saud abrogated Point IV

There were rumours traced to U.S. officials regarding rivalry within the Al-Saud family and speculations about an imminent revolution in the Kingdom. Furthermore, an article that was highly critical of Saud’s spending habits appeared in the *Christian Science Monitor*. It angered Saud.

The King was obliged to cancel the Point IV agreement with the U.S. because he received reports of statements of “high U.S. officials in the area” that the U.S. should concentrate its efforts on Prince Faisal and attempt to play him off against the King. Furthermore, a recent article in the *Christian Science Monitor* [which appeared to be U.S. Government inspired] stated that a revolution could shortly be expected in Saudi Arabia due to the profligacy of the King (*Ibid*, 611.86A/9-2554: September 25 Bergus memorandum of conversation: 2454).

which sensitivities to those ties were always a central, oftentimes dominating consideration. This was especially true in the most delicate area of military assistance” (*Ibid*, ii).

²¹⁷ U.S. grant military assistance for the Near East in the period March 1950 through December 1954 shows a clear distribution heavily oriented toward the ‘northern tier’ states of Turkey \$563.7 million, Iran \$81.4 million, Pakistan \$1.9 million and Iraq \$1.5 million (*Ibid*, 242).

Saud considered such rumours as unwarranted U.S. Government involvement in Saudi internal affairs. To chastise the U.S. and gain some measure of retribution, Saud cancelled the Point IV²¹⁸ mission. This explanation uses Walt's argument about transnational penetration²¹⁹ by the U.S. into Saudi domestic political matters. For the U.S., perhaps transnational penetration was a motive for the Point IV Mission, albeit an obscure motive. For the Saudis any U.S. attempts to influence or manipulate the Saudi domestic political system only served to weaken relations and alignment.

Anthony Cordesman (2003) contended that Saud expelled the Point IV mission because the aid amount Saudi Arabia received was insignificant in relation to U.S. aid to Israel.²²⁰ FRUS documents support both explanations.²²¹ Saud's perspective on Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment was complicated and often times seemed contradictory. The following section explains Saud's perspective in the context of elements from realist alliance theory.

Understanding Saud's views

Saud balanced his interests. Although Saud was bitter towards the U.S. on many issues, in the context of Saudi apprehensions about Israel, or Britain undermining Saudi Arabia's goal of strengthening its armed forces, Saud often spoke of friendly relations and a strong alignment with the U.S. After all, the U.S. was the donor state for the Kingdom's financial,

²¹⁸ The U.S. Point IV Mission was sent to Saudi Arabia in 1951; the Saudi Government "teetered on the edge of bankruptcy" because of low revenues from oil and Hajj pilgrimages (Cordesman 2003: 106). Point IV helped to create the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), which helped to stabilise Saudi finances (*Ibid*). However, Saud believed that U.S. aid of "\$6.4 million was a pointless token compared to U.S. aid to Israel" (*Ibid*, 107).

²¹⁹ Transnational penetration is the "manipulation of one state's domestic political system by another state" (Walt 1985: 46) by using public officials with divided loyalties, lobbying, and propaganda. Lipsky, et al (1959) surmised that Saudi suspicion about too much U.S. influence and excessive U.S. control by the Point IV Mission may have been responsible for the sudden abrogation the Point IV agreement and expulsion of all Point IV personnel (Lipsky et al. 1959: 146).

²²⁰ See footnote in the previous chapter where it cited the vastly greater U.S. Government economic aid to Israel compared to aid for the Arabs from 1948 to 1959. Harry Ellis observed that major American help to the Arabs began only when the Eisenhower administration came into office at the beginning of 1953. This reflected the new administration's desire to repair its relations with the Arabs by demonstrating impartiality between the two sides. The U.S. Government wanted to show its determination to be fair to both sides, both in the distribution of aid and in the protection of Arabs and Israelis against military incursion by each other (Ellis 1960: 97).

²²¹ U.S. assistance to Iraq was probably as much of a reason as were the other explanations (Safran 1988: 80).

economic, and military needs.²²² Saud wanted to weaken U.S. support for Israel; he pushed the Saudi view that “Israel became major channel for communist infiltration Middle East” (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1964: 611.86A/10-154: October 1 Wadsworth telegram #138 to the Department of State: 2455-2456).

It was an accumulation of reasons that pushed Saud to cancel the Point IV mission. He wanted to send a clear message to the U.S. Government of his displeasure at U.S. Government aloofness and ambivalence in the Buraimi dispute, U.S. support of Israel, and U.S. attention to other states in the area to the detriment of Saudi interests and needs. Saud was angry at the ease with which the U.S. granted military aid to other states while Saudi Arabia encountered many hurdles in getting aid. U.S. support for Iraq’s participation in the ‘Northern Tier’ defence arrangement added insult to injury. Saudi-U.S. relations took a further turn for the worse with the signing of the Baghdad Pact.²²³

If Saud perceived that through the alignment, the U.S. imposed its will and controlled his freedom of action, one can explain Saud’s view in several ways. The Saudi state was in a bandwagon alignment with the U.S. Walt contended that a bandwagon alignment subordinates a state to a hegemon, while a balancing alignment preserves most of a state’s freedom to act. Using Dumais-Lévesque’s argument, the U.S. was a powerful state and “predatory state” that used the alignment “to exploit the weaknesses or false sense of security” it provided for the Saudis” (Dumais-Lévesque 2009:1). Using Schroeder’s argument, the Saudi-U.S. alignment “in some measure functions as pact of restraint (*pacta de contrahendo*), restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance” (Schroeder in Knorr 1976: 231). Saud may have felt constrained by the U.S. Saud wanted more freedom

²²² This paper explained previously that the Saudis wanted to build a regular Saudi armed force for defence. Given Saudi fears about the military power of Israel, Iraq, and Egypt, the Saudis wanted to build up their military and other capabilities for defence. Similar to Ibn Saud, Saud wanted modern U.S. weapons, equipment, and training.

²²³ The Northern Tier agreement and the subsequent Baghdad Pact are discussed in the next section in this chapter.

to act. Furthermore, in a bandwagon alignment, perceptions of the intentions and benevolence of a dominant state can be unreliable; it can change its intentions and its benevolence may not last for long. Saud may have looked at U.S. delays as a change in U.S. intentions and benevolence.

Saud, who as Crown Prince often defended the Saudi-U.S. alignment, now shared Faisal's disgust with U.S. Government positions towards Saudi Arabia. Relations deteriorated further. Several issues threatened the alignment. U.S. support of Israel, the Buraimi dispute, and the ARAMCO dispute distressed Saud and Faisal profoundly. This latter point was another complication to relations; it arose from the February 1954 Saudi agreement with Aristotle Onassis that authorised him to transport Saudi oil.

1955: Further deterioration in Saudi-U.S. relations

Threats to U.S. interests in Saudi oil development

ARAMCO opposed the agreement because it violated terms of the oil concession. The Saudis injected the issue of Saudi sovereignty into the dispute. The U.S. Department of State and ARAMCO feared the possibility of Saudi expropriation and nationalisation of ARAMCO properties and the cancellation of the Dhahran base agreement (United States Department of State, 1955-1957. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia: 886A.2553/2-955: February 9 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 250-251). The U.S. Government analysed a series of moves the Saudis could take if the Saudis won in court or in arbitration. In order to prevent any disruption to the flow of Saudi oil and revenues, the Saudis would use experts from Russia and satellite countries to produce and market Saudi oil products. This would be followed by expropriation and nationalisation of Aramco's properties and cancellation of the Dhahran agreement (*Ibid*, 886A.2553/3-455: March 3 Allen memorandum to Murphy: 251, 253). This was a disturbing and threatening scenario for the

U.S.: the U.S. loses its oil interests and strategic position in the Saudi Arabia; the Russians gain a foothold in the Kingdom.

The U.S. Government expected a further unfavorable drift in relations and the alignment. The U.S. Department of State wanted to improve its negotiating position by not showing that U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia are “of such a magnitude to warrant resorting to extreme measures to satisfy Saudi demands” (*Ibid*). The U.S. did not want to be blackmailed. Similar to General Collins downplaying U.S. long-term interests in Saudi oil in 1950, the U.S. Department of State now wanted to downplay the importance of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. There were indications that the U.S. Department of Defense “no longer places the same degree of importance on Dhahran Airfield” compared to the past (*Ibid*). However, a new source of Saudi anguish emerged: “the principal cause of Saud’s current anti-U.S. feelings is U.S. military aid program for Iraq and U.S. support for Iraqi participation in the ‘Northern Tier’ defense arrangement” (*Ibid*).²²⁴ The Department of State drafted the following recommendations.

Give the King and his advisers no reason to suppose that there is the slightest chance of our changing our policy toward Iraq and the ‘northern tier’ development or that we entertain any doubts as to the success of this policy; convince him that regional defense arrangements taking shape in the north are in his own security interests. Continue and expand our present military training efforts in Saudi Arabia to temper Saudi feelings toward us, but [recognise] that such types of help will not reverse the present [downward] trend [of relations and the alignment] (*Ibid*).

The U.S. shifted its focus to the “Northern Tier”, the line of countries that formed a border between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East. Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement in 1954

²²⁴ Iraq was still an enemy of Saudi Arabia. U.S. military aid to Iraq and support of its membership in the Baghdad Pact meant that the U.S. contributed overtly to the strengthening of Iraq’s power. Also see earlier footnote regarding the military aid given to Iraq. The US signed a military aid agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954. Michael Cohen pointed out that Dulles justified this overt move on the grounds that the strategic stakes in Iraq were high. The amount of American military aid to be granted was made contingent upon the effectiveness of Iraqi participation in area defense plans which promised to contribute to the security of the region (Cohen 2004: 79).

to increase security and stability in the region (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1953-1960, the Baghdad Pact: pars.1-2).

Northern Tier agreement²²⁵ and the Baghdad Pact²²⁶

Iraq announced its intention to join a pro-Western alliance and sought to prevent its possible isolation in the Arab world by persuading other Arab states to join the alliance. Anticipating the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt called an emergency meeting of the Arab League in January 1955. Egypt believed that no member of the Arab League should enter pacts with Western powers because such pacts undermined Arab sovereignty and independence. Egypt tried and failed to get Iraq expelled from the Arab League. On February 24, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement that became the Baghdad Pact. The pact was a regional anti-Soviet defence alliance. The purpose was to prevent communist incursions by strengthening regional defence and preventing the Soviets from infiltrating the Middle East. In April 1955, Britain announced its intention to join, followed by Pakistan and Iran. Jordan considered joining, but the King could not overcome domestic opposition to the pact. The U.S. signed individual agreements with each of the nations in the pact, but did not

²²⁵ Cohen explained that during Dulles' 1953 tour of the Middle East and South East Asia, Dulles was impressed above all by two countries - Turkey and Pakistan. The US would act as godfather in encouraging the Turks to establish military links with Pakistan, as the first stage in the foundation of the Northern Tier security pact. Dulles concluded that the defence of the Middle East, with its rich oil reserves, should be built upon defence ties with those states that formed the Northern Tier of the Middle East - Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. In Dulles's opinion, those states were concerned more with the dangers of Soviet encroachment or invasion than with Western colonialism, or the State of Israel. On 19 February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to sign a mutual defence pact, which they did on April 2, 1954 (Cohen 2004: 73, 76).

²²⁶ The Eisenhower administration looked to regional organisations to reconcile its desire for Middle Eastern security with reduced defence budgets and the Pentagon's reluctance to commit US forces. The bulk of U.S. expenditure went to Turkey and Iran in the hope that along with Pakistan, they would form a 'Northern Tier' to deter Soviet expansionism. The Americans hoped to bring these countries together with Britain to co-ordinate regional defence. This was secured on 24 February 1955 by the Baghdad Pact. The alliance ultimately failed because the US did not join amidst intense Arab opposition (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 97). Also see Goold-Adams, R., 1962. *John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; Monroe, E., 1963. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press; Hahn, P.L., 1991. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*. Charlotte, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press; Holland, M.F., 1996. *America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers; Takeyh, R., 2000. *The U.S., Britain, and Nasser's Egypt: 1953-57*. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan; Watt, D.C. and Almog, O., 2003. *Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*. London: Frank Cass; Yesilbursa, B.K., 2005. *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959*. London: Frank Cass.

formally join it (*Ibid*). The Baghdad Pact angered the Saudis. Faisal expressed bitterness and deeper anti-U.S. feelings. Saudi enmity against the Hashemites resurfaced. Ambassador Wadsworth reported that Faisal's reaction to the Turk-Iraqi pact was “unwonted vehemence that I could not but sense underlying jealousy rooted in Saudi Hashemite rivalry and bitterness in defeat, which boded ill for future Saudi-American relations” (*op.cit*, 682.87/2-2755: February 27 Wadsworth telegram #416 to the Department of State: 253). Regardless of its concerns, the U.S. Department of State did not want to be “blackmailed, show any signs of weakness, and would not change its stance on any of the issues” (*Ibid*, 682.87/2-2755: March 5 Hoover telegram #387 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 255-256). The U.S. held its ground.

Realist alliance elements explain the U.S. position

Clearly, to a great extent the Americans played down the importance of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis U.S. defence plans in the area. In the broad perspective, the U.S. appeared to place greater importance on wooing other states; it discounted the overall value of Saudi Arabia for U.S. defence against the Soviets. In other words, except for Saudi oil, the U.S. looked at Saudi Arabia as a very weak state with no other material capabilities to add to the U.S. bandwagon. Saud and Faisal perceived that the strategic and political importance of Saudi Arabia was no longer as valuable to the U.S. as it was in the past.

The imbalance in the Saudi-U.S. alignment was clear. As the stronger power in the alignment, the U.S. controlled the issue of the Northern Tier and, subsequently, the Baghdad Pact. Using Walt's theory (1985: 282, 32), this paper characterises Saudi Arabia as a weak and vulnerable state that the U.S. could pressure into asymmetrical concessions and accept a subordinate role. Walt pointed out that in a bandwagon alignment certain restraints are placed on the subordinate state's freedom to act. Thus, Saudi Arabia as the weak state could not exert enough serious pressure or influence on the U.S. to stop it from pursuing the

Northern Tier arrangement or supporting the Baghdad Pact.²²⁷ Using Walt's argument again, in a bandwagon alignment the dominant state, in this case the U.S., may change its intentions and its benevolence may not last for long.

Schweller (2001: 236) emphasised that alliances are not friendships but relationships of utility based on strict calculations of self-interest; and that governments make decisions for self-preservation and not the survival of a friend or ally. This is seen in the U.S. decision to push through with its interests in sponsoring defence pacts in the northern tier states; and not allow Saudi Arabia to 'blackmail' the U.S. into doing otherwise.

Waltz would explain Saudi objections to the defence pacts in the context of the Saudi state seeking its own preservation or survival. Its first concern is to maintain its position in the system and a status quo distribution of power. Using Waltz' argument, the Saudi-Egyptian alliance resulted from their perception that they faced unbalanced power and tried to increase their own strength by allying to bring the regional distribution of power into balance.

The Soviets saw an opening to try and woo the Saudis to its side. The Soviets wanted to re-establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. China invited Faisal for a state visit, and the Soviets offered arms, technology, and advisers to Saudi Arabia through a proposed defence pact.

Russian overtures to the Saudis

The Soviets offered unlimited quantities of military weapons to the Saudis.²²⁸ The U.S. exhibited tame and ambivalent reaction to the news. Apparently, the U.S. did not want to say or do anything that would, in any way, imply that the U.S. influenced Saudi decisions, especially in situations that might give the appearance that the U.S. encroached on Saudi

²²⁷ Al-Rasheed used the same rationale in the Saudi problem of U.S. support for Israel. Al-Rasheed argued that Saudi Arabia "was not able to seriously influence U.S. policy on Israel, because Saudi Arabia was an "extremely weak country demographically, socially, militarily, and economically" (Halliday 1982 cited Al-Rasheed 2002: 141).

²²⁸ Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Parker Hart discusses this development and why Saud rejected the Soviet offers (Hart 1999: 65).

sovereignty. Consistent with his earlier pronouncement, Hoover believed Saud was blackmailing the U.S. According to him, the Soviets wanted Arab states to be neutral and wanted to achieve that goal by “frustrating collective security arrangements in the area”, and failing that sought “to establish diplomatic relations” with as many Arab states as they could “and supply military equipment” (*Ibid*, 661.86A/9-1955: Hoover telegram #141 to Wadsworth: 268).

The Saudis were very sensitive²²⁹ to anything that projected the image of being subservient to any power. Politically and religiously, the Saudis were most sensitive to criticisms about its sovereignty and its religious leadership in Islam. In response to Wadsworth’s question about communism, Saud framed it in the context of the Saudi state’s own reasons and its freedom to act, and not to please the U.S. According to Saud, “It is Saudi Arabia’s interest that communism not infiltrate into any area in the Middle East; in opposing communism, we do so on basic religious belief and Islamic principle,²³⁰ and not to please America or Western states” (*Ibid*, 611.86A/7-2555: July 25 Wadsworth telegram #39 to the Department of State: 261-262).

Saud wanted the U.S. to understand his perspectives clearly. Saudi Royal Counselor Gargoni provided Wadsworth with Saud’s attitudes towards Russia, Israel, and U.S. military and economic aid. In Saud’s view, the Saudi state was far less important²³¹ to the U.S. compared to the neighbouring states. The Saudis were very displeased with the U.S.

²²⁹ The notion of sensitivities dominating Saudi-U.S. relations was one of the major contentions of Nardulli’s PhD dissertation. According to Nardulli, “The Al Saud constantly brooded over the political and military risks of security ties. This brooding was over far more than common concerns of avoiding situations in which the U.S. could unduly influence or control Saudi policies, but included fears over risks to the survival of the regime itself. At root were deep concerns over maintaining the regime’s political and religious legitimacy and as part of that, strict sovereignty over the affairs of the Kingdom (2002: 3).

²³⁰ Elham Manea explained the impact of the religious nature of the Saudi state on internal politics and foreign policy. See Manea, E., 2005. *Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen*. London: Saqi Books.

²³¹ The importance of Saudi Arabia that Saud wanted to emphasise to the U.S. can be understood better in the context of L.C. Brown’s four drivers of Saudi foreign relations and policy: omnipresent security concerns about possible external threats; vast petroleum resources that give it political and economic influence; it is the largest single entity in the Arabian Peninsula; and as guardian of the Islamic Holy Places, it has unique identity and legacy (Brown 2004: 222-233).

Government because of U.S. support for Israel and the U.S. refusal to send the military arms for defence that the Saudis had long requested.

Saudi Arabia will not sign a pact with Russia or rely on Russian guarantee. Regarding arms offer, we must be realistic. To Arabs, Israel is number one danger and enemy. We see U.S. militarizes it to the teeth, offering all types assistance, financial and economic, to strengthen it. You can defend us against Russia, but we must defend selves against Israel. If there is possibility U.S. will wish 'start new life with us,' benefiting us as other states have benefited, by supplying us with arms so we may better contribute towards area defense, and help us rehabilitate our country and raise living standard, we can postpone answer to Russian offer. U.S. answers only 'you are free do whatever seems to your own interest, U.S. has nothing new to offer,' then we will decide as befits our interests, and U.S. and Saudi Arabia can remain friends. We do not bargain, blackmail, challenge, or quibble (*Ibid*: 269-270).

Expectations of U.S. military arms for Saudi Arabia were extremely important for Saud. He wanted to build the Saudi Armed Forces and have military capabilities for defence. A strong army would change the weak military image of the Saudi states and bring back some measure of respect and prestige for the Kingdom. He was very displeased that the U.S. again attached conditions to granting his requests and told the U.S. Department of State that "Saudi Arabia is poorest armed of all countries and [Saud] considered U.S. replies as negative answer since they imply conditions. [Saud] considers it refusal and wishes to be excused if he tries to find arms where no conditions are attached"²³², (*Ibid*, 786A.5-MSP/10-955: October 9 Newsom telegram #190 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 279). Saud threatened to seek arms from other sources. The Saudis realised how severely disadvantageous their position had become in the alignment with the U.S. The Saudis felt powerless in their relations with the Americans. They understood the asymmetry but not the apparent U.S.

²³² Three months before this, in July 1955, Saud rejected the Soviet offers of diplomatic relations and unlimited quantities of weapons for Saudi Arabia from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Saud wanted to restore normal ties with the U.S. so he could get military grant aid without conditions and retain the U.S. as the sole supplier of arms and training to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. was willing to consider grant aid as a user's payment for Dhahran (Hart 1997: 66).

insensitivity to their needs.²³³ Perhaps, more than anything the Saudis wanted to be treated with respect.²³⁴

In the next section, the discussions turn to the Buraimi dispute. The Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia and Britain was the first major test of U.S. verbal assurances to the Kingdom that the U.S. would protect the territory and sovereignty of the Saudi state against any aggression. The discussion focuses on the impact of Buraimi on Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. The purpose of the discussion is not to give an exhaustive historical account.²³⁵ There are three parts to the discussion: a narrative historical account of the dispute in 1952-1956 that shows how the U.S. and Saudi Arabia managed²³⁶ their alignment during the dispute; brief assessment of the U.S. role in the dispute; and deployment of elements of realist alliance theory in the Buraimi example.

The Buraimi dispute

The Buraimi dispute in 1952

Most historical accounts of the Buraimi tend to start with the premise that a Saudi military force seized the Buraimi Oasis²³⁷ from Abu Dhabi and Muscat, Trucial States allied with

²³³ David Long pointed out that a non-confrontational or cooperative relationship “can lead to unrealistic explanations of how much the other is likely to reciprocate” (1983: 26).

²³⁴ In Schweller’s theory of alliance, prestige, status, and respect are interests that are important in alliance formation.

²³⁵ The historical accounts of Buraimi and the Buraimi dispute are quite extensive. See: Kelly, J.B., 1956. “The Buraimi Oasis Dispute”, *International Affairs* 32: 319; Johnson, P., 1958. *Journey into Chaos*. London: MacGibbon & Lee; Bushrod, H. Jr., 1958. “Buraimi, A Study in Diplomacy by Default” *The Reporter*, 23 January; Lipsky, G.A., Ani, M., Bigelow, M.C., Gillen, F., Larson, T.J., Matthews, A.T.J., Royce, C.H., and Gillen, S.C., 1959. *Saudi Arabia, Its People Its Society, Its Culture*. New Haven, CT: HRAF Press; Lenczowski, G., 1960. *Oil and State in the Middle East*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; Kirk, G.E., 1961. *Contemporary Arab Politics: a Concise History*. New York: F. A. Praeger; Marlowe, J., 1961. *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism*. New York: Praeger; Hawley, D., 1970. *The Trucial States*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; Mursī Abd Allāh, M., 1978. *The United Arab Emirates: a Modern History*. London: Croom Helm Ltd.; Zahlan, R.S., 1978. *The origins of the United Arab Emirates: a Political and Social history of the Trucial States*. New York: MacMillan; Schofield, C.H., 1994. *The Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Routledge; and Smith, S.C., 2004. *Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71*. New York: Routledge Curzon.

²³⁶ Glenn Snyder called it “management of the alliance security dilemma” (Snyder 1997: 307).

²³⁷ The Buraimi Oasis is 382 kilometers north (341°) of Oman and 297 kilometers west of Muscat. It is situated in south-east Arabia near where the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, the British-protected Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Muscat meet (Marlowe 1961: 98). Buraimi is the name of one village out of nine that

Britain; and that the British responded to protect Abu Dhabi and to prevent Saudi Arabia from gaining territory.²³⁸ Saudi Arabia always argued that the disputed area²³⁹ was part of Saudi sovereign territory because the Shaikhs in the area were loyal to Ibn Saud.²⁴⁰ In the Saudi view, Britain was a threat because the British claimed Saudi territory on behalf of Abu Dhabi and Muscat. The British argued that they had long-standing obligations to protect the area.²⁴¹

The Saudis wanted the U.S. to intervene in discussions with the British in resolving boundary problems. Previous negotiations²⁴² on boundary problems failed to solve the problem. Ibn Saud attributed British anti-Saudi policy and British political manoeuvres on Buraimi to Britain's irritation at increasingly close Saudi-U.S. relations (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954: 641.86A/3-1052: March 10 Hare telegram #474 to the Department

formed the oasis. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi ruled six villages; the Sultan of Muscat ruled three villages. There were approximately 6,000 permanent inhabitants of the oasis. It was the Muscat village of Hamasa that Saudi Arabia occupied in August 1952 until October 1955 (Hawley 1970: 186).

²³⁸ C.H. Schofield pointed out that by the mid-1930s, the British considered Ibn Saud as the only one powerful enough to occupy localities and exert authority (Schofield 1994: 35-36). The Saudis laid claim to Buraimi as far back as 1935; in 1949, Saudi guards accompanied ARAMCO exploration crews (Hawley 1970: 188). D. Van der Meulen (1957: 188) pointed to Saudi financial problems and subsequent ARAMCO exploration at Buraimi as the trigger for the dispute. "The more money leaked away, the stronger the pressure of the Saudi government on Aramco to step up their output. Aramco's prospectors soon approached the borders of the British-protected Sheikhdoms along the Persian Gulf coast and the northern fringe of Oman territory; the quest for oil made frontier conflicts inevitable" (Van der Meulen 1957: 188). Likewise, Tore Petersen (2000: 37) pointed to Saudi pressure on ARAMCO for more oil revenues for the monarchy as one of the root causes of the Buraimi problem.

²³⁹ Schofield also explained that "traditional Arabian geopolitics dictated there would often be competing historical claims to regionally significant nodes and localities but rarely to interconnecting swathes of contiguous territory; Britain tried to introduce territorial divisions to constitute an Arabian framework of state territory" (*Ibid*, 28). J.B. Kelly placed the Buraimi dispute in the context of "the long history of Saudi expansion since the late 18th century" (Kelly 1958: 318) to "dominate the entire Arab Peninsula (Petersen 2000: 37).

²⁴⁰ Ibn Saud claimed dominion because in the past, residents there sent *zakat* alms and paid taxes to him (Macris 2010: 115).

²⁴¹ Kelly pointed this out as the British special treaty relationship with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and a special request for representation by the Sultan of Muscat (*Ibid*).

²⁴² The British and Saudi Governments conferred in London August 8-24 1951 in order to resolve their differences on boundary issues. The 'London Agreement' called for both sides to exclude troops and oil-company personnel from disputed areas until settlement of the boundary problems (Hawley 1970: 189). It also called for another conference among Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the Shaikhdoms involved in the border dispute (Al-Baharna 1968: 201). Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi represented by the British conferred at Dammam in January and February 1952. The Saudis maintained their claims. Both sides agreed to continue the 'London Agreement' (Hawley 1970: 189).

of State: 2459). Ibn Saud pointed out that U.S. neutrality on boundary problems was not effective, so he “desired for the U.S. to seek clear cut assurances from Britain that it would forego political machinations that disturb the present political balance (*Ibid*, 2459-2460).

The U.S. Government followed a “hands off” approach. Although it repeatedly exhorted direct talks between the disputants, the U.S. did not want to be trapped in the middle of the dispute. However, it was necessary and important for the U.S. Government to “obtain clarification of British intentions regarding Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms” (*Ibid*, 641.86A/3-1152: March 11 Hare telegram #477 to the Department of State: 2461) in order to avoid surprises if, as alleged repeatedly by Ibn Saud, the British actively pushed for the unification of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Kuwait.

Acheson suggests compromise

There was serious concern in the U.S. Department of State that delays in resolving the conflict could lead to a crisis or overt conflict. The U.S. already saw their dilemma. Supporting the Saudi claim would hurt U.S. relations with the British. Supporting the British contention²⁴³ would result in worsening Saudi-U.S. relations and the fragile alignment. Doing nothing already irked the Saudis. Glenn Snyder defined alignment as “a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with other states and that such expectations arise chiefly from perceived common interests” (Snyder 1992:85). If one agrees with this, then the Saudi expectation of full U.S. support in the Buraimi dispute was not misplaced.

Acheson pushed for prompt resumption of talks between the Saudis and the British and suggested compromise, which he considered as satisfying Saudi requests for U.S. intervention (*Ibid*, 641.86A/3-1052: March 10 Dulles telegram #4691 to the Embassy in the

²⁴³ The British proposed early arbitration. Truman favoured the British proposal but rejected it “to avoid the image of being too closely associated with the British on Buraimi” (Petersen 2000: 38).

United Kingdom: 2462; *Ibid*, 641.86A/3-1152: March 24 Acheson telegram #351 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2464).

Dispute escalates

The Buraimi situation worsened into a potential military conflict on August 1952. Seemingly as retaliation for the presence of British officials in Buraimi, a group of armed Saudis entered the al-Buraimi Oasis and occupied the village of Hamasa.²⁴⁴ This decision made the Saudis appear aggressive and reckless.²⁴⁵ The U.S. disavowed any knowledge²⁴⁶ of the Saudi action and did not give aid or comfort to the Saudis (*Ibid*, 641.86A/9-1852: September 18 Sturgill memorandum of conversation: 2471-2472). The British claimed it did not want to do anything that would lead to armed conflict. However, in its message to the Saudi Government, the British Government threatened to take necessary steps to protect its position unless it received an immediate response from the Saudis.

Faced with the prospect of Britain sending armed troops to Hamasa, Ibn Saud immediately asked for U.S. military assistance. Ibn Saud relied on Truman's letter as assurance of U.S. military assistance. The King used the alignment and Truman's letter to pull the U.S. into the dispute, if not through direct U.S. military aid at Buraimi, then at least through U.S. mediation between Britain and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi request for U.S. assistance

Truman's October 31, 1950 letter that declared "U.S. interest in the preservation the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, and that any threat to the Kingdom

²⁴⁴ Turki bin 'Utayshan, Saudi Amir of Ras-Tanura, accompanied by forty bodyguards occupied Hamasa village. Turki claimed appointment to rule by the Governor of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and distributed generous gifts to the tribesmen (Morton 2006: 176). Ibn Saud believed that Saudi regular and tribal forces had the offensive capability to act against the smaller Shaikhdoms (Safran 1988: 107).

²⁴⁵ A basic assumption in the entrapment notion is that a state that is more confident of support from its ally becomes reckless, intransigent, or aggressive in disputes with an opponent or adversary (Snyder 1997: 44).

²⁴⁶ There is no evidence in the declassified FRUS data that the U.S. knew about this Saudi action in advance. The Saudis did not consult with the U.S. Government or forewarn it about this action. Likewise, the British did not forewarn the U.S. about its countermove.

was of immediate concern to the U.S.” (*Ibid*, 786A.00/9-1752: September 17 Acheson telegram #149 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2473). The Saudi Ambassador asked that the “U.S. be ready to aid Saudi Arabia in case U.K. took necessary steps protect its position” (*Ibid*).

Hare recommended that the U.S. accept Ibn Saud’s plea for informal and private U.S. mediation because the U.S. Government could not turn it down “without the risk of prejudicing solution of the Buraimi problem, as well as our own general position vis-à-vis the Saudi Government; it is our thankless task to act as honest broker in interest of parties concerned, of area stability, and of our own position” (*Ibid*, 780.022/9-2852 September 28 Hare telegram #179 to the Department of State: 2476).

The U.S. had unconfirmed reports that the Saudi armed troops and armed vehicles massed at Al Kharj, and some were at Amn Haradh (*Ibid*, 780.022/10-852: October 8 Acheson telegram # 90 to the Consulate General at Dhahran: 2485). The British troops were only a few kilometers from the Saudis at Hamasa and British jets overflew the area regularly. The probability of armed conflict was high.

Direct talks stalemated, impartial arbitration suggested

The resumption of direct talks between Britain and Saudi Arabia was in stalemate. Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. to mediate immediately. The U.S. was trapped. It wanted to maintain its long-term alignment with the British and to strengthen its fragile alignment with the Saudis. The U.S. did not want to give any appearance of choosing sides.²⁴⁷ U.S. mediation of the dispute had the potential of negative impact on relations with both states and alignments with them. To bail the U.S. out of its predicament, Hare suggested that both sides

²⁴⁷ Williamson believed that the U.S. dilemma arose from two issues. The U.S. believed that Saudi friendship and good relations with the Saudis were more important to the overall Western position in the region than British support for smaller Gulf States (Williamson 2006: 98). However, the U.S. also wanted to find a way to help the British retain its position in the Middle East because the U.S. needed Britain in the Cold War against the Soviets (Citino 2002 cited Williamson 2006: 98-99).

cease their provocative acts, resume direct negotiations with each other, and agree to a standstill²⁴⁸ at Buraimi and other eastern frontier areas (*Ibid*, 641.86A/10-652: October 6 Hart memorandum of conversation: 2482-2483). Britain and Saudi Arabia agreed to a standstill.

The U.S. felt that that direct talks between the British and Saudis were ineffective, so the U.S. promoted the British suggestion of impartial arbitration. Hare explained that the dispute was about British and Saudi aspirations for oil and territory²⁴⁹ (*Ibid*, 780.022/11-452: November 4 Hare telegram #338 to the Department of State: 2494).

For Ibn Saud and Faisal, Buraimi was another instance of U.S. policy aimed against the Arabs. Similar to the Palestine-Israel issue, Faisal considered the Buraimi dispute as another window of opportunity for the Soviets. Faisal warned: "'Don't place too much faith in what Arab leaders may tell you that Communism is incompatible with Islam. We are in desperate straits. A drowning man will grasp at a snake,²⁵⁰ even a poisonous one if it is the only chance he has to prevent his going under for the last time" (*Ibid*, Lot 53 D 65: December 4 S/A (Jessup) files, Foreign Ministers Meetings-New York, October-December, 1952: Plitt memorandum of Acheson conversation with Foreign Ministers of the Near East, 7th U.N. General Assembly: 2501). It was as clear a statement as Faisal could make about the alignment being in jeopardy. If Saudi national interests, security, and survival were at stake and the U.S. did not help, the Saudis would abandon²⁵¹ alignment with the U.S. and consider

²⁴⁸ Neither side wanted to retreat. In the standstill agreement of October 1952, Saudi Arabia retained control over Hamasa, the main village at Buraimi. The British and Saudis remained in current positions but were not to threaten or to jeopardise future decisions regarding sovereignty at Buraimi (Petersen 2000: 38). This latter point was virtually the same as the "London Agreement" in 1951, but which both sides violated in their August 1952 military moves.

²⁴⁹ Petersen (2000:37) argued that the Saudis and Americans had mutual interests in expelling the British from the Arabian Peninsula and controlling the entire Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms. There is no evidence of this in the declassified FRUS documents.

²⁵⁰ Schroeder used the same analogy that "a drowning man will seize hold even of a snake" (Schroeder 1976: 233).

²⁵¹ The terms abandonment, de-alignment, and re-alignment are synonymous (Schweller 2001: 248).

joining with the Soviets.²⁵² Schweller's view of alliance reflected the tougher and more calculating aspect of realist thought: "alliances are not friendships but relationships of utility based on strict calculations of self-interest; they are cooperative endeavors meaning that members concert" or aggregate "their resources in the pursuit of some common goal" (Schweller 2001: 236). In this context, the duty of governments is "safeguarding their territorial frontiers, furthering the interests of their people, and, in international politics, making decisions for self-preservation and not for the survival of an ally or friend" (*Ibid*).

As the only state aligned with the U.S. in the region in 1952, the Saudis wanted the U.S. to exert its political influence²⁵³ on Britain, have the British adhere to the standstill agreement,²⁵⁴ and form a tripartite Buraimi plebiscite commission²⁵⁵ among Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Britain. The U.S. refused to be a part of the plebiscite commission.²⁵⁶ Proposals for impartial arbitration did not move forward. As all sides scurried to find a breakthrough, the threat of full scale war between Saudi Arabia and Britain remained.

²⁵² Other than the Soviets, there were no other comparable great powers that the Saudis could look to for an alignment that could provide them with military and other aid they needed. Walter Laqueur explained that Saudi Arabia had always been regarded with some favor in Moscow. Soviets were benevolent in their view of Ibn Saud because of his anti-British attitude in the 1920s and 1930s (Laqueur 1959: 154). According to Laqueur, "Saudi Arabia and its rulers were described as victims of Western imperialism; the Americans and the British were made responsible for the exploitation of the workers in the oil fields. The Saudi rulers were given credit for their stand against Western aggression, their struggle for independence and against imperialism, and they were supported in their conflict with Britain on the Buraimi oasis" (*Ibid*, 155).

²⁵³ The U.S. and Britain had mutual economic, military, and political interests in the region. The two states were traditional allies. Ibn Saud believed the Americans could influence Britain in the context of "Washington's fears that British activities in Saudi Arabia were prejudicial to the standing of the Western world in the Middle East" (Leatherdale 1983: 345).

²⁵⁴ The Saudis were facing a possible armed battle in which they did not have enough capabilities to fight. Aside from British troops already camped in the area, the Imam of Oman asked the Sultan of Muscat for help; the Sultan agreed to send "a fairly sizeable Arab force to the general area of Buraimi" (FRUS 780.022/11-452: November 4 Hare telegram #338 to the Department of State: 2494). The British also moved to cut off the Saudi supply line between Buraimi and Al Ahsa.

²⁵⁵ The Saudis wanted a plebiscite to determine if the inhabitants of the Buraimi oasis wanted to be with Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis felt they would prevail since they already occupied the oasis and could easily influence the local tribes with lavish bribes (Smith 2000: 38).

²⁵⁶ Truman rejected the Saudi proposal for a plebiscite and decided on arbitration because of the Saudi occupation of Hamasa and reports of lavish Saudi bribes to local tribes (Petersen 2000: 38). That was also the British position for rejecting a plebiscite and wanting arbitration (Williamson 2006: 78). Parker Hart disputes the allegation that Saudi Arabia used ARAMCO royalties to finance bribes against British interests. Hart contended that these were exaggerated claims arising from contradictory intelligence information (Hart 1999: 67).

The Buraimi dispute in 1953

The U.S. turned down Saudi requests for U.S. mediation and U.S. participation in a plebiscite commission because of U.S. fears of entrapment in the dispute. The U.S. Department of State explained to the Saudi Ambassador in Washington that “intimate U.S. friendship for Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom dictates against direct U.S. involvement in settlement machinery which could require United States to attempt to verify allegiances or otherwise exercise judgment (*Ibid*, 780.022/1-1053: January 10 Acheson telegram #418 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2513).

The U.S. and British views on Saudi aggressive intentions and territorial ambitions began to converge. The British believed that the Saudis were “not interested in settlement, but eventually to extend domination over whole Arabian Peninsula at the expense of lesser Arab rulers and the British Government position. (*Ibid*, 780.022/3-3154: March 31 Aldrich Telegram #5371 to the Department of State: 2527). Dulles described the dispatch of Saudi forces to Buraimi in August 1952 as “indicative of expanding Saudi ambitions” and that Truman’s October 1950 letter to Ibn Saud, which gave U.S. assurances against external threats to Saudi Arabia, was “not meant to serve as a cloak for Saudi expeditions into disputed territories on the periphery of [Ibn Saud’s] domain” (*Ibid*, 780.022/4-153: April 1 Dulles telegram #565 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2531). Furthermore, according to Dulles, “if Saudis intend to rely upon us for advice and assistance in security matters they must take us into their counsels²⁵⁷ before embarking upon campaigns in disputed territories” (*Ibid*).

²⁵⁷ Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Parker Hart confirmed that Dulles was angry that the Saudis did not forewarn the U.S. Government of their territorial claims (Hart 1999: 63). Dulles epitomised a missionary vision whereby the world aspired to be like America and America had to champion the rights of both the voiceless and, at times, unenlightened. The battle between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ was so clear that Dulles had little time for either non-alignment or neutrality, concepts he regarded as short-sighted and immoral (Dobson and Marsh 2001: 26).

Thus, by occupying Hamasa and not coordinating with the U.S. beforehand, the Saudis showed that, in fact, there were no constraints on their freedom to act at Buraimi.²⁵⁸ U.S. protection against any aggression was one of the main reasons that the Saudis aligned with the U.S. Using Snyder's theory,²⁵⁹ on which Schweller based most of his arguments, the Saudis perceived that its alignment with the U.S. produced the benefit of enhanced deterrence of attack from its adversaries, which included the British Government that supported Saudi Arabia's neighbouring states. The Saudis perceived that the alignment with the U.S. enhanced its capability for defence against attack; the U.S. would provide aid and, in the event of an attack, U.S. help was forthcoming.

Dulles meetings in Riyadh

The unwillingness of the U.S. to help based on Saudi expectations worsened Saudi perception of U.S. insincerity in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia. At the Riyadh meeting on May 18, 1953 with Dulles, Ibn Saud repeated his contention that the British became unfriendly to him because Saudi Arabia granted oil concessions to the U.S (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, part 1: Conference files, Lot 59 D 95, CF 156: May 18 U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 97). Ibn Saud wanted the U.S. "to execute its promises given in the letter sent to him by President Truman and confirmed by President Eisenhower" (*Ibid*, 99), and pointed out that the U.S. was "not living up to their promises" (*Ibid*). Crown Prince Saud queried Dulles "whether the final U.S. attitude was in favor of the British or whether the U.S. expected more details from Saudi Arabia for the U.S. to reconsider its attitude" (*Ibid*, 100).²⁶⁰ The Crown Prince emphasised that he Saudi

²⁵⁸ The cost in alliance or alignment is loss of some autonomy (Snyder 1997: 43). An alliance generally places constraints of freedom of action because it implies a need to coordinate policy with an ally; and perhaps to modify one's preferred policy to suit an ally's preferences (*Ibid*, 44).

²⁵⁹ Snyder characterised increased security as the benefit of alliance (Snyder 1997: 43).

²⁶⁰ Eisenhower continued the same position that Truman had towards Buraimi, i.e., to stay aloof from the conflict and avoid having to choose between two states friendly to the U.S. (Petersen 2000: 38). According to

Government “did not know whether Saudi Arabia had yet gained the friendship of the U.S. and whether the U.S. would support her;”²⁶¹ if not, Saudi Arabia would have to find some other way to maintain her interests (*Ibid*). Saudi Arabia no longer felt that the alignment satisfied its security needs.²⁶² Without U.S. protection of Saudi sovereignty and territory at Buraimi, the Saudis perceived that alignment with the U.S. did not yield the expected security benefits. The contentious exchanges between Dulles and Crown Prince Saud showed the depth to which relations and the alignment sunk (*Ibid*, 101-104).

Eisenhower tries to calm the Saudis

Eisenhower explained to Ibn Saud the U.S. belief in impartial arbitration for the dispute:

My Government adopted the view that the Buraimi problem might properly be settled through impartial arbitration that would include all relevant fact-finding and investigation on the spot. [It is offered as] an honorable and equitable method of solution. It is therefore gratifying to know that Your Majesty has agreed in principle with the British Government for settlement of the Buraimi issue through impartial arbitration. Upon careful review of the facts, Your Majesty will conclude that the U.S. has not failed in its duties as a true friend of Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*, 786A.11/6-1553: June 15 Eisenhower letter to Ibn Saud: 2541-2542).

Ibn Saud responded to Eisenhower that British forces attacked Saudi subjects at Buraimi on June 27 (*Ibid*, Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower": June 29 Ibn Saud letter to Eisenhower: 2545). Ibn Saud lamented that the British response to his agreement to arbitration was a “series of aggressive acts” and “abominable crimes committed by the British authorities” (*Ibid*). The U.S. investigated the attacks and concluded that it was a “factional strife within the Beni Kaab tribe” with one part of the tribe allegiant to Ibn Saud and another part desirous of British protection (*Ibid*, 780.022/7-753: July 7 Dulles

Petersen, the Anglo-Saudi conflict was a product of “traditional Saudi expansionism and Saudi suspicions that Britain intended to extend the influence of the Hashemites” (*Ibid*, 54).

²⁶¹ Uncertainty about intentions works as a “show-stopper for cooperation” (Glaser 1994 cited Carlsnaes et al 2002: 372).

²⁶² The security benefit in alliance or alignment generally precludes a partner from allying elsewhere if the alignment satisfies the partner’s needs (Snyder 1997: 44). However, the risk of a counter-alliance is always present (*Ibid*).

memorandum to Eisenhower: 2555). The U.S. held to its position that both sides resolve the dispute through impartial arbitration. There were significant hurdles to overcome.

The British did not want to Buraimi to become a symbol of British loss of power and influence in the Persian Gulf area (*Ibid*, 780.022/7-2753: July 27 Salisbury to Dulles: 2560). For the U.S., friendly and confident relations with the Saudi King were of vital importance. For common defence purposes, mutual alignments among the U.S., Britain, and Saudi Arabia were critical to stopping Russian gains in the area and, more immediately, defusing growing tensions at the Suez Canal.²⁶³ (*Ibid*, 780.022/8-2853: August 28 Dulles to Salisbury: 2566). The Saudis wanted equality of forces at Buraimi before arbitration. The Saudis did not want to be embarrassed by the withdrawal of Amir Turki and his forces. Faisal expressed Saudi anxiety and frustration about the U.S. position on Buraimi and that the Saudi people did not see any advantages to Saudi Arabia in its alignment with the U.S. (*Ibid*, 780.022/10-1153: October 11 Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 2567).

Buraimi arbitration talks collapse²⁶⁴

Eden announced to the British Commons that British troops moved to re-occupy the Buraimi Oasis in October 1955.²⁶⁵ The U.S. concern was that British actions would create “new opportunities for those who sought to destroy Western influence in the Near East and make it increasingly difficult to persuade Near Eastern nations to adopt peaceful measures in settlement of disputes” (*Ibid*, 780.022/11-455: November 4 Hoover telegram #223 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 285-286). The U.S. Consulate in Dhahran added that “this British action may drive Saudis and Egyptians together in Persian Gulf area, something contrary to

²⁶³ The British expressed "fear that U.S. policy of trying to wean the Saudis away from Egypt may be at the expense of selling out the British in Buraimi (*Ibid*, United States Department of State, 1955-1957. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia: FRUS Editorial note #227: 365).

²⁶⁴ Britain withdrew from the Geneva talks because it grew weary of political manoeuvrings and doubted the impartiality of the adjudicators (Morton 2006: 177).

²⁶⁵ Similar to their reaction in August 1952 when they sent British troops to the area, the British did not inform or consult with the U.S. (Petersen 2006: 15).

what we were beginning to hope might happen; the UK action in Buraimi may have prejudiced US interests in Gulf area” (*Ibid*, 780.022/10-3055: October 30 Carrigan telegram #79 to the Department of State: 285).

There was internal pressure on Saud to use Saudi forces to fight the British. However, Faisal indicated that Saudi Arabia leaned towards submitting the Buraimi matter to the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. opposed the idea, fearing that charges and countercharges at the U.N. would further weaken the standing of Western countries (*Ibid*, 780.022/11-2155: November 21 Dulles telegram #2929 to the Embassy in the United Kingdom: 292). The U.S. knew the Soviets would support Saudi Arabia at the U.N., while the best the U.S. could do there was to abstain on voting.²⁶⁶ The U.S. expressed grave concern that unless a peaceful solution to the Buraimi issue happened soon, Saudi dissatisfaction could lead to “a considerable risk of the Saudis turning to the Soviets for support, instead of to the [U.S.]” (*Ibid*, 786A.00/12-2055: December 20 Hoover memorandum to Dulles: 304).

The Buraimi Dispute in 1956

At a meeting with Wadsworth in Riyadh in January 1956, Saud emphasised Buraimi as “the test” of future Saudi relations with the West; and his “determination to resist Soviet offers and pressures, to yield only if ‘forced’ so to do by U.S. rebuff of his advances” (*Ibid*, 611.86A/1-2656: January 26 Wadsworth letter to Allen: 325). Saudi Arabia was the last bastion against it: “Be sure we will fight Communism and Russia like the plague, but don’t force me, by your acts of omissions, to take the plague” (*Ibid*). This is hard to interpret other than as a Saudi willingness to pursue a Soviet alignment if the Saudis decided that the U.S. alignment no longer satisfied their needs.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ If the Buraimi dispute went to the U.N. for a decision, the U.S. would not coordinate with Britain (Hart 1997: 67). To do otherwise would show that the U.S. sided with the British against Saudi Arabia, thus proving what the Saudis felt all along.

²⁶⁷ Snyder explained that “the greater the shortfall between a state’s military strength and that of its opponent, and the deeper the conflict, the greater its need and the more it values alliance that satisfies the need” (Snyder

The British argued for a tough policy against Saudi Arabia.²⁶⁸ The U.S. Government wanted to find a way to convince Britain to take a more flexible approach to the dispute with the Saudis. The U.S. believed that the British based their arguments against the Saudis on the wrong premise.²⁶⁹ The U.S. wanted the British to understand Saudi “fear of British domination of the Persian Gulf” (*Ibid*, 780.022/1-1756: NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers) Geren memorandum of conversation: 317).

The U.S. Department of State continued to stay neutral on Buraimi; however, it wanted both sides to return to arbitration, or failing that, have both sides engage in direct talks. The U.S. repeated that it did not want the Buraimi matter sent to the U.N. Security Council because “the Soviets would be able to outbid us in supporting the Arabs just as they have outbid us in the current Arab-Israeli dispute” (*Ibid*, 780.022/1-1756: January 17 Allen memorandum to Hoover: 316). For the Saudis to break its alignment with the U.S. was a serious concern; having Saudi Arabia and other Arab states aligned with Soviet Russia and its communist satellites would be disastrous for the U.S. and the West. This paper does not assess the probability of the Saudis aligning with the Soviets. It merely observes that the Saudi leaders spoke of it as an option. For the Saudis, there were enough issues to keep the Soviet option open.²⁷⁰

1997: 45). Given the military disadvantage of the Saudis relative to the British military capabilities at Buraimi, Saud emphasised the great need for the U.S. Government to help Saudi Arabia. Absent that help, turning to the Soviets might be his only viable option.

²⁶⁸ Tore Petersen explained that the British took harder negotiating positions because they felt that they were being eased out of their former core areas in Middle East (Petersen 2000: xiii). Petersen contended that it was at Buraimi that Britain drew the line against U.S. pressure, even threatening to kill Americans found at the oasis in the Spring of 1954. The British believed that drilling for oil by ARAMCO was only a subterfuge to bribe tribes to switch their allegiance to Saudi Arabia (Petersen 2006: 15). Petersen also contended that the Buraimi dispute eventually contributed to the rupture of the Atlantic alliance during the Suez crisis of 1956 (Petersen 2000: 71).

²⁶⁹ The Geren memorandum claimed that the British described Saudi Arabian activities in terms of evil because the Saudis voted with Communist satellites.

²⁷⁰ First, the Soviets were first to establish diplomatic relations with Ibn Saud in 1926. Even in those early years of the Kingdom, the Soviets wanted to weaken the British and were willing to overlook any political ideological differences with Saudi Arabia. The Soviets had a large Muslim population and did not want to be

The implications of Buraimi for Western power and influence, and Persian Gulf stability and security²⁷¹ were not lost on Dulles when he responded to the British.

Our concern is preservation of the Western position in the area, including assurance of continued Western access to the oil of the region.²⁷² The continued tension between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia threatens the stability of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula; and creates difficulties for the settlement of other disputes. Consideration of Buraimi in the U.N. Security Council will provide an opportunity to the Soviet Union and other elements unfriendly to the West to exploit the situation for their own ends. We acknowledge the threat to our mutual position by Saudi Arabian activities in other parts of the Arab world. We do not believe Saudi Arabia is irrevocably committed to an anti-Western position. Following a solution of the Buraimi issue and some solution to the Arab-Israeli question, Saudi Arabia might be persuaded to reorient its current anti-Western policies and activities. (*Ibid*: 320).

The British response

portrayed as an “adamant anti-Islam” power. Quandt (1981:65; Jacobson 1994: 180-181) pointed to the development of close trade and commercial ties between the Soviets and the Saudis in the 1920s and 1930s. Second, the size of U.S. military and other aid to non-Arab countries was a persistent critical issue for the Saudis and other Arab states. For six and a half years until June 30, 1957, Saudi Arabia received \$43 million in U.S. military and other aid compared to \$394 million for Turkey, \$480 million for Israel, and \$394 million for Iran (Yale 1948: 427-428). Moscow was willing to provide “generous economic aid and arms as a substitute for Western offers that contained conditions such as treaties, bases, and peace with Israel (Telhami 1990 cited in Hinnebusch 2003: 23). The Czech arms deal with Egypt demonstrated the option of getting arms through channels other than Western alignments (*Ibid*, 24). Third, from the perspective of Saudi Arabia and the Arab states, Russia and communism were less dangerous than Israel and Zionism. The Arabs considered Zionism its #1 enemy, followed by British and French colonialism and the Pro-Israel U.S. policy (Yale 1948: 429).

²⁷¹ In Snyder’s theory (1997: 53), power, influence, stability, and security are general or strategic interests in alliance.

²⁷² Oil and territory in the Buraimi dispute are specific or particular interests (*Ibid*, 54, 130). A dilemma arises if one ally focuses on strategic interest and the other ally focuses on particular interest. Reputational interest is another notion advanced by Snyder. It refers to reciprocity in alliance and the fulfillment of a promise to help. These contentions by Snyder influenced Schweller and are relevant to the Buraimi issue. The Saudis focused on oil and territory and seemed to disregard the issue of regional stability and security. Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had reputational interests at stake: the U.S. reputation about its ability and sincerity in fulfilling promises to help; and the Saudi reputation of choosing an ally that did not fulfill its promise to protect its sovereignty and territory.

Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary argued that the stakes in Buraimi and the Persian Gulf were more vital for the British; Britain could not afford to lose. Oil and British economic and national security were the primary reasons for the British position on Buraimi.²⁷³

Our position in the Persian Gulf States depends upon the confidence of the Rulers and people in our ability to protect their interests. Letting the Saudis back into Buraimi would be fatal to that position. Our economy depends entirely on oil. Thirty per cent of Middle East oil lies under the Persian Gulf States with which we have special relations. The proportion will be much higher if substantial deposits are found in Muscat. We must at all costs retain control of this oil. It might make the whole difference to our national survival, particularly if for any reason the larger oil-bearing states were to go wrong. (*Ibid*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK officials' correspondence with Secty. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I. incoming: January 23 Lloyd message to Dulles: 323).

Oil was a sensitive political issue for the British in the context of Roosevelt bluntly telling British Ambassador Lord Halifax about how Middle East oil was to be divided. Vitalis cited the incident: "Trying to allay Halifax's apprehension and irritation, Roosevelt showed the Ambassador a rough sketch he had made of the Middle East; Persian oil is yours. We share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait; as for Saudi Arabian oil, it is ours" (Yergin 1991 cited Vitalis 2003: 4).

Perhaps, that story still weighed heavy on British pride. On his journey from London to Washington, British Prime Minister Eden commented bitterly about "the U.S. wanting always to have Britain abandon its interests and give away its rights" (*op.cit*, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648B: January 30 Barnes memorandum to Hoover: 324). Aldrich assured him and the British Government of three things: "the U.S. did not want to replace Britain in the area and did not want American oil interests to oust the British; the U.S. had no intention to expand the Saudi kingdom at British expense; and failure to reach a

²⁷³ Williamson (2006) argued that the British perceived the "expansionist design" of the Saudis as a "direct challenge to the British position in the Gulf" (Williamson 2006: 75). The British feared that power was shifting to the U.S. and Britain would lose its power, influence, and prestige (*Ibid*: 77).

solution and have the Buraimi matter sent to the UN would embarrass both Governments”

(*Ibid*).

Eden in Washington

Dulles discussed Buraimi with Eden in the context of heavy reliance by the U.S. on Saudi oil and the Dhahran Airfield, thereby making it important for the U.S. to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia. The U.S. did not want to be in a position where U.S. interests might be lost; the U.S. hoped the British Government would agree to a continuation of impartial arbitration in the dispute. Buraimi seriously endangered the Western position in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia (*Ibid*, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. 780.022/1-2256 January 30 memorandum of conversation, White House: 328-329). Eden explained that Britain could not yield in Buraimi. Oil was vital to British existence and if the British should weaken and yield the position of the Sheikdoms, with whom Britain had series of treaties, the resulting situation would be untenable (*Ibid*).

Dulles commented that the Saudis “would not completely renounce Saudi intentions to dominate other areas on the Arabian Peninsula”, and Eden added that Britain did not trust the Saudis²⁷⁴ because “harmful Saudi actions in the area were not only directed at the British in the Buraimi matter but also involved the Hashemite-Saudi quarrel and Israel” (*Ibid*, 333).

Eisenhower believed that a “good plan” for solving the dispute should be “logical but also should be based on the necessity of taking into account world opinion” (*Ibid*). The U.S. and Britain agreed that the Buraimi issue became a question of pride and ‘saving face’ for all parties to the dispute.²⁷⁵ The U.S. Department of State reported to the Saudi Ambassador in

²⁷⁴ Safran (1988) argued that Ibn Saud used Buraimi to “signal to Britain that strategic understanding with them was a two-way street; if there was no restraint on the Hashemites, he would not restrain himself either” (Safran 1988: 65). According to Safran, King Saud turned the Buraimi dispute into a symbol of the recovery of Saudi national rights versus British imperialism (*Ibid*: 79).

²⁷⁵ J.E. Peterson proposed that the “smoldering Anglo-American postwar rivalry in the region came to a head of sorts with the Buraimi crisis” (Peterson 1986: 89). He focused his argument on oil, not territorial expansion: “The significance of the dispute went beyond questions of borders. At the heart of the Saudi action, and the

Washington that, as a result of the meetings in Washington between Eden and Eisenhower, the British “agreed to re-examine the situation to try again to find means of settlement by direct or third party discussions; the U.S. did not wish to remain in the center in this matter but facilitate finding a solution” (*Ibid*, 780.022/2-256: February 2 Newsom memorandum of conversation, Department of State: 338). Eisenhower’s diary papers show that the discussions with Eden concluded that, “only by direct talks between Saud and high British officials can the matter be settled” (Eisenhower Papers Diary Series 1956, doc #1744).

Realist alliance elements in the Buraimi dispute

Power

Buraimi represented a potential shift in power. Power would either weaken for the British and strengthen for Saudi Arabia; or strengthen for the British and further weaken Saudi Arabia. U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia were at stake as well. The Saudis claimed territory and potential oil resources at the Buraimi Oasis. A successful Saudi claim meant a loss of British power and influence in the area of the Shaikhdoms and the Gulf; and a tilt in power there towards the Saudis and indirectly towards the U.S. because of its alignment with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis perceived that British power and influence were diminishing in the region; and may have used Buraimi to resurrect its territorial expansionist appetite that the British managed to suppress previously. Furthermore, the Saudis believed the U.S. would do everything to protect Saudi sovereignty and territory, which added to Saudi confidence in its occupation of Buraimi. The Buraimi dispute seemed to invalidate Ibn Saud’s view that the U.S. was a political and military counterbalance to the British. The Buraimi dispute revealed that the U.S. was not prepared to use military force unless U.S. vital interests in Saudi Arabia were directly threatened.

reason for the spirited British objection, was the possibility of oil in the area. ARAMCO held the concession for Saudi Arabia, while the largely British firm, Iraq Petroleum Company, held the concessions in Abu Dhabi and Oman. Consequently, London and Washington found themselves arrayed on opposing sides” (*Ibid*).

Threat

There was a threat to area stability and security because the dispute seemed to head towards conflict and war as Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the Sultan of Muscat stationed military troops there. Using Walt's theory, the Saudis perceived that British military capabilities aggregated with those of the Sultan of Muscat were immediate and proximate threats to Saudi Arabia. In the Saudi view, the British had the offensive power to pursue offensive intentions against the Kingdom. The British could also call upon Iraq and Jordan for more military power against the Saudis. The Saudis did not have the military capabilities against the British and its Arab allies. U.S. interests were at risk. Any war over Buraimi would surely disrupt the flow of oil from the area. However, in the context of Saudi contentions about ownership of the disputed area, the U.S. underplayed its interests and chose to preserve U.S. relations with Britain, a longer-standing and stronger U.S. ally than Saudi Arabia was at that time. The Soviets watched for the opportunity to attract the Saudis into its sphere of influence if the either the U.S. or Saudi Arabia abandoned their alignment.

Interest/opportunity

The dispute showed that a difference in the nature of their interests²⁷⁶ was one major factor that caused the difficulties²⁷⁷ faced by both states. Similar to the Palestine problem, there was an imbalance of interests in the Buraimi issue. The U.S. seemed more focused on regional stability and security, U.S. oil interests, and keeping Britain from slipping further from its position of power and influence. The U.S. needed Britain and Saudi Arabia in

²⁷⁶ Snyder advanced the notion of general strategic interest, particular interest, and reputational interest in management of security alliance. Schweller adapted his 'balance of interest' theory to Snyder's notions.

²⁷⁷ Josh Pollack attributed these difficulties or "highs and lows" in the relationship to "how closely the security of the Saudi state and the American policy of containment aligned at any given time" (Pollack 2002: 79). The Americans balanced Saudi security concerns against the implementation of the United States' own regional and global strategies for the containment of Soviet power (*Ibid*).

efforts to contain the Soviets.²⁷⁸ The U.S. wanted that status quo maintained. However, the U.S. had to balance this with its specific or particular strategic interests in Saudi oil and Saudi geography.

Saudi Arabia's focus was gaining territory²⁷⁹ and the prospect of additional oil resources. Saudi Arabia wanted to assert its sovereignty; and seemed to show less concern about the effects of their actions on area security and stability.²⁸⁰ The Saudis expected the U.S. to help politically and militarily; the U.S. did not want to arm the Saudis or render military assistance at Buraimi. Saudi Arabia was a revisionist state in the dispute and sought absolute gains.

Both states had reputational interests at stake. The U.S. did not want to project the image of being an unreliable ally. Saudi Arabia wanted to show its freedom of action in order to prevent an image of subservience to the U.S. or Britain. Saudi characterised a prospective Saudi defeat in the Buraimi dispute as a great embarrassment for Saudi Arabia and would give the Kingdom a reputation as a loser. More than simply failed Saudi expectations at Buraimi, a Saudi loss and embarrassment could undo the Saudi-U.S. alignment. That represented a potential monumental shift in the balance of regional and global power and heightened threats of a hot war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

²⁷⁸ Hahn (2004) argued that the U.S. depended too much on Britain as a pillar of global containment against the U.S.S.R. and subordinated U.S. political interests to strategic interests (Hahn 2004: 243). This was evident in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi dispute.

²⁷⁹ Toby Jones pointed out that in late December 1948 American geologist and mining engineer Karl Twitchell noted to the Saudi Minister of Finance Suleiman that maps of the Saudi southern borders had grievous errors, "leaving Saudi boundaries vulnerable to dispute or seizure and undermine the Kingdom's claims to future oil discoveries" (Jones 2010: 201-21). Twitchell urged Suleiman to demand that Saudi borders be drawn as far south as possible (*Ibid*). Robert Sullivan explained that Saudi Arabia's main concern was to "consolidate a territorially and socially expanding habitat and thereby to become an Arab state equal in scope with the Arabian Peninsula; this meant expansion in a south-easterly direction to the outermost limits possible, for Saudi Arabian power was too limited to challenge the more established positions of Great Britain in Iraq and Transjordan in the north" (Sullivan 1970: 436-460).

²⁸⁰ Thomas Risse-Kapen characterised the Saudi-U.S. alliance as "based on narrowly defined self-interests" (Risse-Kapen 1997: 216). This may be true if one restricts the alignment to their specific interests such as oil or military security; or reputational interests such as political image and prestige. There are, however, broader strategic interests for both states on matters of regional security and stability.

Entrapment/Abandonment

Buraimi was not merely a territorial dispute between Britain and Saudi Arabia. Similar to the Palestine problem, it threatened to tear apart the Saudi-U.S. alignment. The U.S. faced what Schweller (2001: 247) called the *entrapment-abandonment* dilemma: being drawn into and entrapped in a conflict in which it did not have interests and was none of its doing; and the prospect of the Saudis abandoning the alignment because they viewed that the U.S. failed to live up to its commitments. The discussions show that U.S. relations and alignment with Saudi weakened further because the U.S. could not solve the double dilemma²⁸¹ it faced in the dispute between two separate allies of the U.S. The ‘dual alignment’ of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on one side and the U.S. and Britain on the other side worsened U.S fears of being entangled or entrapped²⁸² by both states in their dispute over oil and territory. Despite its attempts to stay neutral, the U.S. seemed increasingly entangled with the appeals of both Governments for the U.S. to help settle the dispute.

U.S. neutrality and U.S. refusal to mediate or to arbitrate disturbed the Saudi Arabian leaders deeply. The Saudis and the Americans feared abandonment.²⁸³ From the Saudi perspective, they did not get the military and political support they expected from the alignment with the U.S. The Saudis perceived that the U.S. failed to live up to its assurances to protect Saudi sovereignty and territory and abandoned them in their needs at Buraimi. The U.S. failed to live up to its verbal assurances to protect Saudi sovereignty. Buraimi exposed a

²⁸¹ D.C. Williamson called it an “ambiguous situation” because Saudi Arabia was an ally and not a threat; and the U.S. needed the British to maintain regional stability and help in the Cold War against the Soviets (Williamson 2006: 77).

²⁸² Schweller explained entrapment as a state being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that a state does not share or shares only partially (Schweller 2001: 248). A state that does not share an ally’s interest in a conflict can give a firm commitment to join or support the ally in the conflict; however, this can increase the fear of entrapment and further increase the opponent’s hostility. To avoid entrapment by a weak commitment to the ally increases the fear of abandonment and can strengthen the resolve of the opponent. Fears of entrapment and abandonment create severe dilemmas.

²⁸³ Schweller explained that abandonment is when an ally re-aligns, de-aligns, or simply fails to live up to its treaty commitments when called upon to do so (*Ibid*).

wide gap between U.S verbal assurances and Saudi expectations²⁸⁴ of U.S. fulfillment of guarantees of its territorial integrity and the protection of Saudi Arabia against external aggression.

The Americans thought that the Saudis might choose to leave the alignment, which would jeopardise U.S. oil and strategic interests in Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. perspective, if the alignment broke apart because of Buraimi, Saudi Arabia might push through with its option of aligning with the Soviets. That could mean U.S. and Western access to Saudi oil would disappear or become extremely difficult; and the use of Dhahran and Saudi strategic territory could shift to the U.S.S.R.

Conclusion

The deployment of the realist alliance elements of power, threat, and interest/opportunity to the Buraimi dispute results in a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the management of relations and behaviour in the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

U.S. neutrality in the Buraimi matter and the eventual U.S. decision to accede to Britain's wishes weakened and imperiled relations and the alignment. Similar to the Palestine-Israel problem, Saudi leaders sensed another betrayal on the part of the U.S. The Saudis doubted the reliability and political will of the U.S. to protect and preserve Saudi interests. However, also similar to the Palestine problem, the Saudi-U.S. alignment held together despite the problems at Buraimi. The same specific interests overrode any inclination for either the U.S. or Saudi Arabia to abandon the alignment. These interests included U.S. access to oil, U.S. use rights at Dhahran, Saudi needs for U.S. economic and military aid, Saudi concerns about internal and external threats to the monarchy, and mutual concerns about the threat of Soviet

²⁸⁴ Glenn Snyder explained that in war or crisis states have some expectation of being supported by states with which they share interests and values (Snyder 1992 in Rothstein, et al 1992: 89).

Communism. Their collective mutual interests again prevented the alignment from crumbling.

In the next two years, greater instability in the region brought more pressure on the Saudi-U.S. alignment. Not only would the Suez crisis draw the U.S. into the Middle East completely, the U.S. became the only great power left to deal with regional instability and the Soviet threat.²⁸⁵ As the Soviets became more focused on the Middle East, the more the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to strengthen and maintain their alignment in order to balance against shifts in the regional balance of power and new threats to the region. The next chapter shows how the two states reached the goal of securing their mutual interests and cementing their relationship.

Chapter 8

Deploying Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1956-1957)

Introduction

The aim of Chapter 8 is to continue the deployment of the realist alliance elements of power, threat, and interest/opportunity in order to enrich the understanding of the complex events and circumstances that impacted the alignment in 1956-1957. By continuing to deploy multiple alliance theory elements into the data, a clearer understanding emerges about Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment during the Suez crisis and the immediate post-Suez political and military environment. Perceptions and concerns about balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interest/opportunity are all clearly present during this period. Thus, this chapter argues that in 1956-1957, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia successfully cemented their informal alliance or alignment in response to shifts in the regional and global balance of

²⁸⁵ Freiburger (1992) pointed out that a major Soviet move in the Middle East during the early to mid-1950s was unlikely because the Soviets faced major internal domestic problems and troubles with its Eastern European allies (Freiburger 1992: 212).

power; to new threats posed by Nasser and the growing Soviet influence in Egypt and in other states; and to assure the security of their mutual financial-economic interests in Saudi oil development, and mutual interests in aggregating their military and political power in the region.

The balance of power changed quickly and dramatically. The Suez crisis diminished British and French power and influence in the region. The U.S. had little choice but to fill the region's power gap. New threats against the mutual interests of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia formed because of Nasser's push for Arab nationalism, his own hegemonic ambitions, and the growing Soviet presence and influence in Egypt and other states in the region. By manipulating Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement, Soviet Russia tried to take advantage of Arab rivalries, gain Arab allies, and increase its capabilities to balance against U.S. power in the region. The Soviet Union²⁸⁶ saw political instability in the area as an opportunity to gain a foothold and to create a Russian sphere of influence. Potential shifts in the regional balance of power, and threats to U.S. Middle East interests from Soviet influence on Egypt, meant increased threats to Saudi Arabia.

The prospect of Egypt and Soviet Russia aggregating their power and expanding their influence in the Arab world unnerved the Saudis as much as the threats posed by Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. Thus, King Saud heightened his concerns about external and internal threats to Saudi sovereignty; and the pressing need for Saudi Arabia to acquire U.S. military arms and equipment to defend against the threats. Saud maintained and strengthened alignment with the U.S. because he perceived that the best path for the security and survival of the Saudi

²⁸⁶ Robert Freedman explored Soviet views and policies towards the Middle East extensively, beginning in World War II and until Nasser's death. See Freedman, R.O., 1975. *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*. New York: Praeger. Also see Laqueur, W.Z., 1956. *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger; Taylor, A.R., 1991. *The Superpowers and the Middle East*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press; Cleveland, W.L., 2000. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; and Cohen M.J., 2004. *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tier*. New York: Routledge.

state and the Al-Saud monarchy depended on gaining more U.S. military and financial-economic resources. Eisenhower wanted to cement the alignment with Saud in order gain a strong ally in U.S. efforts to balance against Nasser's power; and to have a partner with whom to strengthen U.S. material and political capabilities in containing the Soviet threat in the region.

The discussions in this chapter begin in the context of on-going negotiations about Dhahran and Saud's request for U.S. military arms for the Kingdom. Relations and the alignment often appeared to be unstable and contentious. Thus, the U.S. sought ways to regain Saudi trust and confidence in order to realise its goal of finally stabilising and cementing the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

1956: Regaining Saud's trust and confidence

U.S. tries to regain Saud's trust and confidence

Dulles believed that regaining Saud's trust and confidence depended a great deal on Britain accommodating the Saudis on Buraimi. Eisenhower suggested that in any settlement of Buraimi, the U.S. might ask as a "*quid pro quo* a better attitude on the part of the Saudis toward Iraq" (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957 Vol. XV Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries, March 28 Goodpaster memorandum of conference: 423). Dulles believed that Saudi-U.S relations "could be much improved if progress can be made in British-Saudi rapprochement, in an improvement in Iraq-Saudi relations, and in the direction of a solution to Israeli problem" (*op.cit*, FRUS editorial note #227: 365). Bringing Saud back into a strong alignment with the U.S., and splitting Saudi Arabia from Egypt required progress on three fronts: Buraimi, Saudi relations with the Hashemites, and Israel (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957 Vol. XIII: 780.022/5-1556: May 15 memorandum of conversation NAC Foreign Ministers meeting: 367). The U.S perceived a closer and stronger Saudi-U.S. alignment if both states brought their positions on these three

matters into more harmony. Perhaps, compromise was possible regarding Buraimi and the Hashemite states. The Saudis were not as flexible on the matter of Israel and became more inflexible with Israel's participation in the Suez war. However, it seemed that the U.S. did not understand that acquiring military arms and rebuilding Saudi military capabilities were equally important to regaining Saud's trust and confidence. The Dhahran lease negotiations emphasised this point very clearly.

Dhahran lease negotiations *quid pro quo* U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia

The U.S. wanted a long-term Dhahran lease because of broader U.S. strategic interests in maintaining regional peace, security, and stability; and Dhahran was a frontline of defence against any threats of invasion by the Soviets or other antagonistic states. In previous years, the U.S. Pentagon indicated that, compared to U.S. needs during World War II, Dhahran was no longer as important for military strategic purposes. However, in the current negotiations, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated to the U.S. Secretary of Defense that Dhahran remained militarily important to the U.S. Dulles believed that the justification for renewal of Dhahran sought by the Saudis was "the continued value our common effort in development and strengthening Saudi Arabia and defense of principles which we share in common" (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/6-2056: July 11 Dulles telegram #25 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 390). Dulles saw Dhahran as a symbol of mutual interest; and that cooperation there resulted in mutual benefit.

The U.S. did not want to fuel an arms race²⁸⁷ between Arabs and Jews because of the explosive Palestine situation that threatened stability and peace in the area. Saud questioned why the U.S. preferred other states such as Iraq and Iran, Greece and Turkey. In other words, Saud wanted to know why the U.S., as Saudi Arabia's most important ally, did not respond to

²⁸⁷ Anthony Cordesman pointed out that in 1956 Jewish pressure groups in the U.S. asked to stop the sale of "eighteen medium tanks and a handful of F-86 jets" to Saudi Arabia; Eisenhower wanted the sale to proceed because in his view it was Nasser who posed a threat to Saudi Arabia (Cordesman 2003: 107).

his requests with the same degree of importance and urgency the U.S. gave to the other states. Wadsworth assured Saud that the U.S. wanted to “contribute to strengthening the Saudi army to maintain internal security and, in the event of war, defend itself and contribute to the defense of the area (*Ibid*, 611.86A/4-256: April 2 Wadsworth memorandum of conversation: 352). Saud was not satisfied with the explanation. The Saudis used Dhahran to leverage their negotiating position in the lease negotiations and hoped to acquire U.S. military arms as a *quid pro quo*. He wanted the U.S. to send the military arms²⁸⁸ and aid he requested. He made his position very clear, and included the option turning to the Soviets for arms and assistance.

Whatever be asked of me I shall do on three conditions: the independence of my country be maintained; my sovereignty be respected; and there be no interference in our internal affairs. I want three things: back me as I am backing you; [Buraimi] part of my country that has been taken by force be restored; and U.S. Government supply my army with the arms it needs. I am the only Arab leader who has not taken arms from the Russians or their satellites. My army is the weakest. I can get arms elsewhere, with training mission as well, but I want only American arms. You may be sure I shall never use them to attack; I want them for defense. As for Dhahran Airfield, I will never hesitate to give anything that will help reinforce Saudi-American relations (United States Department of State, 1955-1957. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia: 611.86A/4-256 April 2 Wadsworth memorandum of conversation: 353).

Saud also wanted to protect Saudi reputational interests.²⁸⁹ Reputational interests were equally important to Saud’s deliberations about Dhahran. He expressed willingness to renew the lease at Dhahran; but not at the expense of Saudi independence and sovereignty.²⁹⁰ Saud

²⁸⁸ Kenneth Pollack argued that Saud’s need for military arms became more urgent because Saud saw the strength of the Egyptian army in 1954. Pollack noted further that the buildup of the Saudi army did not start until the early 1960s; and that after Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars arming itself, the Saudi Army was ineffective. Pollack explained that the Saudis relied on “foreigners to cover their short-term vulnerabilities and to build their long-term strength” and “relied on the U.S. to bail them out if things got too bad” (Pollack 2004: 427, 446).

²⁸⁹ The Saudis had both specific and reputational interests at Dhahran. The U.S. wanted to gain as much control over Dhahran. The Saudis wanted U.S. control limited because they did not want to project any image of foreign domination or occupation (Macris 2010: 94).

²⁹⁰ For Saud, and Ibn Saud before him, this was a reputational interest; it had more to do with their image and prestige in the Arab world rather than a credible threat of losing Saudi independence and surrendering Saudi

wanted friendly relations and alignment with the U.S. without any threat of interference in Saudi internal matters. He wanted some assurance that the U.S. did not have any ulterior motives to intervene or influence Saudi internal politics.²⁹¹ He needed stronger justification to renew the U.S. lease vis-à-vis great internal pressures from domestic opposition and Egyptian pressures to decline renewing Dhahran: “We need some justification, something concrete which our people and others can see and point to, something which will persuade them of the rightness of my judgment and action” (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/6-1356: June 13 Wadsworth dispatch #213 to the Department of State: 373).

Faisal, Yasin, and Al-Walid offered a solution; a specific *quid pro quo*²⁹² that would satisfy the interests of Saudi Arabia and the U.S.: “In return for a renewal of the agreement, the U.S. provides sufficient military equipment to arm a 13-regiment Saudi army or pay \$50 million per year for the renewal” (*Ibid*, FRUS editorial note #232: 374). Saud used the same rationale that Ibn Saud employed: justify the presence of the U.S. at Dhahran because it gave Saudi Arabia the military arms and equipment the Kingdom needed to defend Saudi territory.

Saud negotiated for as much benefit as he could gain from the alignment. He offered to renew Dhahran for a five year term, in exchange for \$25 million plus another \$85 million worth of arms through grant aid. The U.S. Government believed that its proposal of resupplying Saud with U.S. arms on a \$25 million cash-reimbursable basis met Saud’s formula of “use my airfield and strengthen my Kingdom” (*Ibid*, 711.56386A/9-1356: September 13 Wadsworth telegram #106 to the Department of State: 399). Saud countered that the U.S. “offered Pakistan \$300 million and Spain as much; I do not ask equivalent

sovereignty to the U.S. Saud seemed more prone to buckle under pressure from Nasser regarding Dhahran for reputational reasons only.

²⁹¹ Walt included the notion of ‘transnational penetration’ in his reason for seeking alliance. See chapter 2 of this paper on that aspect.

²⁹² Applying Schweller’s opportunity notion, the Saudis used Dhahran to gain the military arms and other aid that they wanted; and the Americans retained the strategic military and commercial advantages that Dhahran provided.

assistance" (*Ibid*). Saud repeated that he needed justification for renewing Dhahran and cooperating with the U.S.: "This is not first meeting at which I have told you I must justify my position; if you accept my offer, I shall be glad to carry on our cooperation; if you reject it, we shall part friends" (*Ibid*). Saud held the U.S. lease at Dhahran hostage in exchange for satisfying his military needs and maximising gains for the Saudi state.

While the Saudis and Americans negotiated on Dhahran, a much larger event brewed. The Suez crisis became a turning point for complete U.S. involvement and commitment to the region vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. The Suez crisis led the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to strengthen their relations and to cement their alignment.

The Suez Crisis²⁹³

The Suez Crisis showed that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. managed their relations and alignment positively because their general and specific interests in the Suez Crisis were harmonious and virtually identical: protection of oil interests, containment of Soviet influence in the area, and prevention of Nasser's hegemonic ambitions. There were two major results from the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. First, it was the gateway for the U.S. to replace the British economic and political role in the region; Suez pulled the U.S. towards substantial, significant, and enduring involvement in the Middle East (Hahn 2006: 26, 29).²⁹⁴ Second, the strong U.S. position against the military actions of Israel, Britain, and France at Suez, and

²⁹³ For detailed history and background of the Suez Crisis, see Nutting, A., 1967. *No End of a Lesson: the Story of Suez*. London: Constable & Co Ltd.; Cooper, C.L., 1978. *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956*. New York: Harper & Row; Louis, W.R. and Owen, R., 1989. *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kyle, K., 1991. *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris; Kingseed, C.C., 1995. *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press; Gorst, A. and Johnman, L., 1997. *The Suez Crisis*. London: Routledge; Kelly, S. and Gorst, A., 2000. *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis*. London: Frank Cass; Turner, B., 2007. *Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War*. London: Hodder Headline; and Nichols, D.A., 2011. *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis--Suez and the Brink of War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

²⁹⁴ For analysis of the complete entry of the U.S. into the Middle East and failed U.S. policies in the region, see Freiberger, S.Z., 1992. *Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East 1953-1957*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.

Eisenhower's subsequent efforts to pick Saud to be the counterbalance to Nasser,²⁹⁵ provided the U.S. its long-sought opportunities to regain closer Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment.²⁹⁶

The first section in this discussion provides a brief explanation of the circumstances that led to the Suez crisis. The second section focuses on Saudi-U.S. motives and cooperation at Suez, Saud's dilemma with Egypt, and the oil boycott caused by the Suez crisis. The third section deploys realist elements to explain the circumstances in the Suez example.

Background to the Suez crisis

The U.S. and British Governments perceived that Nasser was friendly with the Communist block because Nasser entered into an arms deal with the Soviets using Czechoslovakian²⁹⁷ channels in September 1955. Israel was also acutely concerned about the flow of arms to Egypt from the Czechoslovakia arms deal.²⁹⁸ In April 1956, Nasser signed an anti-Israel alliance with Saudi Arabia and Syria; in May, he extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China. Enraged by these moves, but without consulting with Britain, Dulles withdrew the U.S. offer to help build the Aswan Dam (Bagby 1999: 209). On July 26, 1956, in retaliation for the American and British withdrawal of financing for the Aswan Dam, Nasser seized control of the Canal²⁹⁹ and nationalised the British-French company that

²⁹⁵ William Rugh emphasised that the U.S. watched Nasser closely as he became "stronger politically at home and in the region; he was increasingly the leading representative of Arab nationalism that carried with it not only Anti-Israel but also anti-West and anti-America overtones" (Rugh 2006: 51).

²⁹⁶ Saudi-American tensions eased considerably after the Suez Crisis (Pollack 2002: 79).

²⁹⁷ For background and details on the Czech arms deal see Little, T., 1958. *Egypt*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Takeyh, R., 2000. *The U.S., Britain, and Nasser's Egypt: 1953-57*. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan; and Watt, D.C. and Almog, O., 2003. *Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*. London: Frank Cass.

²⁹⁸ The Czech arms deal impeded the Alpha plan by exciting Israeli fears that Soviet weapons would give Egypt military superiority and encourage Arab aggressiveness. In Israel, talk surfaced of attacking Egypt before it attained an advantage (Hahn 1991: 195). The Alpha Plan was a comprehensive plan that included an Arab-Israeli peace treaty, boundary settlements and border security, termination of Suez Canal shipping restrictions, resettlement of refugees and compensation for their lost property, resolution of the question of sovereignty over Jerusalem, and unified economic development of the Jordan River Valley (Hahn 1991: 189).

²⁹⁹ Nasser's retaliatory seizure of the Suez Canal triggered the Suez Crisis and War (Hart 1999: 72). According to Bagby, "Egypt's action was legal, but the canal was Britain's main trade route to its holdings in the East, 'the lifeline of the British Empire,' and the main avenue for moving Arab oil to the West; also at stake was Britain's and France's prestige as world powers" (Bagby 1999: 209).

managed it. Multilateral talks and international conferences³⁰⁰ to find a peaceful solution³⁰¹ and appeals by Britain and France³⁰² to the United Nations failed. The ensuing Suez Crisis threatened regional stability and challenged the U.S. relationship with two primary Cold War allies, Britain³⁰³ and France (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1953-1956, Suez Crisis: par.1).

Close Saudi-U.S. cooperation on Suez

The Israeli invasion of Egypt and the British-French assault on the Suez Canal temporarily shifted the focus of Saudi Arabia and the U.S. away from the Buraimi dispute and the Dhahran negotiations ((U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1953-1956, *op.cit*, pars.4-5). Although the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were not disputants in the Suez Canal Crisis, they consulted with each other and cooperated because of their mutual interests in oil and security and stability in the area.³⁰⁴

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia had a series of meetings in Riyadh on August 20-27.³⁰⁵ The U.S. wanted to know to how far Saudi Arabia and the U.S. could go in “lubricating the way in the Suez problem”, without offending “Arab sensibilities” (U.S. Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Report of Special Mission to Saudi Arabia August 20-27, 1956: August 24 memorandum of conversation: 287). According to Anderson, the “common aim of the

³⁰⁰ There were two London conferences. The 1st conference on August 16-23, 1956 attempted to find a diplomatic solution by adopting eighteen proposals, including an offer to Nasser of Egyptian representation on the Suez Canal Company board and a share in its profits (Neely 2006: par.4). The 2nd conference on September 19-21, 1956 discussed American proposals for a Suez Canal Users Association to ensure continued international use of the Canal (*Ibid*, par.6).

³⁰¹ For analysis of the role of economic diplomacy on Suez, see Kunz, D.B., 1991. *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

³⁰² For analysis of British decision-making on Suez, see Verbeek, B., 2003. *Decision-making in Great Britain during the Suez Crisis: Small groups and a Persistent Leader*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. For analysis of British, French, and Israeli military decisions and strategies, see Varble, D., 2003. *The Suez Crisis 1956 (Essential Histories)*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

³⁰³ Tore Petersen added that during the Suez Crisis, British Prime Minister Eden learned that the U.S. viewed British action at Buraimi in October 1955 as an act of aggression against the Saudis (Petersen 2000: 54).

³⁰⁴ L.C. Gardner added that Eisenhower saw the Suez Crisis as an opportunity to restore the reputation of the U.S. among Arab states (Gardner 2009: 233).

³⁰⁵ The main representatives were Prince Faisal, Yusuf Yasin, Robert Anderson, U.S. Presidential Envoy, U.S. Ambassador Wadsworth, and David Newsom of the U.S. Department of State.

U.S. and Saudi Arabia was settlement of the crisis without the use of force” (*Ibid*, 288).

According to Faisal, the Saudi position was “the abolition of all military and economic measures³⁰⁶ which have been taken” (*Ibid*). King Saud wanted the U.S. to help ease tensions at Suez by seeking “solutions which would realize, for all states, the actual and legitimate interest of guaranteeing the free navigation in the Suez Canal, and would maintain for Egypt the rights of its full sovereignty” (*Ibid*, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: August 24 message From King Saud to President Eisenhower: 295).

In order to help the U.S., Saud sent Yasin on a mission to Nasser to “ascertain how far Nasser willing to go on the 5-power proposal³⁰⁷ and in lessening tensions; and to persuade Nasser to stop his radio and other propaganda attacks against Western powers” (*Ibid*, 974.7301/8-2856: August 26 Wadsworth telegram to U.S. Embassy in Egypt: 299). Yasin reported that “Egypt could not accept true international control” (*Ibid*, 974.7301/8-2856: August 28 Byroade telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State: 310), and could not be expected to negotiate under military and economic duress. Saud repeated to the U.S. Government the necessity of “ending the military and economic measures taken against Egypt, including steps to unblock assets in the U.S. belonging to the Egyptian National Bank” (*Ibid*, Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722, Saudi Arabia-General September 5 Wilkins memorandum of conversation: 348-349).

Saud continued to cooperate with the U.S. Government. Eisenhower asked Saud to use his “great influence to bring about some action on the part of the Egyptian Government to restore confidence which has been so badly shaken by the recent Egyptian action”

³⁰⁶ Faisal meant withdrawal of British, French, and Egyptian forces mobilised and sent to the area after the nationalization of Suez; and cancellation of all economic sanctions imposed against and by Egypt following the nationalization of Suez.

³⁰⁷ At the 1st London conference, eighteen of the twenty two participating delegations called for an international operating Board for the Suez Canal. The eighteen delegations “decided to depute from their number a delegation of five to present their plan for international control directly to the President of Egypt in Cairo” (Eayrs 1964: 87).

(Eisenhower Papers 1956: doc #1990). Saud believed that a “satisfactory compromise could be found and said he would continue to use his influence with Nasser” (*op.cit*, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: September 6 Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State: 395). Saud, however, faced some dilemmas. Saud was in a delicate position by being aligned with the U.S.³⁰⁸ on one hand, and in an alliance with Egypt on the other hand. Saud had political concerns about Nasser; but the King continued his alliance and friendly relations with Nasser and tried to help him during the crisis, especially when Israel attacked.

Saud's dilemma and plan to 'escape' from it

Saud emphasised that Saudi Arabia “committed under treaty³⁰⁹ to go to “defense Egypt in event attack; any attack on Egypt would be attack on whole Arab world”. Saud was unhappy about Nasser’s ambitions, but hesitated to oppose him openly at this time (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8-175: August 17 telegram Department of State to the Secretary of State: 220). Egypt was more powerful than Saudi Arabia; and Saud believed that friendship with Nasser could help lessen the threat from the Hashemites. On the other hand, Saud felt threatened by Nasser: “Nasser's ambition was to become the Napoleon of the Arabs and if he succeeded the regimes in Iraq and Saudi Arabia would be swept away” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: September 6 message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower: 402). On September 23, King Saud, President Nasser, and President Quwatly met at Riyadh. Saud reaffirmed his support of their tripartite alliance but stated his “genuine concern at Egypt's failure to undertake prior consultation

³⁰⁸ Using the argument by Carlsnaes, et al, when a state’s resources are insufficient to create a counterweight to the hegemonic endeavours of another state or group of states, the former seeks or maintains alignment (Carlsnaes, et al 2002: 371).

³⁰⁹ Saud referred to the tripartite alliance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria that formed in response to the Baghdad Pact.

before nationalizing the canal” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: September 27 report Executive Secretariat of the Department of State: 592).

Saud apparently had an ‘escape’ plan from his alliance with Nasser. The Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S. Abdul Monem Rifa’i stated that “the King of Saudi Arabia had told him that he would give all reasonable support³¹⁰ to Nasser but would not back him if he chose to challenge the West militarily or if he brought the Soviets³¹¹ into the area (Department of State Central Files 684A.85/9-2856: September 28 Bergus memorandum of conversation: 605). The most dangerous aspect in the King's mind is “fact Communists have gained as result of [British] threat to use force and actual use would give Communists further opportunity intervene” (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8-2356: August 23 telegram from the Consulate General at Dhahran to the Department of State: 273).

Arabs impose an oil boycott

When the Israelis, British, and French attacked Egypt,³¹² Saud led efforts to help Egypt.³¹³ Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Britain³¹⁴ and France; and Arab countries

³¹⁰ Tim Niblock (2006) argued that Saud’s conciliatory attitude towards Nasser was merely a “veneer of nationalist legitimacy” since Saud needed to “shore up his own nationalist image” (Niblock 2006: 41).

³¹¹ The Soviets capitalized on the Suez Crisis and eventually established its influence in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (Milton-Edwards 2006: 244).

³¹² Britain, France, and Israel quickly decided on a forceful resolution to overthrow Nasser after he nationalised the Suez Canal (Varble 2003: 21). On October 14, 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden held secret discussions with French officials over a military operation to recover use of the Canal. The plan included an invasion of Egypt by Israel followed by British and French forces seizing the Canal as an act of intervention between Egypt and Israel (Neely 2006: par.8). On October 24, 1956, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd concluded the secret agreement with French and Israeli officials at Sèvres, France (*Ibid*, par.9).

³¹³ According to Carl Brown, Saud strongly supported Nasser during the Suez Crisis because good relations with Nasser lessened Saudi dependence on the U.S. (Brown 2004: 226). During the Suez Crisis, Saud declared a general mobilisation in the Kingdom. Saud personally supervised the mobilisation operations. He offered total assistance to the Egyptians. He allowed Egyptian combat planes into Saudi Arabia to protect the aircraft. As a means of exerting pressure on the British and French governments, Saud used the oil weapon for the first time in Saudi history: he blocked oil shipments and banned all British and French tankers and other tankers carrying Saudi oil to those two countries; he also broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and France (Saud 1953 cited in King Saud History, ‘Foreign Policy’, 2008: pars.7-10).

³¹⁴ The British invasion at Suez provided another opportunity for the Saudis to demonstrate opposition to Britain similar to the opposition they wanted to demonstrate in the Buraimi dispute and the Baghdad Pact (Leatherdale 1983: 343).

imposed an oil boycott against the British and French.³¹⁵ With the closure of the Suez Canal and the Saudi oil boycott,³¹⁶ the U.S. became very concerned about the supply of Middle East oil to Europe and the world markets (*Ibid*, FRUS editorial note # 249: 403). The U.S. Government proposed a plan to control the distribution of oil through the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with a promise to Saud that “none of his oil would go to France or Great Britain and that no British or French ships would go into his ports” (United States Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957. Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956 (1955-1957). Suez crisis: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records: November 8 Gleason memorandum of discussion, 303d Meeting of the National Security Council: 1074). U.S. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey pointed out that the oil boycott “indicates to the Arabs what a singularly strong position they are in by virtue of their control of so much oil in the world” (*Ibid*, 1075).

The oil boycott did not threaten or damage Saudi relations and alignment. The U.S. Government knew that Saud would not modify the Saudi position regarding closure of the Bahrain pipeline, barring British and French tankers, and prohibiting shipments to British and French areas until after British-French forces had quit Egypt. To ease the effects of oil shortages, the U.S. advised Saud of the temporary redistribution plan of oil to be implemented after the British and French left Egypt. Saud expressed “great confidence in USG and approve its plan for redistribution of oil, confident at same time USG will minimize loss which Saudi Arabia will sustain as result its implementation; we will welcome plan after withdrawal British-French forces in accordance UN resolutions, and thereafter it may be possible to restore relations with countries as before” (Department of State, Central Files,

³¹⁵ On November 7, 1956 the Saudi Government prohibited the “offloading of any ships with oil destined for the United Kingdom or France; the Government also planned other measures regarding Bahrein Island, which was under a British mandate (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records: November 8 Gleason memorandum of discussion, 303d Meeting of the National Security Council: 1072).

³¹⁶ The oil embargo showed the strategic vulnerability of Western Powers to political decisions in the Middle East (Randall 2005: 262).

880.2553/11-2656: November 2 telegram Consulate General at Dhahran to the Department of State: 1200).

After the Suez Canal crisis ended, Eisenhower explained what he confronted during the oil boycott; and the role that the U.S. performed to protect Western access to Middle East oil suppliers. The U.S. balanced Western oil interests, U.S. relations with Middle East oil suppliers, and friendly U.S. relations with Britain, France and Israel.

Western Europe's economy could be sustained only by Mideast oil. Some member of the West had to preserve the kind of relations with the Arabs that would not encourage that emotional people to destroy the oil industry. They would have been enthusiastically supported by the Kremlin that, although unable to use the oil itself at this time, would pay a very fine price to see it denied to the West. We must remain true to our friends [Britain, France, and Israel] but we must likewise remain on a friendly status with the Mideast oil suppliers. The only other alternative would be a gigantic occupation of the Mideast by military force; no one in the world could contemplate such a venture with complacency (Eisenhower Papers doc # 2124a).

Virtually identical Saudi and U.S. interests during the Suez Crisis and strong cooperation between the two states helped to strengthen relations and alignment. Saud helped actively in private negotiations with Egypt.³¹⁷ Both states worked hard to prevent a military conflict because war would disrupt the stability and security in the area. When war erupted, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia joined in condemning the Israeli attack on Egypt, and the British-French invasion of Suez. The Arab oil boycott against Britain and France did not erode the alignment. Despite the subsequent Saudi oil embargo against Britain and France, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia sought ways to keep oil supplies flowing to the rest of the world.

The next section deploys realist alliance elements to explain the close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. during the Suez crisis, and which eventually led to the

³¹⁷ Schweller's theory would explain this as an opportunity for Saud, within his alliance with Nasser, to modify Nasser's behaviour and manage Saud's rivalry with him. Nasser was a dissatisfied power and Saud wanted to gain leverage in bargaining with him (Schweller 2001: 240).

two states to strengthen and cement their alignment in the post-Suez environment in the region.

Realist alliance elements in the Suez crisis

Power

The Suez conflict fundamentally altered the regional balance of power:³¹⁸ (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones 1953-1956, Suez Crisis: par.5). The withdrawal of Britain³¹⁹ and France from Suez effectively marked the end of their power and influence in the area. Israel demonstrated its military capabilities again and aggregated its military power with those of Britain and France. Nasser showed increasing ambition for hegemonic power and influence in the region. The emergence of Soviet influence in Egypt thrust the U.S. fully into a superpower rivalry for power and influence against the Soviets in the region.

Threat

Using Walt's theory, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia stood together because they perceived similar threats. There was a threat of war exploding into a wider regional or global conflict. Soviet entry into the area and its friendliness towards Egypt and other Arab states created

³¹⁸ The 1956 Suez crisis produced significant results. "It soured U.S. relations with Israel. Eisenhower even threatened economic sanctions when Israel delayed its withdrawal. While the Suez Crisis raised Nasser's prestige, it also brought America much praise from Third World countries for taking a stand against imperialism. It showed how far Britain and France had fallen from their former status as Middle East powers and world powers, and the extent to which they had lost their capacity to act independently of their superpower ally the U.S." (Bagby 1999: 210). It reduced British and French influence in the Middle East and marked the assumption of a leading Middle East role by America. As Soviet influence and the reality of its presence spread in the Middle East, Eisenhower emphasised that, "The existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia" (*Ibid*). Hahn explained the profound impact on the balance of power in the Middle East from another perspective: "It badly tarnished British and French prestige among Arab states; it undermined the European powers' traditional authority over the region. Nasser secured a new level of prestige among Arab peoples as a leader who defied European empires and survived a military invasion by Israel. The region's remaining pro-Western regimes seemed vulnerable to Nasserite uprisings. U.S. officials feared that Moscow's image improved among Arab states. The prospect of promoting Arab-Israeli peace seemed nil for the foreseeable future" (Hahn 2006: 28).

³¹⁹ "Unable to keep the Suez Canal open by diplomacy or force, the 1956 British fiasco at Suez marked the beginning of the end of Britain's position in the Middle East" (Leatherdale 1983: 345).

implicit threats to U.S. power and influence in the region; and clear threat to U.S. interests in oil and U.S. rights at Dhahran.

Arab leaders such as Saud and Nuri of Iraq believed that Nasser must not be allowed to emerge as the dominant Arab leader, succeed in his plans to unify Arabs, and come under Soviet influence. Eisenhower knew that Nasser's success and Soviet support for Nasser would erode U.S. and Western influence in the region. Although Saud and Eisenhower did not want to see Nasser destroyed,³²⁰ both shared interests in thwarting Nasser's ambitions and containing the spread of Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia perceived increasing threats³²¹ to the monarchy from Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism and his hegemonic ambitions.

Israel's attack on Egypt again demonstrated that it was a credible military threat to Arab states. The display of Israel's military power and aggressive intentions heightened Saud's concern that he did not have the military capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia against any threat or attack from Israel.

Interest/opportunity

Using Schweller's theory, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had similar interests: protecting their reputation, image and prestige; and protecting their financial-economic interests. The Saudis lent its support to Egypt in order to project an image of Arab solidarity against British colonialism and imperialism and against Israel, an Arab enemy.

³²⁰ Dulles was angry enough at Nasser in July 1956 that he proposed the 'Omega Plan', which called for regime change in Egypt (Varble 2003: 14). Included in the plan was military aid and political backing for Saud (Burns 1985: 78-79). There would be allegations that Saud conspired to have Nasser assassinated, which damaged the reputation and credibility of the Saudi monarchy (Al-Rasheed 2002: 116).

³²¹ Saud had a threatening experience from his early alliance with Egypt. In 1955, Egyptian-trained Saudi military officers attempted a coup against Saud (Safran 1985 cited Al-Rasheed 2002: 116). In 1956, Nasser's anti-imperialist and Pan-Arab rhetoric gained public support, which "revealed underlying tensions between Nasser's and Saud's leadership (Al-Rasheed 2002: 116). For Saud, the closure of the Canal in the name of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism reflected Nasser's hegemonic ambitions with little regard for the harm done to Saudi oil interests (Leatherdale 1983: 345). Saud perceived Nasser's Pan-Arab approach as incompatible with monarchical rule; Nasser became a threat to the monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan resulting in the Kings' Alliance (Wybrandt and Gerges 2010: 216).

Likewise, the U.S. did not want to project colonialist or imperialist images. Eisenhower balanced U.S. reputation, the use of U.S. military power, and U.S. financial-economic interests in oil. Eisenhower did not use massive U.S. military presence because that risked antagonising states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Furthermore, as the recognised sponsor and supporter of the Israeli state, the U.S. had to castigate Israel in no uncertain terms to protect U.S. reputation and the integrity of U.S. intentions and U.S. strategic interests in Saudi Arabia and the region.

Thus, mutual Saud-U.S. concerns about shifts in the balance of power and the emergence of strong threats to their financial-economic and military interests in the region moved both states into a closer and stronger alignment. The U.S. perceived the Soviets and Nasser³²² as threats to regional stability and to U.S. interests in the region. The Saudis shared U.S. concerns about the Soviets but were more fearful of threat to the monarchy by Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism.

In order to for the U.S. to face these threats, Eisenhower wanted a strong U.S. alliance with a strong Arab leader. Eisenhower had King Saud in mind to fill that role.

Eisenhower searches for a strong Arab leader

Eisenhower's reasons in suggesting Saud

The U.S. campaigned to have Arab states firmly on its side, formally or informally, in order to counteract the Soviet entry into the area. However, U.S. support for Israel was a major barrier to U.S. efforts. Eisenhower characterised the Arab-Israel problem as "one of the most explosive situations" (*Ibid*), which he believed he could "greatly minimise or practically eliminate by getting Libya and Saudi Arabia firmly on the U.S. side, while giving Israel the necessary assurances for its security" (*Ibid*, doc# 1779). Eisenhower placed this

³²² M.F. Jacobs (2011) argued that the U.S. abandoned its quest for a military-political alignment with Egypt, a state pursuing a modern agenda but unwilling to subordinate itself to U.S. political and military wishes. Because of its interests in Saudi oil reserves, the U.S. chose to solidify economic, military, and political relations with Saudi Arabia, even if it was a decidedly anti-modern state (Jacobs 2011: 9).

issue within the context of Nasser's personal ambitions and rejection of any efforts to conciliate the Arabs and Israelis. Eisenhower wanted a counterbalance to Nasser.

Eisenhower suggested King Saud.

The problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world--and because of these beliefs, his rejection of every proposition advanced as a measure of conciliation between the Arabs and Israel. I suggested to the State Department that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world, in the thought that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud. However, I do not know the man, and therefore do not know whether he could be built up into the position I visualize. Nevertheless Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader (*Ibid*, doc#1811).

Eisenhower wanted "U.S. efforts directed toward separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians and concentrating on making the Saudis see that their best interests lie with us, not with the Egyptians and the Russians" (Eisenhower Papers Diary Series 1956: doc# 1773).

During the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower repeatedly brought up the idea of building up Saud as a counterbalance to Nasser. Nasser was undependable and unreliable.³²³ The President said he thought the person to build up was King Saud, who was a great spiritual leader and keeper of the holy places (Department of State, Central Files, 774.11/11-2056: November 20 memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Acting Secretary of State: 1165). The President strongly reiterated his feeling that "we should be trying to build up Saud as an element of strength and stability in the Middle East" (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries: November 19 Goodpaster memorandum of a conference with the President: 1153). One of the measures that we must

³²³ As relations with Egypt continued to sour in 1956, Eisenhower sought ways to counter Nasser's ambition and prestige. Eisenhower wanted to build up a leader who had "personal ambitions antagonistic" to those of Nasser. Eisenhower believed Saud to be that person because the King wanted to protect his guardianship of Islamic holy places and to enhance his political leadership and influence in the Arab world (Jacobs 2011: 88).

take is to build up an Arab rival of Nasser, and the natural choice would seem to be the man you and I have often talked about. If we could build him up as the individual to capture the imagination of the Arab World, Nasser would not last long (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12-1256: December 12 message President to the Secretary of State: 1297).

With Nasser seemingly entrenched with the Soviets, and Syria quickly drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence, Eisenhower believed that the U.S. needed the Saudi alignment more than it ever did before. Eisenhower wanted to groom Saud³²⁴ to be the major leader in the Middle East. Eisenhower believed that by having Saud as a strong U.S. ally would enable the King to counter Nasser effectively and also bring Syria back as a friend of the West.

Reassure Saud that we look upon him as leader of the Arab world and count heavily upon him to influence policies in the Arab world and prevent Soviet infiltration and ultimate domination of the Arab states; endeavour discreetly to cause him to recognize the dangers of too close an association with Egypt and Nasser; reassure him of our confidence that a satisfactory solution can be reached on the Buraimi issue" (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957. Near East: Vol. XIII, FRUS editorial note #221: 351).

However, Eisenhower was not yet sure the British would go along with his idea about Saud because of the Buraimi dispute. He saw Buraimi as the tipping point in his idea of using Saud against Nasser.

We should probably search for some way to induce the British to get out of Buraimi. We must make sure that at least Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq are aware of what we are doing, and give their assent. We must explain a number of points to them very carefully. We must prevent the dissolution of Western Europe. We must let them know that we are going to aid Western Europe financially. We must stress the importance of restoring Saud's oil markets in Western Europe. If we raise output from the U.S., it will be very hard to cut back. If at all possible, we should use Buraimi as an ace in the hole. We must face the question, what must we do in Europe and then the question, how do we square this with the Arabs? (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957

³²⁴ Bronson argued that "oil by itself does not explain why, in the late 1950s, the U.S. sought to transform Saud into a globally recognized Muslim leader" (Bronson 2006: 22). She contended that religion, "Saudi leadership's claim over Makkah and Medinah was more important for America's anti-Communist agenda" (*Ibid*). This is not a compelling argument in the context of Saud leading the Arab world against Communism. Religious or ideological strength was not enough. The U.S. needed a strong political Arab leader. Saud's missteps in dealing with Egypt in the 1950s demonstrated that he was not the leader the U.S. needed against the Soviet-leaning Nasser (Al-Rasheed 2002: 116).

editorial note #250, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries: November 21 Goodpaster memorandum of conversation: 405).

Eisenhower wanted to validate his perspective on Saud so he personally extended an invitation to Saud for an official state visit to Washington. Saud was unaware of Eisenhower's plans to draw him more closely to the U.S. side. Saud's immediate reaction was to say that his "most important subject now is arms. I am ashamed of how my army compares with those of other Arab and Moslem countries. All are equipped by U.S., Britain, or Russia."³²⁵ Saudi Arabia is only country to adhere only to U.S. Are your delaying tactics³²⁶ proper way to repay our friendship" (United States Department of State, 1955-1957. FRUS. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia: 786A.56/12-1556: December 15 Wadsworth telegram #335 to the Department of State: 407).

1957: The U.S. regains Saud's trust and confidence

Eisenhower wanted to use the series of meetings in Washington in January 1957 to assess if Saud was the Arab leader the U.S. wanted to use against Nasser. Saud saw the meetings as an opportunity to discuss issues that affected relations and the alignment; and to gauge the sincerity and reliability of the U.S. towards the Kingdom.

On January 5, 1957, Eisenhower gave a message to the U.S. Congress about the situation in the Middle East. It was a massive change in U.S. policy that committed the U.S. to the Middle East and to its allies, especially Saudi Arabia. The Eisenhower Doctrine authorised programs of military assistance and cooperation and the use of U.S. armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Middle East nations that requested such aid. This was a 'point of no return' for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

³²⁵ As an example, the emergence of the Soviet bloc as an alternative source of arms decreased the value of U.S. aid as a political lever in Egypt; America's bargaining position deteriorated rapidly (Burns 1985: 34).

³²⁶ The nature of the American political system created delays, restrictions, and uncertainties in the aid process. There were legislative requirements, military assistance advisory groups, and annual public reviews (*Ibid*).

Eisenhower wanted strong allies in the Middle East. One of the reasons was containment of the radical Arab nationalism³²⁷ of Nasser who appeared to stand with Soviet Russia. The Eisenhower doctrine expressed U.S. fears of radical nationalism in the Middle East region becoming linked with Communism.³²⁸

By offering aid and protection to Arab nations, the U.S. wanted Arab governments to ally³²⁹ with the U.S., isolate Nasser, and blunt any possible Soviet attempt to dominate the Middle East region.³³⁰ The U.S. pledged protection from the threat of international communism.³³¹ The Eisenhower Doctrine aimed to develop the economic and military power of its allies to fighting communism. More importantly, the doctrine linked U.S. national security to the national security of U.S. allies. These were strong incentives for Saudi Arabia to cement its alignment with the U.S.

The national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security. The United States has manifested in many endangered areas its purpose to support free and independent governments and peace against external menace, notably the menace of international communism. It is now essential that the United States should manifest our determination to assist those nations of the Mid-East area, which desire that assistance (Eisenhower 1957 cited Gettleman and Schaar 2003: 248).

³²⁷ Arab nationalism was only one of several problems that the U.S. faced: “As currents of nationalism and pan-Arabism swept the Middle East during the 1950s...the United States-Saudi relationship came under greater strain. The golden age of American-Saudi ties under Ibn Saud yielded to the more unpredictable tenure of his eldest son Saud. The United States faced the impossible task of reconciling its special relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia (Miller 1980: 213). Nathan Citino argued that Arab nationalism posed a triple threat to the U.S.: the potential expulsion of Western influence and military bases; the possibility of alliance between the Pan-Arab states and the Soviet Union; and threat to U.S. and Western access to oil (Citino 2002: 40-41; Randall 2005: 261).

³²⁸ Eisenhower relied on the anti-Communist consensus that dominated American political thinking in the 1950s in order to connect Nasser’s Arab nationalism to Communism and to gain popular and Congressional support for his policies against Nasser (Jacobs 2011: 125).

³²⁹ According to Freiburger (1992), most of the Arab world interpreted the Eisenhower doctrine as an American version of British colonialism (Freiburger 1992: 212).

³³⁰ Nathan Citino characterised the Eisenhower years as an “era primarily in defence of the U.S. position in the petroleum order and an informal empire that gradually replaced the formal British one” in the Middle East (Citino 2002:17). The Eisenhower doctrine became a policy of support for anti-Communist regimes in favour of the existing petroleum order (*Ibid*, 118).

³³¹ The Eisenhower doctrine also emphasised the use of nuclear weapons to contain communism, threatening any Soviet aggression or spread of communism with ‘massive retaliation’.

Preparations for the Saud-Eisenhower meeting in Washington

U.S. Ambassador Wadsworth asked for Saud's view on a number of issues, which included the Baghdad Pact and military arms for the defence of Saudi Arabia. (*Ibid*, 786A.11/1-657: January 6 Carrigan telegram #319 to the Department of State: 408-409). Saud explained his objections to the Baghdad Pact.³³²

Nuri and Britain want Arab disunity. Britain would give Israel anything it wanted; how can we not assume it working for Arab disunity through its membership in Baghdad Pact? We can never have confidence in Baghdad Pact as long as Britain is member of it. Any pact or bloc in this area, unless supported by Saudi Arabia, will not succeed; I will never join anything I think will cause harm to Arabs or bring destruction their homes (*Ibid*).

On his requests for U.S. military arms for Saudi defence, Saud pointed out that he spent "400 million riyals a year on army which cannot go into action; you cannot have good morale in army unless it has arms. We are under pressure, directly and indirectly, to take arms that have been offered [by the Soviets]. I have taken nothing because I gave my word to U.S. that we will train and you must send arms (*Ibid*).

Introductory meeting in Washington

Because of the importance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and its impact on the Middle East, Dulles explained that its purpose was "not to extend the power of the U.S. into the Middle East; rather it was to help insure the independence and economic well-being of those states who expressed their desire for aid from the U.S." (*Ibid*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 33: January 30 memorandum of conversation, White House: 419). Eisenhower explained that the doctrine recognised a military threat and an economic threat: "military force by aggressors and the inability of people to make a living under modern conditions" (*Ibid*, 422).

³³² Freiburger (1992) argued that the Baghdad Pact was not attractive to most Arab leaders because the U.S. and Britain failed to convince them that the Soviets were a greater threat. The Arabs always contended that their main enemies were Israel and Western imperialism (Freiburger 1992: 212).

Eisenhower assured Saud that “the U.S. sought no monopoly of economic or military power in the area” (*Ibid*).

Dulles emphasised the Russian threat to the Middle East: “if the Russians succeeded in the Middle East, with its great resources of oil and its position as a strategic cross-roads, Russia would have gained a position of great power (*Ibid*, 418). Dulles also addressed the importance of Dhahran and the Suez Canal for both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Schweller’s theory would argue that, in the context of the U.S. alignment with Saudi Arabia, Dulles’ statement referred to the primacy of protecting of U.S. interests in Saudi oil and the Kingdom’s strategic military location. These were values already possessed by the U.S. If Russia became a great power in the area, that would pose a significant threat to the status quo that the U.S. sought to maintain.

Eisenhower and Saud meet in private

Saud and Eisenhower met in private.³³³ Considerations of threat and power are clearly evident in their discussion. Saud wanted to discuss his most pressing security concern: getting military arms to build up Saudi military capabilities.³³⁴ Saud disclosed that Saudi Arabia and the Arabs distrusted the British because they denied military arms to the Arabs to keep them weak. Being weak, Arabs suffered indignities at the hands of the British, and now also from the Israelis. According to Saud, there was “a strong element in his country demanding that he deal with the Soviets in order to get the necessary arms”, but he was not going to cave in to the pressures (*Ibid*, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries: Eisenhower memorandum of Conversation, White House: 424). Eisenhower did not

³³³ The only other person in the room was Saud’s Royal Counselor Jamal al-Husyani (*Ibid*).

³³⁴ Based on the argument by Snyder, on which Schweller anchored his theory, “the greater the shortfall between a state’s military strength and that of its opponents, the greater its need for alliance and the greater the deterrence and defence benefits it will gain (Snyder 1992 in Rothstein 1992: 90). This is a strong explanation for Saud’s decision to remain aligned with the U.S.

want Saudi Arabia to overextend its economic capacity to arm itself. Eisenhower suggested the best military policy for the Kingdom.

The best military policy for any nation, which had a great problem of economic development facing it, was to seek such arms as would assure the maintenance of internal order and freedom from subversive activities, together with a small reserve that would give it reasonable protection against small raiding attacks against its borders. Beyond this point, any country in this position should depend largely upon its friendship with the other free nations of the world and the U.N. (*Ibid*, 425).

Saud assured Eisenhower that “when we get this strength it will always be with yours” (*Ibid*, 426). Saud’s singular statement about aggregating Saudi power with U.S. power may have assured Eisenhower that, although the Saudi-U.S. alignment might weaken, the Saudis would never allow it to crumble. Eisenhower believed that whatever strength the U.S. built up for Saudi Arabia would always be available to the U.S.³³⁵ Saud emphasised that the basis of his solidarity with the other Arab states was on the Israel issue; however, he separated from the Arabs when it came to any alignment with the Soviets (*Ibid*).

Main meetings

The discussions at the meetings underscored the most important specific and general strategic interests³³⁶ that impacted relations and alignment during the 1950s (*Ibid*, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833: January 31 Stoltzfus memorandum of conversation, Blair House: 431-443). Saudi Arabia tended to speak about relations and alignment in the context of more specific interests: securing military arms for defence, Dhahran, threats to its borders, and economic projects. The U.S. spoke in terms of

³³⁵ Saud’s statement supports the aggregation of power concept in realist alliance theory: the weaker state aggregates its material capabilities with a stronger state in order to increase the weaker state’s security (see chapter 2 of this paper).

³³⁶ See earlier discussions of balance of interests during the Suez Crisis and imbalances in the Palestine problem and Buraimi dispute.

broader strategic interests:³³⁷ the Communist threat to Europe; and the threat that Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism, linked to the Soviets, posed to the stability and security of the Middle East. During these meetings, oil interests³³⁸ and the Palestine-Israel problem³³⁹ did not seem to dominate the discussions. This project presumes this was because both states understood and accepted their shared mutual interests in oil. It also presumes that neither state wanted to get mired in discussions about the Palestine-Israel problem.

The specific topics discussed were U.S. military arms for Saudi Arabia; the Dhahran airfield,³⁴⁰ the Buraimi dispute; the dangers of Communism; the Baghdad Pact and Saudi relations with Iraq;³⁴¹ and U.S. relations with Egypt and Syria.

Arms for Saudi Arabia

Saud explained that Saudi Arabia had been waiting twelve years for U.S. arms. According to the King, Saudi Arabia was ill-equipped militarily compared to Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Greece. He wanted U.S. arms for defence to maintain vital Saudi-U.S. interests. However he was under great pressure in Saudi Arabia to get arms from elsewhere. Dulles explained that the U.S. considers the degree of danger in each place in deciding where to send U.S. military arms. The danger to northern tier countries was their close proximity to the greatest military force outside the U.S., which was Soviet Russia. Saudi Arabia was not in the front line of this danger.

³³⁷ Miglietta identified historical U.S. interests in the Middle East as: maintaining secure access to oil; containing the spread of Soviet influence; promoting regional stability; and maintaining favorable climate for U.S. investments in the region (Miglietta 2002: 301).

³³⁸ In March 1956, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate emphasised that "The Saudis will remain anxious to avoid deterioration in their relations with the U.S. as it would endanger their vital oil revenues from the Arabian American Oil Company" (Department of State, INR-NIE Files: July 31 Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 30-3-56: 89).

³³⁹ There is no indication in FRUS notes that discussions on oil and the Palestine-Israel problem during these meetings remain classified.

³⁴⁰ Failure to reach agreement concerning the air base would cause Saud seriously to consider obtaining Bloc arms, although he would prefer to obtain arms from the US or some other non-Soviet source (Department of State, INR-NIE Files: July 31 Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 30-3-56: 89).

³⁴¹ The same report pointed out that "Saud is using his diplomatic influence and considerable financial resources to stir up trouble for the UK, the Hashemite dynasties of Iraq and Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact" (*Ibid*).

Saud countered that Saudi Arabia was in constant danger from Israel and from British-supported states (*Ibid*, 433).

Dhahran Airfield

Dulles emphasised that Dhahran demonstrated to the world that it would be a mistake to attack Saudi Arabia. Dhahran was one of the most important symbols of U.S.-Saudi cooperation, friendship, and support. Dhahran also provided communications and transit benefits for Saudi Arabia. Saud reiterated that he welcomed a renewal of the Dhahran agreement if other points in his memorandum were met: U.S. arms for Saudi Arabia and protection of Saudi reputation and sovereignty (*Ibid*, 435).

Territorial Dispute-Buraimi

Saud considered Britain the aggressor so that if Britain withdrew from proven Saudi Arabian territory, Saudi Arabia was prepared to negotiate a bilateral agreement demarcating the boundaries or re-submit the question to arbitration. Dulles emphasised that U.S. help in the Buraimi dispute lessened the dangers posed by the dispute, but acknowledged that U.S. help had not yielded the results that Saudi Arabia wanted (*Ibid*, 436).

Dangers of Communism

Dulles emphasised that the danger from Communism was much greater than that from other “imperialist” powers. The U.S. had no desire to substitute its judgment for the judgment of Arab leaders on how to combat Communism in their countries. Saud believed that dangers to the area would not be overcome until the Arab peoples as well as their Governments came to understand and have confidence in the U.S. and its policies in the area (*Ibid*, 438).

Baghdad Pact

Saud believed that the pact harmed Arabs because of Turkey and Iraq. Turkey had working relations with Israel. However, Saud was ready to improve relations with Iraq

because of their mutual interests in fighting communism, and in the interest of Arab nationalism. Saud was also willing to cooperate with Iran and Pakistan because they were Islamic states. Dulles believed that the Baghdad Pact was an effective instrument to oppose communism; but the U.S. did not join the pact in deference to Saud's negative views about it (*Ibid*, 439).

U.S. Relations with Egypt and Syria

Dulles pointed out that Egypt played the U.S. and Russia against each other and, despite U.S. assistance, Egypt was unfriendly to the U.S. The U.S. wanted the Suez dispute concluded based on the U.N. Security Council resolutions and needed Saudi help in having Egypt stop military raids against Israel. The U.S. did not oppose Egypt's nationalism but was displeased by the manner in which it was used. Communist influence in Syria posed more danger to stability in the area and Saudi Arabia. Saud believed that Nasser was willing to improve relations with the U.S. but needed some time. Syria was not communist but extreme nationalist and that the Syrians thought wrongly that they could play the U.S. and Russia against each other. What the U.S. believed to be communism in the Middle East were only manifestations of Arab nationalism (*Ibid*, 431).

Press report on the results of the meetings

President Eisenhower declared in his press conference after the meetings that the talks had cleared away much of "the underbrush of misunderstanding; now the seeds could be planted, and clearly Saud would be a valued planter of U.S. offers of friendship and protection among his fellow Arabs" (The Nation: A New Concord, Monday, Feb. 18, 1957). For the U.S., relations and alignment seemed to be back on a smoother path. Beyond concord on aims and future pursuits within the framework of the U.N., the two countries agreed that the U.S. could continue using the strategically important Dhahran Air Field in Saudi Arabia for the next five years. The U.S. retained the right to use Dhahran, thus preserving its strategic interests there.

Quid pro quo, the U.S. would provide economic assistance and, over a five-year stretch, some \$50 million in arms for Saudi Arabia. Saud gained the military arms it had long sought; the benefits of continued U.S. economic aid; and U.S. promises to protect Saudi reputation and sovereignty. Saud renewed his belief that U.S. aid and support were forthcoming; more importantly, he may have perceived that U.S. recognition of his political and religious leadership image and prestige strengthened his standing in the Arab world as a worthy challenger to Nasser. The Saudi-U.S. alignment was now cemented.

Integrating realist alliance theories in the Saudi-U.S. case: 1953-1957

Alignment as balance of power response

The U.S. sought to tilt the regional power structure in its favor. Britain and France lost significant power after the Suez crisis. The U.S. wanted to contain Nasser and the Soviets from establishing stronger positions in the region. To counter the potential tilt towards Egypt and the Soviets, Eisenhower worked to separate Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and convince the Saudis that their best interests lay with the U.S., not with Egypt or Soviet Russia. Although there were times the Saudis doubted the efficacy of its alignment with the U.S., Saudi Arabia perceived that its position was more secure by staying aligned with the U.S. Eisenhower also sought to minimise or practically eliminate the Arab-Israel problem by splitting the Arabs and making certain that Saudi Arabia was firmly in the U.S. camp.

Alignment as a balance of threat response

The introduction in Chapter 7 noted that the prospective entry of the Soviet Union posed a new and significant threat to U.S. power and influence in the region and globally. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia understood and agreed that any shift in the balance of power in the regional³⁴² and global system, created new threats. Nasser's hegemonic moves and the

³⁴² William Quandt contended that the Saudis focused on the balance of power model. As a relatively weak power, the Saudi goal was to prevent domination by any single Arab state such as Egypt. To do that, the Saudis

Soviets gaining position in the Middle East power structure meant increased threats to both states. Perceived threats from surrounding Hashemite states had not faded, so the prospect of Nasser and the Soviets gaining power and influence in Iraq and Jordan became more disconcerting to the Saudis. Saud and Faisal believed that Nasser's alliance with the Soviets was a clear and present danger to the independence and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and to the survival of the Al Saud monarchy.

Faced with a multiplicity of threats, the Saudis stayed aligned with the U.S. because U.S. protection remained the best overall option for the security and survival of the Saudi state and the monarchy.

Alignment as a balance of interest/opportunity for gain response

Reputational interest played a significant role in the alignment. The dual alignment created a sticky dilemma for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. In the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, neighbouring Arab states viewed Saudi Arabia not only as dependent on the U.S. but a puppet of a U.S. that was friendly and supportive of Israel, an Arab enemy. Most Arabs looked at the U.S. presence at Dhahran as a surrender of Saudi sovereignty. On the other hand, breaking the Saudi alignment with the U.S. meant losing U.S. protection and access to valuable U.S. economic and military aid. Aligning with the Soviets was an option that could replace U.S. protection and aid; however, Soviet atheism conflicted with Islam. Furthermore, the loss of access to Saudi oil by the U.S. and the West would create heightened threats of conflict and war. Saudi Arabia could stay neutral in such a scenario but would probably face

did not want the intervention of an outside power that would make Egypt too strong. The Saudis used its money to win the support of other neighbouring states that were also weak. In the Saudi model, military power was not crucial as long as shifting alliances among Arab states prevented conflict and the Saudis could count on deterrence by "the shadow presence of a major power that had a stake in Saudi Arabia's survival" (Quandt 1981: 29-31). According to Quandt, the Saudi model broke down in the 1950s because Israel became a common adversary of the Arab states making shifting alliances less flexible; Soviet arms enhanced the war-making capabilities of Egypt and Syria; and Arab politics became intensely ideological (*Ibid*).

great pressure from both superpowers, especially pressures from the proximate threats and aggressive intentions posed by surrounding states that would align either with the U.S. or the Soviets.

For the U.S., cementing the alignment meant continued U.S. and Western access to Saudi oil and a continued U.S. presence at Dhahran. Using Schweller's balancing argument, by maintaining their alliance both states were 'status quo' and sought to protect values already possessed. Both states did not have any revisionist aims and there were no new opportunities for either state to gain or profit from their alignment. Both states never lost sight of the fact that they had considerable interests stake, what Schweller calls the probability of losing values already possessed. Both states did all they could to strengthen and cement their alignment. Thus, despite circumstances and disagreements that at times weakened relations and the alignment, the Saudis and Americans stayed together.

Conclusion

The discussions in chapters 7 and 8 showed that notions of power shift, threats, and opportunities for gain are a consistent thread in the maintenance and management of Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. Without the structure provided by the integration of realist alliance theories, explanation of the Saudi-U.S. case is more difficult and easily leads to convenient labels and characterisations that do not clearly explain the profoundly realist origins and development of relations and alignment between the two states. Integrating realist alliance concepts to the data lends clarity to the nuances, twists and turns in the Saudi-U.S. case.

The chapters continued to reveal underlying tensions in the alignment and dilemma for both states.³⁴³ Despite these tensions, the two states continued relations and alignment

³⁴³ Professor Mohammed Ahmed argued that "at a deeper level, the relationship is characterized by uncertainty, controversy, and ambiguity" (Ahmed 2006: par.1).

characterised mainly by realist elements of power, threat, and interest: maintaining U.S. power and influence in the region; containing threats from Soviet communist influence in the region; assuring Saudi regime survival and stability against external and internal threats; and protecting U.S. access to Saudi oil.

The alignment weathered the political storms of the 1950s. The alignment bent but did not break. However, in the coming years greater stresses and challenges faced the alignment: the Yemen War; the June 1967 Arab-Israel War and a second Arab oil embargo; and the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and a third Arab oil embargo. More so than the massive buildup of its military weaponry, the power of Saudi oil would thrust the Saudi state into the international arena completely. New power shifts, new threats, and new opportunities for gain lay ahead.

Chapter 9

Integrating Realist Alliance Theories

The Saudi-U.S. Case (1941-1957)

Conclusion

General observations

The Saudi-U.S. alignment is an informal alliance. An informal alliance often implies a security guarantee. The Saudis believed that the U.S. gave a security guarantee based on Truman's October 1951 letter to Ibn Saud. It promised to protect Saudi sovereignty and security, which the Saudis interpreted to include U.S. military assistance. The Saudi-U.S. case can also be characterised as a strategic partnership. It recognises common or shared security interests and provides for strong military cooperation. Alignment³⁴⁴ is more

³⁴⁴ Snyder explained alignment as "a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other's support in disputes or wars with other states; such expectations arise chiefly from perceived common interests" (Snyder 1992: 85). The Saudi-U.S. alignment seeks to reinforce the security of the two states and to promote their interests in the external world (Wight 1978:122).

descriptive of the Saudi-U.S. case. Based on their relative capabilities, the Saudi-U.S. alignment is unequal and asymmetrical.

Saudi Arabia was a weak state.³⁴⁵ In the context of Saudi fears of its neighbouring states and the threat of British military force at Buraimi, Saudi Arabia perceived it did not gain the benefit of U.S. protection. The character of the Saudi-U.S. alignment is not military force and does not direct its cooperative action against another state or alliance.³⁴⁶ However, Ibn Saud believed that U.S. military force was a component that he could rely on in the event of aggression by his traditional rivals.

Saudi-U.S. relations from 1941 to 1957 were rarely harmonious. The alignment was often weak and fragile. Although both states responded to shifts in power, perceptions of threat, and self-interest and opportunity for gain, they were often at odds in their perspectives and priorities. It was not until 1957 that they achieved more harmony in their interests and perspectives, which led both states to cement their alignment.

Project results

There are multiple drivers for Saudi-U.S. relations and alignment. The Saudi-U.S. case is a complex web of economic, political, and military aspects that cannot be explained by just one theory of alignment. The Saudi-U.S. case is not a one-dimensional “oil for security” relationship that much of the literature leans on. Furthermore, the literature also tends to focus on a single dimension, typically the balance of power argument. Power shift, threat perception, and interest/opportunity for gain or profit interacted in the dynamics of alliance formation and the behaviour of the Saudi and American state actors.

³⁴⁵ According to Tertrais, a weak state benefits from the protection provided by having a stronger country as an ally (Tertrais 2004:136).

³⁴⁶ Oest defined alliance as military force that directs cooperative action against another state or alliance (Oest 2007:14).

Although many might argue that each theory should stand on its own in applying it to alliances such as the Saudi-U.S. case, this project aimed to show that integrating elements from the three theories within the events and circumstances of the Saudi-U.S. alignment produces a richer and nuanced presentation and interpretation of relations and the alliance. The use of a single theory, whether it is power, threat, or interest/opportunity, cannot develop a complete picture of relations and the alliance between the two states. Each of the three alliance theories is applicable to the Saudi-U.S. case and integrating their elements produces a clearer perspective of the alignment: from the infant years of alignment, to the signing of a treaty under the MDAP [Mutual Defense Assistance Program] in 1951, and subsequent years in which the durability and strength of the alignment were tested and refined in the fires of Middle East rivalries and competing alliances brought on by the Cold War and an intensifying Arab Cold War.

The integration of balance of power, balance of threat, and balance of interest/opportunity paradigms enriches the notion of alliance formation and behaviour in alliance. In this tripartite approach, the three theories form a triangle in which one can view the Saudi-U.S. alliance formation and durability more clearly. Using Waltz' theory, the U.S. sought alliances to pre-empt or counter any shift in the balance of power if the Soviets established position in the Middle East. The Saudis sought an alliance with the U.S. to balance regional power that in the Saudi view was skewed towards its traditional rivals because of British support.

The paper agrees with Walt that real or perceived shifts in power do not adequately explain alliance formation. Saudi perceptions of threats to the Kingdom: aggregated power, offensive power, proximate power, and aggressive intentions of its neighbouring states played consistently in Saudi alignment deliberations. The creation of the state of Israel added to these threats. On the U.S. side, its perceptions of external threats posed by Soviet entry

into the region prompted it to seek Middle East alliances. There were dangers from Soviet offensive power, Soviet proximity to the Middle East, and perceptions of Soviet aggressive intentions towards the region.

The paper disagreed heavily with Walt's conclusion that foreign aid is not a major reason for alliance formation. Foreign financial-economic and military aid was a primary motive for the Saudis in aligning with the U.S. and staying allied with it. Shared ideology against communism was a major incentive for both states to maintain their alignment. A desire for transnational political penetration by the U.S. played an insignificant role, especially since the issue of Saudi sovereignty was of paramount concern to the Saudis. The Saudis may have wanted to penetrate the U.S. political arena but recognised it could not compete effectively with the enormous power of the pro-Israel lobby.

Schweller's power shift and threat perspectives are substantially similar to those of Waltz and Walt. However, the use of Schweller's contention about internal domestic threat completed the picture of why the Saudis aligned with the U.S. From the Saudi perspective, an alignment could help them deal with both internal and external threats. Schweller added dimensions that the other two theories failed to address. Using Schweller's arguments, the U.S. sought alignments to maintain the status quo; preserve its political hegemony; and retain values already possessed: economic and political benefits from Saudi oil. The U.S. Government sought Middle East alignments to protect oil concessions already in the hands of American oil companies. One can also argue that the U.S. wanted to revise the regional and global power structure by amassing more economic and political power through Middle East alliances.

Schweller's opportunity for gain and profit argument integrated strongly into that contention. The U.S. saw an opportunity for gain or profit by being able to use and control raw materials and energy resources from Arab oil states. The U.S. wanted Arab states to jump

on the U.S. bandwagon. Stronger economic capabilities meant the U.S. could exert more power and influence in the region. If the threat of war or a shift in the balance of power were not of immediate concern, the U.S. and Saudi seized the opportunity to guarantee each other the enormous gain or profits from oil. Massive revenues drove the economies of both states. In that context, Schweller's balance of interest/opportunity argument overshadowed any balance of power and balance of threat arguments.

A final comment

There are those who may criticise the paper's focus on U.S. State Department FRUS documents because the language of *realpolitik* used by foreign relations and foreign policy leaders and elites does not prove that realism ruled relations and alliance formation. The paper argues that there is no better way to prove it than to read in context thousands of pages that rarely spoke of idealist/liberalist or constructivist motivations in the Saudi-U.S. case. Realist motivation and behaviour overshadow the few instances where idealism and constructivism are evident in the record. There is no better basis for studying the nature of Saudi-U.S relations and the alignment than the communications and pronouncements of U.S. and Saudi leaders and elites contained in the official FRUS records. They are unmistakably realist in content and tone. It is precisely their *realpolitik* language that conveyed their overwhelmingly realist thoughts and motives of power, threat, and interest/opportunity in the formation and maintenance of the Saudi-U.S. alignment.

Bibliography

Primary

U.S. Department of State FRUS documents

United States Department of State, 1939. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers. The Far East; the Near East and Africa, Volume IV, Saudi Arabia: pp. 824-831.

124.90F/11 June 21 Fish telegram to Hull: 827.

Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1939v04> [Accessed 12 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1941. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers. The British Commonwealth; the Near East and Africa, Volume III, Saudi Arabia: pp. 624-659.

890F ~1/481 April 16 Moffett memorandum to President Roosevelt: 624-625.

890F.51/48~ April 21 Murray memorandum to the Secretary of State: 627-628.

890F.6363 April 29 Ailing memorandum on conversation with Standard Oil Co: 630.

890F.51/23 June 26 Kirk telegram to Hull: 639.

890F.51/29 July 23 Kirk telegram to Hull: 640.

890F51/31 May 10 Murray memorandum to Hull: 633.

890F.51/31 May 20 Knox memorandum to Roosevelt: 635-636.

890F.51/21 May 29 Murray memorandum to Hull and Eerie: 637.

890F.51/34 July 2 Ailing memorandum of conversation with Butler: 639.

890F.51/37 August 6 Jones memorandum to Hull: 643.

890F.51/38 August 7 Jernegan memorandum of conversation: 643.

890F.51/29 August 22 Hull telegram to Kirk: 646.

890F.51/30 August 30 Kirk telegram to Hull: 647.

890F.51/30 September 10 Hull telegram to Kirk: 648.

890F.515/1~ September 27 Ailing memorandum to Welles: 650

Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941v03> [Accessed 13 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1942. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers. The Near East and Africa Volume IV, Saudi Arabia, pp. 559-585.

890F.61A/2: February 6 Hull telegram to Kirk: 562.

890F.61A/9: February 26 Welles telegram to Kirk: 564.

890F.7962/11a: July 7 Hull telegram to Kirk: 571.

890F.7962/3a: April 15 Welles telegram to Kirk: 569.

24.90F/22a: March 3 Welles telegram to Kirk: 559.

90F.6363/44: September 14 Moose telegram to Hull: 585.

Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1942v04> [Accessed 14 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1943. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, the Near East and Africa Volume IV, Saudi Arabia, pp. 830-952.

890F.24/20 January 9 Acheson to Stettinius: 854-855.

890P.24/30: January 12 Stettinius to Acheson: 855.
 890F.515/2: January 18 Kirk telegram to Hull: 857.
 890F.24/32: February 18 Roosevelt to Stettinius: 859.
 811.5151/282: July 15 Parker memorandum of conversation: 875.
 890F.51/53: August 3 Hull telegram to Moose: 887.
 124.90F/31a March 30 Hull to Roosevelt: 830.
 890F.6363/78: June 8 Leahy memorandum to Roosevelt: 921.
 800.6363/1234a: June 14 Hull to Roosevelt: 922, 923.
 800.6363/1223 June 26 letter to Roosevelt: 925.
 890F.6363/58: July 27 Kirk telegram to Hull: 935-937.
 890F.6363/89: October 26 Murray memorandum to Stettinius: 940.
 890F.0011/99: November 1 Ailing memorandum of conversation: 850.
 890P.6363/82: November 3 Moose telegram to Hull: 941.
 800.6363/1367a: November 13 Hull to Ickes: 941, 942, 943.
 800.6363/1387: November 24 Murray memorandum to Hull and Stettinius: 944, 945.
 800.6363/1388a: December 2 Hull letter to Halifax: 947.
 800.6363/1423: December 8 Hull memorandum to Roosevelt: 949.
 800.6363/1404: December 15 Hull to Leahy: 950.
 00.24/1160: August 3 Winant aerogram to Hull: 886.
 890F.24/63: October 16 Moose telegram to Hull: 906.
 890F.24/67: November 25 Berle to Wright: 913.
 890F.0011/97: October 25 Moose to Hull: 841, 842.
 890F.0011/102: November 1 Ailing memorandum of conversation: 845, 846, and 847.
 890F.OO11/123: December 31 Kirk to Stettinius: 851.
 Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943v04> [Accessed 15 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1944. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers; the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East Volume V, Saudi Arabia, pp. 658-773.

890F.51/10-2744: October 27 Stimson to Hull: 748, 749.
 890F.6363/12-1144: December 11 Forrestal to Stettinius: 755-756.
 890F.51/12-2044: December 22 Stettinius to Roosevelt: 757.
 890P.50/9-744: September 7 Eddy to Hull: 734.
 890P.24/10-3044: October 30, Eddy telegram to Hull: 751.
 890F.24/4-1044: April 3 Hull memorandum to Roosevelt: 679.
 890F.51A/3a: April 18 Hull telegram to Moose: 687.
 800.24/1512: February 7 Winant aerogram to Hull: 674.
 890F.20 Missions/I: May 3 Moose telegram to Hull: 698.
 90F.20 Missions/9-2944: October 5 Hull to Stimson: 745.
 890F.24/164: April 29 Moose telegram to Hull 695-696.
 890F.515/116: June 18 Tuck telegram to Hull: 707-708.
 890P.50/9-744: September 7 Eddy to Hull: 734, 735, 736.
 890F.24/9-2544: September 25 Eddy telegram to Hull: 744.
 Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1944v05> [Accessed 17 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1945. Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers. The Near East and Africa Volume VIII, Saudi Arabia, pp. 845-1033.

890F.51/1-845 Stettinius memorandum to Roosevelt: 847.
 890F.24/4-2045: April 20 Eddy telegram to Grew: 878.
 890F.00/3-845 March 8 Acheson Memorandum of Conversation: 861.
 90F.51/5-1745: May 17 Acheson memorandum of conversation: 895.
 890F.51/5-2945: May 23 Grew memorandum to Roosevelt: 900-901.
 890F.51/6-1845: June 18 Grew telegram to Eddy: 908.
 890F.51/6-2145: June 21 Eddy to Stettinius: 911-914.
 890F.248/5-1345: May 13 Eddy telegram to Grew: 894.
 890F.248/5-2445: May 24 Department of State memorandum to British Embassy: 922-923.
 90F.248/6-2545: June 25 Grew telegram to Eddy: 915-917.
 890F.248/6-2845: June 28 Grew telegram to Eddy: 918.
 90F.248/8-845: August 8 Eddy to Grew: 943-944.
 890F.20 Mission/7-445: July 4 Sands telegram to Byrnes: 920.
 890F.20 Missions/7-845: July 8 Eddy to Grew: 923.
 89, 0.248/7-845: July 13 Grew telegram to Eddy: 928.
 890F.248/7-1545: July 15 Eddy telegram to Grew: 929-930.
 890F.20 Missions/7-845: July 8 Eddy to Grew: 923-927.
 890F.0011/7-3145: July 31 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 1000-1007.
 890F.248/8-845: August 8 Eddy to Grew: 945.
 890F.24/9-1345: September 13 Truman letter to Ibn Saud: 954.
 711.90F/9-1345: September 13 Eddy to Grew: 955-956
 Available from: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v08> [Accessed 18 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1946. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume VII, Saudi Arabia, pp. 738-750.
 S89OF.00/12-3145: telegram 451 Eddy to Byrnes: 738.
 Eddy undated telegram #21 to U.S. Department of State: 738.
 711.90F/1-1946: January 19 Grew to Tuck: 738.
 711.90F/1-446: January 3 U.S. Department of State telegram #3 to Eddy: 739.
 890F.00/3-2146 March 21 Eddy telegram #77 to U.S. Department of State: 739.
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 21 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1946. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume VII, Palestine, pp. 576-737.
 867N.01/5-646: May 6 Sands telegram to Byrnes: 595.
 867N.01/5-346: May 8 Merriam memorandum to Acheson: 597, 599.
 867N.01/5-646: May 8 Truman telegram to Attlee: 596.
 867N.01/5-946: May 9 Wadsworth telegram to Byrnes: 599.
 567N'.01/5-2546: May 28 Eddy telegram to Byrnes: 615-616.
 867N.O1/7-246: June 21 memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee: 632-633.
 867N.01/7-146: July 1 Childs telegram to Byrnes: 641.
 867N.01/7-2046: Smith telegram to Byrnes: 647-648.
 867N.01/10-1 546: October 1 Ibn Saud letter to Truman: 708.
 867N.01/10-1546: October 25 Truman telegram to Ibn Saud: 716-717.
 867N.01/10-2846: October 28 Childs telegram to Byrnes: 714.
 867N.01/11-246: November 2 Ibn Saud letter to Truman: 718.
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 21 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1947. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume V, Participation by the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East, pp. 627-668.

891.6363/1-947: January 9 Loftus memorandum of conversation: 630.

890F.6363/1-1647: January 16 Henderson to Acheson: 634-635.

891.6363 AIOC/2-347: February 3 Eakens memorandum of conversation: 640.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 23 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1947. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume V, Interest of the United States in Proposals by Transjordan for a Greater Syria, pp. 738-759.

711.90F/1-1747 January 17 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 738-741

890D.00/2-1447: February 14 Marshall circular telegram to certain diplomatic and consular officers: 741.

890D.00/2-1847: February 18 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 742-743.

890D.00/-1847: March 3 Marshall telegram to Gallman: 744.

890D.00/5-947 May 9 telegram 2674 from London: 746.

711.90/6-2047: June 20 Childs telegram to Marshall: 750.

890D.00/6-1147: June 11 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 747.

890D.00/8-1947 August 19 Childs telegram and 890D.00/8-2147 August 21 Cairo Embassy dispatch: 754.

890D.00/8-2547: September 5 Lovett telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 756.

890D.00/9-1347: September 13 Bailey telegram to Marshall: 758.

890D.00/9-1347: September 18 Marshall telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 758.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 23 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1947. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume V, Palestine, pp. 999-1328.

5867N.01/12-1646: January 13 Byrnes telegram to the Embassy in Egypt: 1003-1004.

867N.01/11-1447: November 14 Smith telegram to Marshall: 1263-1264.

867N.01/1-1747: January 24 Truman to Ibn Saud: 1011-1014.

867N.01/10-3047: October 26 Ibn Saud letter to Truman: 1212.

867N.01/1-2147: January 21 Acheson memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador: 1010.

867N.01/2-1247: January 27 Acheson oral statement to Lord Inverchapel: 1014.

867N.01/11-1447: November 14 Smith telegram to Marshall: 1263.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 23 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1947. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume V, Saudi Arabia, pp. 1329-1342.

711.90F/1-747: January 17 Henderson memorandum of conversation: 1329.

890F.00/12-447: December 4 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1335-1338

890F.00/12-847: December 12 Lovett telegram to the Legation in Saudi Arabia: 1338-1340.

890F.00/12-1547: December 15 Childs telegram to Marshall: 1341-1342.

890F.00/12-1647: December 16 Ibn Saud message to Childs: 1342.

FRUS editorial note re: 890F.00/12-1647 December 16 Childs telegram 568: 1341-1342.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 23 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1948. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1, Saudi Arabia, pp. 209-263.

867N.01/1-1348: January 13 Childs telegram to Marshall: 209.

711.90F/1-1348: January 13 Childs telegram to Marshall: 209-210.

741.90F/1-2048: January 20 Childs telegram to Marshall: 212.

741.90F/1-2048: January 20 Gallman telegram to Marshall: 214.

741.90F/1-2648: January 26 Henderson memorandum to Marshall: 217.

890F.20 Missions/2-348: February 3 Childs telegram 46 to Marshall: 216.

741.60F/2-648: February 6 Marshall telegram to Childs: 219, 220.

741.90F/2-1248: Marshall telegram to Childs: 222.

741.90F/2-2148: February 21 Childs telegram #76 to Marshall: 223.

711.90B/4-648: April 6 Childs telegram #182 to Marshall: 228.

711.90B/4-848: April 8 U.S. Embassy telegram #1456 to Marshall: 229.

5890F.00/4-1948: April 19 Childs telegram to Marshall: 234.

890F.7962/11-1448: Childs telegram to Lovett: 254.

890F.7962/12-1748: Lovett telegram #471 to Legation in Saudi Arabia: 257.

741.90P/8-1648: August 10 joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to Forrestal: 244.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 24 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1949. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume VI, Saudi Arabia, pp. 1573-1629.

890D.00/2-349: Childs telegram #88 to Acheson: 1579.

890D.00/2-349: February 19 Acheson telegram #62 to Legation in Saudi Arabia: 1580.

890D.00/1-1949: January 19 Childs telegram to Acheson: 1578.

711.90F/2,-2749: February 27 Childs telegram #138 to Acheson: 1581-1582.

711.90F/4-249: April 2 Childs telegram #83 to Acheson: 1586-1587.

890F.7962/4-1449: April 14 Childs telegram #272 to Acheson: 1589.

8Q90F.00/5-1049: May 10 Childs telegram #159 to Acheson: 1595-1596.

890F.7962/1-2449: January 24 Childs telegram #54 to Acheson: 1577.

890F.7962/4-249: April 2 Childs telegram #84 to Acheson: 1590.

890F.7962/4-649: April 6 Childs telegram #254 to Acheson: 1594.

890F.7962/5-2349: May 23, Childs telegram #137 to Acheson: 1598-1599.

811.001/5-2349: May 23 Truman letter to Ibn Saud: 1599-1560.

890F.7962/5-1049: May 10 Acheson draft to Truman: 1599.

890F.7962/6-449: June 4 Childs *aide memoire* to Ibn Saud: 1600-1601.

811.2390F/8-2549: August 25 Hill to Acheson: 1613.

890. F.00/9-2849: September 28 Childs memorandum of conversation: 1614.

811.2390F/1.1-1749: November 17 Childs telegram #668 to Acheson: 1618-1619.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 26 January 2009].

United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Near East: Multilateral Relations, pp. 1-283.

886A.00/10-5-50: October 5 Awalt memorandum of conversation: 101.

890.00 TA/G-750: June 7 McGhee memorandum to the Secretary of State: 169.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 26 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1950. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Volume V, Saudi Arabia, pp.1112-1200.

711.56386A/2-1350: March 8 Hare to U.S. Secretary of Defense: 1130.

611.86A/2-150: February 1 Childs telegram #62 to Acheson: 1123
 786A.5/2-1450: February 14 Childs telegram to the Secretary of State: 1127.
 886A.10/2-1350: February 13 Childs telegram #78 to Acheson: 1124-1125.
 886A.10/6-2650: June 26 Childs dispatch #375 to Acheson: 1179.
 611.86A/3-1950: March 19 McGhee memorandum of conversation: 1133-1142.
 611.86A/3-2350: March 23 Childs memorandum of conversation: 1147-1153.
 786A.5MAP/4-350: April 3 Collins telegram #194 to Haislip: 1158.
 786A.5/4-1950 April 19 Collins excerpt to Gray: 1158.
 786A.5MAP/4-350: April 3 Collins telegram #194 to Haislip: 1160.
 FRUS, 1950 editorial note: 1182.
 786A.00/9-350: September 3 Hill telegram #127 to Acheson: 1185-1186.
 786A.5/11-450: November 4 Hare telegram #270 to Acheson: 1191.
 711.56386A/12-2450: December 24 Hare telegram #400 to Acheson: 1197.
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 27 January 2009].

United States Department of State, 1951. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near East and Africa Volume V, Saudi Arabia, pp. 1017-1072.

711.56386A/1-351: January 3 Hare telegram #152 to Acheson: 1017.
 711.56386A/1-1251: January 12 Hare telegram to Acheson: 1020, 1021.
 711.56386A/1-1651: January 16 Hare telegram to Acheson: 1024.
 611.86A/2-551: February 5 Policy Statement on Saudi Arabia: 1029
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 1 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 1952-1954. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near and Middle East Volume IX, Part 1. Conference files.

Lot 59 D 95, CF 156: May 18 U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 97, 99, 100, 101-104.

Lot 59 D 95, CF 156: May 19 U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 106

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 2 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 1952-1954. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near and Middle East Volume IX, Part 1. The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1953, pp. 1-167.

110.11 DU/1-2353 FRUS editorial note on December 17 1952 Jernegan memorandum: 1-2.
 Lot 59 D 95, CF 156: May 18 U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 97, 99, 100, 101-104, 106.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 2 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 1952-1954. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near and Middle East Volume IX, Part 2, Saudi Arabia pp. 2409-2616.

1952

786A.5 MSP/4-1652: April 16 Acheson to Lovett: 2413.

786A.5 MSP/6-1352: June 13 Foster to Acheson: 2416.

711.56386A/8-452: August 4 Hare telegram #83 to Acheson: 2418.

86A.5 MSP/9-1952: September 19 Sturgill memorandum of conversation: 2422.

611.86A/12-1052: December 10 Hare telegram #445 to Acheson: 2430.

641.86A/3-1052: March 10 Hare telegram #474 to the Department of State: 2459-2460.

641.86A/3-1152: March 11 Hare telegram #477 to the Department of State: 2461.
 641.86A/3-1052: March 10 Dulles telegram #4691 to the Embassy in the United Kingdom: 2462.
 641.86A/3-1152: March 24 Acheson telegram #351 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2464.
 641.86A/9-1852: September 18 Sturgill memorandum of conversation: 2471-2472.
 786A.00/9-1752: September 17 Acheson telegram #149 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2473.
 780.022/9-2852 September 28 Hare telegram #179 to the Department of State: 2476.
 780.022/10-852: October 8 Acheson telegram # 90 to the Consulate General at Dhahran: 2485.
 641.86A/10-652: October 6 Hart memorandum of conversation: 2482-2483.
 780.022/11-452: November 4 Hare telegram #338 to the Department of State: 2494.
 Lot 53 D 65: December 4 S/A (Jessup) files, Foreign Ministers Meetings-New York, October-December, 1952: Plitt memorandum of Acheson conversation with Foreign Ministers of the Near East, 7th U.N. General Assembly: 250.

1953

786A.5 MSP/2-1453: February 14 Hare telegram #621 to the Department of State: 2434.
 786A.5 MSP/2-2053: February 27: Smith to Stassen: 2436.
 786A.5 MSP/3-1453: March 14 Eisenhower memorandum to Stassen: 2438.
 786A.11/11-1053: November 10 Jones telegram to the Department of State: 2447.
 711.56386A/12-2053: December 20 Hackler telegram #97 to the Department of State: 2450-2451.
 611.86A/6-154: June 15 Wadsworth telegram #493 to the Department of State: 2452-2453.
 611.86A/10-154: October 1 Wadsworth telegram #138 to the Department of State: 2455-2456.
 780.022/1-1053: January 10 Acheson telegram #418 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2513.
 Lot 64 D 199 Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, January-April 1953, Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 2516.
 Lot 64 D 199 #154 March 2 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation, meeting of Eisenhower and Faisal: 2519.
 780.022/3-3154: March 31 Aldrich Telegram #5371 to the Department of State: 2527.
 780.022/4-153: April 1 Dulles telegram #565 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 2531.
 780.022/4-353: April 3 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 2533.
 786A.11/6-1553: June 15 Eisenhower letter to Ibn Saud: 2541-2542.
 Lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower": June 29 Ibn Saud letter to Eisenhower: 2545.
 780.022/7-753: July 7 Dulles memorandum to Eisenhower: 2555.
 780.022/7-2753: July 27 Salisbury to Dulles: 2560.
 780.022/8-2853: August 28 Dulles to Salisbury: 2566.
 780.022/10-1153: October 11 Embassy in Saudi Arabia memorandum of conversation: 2567.
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 2 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 1955-1957. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near and Middle East Volume XIII, Saudi Arabia pp. 249-512.

1955

886A.2553/2-955: February 9 Fritzlan memorandum of conversation: 250-251.
 886A.2553/3-455: March 3 Allen memorandum to Murphy: 251, 253.
 682.87/2-2755: February 27 Wadsworth telegram #416 to the Department of State: 253.
 682.87/2-2755: March 5 Hoover telegram #387 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 255-256.

611.86A/7-2555: July 25 Wadsworth telegram #39 to the Department of State: 261-262.
 661.86A/9-1955: Hoover telegram #141 to Wadsworth: 268-270.
 786A.5-MSP/10-955: October 9 Newsom telegram #190 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 279.
 780.022/10-3055: October 30 Carrigan telegram #79 to the Department of State: 285.
 780.022/11-455: November 4 Hoover telegram #223 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 285-286.
 780.022/11-2155: November 21 Dulles telegram #2929 to the Embassy in the United Kingdom: 292.
 786A.00/12-2055: December 20 Hoover memorandum to Dulles: 304.

1956

780.022/1-1756: NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers) Geren memorandum of conversation: 317.
 780.022/1-1956 January 19 Wilkins memorandum of conversation: 318-320.
 Lot 66 D 204, UK official correspondence with Secy. Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I. incoming: January 23 Lloyd message to Dulles: 323.
 Lot 62 D 181, CF 648B: January 30 Barnes memorandum to Hoover: 324.
 611.86A/1-2656: January 26 Wadsworth letter to Allen: 325.
 Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. 780.022/1-2256 January 30 memorandum of conversation, White House: 328-329, 333.
 780.022/2-256: February 2 Newsom memorandum of conversation, Department of State: 338.
 FRUS editorial note #221: 351.
 FRUS editorial note #227: 365.
 780.022/5-1556: May 15 memorandum of conversation NAC Foreign Ministers meeting: 367.
 611.86A/4-256 April 2 Wadsworth memorandum of conversation: 352, 353.
 711.56386A/6-1356: June 13 Wadsworth dispatch #213 to the Department of State: 373.
 FRUS editorial note #232: 374.
 711.56386A/6-2056: July 11 Dulles telegram #25 to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia: 390.
 711.56386A/9-1356: September 13 Wadsworth telegram #106 to the Department of State: 399.
 FRUS editorial note # 249: 403.
 786A.56/12-1556: December 15 Wadsworth telegram #335 to the Department of State: 407.

1957

786A.11/1-657: January 6 Carrigan telegram #319 to the Department of State: 408-409.
 Lot 62 D 181, CF 33: January 30 memorandum of conversation, White House: 418, 419, 422. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries: Eisenhower memorandum of conversation, White House: 424-426.
 Lot 62 D 181, CF 833: January 31 Stoltzfus memorandum of conversation, Blair House: 431-443.
 Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 2 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 1955-1957. Foreign relations of the United States. The Near and Middle East Volume XV.
 Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries, March 28 Goodpaster memorandum of conference: 423.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 4 February 2009].

United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956 (1955-1957). Suez crisis: United States response to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and related Arab-Israeli developments, July 27-October 29, 1956, pp. 1-820.

Lot 59 D 518, Report of Special Mission to Saudi Arabia August 20-27, 1956: 287, 288.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: August 24 message From King Saud to President Eisenhower: 295.

974.7301/8-2856: August 26 Wadsworth telegram to U.S. Embassy in Egypt: 299.

974.7301/8-2856: August 28 Byroade telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State: 310.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File: September 6 Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State: 395.

786A.56/12-1556: December 15 Wadsworth telegram #335 to the Department of State: 407.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records: November 8 Gleason memorandum of discussion, 303d Meeting of the National Security Council: 1072, 1074-1075.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries: November 19 Goodpaster memorandum of a conference with the President: 1153.

774.11/11-2056: November 20 memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Acting Secretary of State: 1165.

880.2553/11-2656: November 2 telegram Consulate General at Dhahran to the Department of State: 1200.

684A.86/12-1256: December 12 message President to the Secretary of State: 1297.

Available from: <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu> [Accessed 4 February 2009].

Eisenhower Papers

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Cable 7841. Top secret to Winston Spencer Churchill, 10 June 1953. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 239. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/239.cfm> [Accessed 30 January 2010]

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Secret to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, 15 June 1953. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 245. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/245.cfm> [Accessed 30 January 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Diary, 8 February 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1744. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1744.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Diary, 8 March 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1773. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1773.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Secret to Herbert Clark Hoover, Jr., 10 March 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1779. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1779.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Top secret Diary, 28 March 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1811. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1811.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Secret to Ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud, 18 September 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1990. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1990.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Top secret to Lewis Williams Douglas, 30 November 1956. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 2124A. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/2124A.cfm> [Accessed 30 January 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D. to John Foster Dulles, 3 December 1957. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 478. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/478.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Introduction to the Second Term in *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/introduction.htm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Secret to Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, 1 February 1958. In *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 560. World Wide Web

facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Available from: <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/560.cfm> [Accessed 30 Jan 2010].

U.S. Government: miscellaneous

United States Department of State, 2007. *Bilateral Treaties in Force as of November 2007*. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83022.pdf> [Accessed 1 December 2008].

United States House of Representatives, 2007. "U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia: Oil, Anxiety, and Ambivalence." Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Congress, First Session 18 September 2007, Serial No. 110-133.

United States National Security Council, 1970. National Security Decision Making Memorandum 96, 7 November.

United States Senate, 1975. "Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy", Report by the Sub-committee on Multinational Corporations to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, 2 January, U.S. Government Printing Office. Available from: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/oil1.htm> [Accessed 13 February 2009].

Miscellaneous

United Nations Treaties, 1952. No. 1906 United States of America and Saudi Arabia Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual defense assistance 18 June 1951. Available from: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/4/17/00006847.pdf [Accessed 19 May 2008].

Secondary

Books

Abir, M., 1988. *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites Conflict and Collaboration*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Abir, M., 1993. *Saudi Arabia: Society, Government, and the Gulf Crises*. London: Routledge.

AbuKhalil, A., 2003. *Battle for Saudi Arabia, the Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Acacia, J., 2009. *Clark Clifford: the Wise Man of Washington*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

Acheson, D., 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department*. New York: W.W. Norton, Inc.

Al-Baharna, H.H., 1968. *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States; a Study of their Treaty Relations and their International Problems*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Allain, J., 2004. *International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

Al-Nafjan, F., 2009. *The Origins of Saudi-American Relations: from Recognition to Diplomatic Representation (1931-1943)*. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, Inc. S.A.L.

Al-Rasheed, M., 2002. *A History of Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Amirahmadi, H., 1993. *The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Anderson, B.S., 2005. *Nationalist Voices in Jordan: the Street and the State*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Anderson, I., 1981. *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Auty, Richard, 2002. *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ayoob, M., 1991. "The Security Problematic of the Third World". *World Politics* 43 (2): 257-283.

Ayoob, M., 2002. "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: the Case for Subaltern Realism". International Studies Association Convention, Chicago 2001. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bagby, W.M., 1999. *America's International Relations since World War I*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Baldwin, D.A., ed, 2008. *Theories of International Relations*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Group.

Barrett, R.C., 2007. *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy (Library of International Relations)*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Bassiouni, M. C., and Ben-Ami, S., 2009. *A guide to documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli conflict: 1897-2008*. Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV.

Beattie, K.J. *Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Beisner, R.L., 2006. *Dean Acheson: a Life in the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benson, M.T., 1997. *Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

- Berger, M., 1962. *The Arab World Today*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- Bergsmann, S., 1995. "The Concept of Military Alliance", in Reiter, D. and Gartner, H., eds. 2001. *Small States and Alliances*. New York: Physica-Verlag.
- Black, E., 2011. *British Petroleum and the Redline Agreement: the West's Secret Pact to Get Mideast Oil*. Washington, D.C.: Dialog Press.
- Brady, L.P., 1991. *The Politics of Negotiation: America's Dealings with Allies, Adversaries, and Friends*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Brecher, M. and Wilkenfield J., 2000. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. University of Maryland interactive version available from: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/> [Accessed 3 January 2009].
- Brown, L.C., 2004. *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd.
- Boyle, F.A., 2004. *Destroying World Order: U.S. Imperialism in the Middle East before and after September 11*. Atlanta: Clarity Press.
- Brady, L.P., 1991. *The Politics of Negotiation: America's Dealings with Allies, Adversaries, and Friends*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Brenchley, F., 1989. *Britain and the Middle East: an Economic History, 1945-87*. London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing.
- Bronson, R. 2006b. *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, A.C., 1999, *Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
- Brown, C. & Ainley, K., 2005, *Understanding International Relations* (3rd edition), Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire.
- Buheiry, M.R., 1989. *The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World*. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press
- Bull, H. and Hurrell, A., 2002. *The Anarchical Society*, 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Deverak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C. & True, J., 2005, *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd edition. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Burns, W.J., 1985. *Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Buzan, B., 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-first Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Buzan, B., Jones, C.A, and Little, R., 1993. *The Logic of Anarchy*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Buzan, B., De Wilde, J., and Waever, O., 1997. *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, B. and Waever, O., 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, D.L. and Wise J.R., 2002. *The Persian Gulf in the Coming Decade: Trends, Threats, and Opportunities*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publications.

Caldarola, C. ed, 1982. *Religion and Societies: Asia and the Middle East (Religion and Society)*. New York: Mouton Publishers.

Canfield, J.V., 2001. *The Middle East in Turmoil, Volume 1*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Carlsnaes, W., Risse-Kappen, T. and Simmons, B.A., 2002. *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Carr, E.H., 1939. *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Reprinted 2001, New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Champion, D., 2003. *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform*. London: C. Hurst & Co., Ltd.

Chay, J., ed., 1990. *Culture and International Relations*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Christison, K., 1991, *Perceptions of Palestine: their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Citino, N.J. 2002. *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Clausewitz, K., 1993. *On War*, M Howard, M. & Paret, P. eds. New York: Everyman's Library.

Cleveland, W.L., 2000. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cohen M.J., 2004. *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tier*. New York: Routledge.

Cohen, M. and Kolinsky, M., eds., 1998. *Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943-55*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

- Cole, W.S., 1995. *Determinism and American Foreign Relations During the Franklin D. Roosevelt Era*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Cooper, C.L., 1978. *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Cooper, W.W. and Yue, P., 2008. *Challenges of the Muslim World, Volume 19: Present, Future, and Past*. London: Elsevier Publishing.
- Cordesman, A.H., 1997. *Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Cordesman, A.H., 2003. *Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty First century: the Political, Foreign policy, Economic and Energy Dimensions*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cordesman, A. H. and Obaid, N., 2005. *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- DeConde, A., 1958. *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Devine, M.J., Watson, R.P, and Wolz, R.J., eds 2008. *Israel and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press
- Dobson, A.P. and Marsh, S., 2001. *U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945*. London: Routledge.
- Donnelly, J., 1993. "Twentieth-Century Realism", Chapter 5:85-104 in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D.R., eds, 1993. *Tradition of International Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Donnelly, J., 1995. "Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations", pp. 175-198 in Dryzek, J.S., Farr, J. and Leonard, S., 1995. *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Donnelly, J., 2000. *Realism and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B.C., 2001. 'Realism' in *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds J Baylis & S Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eayrs, J., ed., 1964. *The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Ellis, H.B., 1960. *Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and American Policy*. New York: Ronald Press Co.
- El-Shazy, S., 1986. *The Arab Military Option*. San Francisco, CA: American Mideast Publishing.

- Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR), 2002. *The Middle East and North Africa*, 49th edition. London: Routledge.
- Evensen, B.J., 1992. *Truman, Palestine, and the Press: Shaping Conventional Wisdom at the Beginning of the Cold War*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Ferrell, R.H., ed, 1997. *Off the Record: the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.
- Findlay, A.M., 1994. *The Arab World*. New York: Routledge.
- Flower, R., 1977. *Napoleon to Nasser: the Story of Modern Egypt*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Forde, S., 1993. Classical realism (Chapter 4) in Nardin, T. and Mapel, D.R., eds, 1993. *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frankel, B., 1996. *Realism Restatements and Renewal*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
- Freedman, R.O., 1975. *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*. New York: Praeger.
- Freiberger, S.Z., 1992. *Dawn over Suez: the Rise of American Power in the Middle East 1953-1957*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
- Gaddis, J., 1994. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", pp.323-388 in *The Cold War and After*, eds S. Lynn-Jones & S. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press. Cambridge.
- Gardner, L.C., 2009. *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II*. New York: The New Press.
- Gelpi, C., 1999. Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control. Chapter 4 in Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R.O. and Wallender, C.A. eds. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Across Time and Space*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gettleman, M.E. and Schaar, S., eds, 2003. *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*. New York: Grove Press.
- Gevin, J.L., 2007. *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goold-Adams, R., 1962. *John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Gorst, A. and Johnman, L., 1997. *The Suez Crisis*. London: Routledge.

Griffiths, M. & O'Callaghan, T., 2002. *International Relations: The Key Concepts*. London: Routledge.

Guzzini, S., 1998. *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*. London: Routledge.

Haddad, W.W. and Hardy, M.M., 2003. "Jordan's Alliance with Israel and Its Effects on Jordanian-Arab Relation" in Karsh, E. and Kumaraswamy, P.R., eds, 2003. *Israel, the Hashemites, and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

Hahn, P.L., 1991. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy And Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*. Charlotte, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.

Hahn, P.L., 2004a. *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Charlotte, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Hahn, P.L., 2004b. *United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*. Charlotte, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Hahn, P.L., 2005. *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.

Halliday, F., 1994. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: MacMillan.

Hansen, B., 2001. *Unipolarity and the Middle East*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hart, P.T., 1999. *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership*, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Hartley, C., Lea, D., and Rowe, A., 2004. *A survey of Arab-Israeli relations* 2nd edition. London: Europa Publications Ltd.

Hawley, D., 1970. *The Trucial States*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Hechler, K., 1982. *Working with Truman: a Personal Memoir of the White House Years*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Hillman, W., 1952. *Mr. President: The First Publication from the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-Second President of the United States of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young.

Hinnebusch, R. and Ehteshami, A. eds, 2002. *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hinnebusch, R., 2003. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.

Hobbs, J.J., 2008. *World Regional Geography*, 6th edition. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.

- Hobson, J.M., 2000. *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan, M.J., 1996. *America in the World: The Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations since 1941*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holland, M.F., 1996. *America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Holsti, K., 1985. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Holsti, O. R., Hopmann, P.T., and Sullivan, J.D., 1973. *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*. New York: John Wiley.
- Huth, P.K., 1996. *Standing Your Ground*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Jacobs, M.F., 2011. *Imagining the Middle East: the Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Jacobson, J., 1994. *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics*. London: University of California Press Ltd.
- Jankowski, J., 2002. *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Jarvis, D.S.L., 2000. *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press.
- Johnson, P., 1958. *Journey into Chaos*. London: MacGibbon & Lee.
- Jones. T.C., 2010. *Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kagan, R., 2003. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Kamrava, M., 2011. *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War*, 2nd Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kaplan, L.S., 1999. *Thomas Jefferson: Westward the Course of Empire*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc.
- Karsh, E., 2002. *Essential Histories, The Arab-Israeli conflict: the Palestine War 1948*. Colchester, Essex: Osprey Publishing.
- Karsh, E. and Kumaraswamy P.R., eds., 2003. *Israel, the Hashemites, and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle*. London: Frank Cass.
- Kelly, S. and Gorst, A., 2000. *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis*. London: Frank Cass.

- Keohane, R., 1984. *After Hegemony: Power and Discord in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R. ed., 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., 2001. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd edition. New York: Longman.
- Kertesz, S.D., ed, 1961. *American Diplomacy in a New Era*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Khan, M.A.M., 2004. *Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kheirallah, G., 1952. *Arabia Reborn*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Khoury, F.J., 1985. *The Arab-Israeli dilemma*, 3rd edition. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Kimche, J. and Kimche, D., 1960. *A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel*. New York: Praeger.
- Kingseed, C.C., 1995. *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Kirk, G.E., 1961. *Contemporary Arab Politics: a Concise History*. New York: F. A. Praeger.
- Kochavi, A.J. *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kreutz, A.J., 2007. *Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?* Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- Kunz, D.B., 1991. *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kyle, K., 1991. *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Lacey, M.J., 1991. *The Truman Presidency*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
- Lake, D.A., 1999. *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lapidoth-Eschelbacher, R., 1982. *International Straits of the World: the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden*. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Laqueur, W.Z., 1956. *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger.

- Laqueur, W.Z., 1959. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. New York: Praeger.
- Leatherdale, C., 1983. *Britain, Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: the Imperial Oasis*. New York: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.
- Lebow, R.N., 2003. *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leffler, M.P., 1992. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lenczowski, G., 1960. *Oil and State in the Middle East*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Lesch, A.M. and Tschirgi, D., 1998. *Origins and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Levantrosser, W.F., 1986. *Harry S. Truman: The Man from Independence*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Levey, Z. and Podeh, E. eds, 2008. *Britain and the Middle East: from Imperial Power to Junior Partner*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press.
- Lieber, K.A., ed. 2009. *War, Peace, and International Political Realism: Perspectives from The Review of Politics*. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Lippman, T.W., 2004. *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia*. New York: Westview Press.
- Lippman, T.W., 2008a. *Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East*. Vista, California: Selwa Press.
- Lipsky, G.A., Ani, M., Bigelow, M.C., Gillen, F., Larson, T.J., Matthews, A.T.J., Rouse, C.H. and Gillen, S.C., 1959. *Saudi Arabia, Its People Its Society, Its Culture*. New Haven, CT: HRAF Press.
- Liska, G., 1962. *Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Little, D., 2008. *American Orientalism: the United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press.
- Little, T., 1958. *Egypt*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Long, D.E., 1885. *The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Long, D.E., 1997. *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Louis, W.R., 1984. *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Louis, W.R. and Owen, R., 1989. *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macris, J.R., 2010. *The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Maisel, S. and Shoup, J.A., 2009. *Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States Today*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing.

Manea, E., 2005. *Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen*. London: Saqi Books.

Manuel, F.E., 1949. *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations*. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press.

Mark, C.R., 2006. *Israel-United States Relationship*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Marlowe, J., 1959. *The Seat of Pilate: an Account of the Palestine Mandate*. London: Cresset Press.

Marlowe, J., 1961. *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.

McDowall, D., 1989. *Palestine and Israel: the Uprising and Beyond*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McFarland, K.D. and Roll, D.L., 2005. *Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: the Roosevelt and Truman Years*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana State University Press.

McMahon, R.J., 2009. *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order*. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.

McNay, J.T., 2001. *Acheson and Empire: the British Accent in American Foreign Policy*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Mearsheimer, J.J., 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: WW Norton.

Mearsheimer, J.J., 2007. "Structural Realism" in Dunne T., Kurki, M., and Smith, S. eds, 2007. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Melby, Eric D.K., 1981. *Oil and the International System: the case of France, 1918-1969*. New York: Arno Press Inc. Originally presented as a dissertation, 1978, Johns Hopkins University.

- Metz, H.C. ed., 1992. "Nation Building: the Rule of Abd Al Aziz, 1926-1953", *Saudi Arabia, a Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress.
- Metz, H.C. ed., 1992b. "Government: Beduin Tribes and Merchant Families", *Saudi Arabia, a Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress.
- Metz, H.C. ed., 1992c. "Saudi Arabia: the Economy", *Saudi Arabia, a Country Study*. Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress.
- Miglietta, J.P., 2002. *American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia*. Oxford: Lexington Books.
- Mihalkanin, E.S., ed., 2004. *American Statesmen: Secretaries of State from John Jay to Colin Powell*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Miller, A.D., 1980. *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.
- Mingst, K., 2004. *Essentials of International Relations* (3rd Edition), Kentucky: University of Kentucky.
- Monroe, E., 1963. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Morgenthau, H., 1948, 1954. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morris, B., 2008. *1948: a History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Morton, M.Q., 2006. *In the Heart of the Desert: The Story of an Exploration Geologist and the Search for Oil in the Middle East*. Aylesford: Green Mountain Press.
- Morton, M.Q., 2012 (expected release). *Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence and Oil in South-eastern Arabia*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Muqtedar Khan .M.A., 2004. *Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
- Mufti, M., 1996. *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Murawiec, L., 2005. *Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West*. George Holoch (Translator). Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R., eds, 1994. *The Defense Policies of Nations: a Comparative Study*, 3rd edition. London: Johns Hopkins Press, Ltd.

Mursī Abd Allāh, M., 1978. *The United Arab Emirates: a Modern History*. London: Croom Helm Ltd.

Nersesian, R.L., 2010. *Energy for the 21st Century: A Comprehensive Guide to Conventional and Alternative Services*. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc.

Niblock, T., 1982. *State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia*. Kent: Croom Helm Ltd.

Niblock, T., 2006. *Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Nichols, D.A., 2011. *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis--Suez and the Brink of War*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Niebuhr, R., 1932. *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics (Library of Theological Ethics)*. Paperback edition 2002. Westminster: John Knox Press.

Nutting, A., 1967. *No End of a Lesson: the Story of Suez*. London: Constable & Co Ltd.

Onuf, N., 1989, *World of Our Making*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Oron, Y., ed, 1960. *Middle East Record Volume 1, 1960*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Palmer, M.A., 1999. *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1883-1992*. New York: Touchstone, Simon and Schuster.

Pappé, I., 2001. *The Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1947-1951*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Pappé, I. and Hilāl, J., 2010. *Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Peretz, D., 1994. *The Middle East Today*. Westport CT.: Praeger.

Petersen, T.T., 2000. *The Middle East between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952-7*. Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.

Petersen, T.T., 2006. *The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961-1969: a Willing Retreat*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

Petersen, T.T., 2009. *Richard Nixon, Great Britain & the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf & Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies Out of Clients*. UK: Sussex Academic Press.

Peterson, J.E., 1986. *Defending Arabia*. London: Croom Helm.

Philby, H.S.J., 1955. *Saudi Arabia*. London: Ernest Benn.

Pollack, K.M., 2004. *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Powaski, R.E., 1991. *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950 (Contributions to the Study of World History.)* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Quandt, W.B., 1981. *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Quigley, J.R., 1990. *Palestine and Israel: a Challenge to Justice.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Rabie, M., 1988. *The Politics of Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Assistance and Aid to Israel.* New York: Praeger.

Ramady, M.A., 2010. *The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges*, 2nd edition. London: Springer.

Randall, S.J., 2005. *United States Foreign policy since World War I: for profits and Security* 2nd edition. Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Reich, B. ed, 1990 *Political leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc.

Reichard, G.W., 2004. *Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower.* Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.

Reiter, E. and Gartner, H., eds. 2001. *Small States and Alliances.* New York: Physica-Verlag.

Rice, D.A., 2006. "Simmons, MR 2005, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy*, Wiley, London.

Risse-Kappen, T., 1997. *Cooperation among Democracies: the European Influence on US Foreign Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rogan, E.L. and Shlaim, A., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rourke, J.T., 2005. *International Politics on the World Stage*, New York: McGraw Hill.

Rugh, W.A., 2006. *American Encounters with Arabs: The "Soft Power" of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.* Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

Ryan, H.R., 1993. *Harry S. Truman: Presidential Rhetoric.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Safran, N., 1988. *Saudi Arabia: the Ceaseless Quest for Security.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Salibi, K.S., 2006. *The Modern History of Jordan.* London: I.B. Tauris.

Sayigh, Y. and Shlaim, A., eds, 1997. *The Cold War and the Middle East*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schneer, J., 2010. *The Balfour Declaration: the Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Schoenbaum, D., 1993. *The United States and the State of Israel*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schofield, C.H., 1994. *The Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Routledge.

Schreiber, G., Stegemann, B. and Vogel, D., 1995. *Germany and the Second World War Volume III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941 (From Italy's Declaration of Non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War)* Translated by Dean S. McMurray, Ewald Osers and Louise Wilmott, Translation Editor: P. S. Falla Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schroeder, P., 1976. Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management, pp.247-286 in Knorr, K, ed., 1976. *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Shannon, V.P., 2003. *Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

Sharp, J.M., 2009. *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, Report to Congress. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Diane Publishing Co.

Singer, J.D. 1961. "The Levels of Analysis Problem" in *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Revised edition), ed J.N. Rosenau. New York: Free Press.

Smith, S., Booth, K. & Zalewski M., 1996. *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, S.C., 2004. *Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71*. New York: Routledge Curzon.

Smith, T.W., 1999. *History and International Relations*. London: Routledge.

Snetsinger, J., 1974. *Truman, the Jewish vote, and the Creation of Israel*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Studies.

Snyder, G. H., 1992. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", in Rothstein, R.L. ed., 1992. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations*. Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press.

Snyder, G.H., 1992. "Alliance Theory: a Neorealist First Cut" in Rothstein, R.L. ed, 1992. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations: Essays in honor of William T.R. Fox*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.

- Snyder, G.H., 1997. *Alliance Politics*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Spiro, D.E., 1999. *The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Steiner, M.J., 1947. *Inside Pan-Arabia*. Chicago: Packard.
- St. John, R., 1960. *The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Takeyh, R., 2000. *The U.S., Britain, and Nasser's Egypt: 1953-57*. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan.
- Taylor, A.R., 1982. *The Arab Balance of Power*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Taylor, A.R., 1991. *The Superpowers and the Middle East*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Thucydides, 1985. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Toffler, A., 1990. *Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century*. London: Bantam.
- Turner, B., 2007. *Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War*. London: Hodder Headline.
- Ulam, A.B., 1968. "Expansion and Co-existence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973", in Beisner, R.L., 2003. *American Foreign Relations since 1600: a Guide to the Literature*, 2nd edition. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Inc., Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.
- Van der Meulen, D., 1957. *The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Varble, D., 2003. *The Suez Crisis 1956 (Essential Histories)*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Verbeek, B., 2003. *Decision-making in Great Britain during the Suez Crisis: Small groups and a Persistent Leader*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Viotti, P.R. & Kauppi, M.V. 1999. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Vitalis, R., 2007. *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Wagner, H.L., 2008. *Saudi Arabia (Creation of the Modern Middle East)*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers.

Wallerstein, I., 1996. "The Interstate Structure of the Modern World System" in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, eds S Smith, K Booth, & M Zalewski, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walt, S.M., 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Waltz, K.N., 1954. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, K.N., 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Waltz, K.N., 1986. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: Response to My Critics", in Keohane, R.O. ed., 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Watt, D.C. and Almog, O., 2003. *Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*. London: Frank Cass.

Weitsman, P.A., 2004. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press.

Wendt, A., 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weston, M., 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Wheelock, K., 1960. *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Wight, M., 1978. *Power Politics*, New York: Holmes & Maier.

Williamson, D.C., 2006. *Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-American Relations, 1953-1955*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Wilson, M.C., 1990. *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wynbrandt, J. and Gerges, F.A., 2010. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York: Facts on File.

Yaqub, S., 2004. *Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower doctrine and the Middle East*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Yale, W., 1958. *The Near East: A Modern History*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Yesilbursa, B.K., 2005. *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959*. London: Frank Cass.

Zahlan, R.S., 1978. *The origins of the United Arab Emirates: a Political and Social history of the Trucial States*. New York: MacMillan.

Journals

Al-Faisal, Prince Turki, 2006c. "With Values Aligned: Improving Saudi-US Relations". *Harvard International Review*, 28 (3), 14. Available from: <http://www.questia.com/read/5018739172> [Accessed 1 December 2006].

Al-Shayej, A., 1997. "Dangerous Perceptions: Gulf Views of the U.S. Role in the Region". *Middle East Policy*, 5:3, pp.1-13

Alterman, J.B., 1998. "American Aid to Egypt in the 1950s: from Hope to Hostility". *The Middle East Journal*. 52 (1): pp. 51+.

Alyami, A., 2008. "Saudi Arabia: The Gathering Storm". *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, Fall (15). Available from: <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/15/alyami.php> [Accessed 1 November 2008].

Ashley, R.K., 1984. "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organization* 38: pp. 225-286.

Bashir, A. and Wright, S., 1992. "Saudi Arabia: Foreign Policy After the Gulf War". *Middle East Policy*. 1:1, pp.107-117.

Bowman, B., 2005. "Realism and Idealism: US Policy toward Saudi Arabia, from the Cold War to Today." *Parameters*, Winter 2005-2006, 35:4, pp.91-105.

Boyle, F., 2008. "Hans Morgenthau's Unlimited Imperialism." *True Blue Liberal*, July 1. Available from: <<http://www.trueblueliberal.com/2008/07/01/hans-morgenthau-unlimited-imperialism/>> [Accessed 1 July 2008].

Brooks, S., 1997. "Dueling Realisms: Realism in International Relations". *International Organization*, MIT Press Summer 51:3, pp.445-477.

Bushrod, H. Jr., 1958. "Buraimi, A Study in Diplomacy by Default". *The Reporter*, 23 January.

Christensen, T. and Snyder, J., 1990. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity". *International Organization*, 44 (2), 137-168.

Ciorciari, J.D., 2005. "Saudi-U.S. Alignment after the Six-Day War". Gloria Center, *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA), June, 9:2. Available from: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue2/jv9no2a1.html> [Accessed 30 June 2007].

Copeland, D.C., 2000. "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism". *International Security*, Fall 25:2, pp. 187-212.

Cox, R., 1981. "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International relations Theory", *Millennium* 10: 126-155.

Dumais-Lévesque, L.B., 2009. "Stand by me: Wartime Alliance Dynamics in History". *University of Virginia*, March.

Fayazmanesh, S., 2004. "The Holy Empire: who we are and what we do", *International Relations, GeoStrategy and Middle East Affairs Journal*. Available from: <http://www.nvo.com/solvayalumni/theholympire/> [1 May 2007].

Friedman, M.J., 2006. "The Cold War: a Test of American Power and a Trial of Ideals". *Foreign Policy Agenda*, U.S. Department of State, April, 11:1. Available from: <http://usinfo.state.gov/pub/ejournalusa.html> [Accessed 17 November 2008].

Gause, F.G. III, 2007. "Threats and Threat perception in the Persian Gulf. Mesa Roundtable: Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Gulf", Middle East Policy Council. *Middle East Policy*, 14 (2), 119-124.

Hudson, M., 1996. "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East". *The Middle East Journal*, 50 (3), 329-343.

Karle, W., 2003, "Realism and Liberalism continue to shape the ways in which policy makers conceptualise international relations", *Shedden Papers*, Australian Public Service.

Kelly, J.B., 1956. "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute," *International Affairs* 32: 319.

Keohane, R.O., 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work." *Foreign Policy*, Spring: pp. 82+.

Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., 1971. "Transnational Relations and World Politics: a Conclusion". Cambridge University Press, *International Organization* 25:3, pp.721-748.

Korab-Karpowicz, W.J., 2006. "How Can International Relations Theorists Benefit from Reading Thucydides" *The Monist*, 89: pp.231-243.

Kurth, J., 1998. "Inside the Cave: the banality of I.R. Studies", The National Affairs, Inc., *The National Interest*, Fall 53: 29-40.

Lagon, M.P., ed, 1994. "Alternatives to Structural Realism: International Relations after the Cold War". *Perspectives on Political Science*, Vol. 23, p.68.

Lake, D.A., 2000. "The Self-Restrained Superpower". *Harvard International Review*, 22 (3), 48.

Landau, Z., 2007. "Jordan's Entry into the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: a Study in Omni-balancing", *NIMEP Insights*, National Institute for Middle East Peace, 3 (Fall), 83-94.

- Lepgold, J. and McKeown, T., 1995. "Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis". *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(3): 369-84. Available from: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lepgold.htm> [Accessed 28 November 2010].
- Lewis, S.W., 1999. "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance. Middle East Institute", *The Middle East Journal*, 53:3, 364+.
- Long, D. E., 2004. "US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and Future Prospects". *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15 (3), Summer, pp. 24-37.
- Meilahn, K.M., 2007. "Cultural Understanding within Context as a Tool for Countering Irregular Threats and as a Force for Peace". Center for Contemporary Conflict e-journal *Strategic Insights*, 6:2.
- Moore, J.K., 2001. "Destabilizing the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward Palestine, 1943-1949". J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, *Journal of Church and State* 43:1.
- Morgenthau, H., 1998. "Realism in International Politics". *Naval War College Review*, 51:1, pp. 16+.
- Neff, D. 1995. "Middle East History: it Happened in October, the Marginalization of U.S. Mideast Experts". *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, October-November. Available from: <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1095/9510080.htm> [Accessed 1 December 2007].
- Oest, K.J.N., 2007. "The End of Alliance Theory: a Literature Review of Realist Alliance Theory". Arbejdspapir, March, Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet.
- Oest, K.J.N., 2008. "Security, Profit, or Shadow of the Past: Explaining the Alliance Strategies of Micro States". Paper prepared for the panel 'Small State Strategy' at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, USA, March 26-29.
- Pereboom, M.L., 2006. "Trade and Economics as a Force in U.S. Foreign Relations", *eJournal USA: Foreign Policy Agenda*, April. Available from: usinfo.org/E-JOURNAL/EJ_ForEvents/pereboom.htm [Accessed 17 August 2009].
- Peterson, J.E., 2000. Chapter 2: Air Power and Empire in the Arabian Peninsula, *Defending Arabia*. On line edition available from: <http://www.JEPeterson.net> [Accessed 12 January 2008].
- Piccoli, W., 1999. "Alliance Theory: the Case of Turkey and Israel", *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute*, July-August, pp.3-80.
- Pollack, J., 2002. "Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002", *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*. September, 6: 3. Available from: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a7.html> [Accessed 5 November 2006].
- Pollack, J., 2003. "Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Saudi Arabia", *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*. December, 7:4 Available from: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a3.html> [Accessed 7 November 2006].

- Pustelnik, D. and Lucic, A., 2009. "American Relations with Saudi Arabia: An Assessment of Shifting Policies". *National Security and the Future* 1: 10
- Reiter, D., 1994. "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: the Weight of the Shadow of the Past". *World Politics*, July, 46: pp.490-526.
- Rosenberg, J., 1990. "What's the matter with realism?" *Review of International Studies*, 16: pp. 297-298.
- Ruggie, J.G., 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, Autumn, pp. 855-886.
- Schofield, R., 2011. "The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966-71." *Journal of Arabian Studies*, 1(1): 27-51.
- Schroeder, P., 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory". *International Security* Summer, 19: 108-148.
- Schweller, R.L., 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In". *International Security*, Summer, 19: 72-107
- Schweller, R.L., 1997. "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition". *American Political Science Review*, 91:4; 927-929.
- Schweller, R.L., 2001. "The Concept of Alliance" pp. 236- 262 in Funabashi, Y., ed., 2001. *Alliance Tomorrow: Security Arrangements After the Cold War*. Tokyo: Tokyo Foundation.
- Schweller, R.L., 2001. "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay". *International Security*, Summer (1) 26.
- Simon, R.S., 1974. "The Hashemite 'Conspiracy': Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (5): 314-327.
- Singer, J. D. and Small, M., 1966). "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: a Quantitative Description". *Journal of Peace Research*, 1: 1-32.
- Smith, A. 1996a. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly*, December, 39: 405-426.
- Smith, A., 1996b. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(March), 16-40.
- Snyder, J., 2004. "One world, rival theories". *Foreign Policy* No.145 pp.52-62 Available from: <<http://www.alanalexandroff.com/Snyder.html>> [10 October 2007].
- Sullivan, R.R., 1970. "Saudi Arabia in International Politics". *The Review of Politics* 32: 436-460.

Tertrais, B., 2004. "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances". Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly*, 27 (2), 135-150.

Tomashevskiy, A., 2008. "Balancing Power: an Empirical Test of Realist Theories of Alignment". *Journal of Political Inquiry*, Spring, 1: 1-14.

Tortola, P.D., 2005. "The Twenty Years' Crisis by Edward H. Carr", *Crossroads*, 5:1, pp.78-81.

Vitalis, R., 2002. "Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism, Hierarchy, and Hegemony in the Gulf," *Diplomatic History*, Spring, 26:2, pp. 185-213.

Vitalis, R., 2003. "1941-1946, Saudi Arabia: the Making of a U.S. Colony", *Press for Conversion*, May, 51: pp.4-5.

Walt, S.M., 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power". *International Security*, 9: 4, 3-43.

Walt, S.M., 1998. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Foreign Policy*, Spring, 10: pp.29-45. Available from: <<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/110/irelations.pdf>> [10 October 2007].

Waltz, K.N., 1990. "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory". *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring, 44: 21-37.

Waltz, K.N., 1993. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics". *International Security* 17 (Fall), 44-79.

Waltz, K.N., 1997. "Evaluating Theories". *American Political Science Review*, 91:4, 913-917.

Watts, L.L., 1998. "Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance Behavior in Wartime-Theoretical Assessment". *Euro Atlantic Studies*. Based on a Thesis-Dissertation *Forskningsrapport Umea Universitet Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen*.

Wendt, A., 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, 46:2, pp. 391-425.

Williams, M.C., 1993. "Neo-realism and the Future of Strategy". *Review of International Studies* 19: pp. 103-121.

Theses

Casillas, R.J., 1983. *Oil and diplomacy: the Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Saudi Arabia, 1933-1945*. Thesis (PhD), University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT.

Gold, I.J., 1984. *The United States and Saudi Arabia, 1933-1953: Post-imperial Diplomacy and the Legacy of British power*. Thesis (PhD), Columbia University, New York.

Humphreys, A.R.C., 2006. *Kenneth Waltz and the Limits of Explanatory Theory in International Relations*. Thesis (DPhil in International Relations). Balliol College, University of Oxford.

Nardulli, B.R., 2002. *Dance of Swords: U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia (1942-1964)*. Thesis (PhD), Graduate History Program, Ohio State University.

Sylvester, E., 2008. *The U.S.-Saudi Partnership: Is this Marriage Headed for Divorce?* Thesis (Masters in Security Studies), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California.

Turner, R.G., 2008. *Implications for the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a New Arms Race*. Thesis (Masters in Security Studies), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

U.S. Department of State: miscellaneous

United States Department of State, 2010. *Background Note: Israel*, December. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm> [Accessed 1 February 2009].

United States Department of State, 2009. *Background Note: Saudi Arabia*, January. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm> [Accessed 1 February 2009].

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Department History. Available from: [http://www. http://history.state.gov/departments/history/people](http://www.history.state.gov/departments/history/people) [Accessed 1 July 2010].

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones.

1945-1952 Kennan and Containment, 1947.

1945-1952, Truman Doctrine, 1947.

1945-1952, Creation of Israel, 1948.

1945-1952, Arab-Israeli War, 1948.

1945-1952, NSC-68, 1950.

1953-1956, Suez Crisis.

Available from: <http://www.history.state.gov/milestones/> [Accessed 1 July 2010].

Web articles on-line

Ahmed, M.M., 2006. *Saudi-United States Relations: Past, Present, and the Moment of Truth*. Available from: <http://www.sarab.fi/file/marhaba/2006/m06-s50.pdf> [Accessed 24 February 2012].

Al-Faisal, Prince Saud, 2004a. *Examining the Relationship*. Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-04-28.html> [Accessed 5 November 2006].

Al-Faisal, Prince Saud, 2004b. *The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Relationship Threatened By Misconceptions*. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Available from: <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6982> [Accessed 5 November 2006].

Al-Faisal, Prince Turki, 2006a. *A Look at Saudi-U.S. Relations*. Speech delivered at Brigham Young University, Salt Lake City, Utah, 11 January. Available from: <http://kenedy.byu.edu/events/docs/saud.pdf> [Accessed 1 November 2006].

Al-Faisal, Prince Turki, 2006b. *A Conversation with Prince Turki al-Faisal*. Council on Foreign Relations. Available from: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9860/conversation_with_prince_turki_alfaisal_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html [Accessed 5 November 2006].

Al-Kurdi, U., 2004. *A Strong Relationship is the Only Path*. Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations - A Strong Relationship is the Only Path -- Interview with Usamah Al-Kurdi.htm [Accessed 11 November 2006].

Al-Rasheed, M., 2007. "Saudi Arabia and the 1948 Palestine War: Beyond Official History". 30 October. Available from: <http://www.madawialrasheed.org/index.php/site/more/133/> [Accessed 12 January 2011].

Al-Saud, Prince Waleed bin Talal, 2005. "Holding the Kingdom is key to East-West understanding". *The New York Times*, 21 November. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/global/saudi-arabia/nine.html> [Accessed 2009 April 5].

A New Concord, 1957. "The Nation". *Time Magazine*, 18 February.

Bandow, D., 2002. *Dubious Alliance*. Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 428, 20 March. Available from: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1287 [Accessed 19 June 2010].

Brenner, W., 2005. 'Gods and Monsters: Realism, Secularism, and Progress in International Relations Theory after September 11', *Annual meeting of the International Studies Association*, 5 March. Available from: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71192_index.html [Accessed 4 April 2008].

Bronson, R. 2005a. *President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz - The Meeting at Great Bitter Lake*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2005/saudi-relations-interest-03-17.html> [5 November 2006].

Bronson, R., 2005b. *On Relations and Reforms: A Conversation with Rachel Bronson*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: <http://www.susris.com/2005/05/31/on-relations-and-reforms-a-conversation-with-rachel-bronson/> [Accessed 5 November 2006].

Bronson, R., 2006a. "5 Myths about U.S.-Saudi Relations". *The Washington Post*, 21 May, p.B04. Available from: http://www.cfr.org/publication/10728/5_myths_about_ussaudi_relations.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F413%2Fsaudi_arabia [Accessed 15 December 2006].

Bronson, R., 2007. *What Saudi Arabia Wants - Good Neighbors*, SUSRIS, 17 April. Available from: <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2007/ioi/070417-bronson-neighbors.html> [Accessed 30 April 2007].

Capet, A., 2007. Review of Williamson, D.C., 2006, *Separate Agendas: Churchill, Eisenhower, and Anglo-American Relations, 1953-1955*. H-Albion, 2007 January. Available from: <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=12722> [Accessed 23 August 2009].

Clifford, C. and Holbrooke, R., 2008. "President Truman's Decision to Recognize Israel", excerpts from "Showdown in the Oval Office", Chapter 1 of Clifford, C. and Holbrooke, R., 1991. *Counsel to the President: the Memoirs of Clark Clifford*. Jerusalem Viewpoints, *Institute for Contemporary Affairs*, May. Available from: <http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=376&PID=0&IID=2203> [Accessed 12 January 2011].

Cordesman, A.H., 2006. *Why Reforge the U.S. and Saudi Relationship?* Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations Interview Series -- Anthony Cordesman Why Reforge US-Saudi Relations.htm [12 November 2006].

Cordesman, A.H., 2007. 'Weapons of Mass Preservation', *The New York Times*, 16 August, Op-Ed section. Available from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/opinion/16cordesman.html> [17 August 2007]

Cox, M.L., 2007. *Back to the Future of Political Realism: In Conversation with Nicolas Guilhot*, Social Science Research Council. Available from: http://www.ssrc.org/features/political_realism100107/ [16 April 2008].

Denson, J.V., 2007. *FDR, Pearl Harbor, and the U.N.* Lew Rockwell.com, 27 July 2007. Available from: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig2/denson8.html> [Accessed 25 August 2009].

Eilts, H.F., 2001. "U.S.-Saudi Relations after the September 11 Debacle", *American Diplomacy*, 22 November, University of North Carolina. Available from: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_10-12/eilts_saudi/eilts_saudi.html [Accessed 3 November 2006].

Eland, I., 2002. *Saudi Arabia: Friend, Foe, or Neither?* Cato Institute. Available from: <http://www.cato.org/dailys/08-13-02.html> [4 November 2006].

Fawcett, L., 2009. Introduction: the Middle East and International Relations, 5 February. Available from: http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215539/fawcett_intro.pdf [Accessed 9 September 2009].

Ferguson, R.J., 2004. 'Morgenthau and Power Politics Among Nations'. *Essays in History, Politics and Culture*. Available from: <http://www.international-relations.com/History/Machiavelli.htm> [Accessed 24 March 2008].

Fiott, D., 2010. 'Carr's Quest: Escaping the Rules of International Relations'. 3rd ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin, Summer. Available from: <http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/869.pdf> [Accessed 13 September 2010].

Fowler, W., 2004. *U.S.-Saudi Relations: Attitudes and Perspectives*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations - Interview - Amb_ Wyche Fowler.htm [12 November 2006].

Freeman, C., 2004a. *Defining Interests and a Changing Relationship*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations - Interview - Defining Interests and a Changing Relationship - Amb_ Chas Freeman.htm [12 November 2006].

Freeman, C., 2004b. *U.S.-Saudi Relations: The Path Ahead*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations - Interview - Amb_ Chas Freeman - The Path Ahead for US-Saudi Relations.htm [12 November 2006].
Friedman, T., 2002. 'Tom's Journal', PBS *Newshour*, February 20. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/foreign_correspondence/jan-june02/friedman_2-20.html [3 November 2006].

Friedman, T., 2003. 'Theory of Everything', *New York Times*, 1 June. Available from: <http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0601-05.htm> [1 May 2007].

Gause, F.G. III, 2003. *The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of U.S. Relations with the Gulf States*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: <http://www.Saudi-American Forum - US Relations with the Gulf States - Saudi Arabia Relations Information.htm> [11 November 2006].

Gause, F.G., 2004. *How to Reform Saudi Arabia without Handing It to Extremists Part 1*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations Item of Interest How to Reform Saudi Arabia without Handing It to Extremists.htm [12 November 2006].

Gerges, F.A., 2001a. The Tragedy of Arab-American Relations. *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 September. Available from: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0918/p9s1-coop.html> [1 November 2006].

Gerges, F., 2001b. The Saudi Dilemma. *CNN on Line*, Newshour, 6 November. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec01/saudi2_11-6.html [Accessed 1 November 2006].

Gross, S., 2005. 'Some Common Ground for Liberals and Realists'. Associatedcontent.com. Available from: http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/15410/some_common_ground_for_liberals_and_pg6.html?cat=37 [Accessed 17 October 2009].

Guilhot, N., 2007a. 'Back to the Future of Political Realism: Questions for Nicolas Guilhot. Interview by Mary Lea Cox, Social Science Research Council, 1 October. Available from:

<http://www.ssrc.org/features/view/back-to-the-future-of-political-realism/> [Accessed 5 November 2007].

Guilhot, N., 2007b. Secularism, Realism, and International relations, 31 October. Available from: http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2007/10/31/secularism-realism-and-international-relations/ [Accessed 5 November 2007].

Hahn, P.L., 2006. The Suez Crisis: A Crisis That Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. U.S. Department of State, America.gov, 1 April. Available from: <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080522120851WRybakuH0.4956781.html> [Accessed 19 February 2009].

Hudson, M., 2004. *Imperial Over-Reach? How to Lose Friends and Alienate People in the Arab East*, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS). Available from: <http://www.Saudi Arabia-U_S_Relations - Michael Hudson - Imperial Over-Reach - US-Arab Relations.htm> [12 November 2006].

Isseroff, A., undated. "President Harry S. Truman and U.S. Support for Israeli Statehood". MidEastWeb for Coexistence R.A. Available from: http://www.mideastweb.org/us_supportforstate.htm [Accessed 12 January 2011].

Jones, T.C., 2006. "Reading America's Kingdom". *Qahwa Sada Book Forum*, December: *America's Kingdom* by Robert Vitalis. Available from: http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/qahwa_sada/2006/12/jones_americas_.html [Accessed 24 November 2007].

Keohane, R., 2004. *Theory and International Relations*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley March 9. Available from: <<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Keohane/keohane-con2.html>> [15 September 2007].

King Saud History, 2007-2008. *King Saud Official Website*. Available from: http://www.kingsaud.net/eng/king_saud_history/ [Accessed 12 December 2008].

Kreisler, H., Conversations with History. *Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley*. Available from: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/n.html> [Accessed 19 June 2008].

Laipson, E. & El-Hokayem, E., 2005. "Saudi Security: King Abdallah's Greatest Challenge", *Daily Star*. Available from: <<http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=256>> [Accessed 9 November 2006].

Lazazzero, J.A., 2008. The U.S.-Saudi Alliance: A Necessary Shift toward Peace. Wake Forest University. Available from: <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf> [Accessed 19 July 2010].

Lippman, T., 2003. *Forum on U.S.-Saudi relations*. Understanding the Middle East Club, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, 7 November. Available from: <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter/saudi-relations-interest-12-16.html> [Accessed 17 June 2010].

Lippman, T.W., 2008b. "Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East", A Conversation with Thomas Lippman, SUSRIS Interview. Available from: <http://www.susris.com/2008/09/15/arabian-knight-colonel-bill-eddy-usmc/> [Accessed 26 December 2010].

Long, D.E., 2003. 'Whither Saudi Arabia?' *SUSRIS*, 4 September. Available from: <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter/saudi-relations-interest-9-04.html> [Accessed 12 December 2006].

Makovsky, D., 2009. Neo-Conservatism vs. Realism: Applying Grand Theories to the Middle East. *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, MIT Security Studies Program Seminar. Available from: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_09fall/Makovsky.html [Accessed 17 July 2010].

Manea, E., 2005b. 'The Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', excerpts from *Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Yemen*. Available from: http://www.metransparent.com/old/texts/elham_manea/elham_manea_forign_policy_of_the_kingdom_of_saudi_arabia.htm [Accessed 12 January 2008].

Mearsheimer, J.J., 2002. *Through the Realist Lens*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. Available from: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Mearsheimer/mearsheimer-con2.html> [15 September 2007].

Neely, M., 2006. "The Suez Crisis". Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Available from: <http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/projects/suez/suez.html> [Accessed 26 June 2009].

Newsom, D.D., 2002. *Reflections of a Diplomat*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley June 13, 2002. <http://globetrotter-demo.berkeley.edu/people2/Newsom/newsom-con3.html> [15 September 2007].

Nye, J.S. Jr., 1998. *Theory and Practice in International Relation*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. Available from: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Nye/nye-con2.html> [15 September 2007].

Ottaway, D., 2009. "The U.S. and Saudi Arabia since the 1930s". *Footnotes*, The Newsletter of FPRI's Wachman Center, 14 (21) Available from: <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1421.200908.ottaway.ussaudi Arabia.html> [Accessed 11 July 2010].

Ottaway, D.B. & Kaiser, R.G., 2002. "Marriage of Convenience: The U.S.-Saudi Alliance after Sept. 11, Severe Tests Loom for Relationship", 12 February, *Washington Post*, p.A01. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60502->

2002Feb11?language=printer> [8 November 2006].

Palmer, M.A., 2003. *The Real Axis of Evil*, United States Secretary of State Open Forum. Available from: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_01-03/palmer_axis/palmer_axis.html> [3 November 2006].

Palmquist, M., 2008. The Inconvenient Alliance. *Miller-McCune*, August. Available from: <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-inconvenient-alliance-4304/> [Accessed 20 June 2010].

Peters, G. and Wooley, J.T., undated. "Harry S. Truman October 28, 1946: Message to the King of Saudi Arabia Concerning Palestine". The American Presidency Project. Available from: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1253> [Accessed 12 January 2011].

Puchala, D.J. 1994. *The History of the Future of International Relations*, Carnegie Council. Available from: <<http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/08/articles/395.html>> [7 July 2007].

Rosmaita, G.J., 1994. "Strange Menagerie: The Atlantic Charter as the Root of American Entanglement in Iran, & Its Influence Upon the Development of the Policy of Containment, 1941-1946" Available from: http://www.hicom.net/~oedipus/us_iran.html [Accessed 30 December 2010].

Roth, A., 2003. *U.S.-Saudi Relations Examined*. Dickinsonian Opinion Article, 12 December. Available from: <http://www.dickinson.edu/dickinsonian/detail.cfm?174> [Accessed 7 June 2010].

Seznec, J.F., 2005. "Business as usual: the Saudi-US Relationship", *The Harvard International Review Energy*, 26:4. Available from: <<http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1297>> [9 November 2006].

Siddique, A. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: U.S. Ties At Odds With Expanding Regional Role?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 14 August. Available from: <<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/8/cae6776e-aad3-420b-b13b-0a8dd674f44d.html>> [15 August 2007].

Teslik, L.H., 2008. *A Complicated Alliance*. Council for Foreign Relations (CFR), 16 May. Available from: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16255/complicated_alliance.html [Accessed 19 May 2008].

University of Pennsylvania 2006, *University of Pennsylvania Professor Re-Writes History of U.S. Saudi Relations*. Office of University Communications. Available from: <<http://www.upenn.edu/pennnews/article.php?id=1026&print=1>> [3 November 2006].

U.S.-Saudi Relations: Difficult Times Ahead? 2002, Global Security.org. Available from: <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/09/mil-020924-wwwwh2924.htm>> [18 November 2006].

United States Library of Congress, 2006, *Saudi Arabia Country Profile*. Available from:

<<http://www.saudi historical setting.htm>> [11 November 2006].

United States Whitehouse, 2009. About the White House Presidents. Whitehouse.gov. Available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/> [Accessed 13 February 2009].

Van Efferink, L., 2009. *International Relations, realism and liberalism - Gérard Dussouy Interview*. Exploring geopolitics.org. Available from: http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Dussouy_Gerard_International_Relations_Realist_Idealist_Schools_Liberalism_Constructivist_Approach_Pragmatic_Holism.html [Accessed 17 July, 2009].

Walt, S.M., 2005. *Balancing American Power in the Post-9/11 World*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley November 15, 2005. Available from: <<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Walt/walt-con0.html>> [15 September 2007].

Walt, S.M., 2008. *America needs realists, not William Kristol*. Stephen M. Walt: *Opinion*, 16 January. Available from: <<http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2008/01/16/realism/>> [17 January 2008].

Waltz, K.N., 2003. *Theory and International Relations*, Harry Kreisler Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley February 10, pp.3-7 Available from: <<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-con0.html>> [15 September 2007].

Wiener, A., 2006. "Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory: Puzzles and Promises", *Constitutionalism Webpapers ConWEB*, No 5.

Yaqub, S., 2004b. "Contesting Arabism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Arab Middle East, 1956-1959", Conference paper, Department of History, University of Chicago. Available from: <http://opus.macmillan.yale.edu/workpaper/pdfs/MESV3-9.pdf> [Accessed 12 January 2011].

Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project. "A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949, Attitude of American Government toward Palestine: Letter From President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, April 5, 1945". Available from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad161.asp#b1 [Accessed 12 January 2009].

Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project. "Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946". Available from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angch06.asp [Accessed 16 February 2010].

Zogby, J., 2002(b). *A Non-Story and the US-Saudi Relationship*. Aaiusa.org, 2 December. Available from: <http://www.aaiusa.org/washington-watch/1669/w120202> [Accessed 12 January 2007].

Zogby, J., 2004. *Threats to U.S.-Saudi Ties*. Saudi-American Forum (SAF). Available from: <http://www.Saudi-American Forum - Threats to US-Saudi Ties - Saudi Arabia Relations Information.htm> [Accessed 12 November 2006].

Zunes, S., 2003. "Time to Question the U.S. Role in Saudi Arabia". *Foreign Policy in Focus*. Available from: <http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305saudi.html> [Accessed 5 November 2006].

Zusman, L.K. and Helfand, N.S., 2004. "Mutual Security Act (1951) in *Major Acts of Congress*, Ed. Landsberg, B.K. Macmillan-Thomson Gale eNotes.com. 2006. Available from: <http://www.enotes.com/major-acts-congress/mutual-security-act> [Accessed 30 June 2010].